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HISTORY OF EUROPE

DURING

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

“ **BELLUM** maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint me scripturum ; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit : et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello ; odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus ; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt.”—Liv. lib.21.

HISTORY OF EUROPE

COMMENCEMENT OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

ADVOCATE.

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HISTORY OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

EXPEDITION TO EGYPT — CONCLUSION OF THE WAR. —
AUG. 1799 — OCT. 1801.

WHEN Napoleon quitted the Egyptian shores and the career of Asiatic glory, to follow his fortunes on the theatre of Europe, he left Kleber in the command of the army, and addressed to him a long letter, containing minute directions for the regulation of his conduct in all possible emergencies which might occur. As it was evident that the victory of the Nile had completely cut off all chance of maintaining a regular intercourse with France, and it was therefore more than probable that the Egyptian army would be compelled to capitulate, he distinctly authorised his successor to conclude a convention for the evacuation of Egypt, provided only that he received no succours or assistance from France during the following year, and the deaths by the plague should amount to above fifteen hundred persons. Immediately after being invested with the command, Kleber wrote a letter to the Directory, in which he gave the most desponding view of the situation of the army; asserted that it was reduced to half its former amount; was destitute of every thing, and in the lowest state of depression; that the manufactories of powder and arms had totally failed; that no resources existed to replace the stores which had

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1799.

1.
State of the
Egyptian
army when
left by Napo-
leon. Kleber's
desponding
views regard-
ing it.

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been expended; that General Buonaparte, so far from leaving any money behind him to maintain the troops, had bequeathed to them only a debt of twelve millions of francs (£480,000,) being more than a year's revenue of the province; that the soldiers were four millions (£160,000) in arrear of their pay; that the Mamelukes were dispersed, not destroyed; and that the Grand Vizier and Djazzar Pasha had arrived at Acre at the head of thirty thousand men. He concluded in these terms: "Such are, citizen directors, the circumstances under which General Buonaparte has laid upon me the enormous burden of the Army of the East. He saw the fatal crisis was approaching; your orders doubtless prevented him from attempting to surmount it. That the crisis was at hand is attested equally by his letters, his instructions, his negotiations. It is notorious to all the world, and unhappily as well known to our enemies as to the French in Egypt. In these circumstances, I think the best thing I can do is to continue the negotiations commenced by Buonaparte, even if this should lead to no other result than the gaining time.

1 Napoleon's
and Kleber's
letters, in
Dum. iv. 110,
125.

I have annexed the letter I have written to the Grand Vizier, sending him at the same time the duplicate of that of Buonaparte."¹*

Aug. 17,
1799.

* The letter which Napoleon had addressed to the Grand Vizier previous to his departure from the East, is one of the most characteristic of all his compositions. "Alas!" said he, "why are the Sublime Porte, and the French nation, after having been friends for so many years, now at war with each other? Your excellency cannot be ignorant that the French nation has ever been warmly attached to the Sublime Porte. Endowed as your excellency is with the most distinguished talents, it cannot have escaped your penetration, that the Austrians and Russians are united in a perpetual league against the Turkish empire, and that the French, on the other hand, have done every thing in their power to arrest their wicked designs. Your excellency knows that the Russians are the enemies of the Mussulman faith; and that the Emperor Paul, as Grand Master of Malta, has solemnly sworn enmity to the race of Osmanlis. The French, on the other hand, have abolished the Order of Malta, given liberty to the Mahometan prisoners detained in that fortress, and profess the same belief as themselves. 'That there is no God but the true God.' Is it not strange, then, that the Sublime Porte should declare war on the French, its real and sincere friends, and contract alliance with the Russians and Germans, its implacable enemies?

"As long as the French were of the sect of the Messiah they were the friends of the Sublime Porte; nevertheless that power declares war against them. This has arisen from the error into which the Courts of England and Russia have led the Turkish Divan. We had informed it by letter of our intended expedition into Arabia; but these Courts found means to interrupt and suppress our letters; and although I had proved to the Sublime Porte that the French Republic, far from wishing to deprive it of any part of its dominions, had not even the smallest intention of making war on it, his most Glorious Majesty, Sultan Selim, gave credit to the English, and with unaccountable precipitance declared war on the French, his ancient allies. Though informed of this war, I despatched an ambassador to avert it; but he was seized and thrown into prison, and I was obliged, in spite of myself, to cross the Desert and carry the war into Syria.

That this letter contained an exaggerated picture of the circumstances and sufferings of the army, is abundantly proved by the condition in which it was found by the English troops, when they landed at Alexandria eighteen months afterwards. In truth, Kleber wrote under a bitter feeling of irritation at Napoleon for having deserted the Egyptian army; and his letter is tinged by those gloomy colours in which all exiles, but in an especial manner the French, regard the country of their banishment. It fell into the hands of the English during its passage across the Mediterranean, and was by their Government forwarded to the First Consul after his accession to supreme authority; and it is not the least honourable trait in that great man's character, that he made allowance for the influence of the desponding feelings which he had so repeatedly witnessed in the Egyptian officers, and never sought to revenge upon his absent lieutenant the spiteful expressions which, in an official despatch to Government, he had used in reference to himself.¹

But although Kleber, under the influence of these gloomy views, addressed proposals of accommodation to the Grand Vizier, he made the most vigorous preparations to repel the attack with which he was threatened by the Ottoman army. The greater part of the French troops were stationed at El-Arish and the eastern frontier, to watch the motions of the Syrian host, while six thousand were scattered along the course of the Nile, from the cataracts to the ocean, to overawe the Mamelukes, and guard the sea-coast from Turkish invasion. Encouraged by the approach of the Grand Vizier's army, the indefa-

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1799.

2.

It falls into the hands of the English, who forward it to Napoleon.

¹ Dum. iv. 130, 131.
Jom. iv. 376.
Nap. in Month. ii. 215.

3.

Mourad Bey issues from the desert, and is defeated. Aug. 6, 1799.

" Though my army is as innumerable as the sands of the sea, full of courage; though I have fortresses and castles of prodigious strength; though I have no fear or apprehension of any sort; yet, out of commiseration to the human race, and, above all, from a desire to be reunited to the first and most faithful of our allies, the Sultan Selim, I now make known my disposition for peace. If you wish to have Egypt, tell me so. France never entertained an idea of taking it out of the hands of the Sublime Porte and swallowing it up. Give authority to your minister who is at Paris, or send some one to Egypt with full powers,

¹ the
a French colony; his unprovoked seizure of that country while at peace with the Ottoman empire, and his attempt which, but for the repulse at Acre, would in all probability have succeeded, of revolutionising the whole of Asia Minor, and mounting himself on the throne of Constantine.—See *the Original Letter in Ann. Reg.* 1800, 218, 219.

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1799.

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XXXIV.
1799.

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¹ Dum. iv. 130, 131.
Jom. iv. 376.
Nap. in Month. ii. 215.

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Under such a specious guise did Napoleon conceal his ambitious designs on the East; his resolution, so early formed and steadily adhered to, of making Egypt a French colony; his unprovoked seizure of that country while at peace with the Ottoman empire, and his attempt which, but for the repulse at Acre, would in all probability have succeeded, of revolutionising the whole of Asia Minor, and mounting himself on the throne of Constantine.—See the *Original Letter in Ann. Reg.* 1800, 218, 219.

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XXXIV.

1799.

Oct. 8.

¹ Jom. xiv.
377, 378.
Dum. iv. 151.
Berth. 198.

4.
Advance of
the Turkish
force. Defeat
of a detach-
ment at the
mouth of the
Nile. Nov. 1.

² Ann. Reg.
1799, 217.
Dum. iv. 132.
133. Jom.
xiii. 396, 397.

5.
Convention
of El-Arish.

tigable Mourad Bey again issued from the desert, at the head of two thousand Mamelukes; but he was attacked by Desaix, early in August, at Syout, and obliged to fall back. Following up his success, the French general mounted his infantry on dromedaries, and, at the head of a chosen band, pursued the Mameluke chief into his furthest recesses. The latter, conceiving he had only to deal with horsemen, charged the attacking column with great impetuosity; but the cavaliers instantly dismounted, placed their dromedaries in the centre, and formed a square, with the front rank kneeling, as at the battle of the Pyramids. The Mamelukes were received with the murderous rolling fire of Sultaun Kebir, and, after charging repeatedly on every side, they fled in disorder into the desert, and did not again appear on the theatre of Egyptian warfare.¹

The Turkish army which Napoleon destroyed at Aboukir, was but the advanced guard of the vast force which the Sublime Porte had collected to recover Egypt from the Republican arms. Their main body, consisting of twenty thousand Janizaries and regular soldiers, and twenty-five thousand irregular troops, arrived in the end of October in the neighbourhood of Gazah, on the confines of the desert which separates Syria from Egypt. At the same time a corps of eight thousand Janizaries, under the convoy of Sir Sidney Smith, made their appearance at the mouth of the Nile, to effect a diversion in that quarter. The leading division, consisting of four thousand men, landed, and soon became masters of the tower of Bogaz, at the entrance of one of its branches, where they immediately began to fortify themselves; but before their works had made any progress, they were attacked by General Verdier, at the head of a thousand French, routed, and driven into the sea, with the loss of five pieces of cannon, and all their standards.²

Relieved by this decisive victory from all apprehensions in that quarter, Kleber turned his whole attention to the great array which was approaching from the Syrian desert. The check at the mouth of the Nile rendered the Grand Vizier more disposed to enter into negotiations, while the declining numbers and desponding spirits of the French rendered them desirous on any terms to extricate

themselves from a hopeless banishment, and revisit their beloved country. Napoleon had made propositions for an accommodation so early as 17th August; and Sir Sidney Smith had warned Kleber that, in virtue of the treaty, 5th January, 1799, Turkey could no longer make peace with France, except in concert with Russia and Great Britain. An unexpected reverse facilitated the negotiations; the Grand Vizier having crossed the desert laid siege to El-Arish. The operations were conducted by Major Douglas and other British officers, and the fort was carried, during a tumult of insubordination on the part of the garrison, on the 29th December. After their means of defence were exhausted, the garrison capitulated; but the terms were disregarded by the unruly crowd of Mussulmans, and in spite of the utmost efforts of the British officers, above three hundred French were put to the sword. The capture of this stronghold, which Napoleon termed one of the keys of Egypt, and the proof it afforded of the degree to which the spirit of the troops had been shaken, had a powerful effect in accelerating the negotiations; and a convention was signed at El-Arish about a month afterwards, by which it was stipulated, that the French army should return to Europe with its arms and baggage, on board its own vessels, or those furnished by the Turkish authorities; that all the fortresses of Egypt, with the exception of Alexandria, Rosetta, and Aboukir, where the army was to embark, should be surrendered within forty-five days; that the prisoners on both sides should be given up, and that the Grand Vizier should pay £120,000 during the three months that the evacuation was going forward.

This convention was not signed by the British admiral, Sir Sidney Smith; nor was he vested either with express authority to conclude such a treaty, nor with such a command as necessarily implied a power to do so. It was, however, entered into with his concurrence and approbation, and, like a man of honour, he felt himself as much bound to see it carried into effect as if his signature had been affixed to the instrument. But the British Government had, three months before, sent out orders to Lord Keith, commanding the English fleet in the Mediterranean, not to consent to any treaty in which it was not

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XXXIV.
1799.

Dec. 29

Jan. 24, 1800.

1 Jom. xiv.
402. Ann.
Reg. 1800,
219. State
Papers, 223.
Berth. 310,
313.

6.
The British
Government
had previously
prohibited such a
convention,
and hostilities
are in
consequence
renewed.

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1800.

¹ See Lord
Keith's letter
in Berthier,
391.

² Jom. xiv.
404, 405.
Dum. Iv. 136.
Berth. 392.

³ Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 590.

⁴ Jom. xii.
421.

stipulated that the French army were to be prisoners of war; and Lord Keith, on the 8th January, a fortnight before the convention of El-Arish was signed, had sent a letter from Minorca to Kleber, warning him that any vessels having on board French troops, returning home in virtue of a capitulation, other than an unconditional surrender, would be made prisoners of war.¹ No sooner was this letter received by General Kleber, in February following, than he was filled with indignation, despatched instant orders to put a stop to the evacuation of the country, which had commenced, and resolved to resume hostilities. In an animated proclamation to his troops, he declared: "Soldiers! we can only answer such insolence by victories—prepare to combat."² This announcement was received with loud shouts by the soldiers, who had already become highly dissatisfied at the humiliating convention which had been concluded, and they joyfully prepared to forget all their cares in the excitement of battle.*

* The continental historians of every description are loud in their abuse of the English Government for what they call its bad faith in refusing to ratify the convention of El-Arish. The smallest attention to dates must be sufficient to prove that these censures are totally destitute of foundation. The convention was signed at El-Arish on January 24th, 1800, and Lord Keith's letter, announcing that the British Government would agree to no capitulation, was dated Minorca, January 8th, 1800, or *sixteen days before the signature of the treaty*. This letter was founded on instructions sent out by the English Cabinet to Lord Keith, dated December 17th, in consequence of the intercepted letters of Kleber, which had fallen into their hands immediately after Napoleon's return. Kleber no sooner received Lord Keith's letter than he resumed hostilities, and fought the battle of Heliopolis with his wonted precipitance, without once reflecting on the fact, that the letter on which he founded so much, was written, not only long before intelligence of the treaty had reached England, but from Minorca, *sixteen days before the treaty itself was signed*. "No sooner, however," said Mr Pitt in his place in Parliament, "was it known in England that the French general had the faith of a British officer pledged to him, and was disposed to act upon it, than instructions were sent out to have the convention executed, though the officer in question had, in fact, no authority to sign it."³ Orders, accordingly, were sent out to execute the treaty, and they arrived in Egypt in May 1800, long after the battle of Heliopolis; and Kleber had consented to a renewal of the treaty, when it was interrupted by his assassination at Grand Cairo, on June 14, 1800.⁴ Sir Sidney Smith had no authority to agree to the convention, nor was he the commanding officer on the station, in whom that power necessarily resided, but a mere commodore in command of a ship of the line and two frigates, Lord Keith being the head of the squadron in the Mediterranean. This conduct, in agreeing, contrary to their obvious interests, to restore to France a powerful veteran army, irrecoverably separated from the Republic at the very time when it most stood in need of its assistance, in consequence of a convention acceded to, without authority, by a subordinate officer, is the strongest instance of the good faith of the English Cabinet; and affords a striking contrast to the conduct of Napoleon soon after, in refusing to ratify the armistice of Treviso, concluded with full powers by his general, Brune; a proceeding which the French historians mention, not only without disapprobation, but with manifest satisfaction.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 220, and *NAPOLÉON*, ii. 134.

Kleber drew up his army, which had now arrived from all parts of Egypt, and was twelve thousand strong, by moonlight, on the night of 19th March, in four squares, in the plain of Kδubbe, in front of the ruins of Heliopolis. The heavens, ever serene in those latitudes, and the bright rays of the Queen of Night, which poured through the unclouded vault, enabled them to perform the movement with precision, though the light was too feeble to permit the enemy to perceive what was going forward. In front were stationed the four squares, with the artillery at the angles, and the cavalry in the intervals. Companies of grenadiers doubled the corners of each square, and were ready to be employed either in resisting an attack or in offensive movements. Order, silence, and regularity, prevailed in the European army: the solemnity of the occasion had subdued the usual vivacity of the French character; they felt that the moment had arrived when they must either conquer or die. The Turks, on the other hand, were encamped, after the manner of Asiatics, in confused masses, in the neighbourhood of El-Hanka; six thousand Janizaries lay in the village of Matarieh, where they had thrown up some rude fortifications; their numerous cavalry, with the Mamelukes of Ibrahim Bey, extended on the right of that advanced guard as far as the banks of the Nile. Their whole force amounted to nearly fifty thousand men; but more than half of this array consisted of irregulars, upon whom little reliance was to be placed; and the situation of the regular corps in the village suggested the hope that they might be cut off before the remainder of the army could come up to their support.¹

For this purpose, General Friant advanced before day-break straight towards that village, while Regnier, with his division, moved forward in front of the ruins of Heliopolis, to cut off the communication between their detached corps and the bulk of the Turkish army. No sooner did the Janizaries perceive that the enemy were approaching their intrenchments, than they sallied forth with their redoubtable scimitars in their hands, and commenced a furious attack on the French squares. But Asiatic valour could effect nothing against European steadiness and discipline; the Ottomans were received in front by a

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7.
Position of
the two
armies before
the battle.
March 20,
1800.

¹ Berth. 399.
Dum. iv. 137.
Jom. xiii.
406.

8.
Battle of
Heliopolis

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murderous rolling fire, and charged at the same time, while disordered by their rush forward, in flank. In a few minutes they were mown down and destroyed, the ditches filled by their wounded fugitives, and over the breathing and bleeding mass the French grenadiers pressed on and scaled the works. Instantly the camp of the Janizaries was carried; cannon, ammunition, tents, all fell into the hands of the victors; and the small remnant who fled towards the main army were swept away by the fire of Friant's division, or cut down by the charges of the French cavalry.¹

¹ Berth. 399,
400. Jom.
xiii. 406, 407.
Dum. iv. 137,
138.

9.
Advance of
the Grand
Vizier.

The Grand Vizier no sooner saw his advanced guard destroyed, than he moved forward with his whole army to avenge their loss. The French were reposing after the fatigues of their first onset, when the rays of the newly risen sun were intercepted by a cloud of dust in the east. It was the Ottoman army, still forty thousand strong, which was approaching to trample under their horses' hoofs the diminutive band of Franks which had dared to await their charge. Immediately the French order of battle was formed; the troops were drawn up in squares, Friant on the left, Regnier on the right; the cannon advanced into the intervals between the masses; the cavalry remained close behind, ready to break through the moment a favourable opportunity occurred. The cannonade soon became extremely warm on both sides; but the balls of the Ottomans, ill directed, flew over the heads of the Republicans, while their artillery was rapidly dismounted by the well directed fire of their adversaries, and even the Grand Vizier's staff was melting away under the deadly tempest of shot. Torn to pieces by the hail-storm of bullets, the Osmanlis prepared for a general charge.²

² Berth. 400.
Dum. iv. 138.
Jom. xiii.
407.

10.
Terrible
charge of the
Turks, and
its defeat.

The concentration of their standards along their whole line gave the French warning that it was approaching; a cloud of dust filled the sky; the earth trembled as if shaken by an earthquake, and the roar of twenty thousand horsemen at full speed was enough to have struck terror into the most dauntless breasts. But nothing could break the firm array of the Republicans. As the enemy approached, they were received by a terrible discharge of grape-shot; their front rank almost all fell under the

fatal storm ; the rear wheeled about and fled, and in a few minutes the mighty array had disappeared, without a single musket having been fired by the French infantry. The Vizier rallied his troops, and brought them up again to the attack ; but they were unable to break those flaming citadels, from which a devouring fire issued on every side. Surrounded by an innumerable multitude, not one of the balls from the French squares fell without effect, and in a short time the carnage became intolerable, and the Ottomans fled in indescribable confusion towards the desert. Kleber, following up his success, advanced rapidly to El-Hanka ; the Turks fled the moment the French bayonets appeared ; the whole army pressed forward, and before nightfall they had made themselves masters of the Ottoman camp, and reposed in the splendid tents where the luxury of the East had displayed all its magnificence.¹

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While these important events were going forward in the plain of Heliopolis, the garrison of Cairo was reduced to the last extremity. Two thousand men had been left in that city, under the command of Generals Verdier and Zayoncheck, with orders, if a general insurrection broke out, to retire into the forts which had been constructed to overawe its turbulent population. A corps of Mamelukes and Turks was detached during the battle, and by a circuitous route reached Cairo, where it excited a revolt. The French were shut up in the forts, and it was only by a vigorous defence that they maintained themselves against the furious attacks of the Mussulmans. When the firing had ceased on the plain of Heliopolis, the sound of a distant cannonade, in the direction of Cairo, informed the victors of what was going forward at the capital. They instantly despatched a corps at midnight, which, traversing the desert by starlight, arrived in time to rescue the brave garrison from their perilous situation. Kleber at the same time pursued the broken army to Balbier, which surrendered, though strongly garrisoned, at the first summons ; and soon after, the Grand Vizier, abandoning all his artillery, baggage, and ammunition, retired across the desert, actively pursued by the Arabs, and his mighty host was speedily reduced to a slender train of followers.²

II.
Desperate
situation of
the garrison
at Cairo.

March 23.

¹ Berth. 400,
403. Jon.
xiii. 407, 408.
Dum. iv. 138.

² Berth. 403,
405. Jon.
xiii. 409,
410. Dum.
iv. 140, 142.

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12.

Storm and
massacre at
Boulak, and
defeat of the
Turks in
every quarter.

April 15.

April 18.

April 19.

¹ Berth. 413,
427. Jom.
xiii. 414, 415.
Dunn. iv. 141,
142.

13.
Improved
condition of
the French

The Turks, under Ibrahim Bey, who had been detached to Cairo, agreed to evacuate the town when they were informed of the result of the battle of Heliopolis ; but it was found impracticable to bring the insurgent population to terms of surrender, and it was necessary, at all hazards, to strike terror into the country by a sanguinary example near the capital. Boulak, a fortified suburb of Cairo, was surrounded, and the inhabitants having refused to capitulate, it was carried by storm, and every soul within the walls put to the sword. The French troops, who came back from the pursuit of the Grand Vizier, soon after surrounded the city of Cairo, and summoned it to surrender. A refusal having been returned, a severe bombardment and cannonade were kept up for some hours, until several practicable breaches were made, when a general assault took place. In vain the Mussulmans defended the walls with the courage which they have so often displayed in similar situations ; after a bloody contest the French entered on all sides, and a desperate struggle took place in the streets and houses, which was only terminated by the approach of night. On the following morning, however, the Turkish leaders, seeing their defences forced, and being apprehensive of meeting with the fate of Boulak, if the resistance was any longer continued, made offers of capitulation ; and Kleber, delighted at the prospect of terminating so bloody a strife, granted them favourable terms. Soon after, the division of the army which had entered Cairo took the route of the desert, escorted by the French troops, and the insurgents of the capital purchased their lives by consenting to an enormous contribution. At the same time the Turks who had landed in the Delta were driven into Damietta, where they surrendered to General Beliard ; and Mourad Bey, seeing all hope at an end, concluded an honourable convention with Kleber, in virtue of which he was permitted to retain the command of Upper Egypt. Within a month after the battle of Heliopolis, the crisis was entirely surmounted, and the French had quietly resumed possession of all their conquests.¹

This great victory completely re-established the French affairs on the banks of the Nile. The troops, recently so gloomy and depressed, returned to their quarters joyous

and triumphant; the stores and ammunition were repaired from the spoils of the defeated army; the booty obtained by the soldiers was immense, and from the contributions levied on the rebellious cities funds were obtained to clothe and equip the whole army anew. Cairo expiated its offence by a contribution of twelve million francs, or £480,000; the other towns paid in the same proportion, and from the money thus acquired means were obtained, not only to discharge all the arrears due to the troops, but to remount the cavalry and artillery, restore the hospitals, and replace all the other establishments requisite for the comfort of the soldiers. Such was the affluence which prevailed at headquarters, that Kleber was enabled to make his captives participate in his good fortune; and by promising half-pay to the Turks made prisoners at Aboukir and Heliopolis, recruited his army by a crowd of active horsemen, anxious to share in the fortunes of the victorious army. The Egyptians, confounded by the astonishing successes of the French, quietly resigned themselves to a fate which seemed inevitable, and their dominion was more firmly established than it had ever been since the disastrous expedition into Syria.¹

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¹ Berth. 427,
433. Jom.
xiii. 416, 417.
Dum. iv. 145,
146. Reg. 84.

It was in the midst of these pacific labours, and when he was just beginning to reap the fruits of his intrepidity and judicious conduct, that Kleber was cut off by an obscure assassin, named Souleyman. This fanatic was stimulated to the atrocious act by religious conviction, and the prospect of obtaining a sum of money to liberate his father, who was in confinement. He remained a month in Cairo, watching his opportunity, and at length concealed himself in a cistern in the garden of the palace which the general occupied, and, darting out upon him as he walked with an architect, stabbed him to the heart. The assassin was brought before a military commission, and ordered to be impaled alive; a shocking punishment, affixing dark disgrace to the French generals, which he endured with unshrinking fortitude for three days together, evincing alike in his examinations and his last moments a mixture of fanatical spirit and filial piety, which would be deemed incredible if it had not occurred in real life.²

14.
Assassination
of Kleber.

June 14,
1800.

² Sir Robert
Wilson's
Egyptian
Campaign,
184. Dum.
vi. 149.

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15.
Designs of
Kleber when
he fell.

The premature death of this distinguished general was a clap of thunder to the Egyptian army, and was attended with important effects upon the issue of the war. He had formed many important designs for the regulation of his colony, which, if they could have been carried into effect, might perhaps have long preserved that important acquisition to the French empire. It was his intention to have distributed the lands of the conquered country among his soldiers, after the manner of the Romans; to have enlisted the Greeks, Mamelukes, and Copts, extensively in his service; disciplined them after the Western fashion; and on the stock of a formidable European infantry, engrafted the fire and celerity of the Asiatic horse. These designs were calculated unquestionably to have formed a native force on the banks of the Nile, which might in time have rivalled that which England has brought to such perfection on the plains of Bengal; and the revenue of Egypt, under a regular government, would soon have been equal to the support of thirty or forty thousand auxiliary troops of that description;* but it is extremely doubtful whether, by these or any other measures, it would have been possible to have preserved this colony while England held Malta, and retained the command of the sea, if she were resolutely bent upon rescuing it from the hands of France. Nor has the result of the establishment of the French at a subsequent period in Algiers, warranted the belief that their genius is adapted for colonisation, or that any durable benefit either to themselves or others is to arise from their conquests in the East.¹

¹ *Jom.* xiii.
422. *Regn.*
85, 86.

16.
Menou takes
the command.

Upon Kleber's death, Menou, the governor of Cairo, and the oldest of the generals of division, assumed the command. Intoxicated with the prosperity of his situation, and carried away by the idea that he would succeed in amalgamating the French and Egyptians, so as to render them impervious to any foreign attacks, he declined all steps towards an accommodation, rejected the new overtures of the Grand Vizier to evacuate the country at the conclusion of a general peace, and

* The revenue obtained by Menou from Egypt, even after all the disasters of the war, amounted to twenty-one million francs, or £840,000. The present Pasha has raised it to £2,500,000.—See *REGNIER*, 122.

refused to listen to the proposals of Sir Sidney Smith, who was now empowered by his government to carry into effect the unauthorised convention of El-Arish. At the same time he exasperated the inhabitants by the imposition of additional imposts to meet the expenses of government, which had increased four hundred thousand francs (£16,000) a-month since the death of his predecessor, and vainly flattered himself that, by assuming the title of Abdallah, (the servant of God,) wearing the Oriental costume, and embracing the religion of Mahomet, which he publicly did, he would succeed in maintaining the country against the united hostility of the Turks and English.¹*

But the time was now approaching when the Republicans were to pay dear for their resolution to maintain themselves in Egypt, and that glorious train of military triumphs was to commence, which was destined

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¹ Dum. iv.
150, 151.
Regn. 93, 97.
Jom. xiv
312. Bign.
ii. 28.

17.
Preparations
for the Eng-
lish expedi-
tion, and
magnificent
conception of
the attack.

* The admission of the French themselves will show with whom the blame of resiling from the convention of El-Arish really rests. The convention was signed at El-Arish on January 24, 1800; and Lord Keith's letter, announcing that he could agree to no capitulation, was dated Minorca, *January 8th*, more than a fortnight before the convention was signed, founded on orders dated 15th December, 1799, from the British Government. Sir Sidney Smith, on the 21st February, 1800, stated, in a letter to General Kleber, that he had received such instructions as prevented him from acquiescing in the convention of El-Arish. He adds, "You will observe that the despatches I enclose are of old date (1st January,) written after orders transmitted from London, on the 15th or 17th December, evidently dictated by the idea that you were about to treat separately with the Turks, and to prevent the execution of any measure contrary to our treaty of alliance. But now that my Government is better informed, and that the convention is really ratified, I have not the slightest doubt that the restriction against the execution of the treaty will be removed before the arrival of the transports."² In this expectation of what he might expect from the probity of the English Cabinet, Sir Sidney was not mistaken; for Mr. Pitt stated in Parliament, that though they had previously resolved to agree to no treaty between the Turks and French, in which the latter did not surrender as prisoners of war, yet "the moment we found that a convention had been assented to by a British officer, though we disapproved of it, we sent orders to conform to it."³ Lord Keith communicated the *previous* orders he had received, not only to the Turks, but to the French on the same day; but the English did nothing to dissolve the treaty; the French broke the armistice, and the battle of Heliopolis was the consequence. These orders to ratify the treaty as soon as they had heard it had been assented to by an English officer, arrived in due time in Egypt, and were communicated by Sir Sidney Smith to General Menou. Let us hear his conduct from the mouth of General Regnier. "On the 9th Messidor (22d August) M. Wright, lieutenant on board the *Tiger*, arrived with a flag of truce from the desert, with despatches from the Grand Vizier and Sir Sidney Smith. He announced that England had given to him the authority necessary to carry into execution the treaty of El-Arish. He had presented himself at Alexandria, but was refused admittance, and he had come round by the desert. He had endeavoured to induce the troops to revolt against the generals who refused to lead them back to France. *He was sent back.*" And this is what the French called the British want of faith in refusing to ratify the treaty of El-Arish! and yet their declamations on this subject received frequent and able support from the Opposition in the English Parliament.—See *Parl. Debates*, xxxv. 595, 598, and 1436, 1438.

² Berth. 354,
355.

³ Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 596,
597.

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to throw into the shade the disasters of former years, and terminate in the final overthrow of Napoleon on the field of Waterloo. The English Government no sooner received intelligence of the resolution of Menou to decline the execution of the convention of El-Arish, than they put in motion all their resources to effect the expulsion of the French from the important settlement they had conquered. For this purpose their ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Elgin, received orders to use his utmost efforts to induce the Turks to make a grand exertion, in conjunction with the forces of Great Britain; the corps of Abercromby, so long condemned to hurtful inactivity in the Mediterranean, was to bear the brunt of the contest, and an English expedition from India received orders to ascend the Red Sea, cross the desert, descend by the waters of the Nile, and display the standards of Brama on the shores of Alexandria. So great and extensive a project had never been formed by any nation, ancient or modern; and it was not the least marvellous circumstance of this eventful period, that a remote province of the Roman empire should have assembled at the foot of the Pyramids the forces of Europe, Asia, and Africa, in one combined enterprise, and brought to the shores of the Nile tribes unknown to the arms of Cæsar and Alexander.¹

1. Wilson's
Egypt. 3.
Jom. xiv.
308.

18.
Formation of
the English
expedition.

Agreeably to this plan, the corps of SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, which had so long been tossed about by the winds in the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean sea, set sail from Malta on December 10th, and after a tedious voyage of six weeks, and remounting two hundred of its cavalry with Turkish horse, arrived at Marmarice in the Levant in the beginning of February. Eight thousand men, under Sir David Baird, were ready to embark at Bombay at the same time, and proceed by the Red Sea to Suez, while the army of the Grand Vizier, which had been reinforced since its late disasters, was to break up from Acre, and again cross the desert which separates Egypt from Syria. The project was magnificently conceived, but it presented almost insurmountable difficulties in the execution, and it was easy to perceive that the weight of the contest would fall upon Abercromby's forces. To combine an attack with success from various quarters, on an enemy in possession of a

central position from whence he can at pleasure crush the first who approaches, is at all times a difficult and hazardous operation. But what must it be, when the forces brought together for the enterprise are drawn from different quarters of the globe, and the tumultuary levies of Asia Minor are to be supported by the infantry of England proceeding up the Mediterranean, and the sable battalions of Hindostan wafted from the shores of India by the Red Sea ?¹

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1 Wilson,
4, 5. Ann.
Reg. 1801.
226. Jom.
xiv. 309.

The English army had long delayed the commencement of operations in Egypt, in order to await the re-organisation of the Turkish forces, and give time to the Grand Seignior to collect an armament of the promised strength on the Syrian side of the desert. But when the fleet approached the Levant, they learned that no reliance could be placed on any co-operation in that quarter. The Ottoman forces, notwithstanding the levies ordered in Asia Minor, did not yet amount to twelve thousand men, and they were all in the most wretched state of discipline and equipment. So completely had their spirit been broken by their recent disasters, that they anticipated with the utmost dread a renewal of the contest, and it was extremely doubtful whether they ever could be brought to face the French infantry. To complete their inefficiency, the plague had broken out in the camp, and rendered their co-operation a subject of dread rather than desire; a frightful epidemic, the bequest of the desolation produced by war, ravaged Palestine; the most violent discord raged between the Grand Vizier and the Pasha of Acre, and a reinforcement of ten thousand men, who had been collected at Aleppo to repair their losses, received a different destination, from the alarming rebellion of Oglou Pasha, one of the eastern satraps of the Turkish empire.²

19.
The whole
contest falls
on Aber-
cromby's
corps.

2 Wilson, 6.
Dum. iv. 154.
Regn. 146.

Deprived of all hope of co-operation in this quarter, and unable to rely on the distant and uncertain aid of the Red Sea expedition, Sir Ralph Abercromby perceived that the success of this great enterprise, on which the hopes of the nation had so long been set, and in which, in some measure, the fate of the war was involved, would depend on his own troops. Fortunately, he was of a character not to be intimidated by the prospect of danger,

20.
Sir Ralph
resolves to
make the
attack alone.
Feb. 23, 1801.

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and although the forces at his disposal were little more than half of those which it was ultimately proved were in the hands of his adversary, he gallantly resolved, alone and unaided, to make the attempt. Orders, therefore, were given to the fleet to weigh anchor; and although the weather was still very tempestuous, and the Greek pilots unanimously declared that it was impracticable to attempt a landing on the Egyptian coast till the equinoctial gales were over, the admiral stood out to sea, bearing with him a noble array of two hundred ships.¹*

¹ Wilson, 7.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 226.

21.
Arrival of the
expedition on
the coast of
Egypt, and
landing of the
troops.
March 1.

On the 1st March, the leading frigate made a signal for land, and on the following morning the whole fleet anchored in Aboukir Bay, precisely on the spot where Nelson's great victory had been gained three years before. The remains of that terrible strife were still visible; the Foudroyant chafed her cables against the L'Orient's wreck, and soon after fished up her anchor. A nobler sight could hardly be imagined; two hundred vessels covered the ocean almost as far as the eye could reach; the sand-hills of Egypt were already crowded with cannon and hostile troops; while every heart beat high with exultation at the prospect of soon measuring their strength with the enemy, and engaging in a contest on which the eyes of the whole world were fixed. The state of the weather for several days prevented the possibility

* The forces on board the fleet, and those to which they were opposed in Egypt, stood as follows:—

	English.		French.	
² Sir Ralph Aber- cromby's Return. Wilson, 270, 273.	Infantry,	15,463	Infantry,	23,690
	Cavalry,	472	Cavalry,	1,250
	Artillery,	578	Artillery,	1,100
		<hr/>	Dismounted Cavalry,	480
		16,513		
	Sick,	999		26,520
			Sick,	996
	Total,	17,512 ²	Total,	27,516 ³

³ Jom. xiv.
316.

There were 999 sick in the British army when it landed, and 996 in the French, so that this diminution left the relative forces of the two nations the same as before.

The French troops who capitulated at Cairo were . . . 13,672
And at Alexandria, 10,508

24,180

So that, supposing 4000 had been lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, during the campaign, the total force at its commencement must have been from 27,000 to 28,000 men. The force under Sir David Baird, which ultimately landed at Suez, was 5500 men, and as they could not be entirely neglected, and the French required to maintain garrisons in the interior, the active forces that could be relied on for immediate operations were nearly equal, and they proved exactly so in the decisive battle of Alexandria.—See JOMINI, xiv. 316.—SIR R. WILSON, 167, and REGNIER, p. 412—*Tableau*, No. 2.

of landing; but the wind having at length abated, the preparations were completed on the evening of the 7th, and on the morning of the 8th, at two o'clock, the first division, five thousand five hundred strong, assembled in the boats, one hundred and fifty in number, which were prepared to convey them to the shore. The clear heavens and unbroken silence of the night, the solemnity of the scene, the magnitude of the enterprise on which they were engaged, the dark outline of the troops and guns on the sand-hills in their front, the unknown dangers to which they were approaching, filled every mind with anxious suspense; and thousands of brave hearts then throbbed with emotion, who were yet destined to astonish Europe by their gallant bearing, when the hour of trial had come. But not a vestige of confusion or trepidation appeared in the conduct of the debarkation; silently the troops descended from their transports, and took the places assigned them in the boats; and not a sound was heard as they approached the coast, but the measured dip of thousands of oars in the water, incessantly urging towards the shore the flower of the British army.¹

The French on the heights were about two thousand strong, posted in a concave semicircle, about a mile in length, supported by twelve pieces of artillery on the one side, and the castle of Aboukir on the other. The boats remained for some time in the middle of the bay, menacing different points of the coast, and at length the whole being assembled, the signal was made to advance at nine o'clock. One hundred and fifty boats, each filled with fifty men, instantly moved forward with extraordinary rapidity, while the armed vessels, which covered their flanks, began to cannonade the batteries on shore. The French allowed them to approach within easy range, and then opened at once so heavy a fire that the water seemed literally to be ploughed up with shot, and the foam raised by it resembled a surf rolling over breakers. Silently the boats approached the tempest, the sailors standing up and rowing with uncommon vigour, the soldiers sitting silent and steady, with their arms in their hands, anxiously awaiting the moment to use them. When they reached the fire, several boats were sunk, and the loss among their crowded crews was very severe; but notwithstanding this

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March 8.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1804. 227.
Wils. 12, 13.
Jom. xiv. 322.

22.

Severe action
on the sand-
hills.

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the line pressed forward with such precision, that the prows of almost all the first division struck the sand at the same time. The troops instantly jumped out into the water, and rapidly advancing to the beach, formed before they could be charged by the enemy; the 42d, 23d, and 40th regiments rushed up the steep front of the heights with fixed bayonets, and carried them in the most gallant style; the guards followed, and though disordered for a moment by a charge of horse before their formation was completed, made good their ground, and drove back the enemy. Soon after the 54th and Royals landed just in time to defeat a column which was advancing through a hollow against the flank of the newly established line. A third division completed the debarkation, and then the French, despairing of the success of further resistance, retired on all sides. In an hour the whole division was established on the heights, though weakened by five hundred men killed and wounded; the enemy retired with the loss of three hundred, and left eight pieces of cannon in the hands of the victors.¹*

¹ Regn. 205, 209. Wils. 14, 15. Ann. Reg. 1801, 227, 228.

23.
And defeat
of the French
there.

This brilliant opening had the most important effects on the fate of the campaign. The gallant conduct of the troops, the splendid spectacle which their landing in presence of the enemy had afforded, the rapidity of their success in the sight of the whole fleet, filled both the soldiers and sailors with exultation, and already began to produce that confidence in their own prowess which in military affairs, as well as elsewhere in life, is not the least important element towards success. Sir Ralph hastened to profit by his good fortune, by disembarking the other divisions of the army, which was effected during the remainder of the day with the greatest expedition. Some uneasiness was at first experienced by the want of water, but Sir Sidney Smith soon relieved their anxiety by telling them that wherever date-trees grew water must be near; a piece of grateful information, which, like every other furnished by that enterprising officer, proved to be correct.²

² Wils. 17, 18. Ann. Reg. 1801, 228.

It is now ascertained, that if the English army had pushed vigorously on before the enemy had time to

* "This debarkation," said General Bertrand, "was admirable: in less than five or six minutes they presented 5500 men in battle array; it was like a movement on the opera stage; three such completed the landing of the army."—*LAS CASES*, i. 242.

recover from their consternation, they might have taken Alexandria with very little difficulty ; and had they been as well aware of their prowess as they have since become, they would probably have done so.¹ But they were then only novices in the military art, and naturally distrustful of themselves when opposed to the far-famed veterans of France. Abercromby, therefore, advanced with caution. His first care was to complete the disembarkation of the troops, cannon, and stores, a service of considerable difficulty and danger, from the tempestuous state of the weather, and which occupied the three following days. The castle of Aboukir was at the same time invested, and intrenchments thrown up round the camp. It then appeared how much reason the British had to congratulate themselves on the supineness of Menou in retaining his principal force at Cairo, when so formidable an enemy was establishing himself in his colony. Had he appeared with eighteen thousand men on the heights of Aboukir, the only point on the coast where a descent was practicable, the landing could never have been attempted, and even if effected, it would in all probability have terminated in disaster. The truth is, the French general, like all his contemporaries at that period, greatly underrated the British military forces, and he gladly heard of their debarkation, from a belief that they would soon become prisoners of war. Thus, while the English, from not being aware of their own strength, lost the opportunity of taking Alexandria in the outset of the campaign, the French, from an overweening confidence in theirs, reduced themselves, in the end, to the humiliation of the Caudine forks.²

The preparations being at length completed, the army moved forward, on the evening of the 12th, to Mandora tower, where they encamped in three lines. The enemy had by this time been considerably reinforced from Cairo and Rosetta, so that their force amounted to five thousand four hundred infantry, six hundred cavalry, and twenty-five pieces of cannon. Notwithstanding the smallness of their numbers, Generals Friant and Lanusse resolved to make good their ground against the invaders, trusting to their great superiority in cavalry, the strength of their position in front of an old Roman camp, and the facility of retiring to Alexandria in case of disaster. The English

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

24.
Cautious
measures of
the English
general.

1 Regn. 209.
Dum. iv. 157.

2 Dum. iv.
158. Wils.
18, 19. Jom.
xiv. 324, 325.

25.
Bloody en-
counter with
the French
vanguard.

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1801.

general advanced cautiously, at daybreak on the morning of the 13th, in three lines; the enemy's force was unknown, and it was in an especial manner necessary to take precaution against his decided superiority in horse. The first line, when it came within range of the French, was received with a heavy fire of grape and musketry, while a regiment of cavalry impetuously charged its flank; but both attacks were gallantly repulsed by the 90th and 92d regiments, and the advance of the second line soon compelled the Republicans to retreat. Then was the moment to have followed up their success, and by a rapid charge completed the defeat of the enemy, in which case Alexandria would probably have fallen an easy conquest; but the English were still ignorant of their own power, and the want of cavalry prevented them from taking the advantage which they might have derived from their victory.¹

¹ Regn. 215,
217. Wils.
20. Jom.
xiv. 327.

26.
Ultimate suc-
cess, but great
loss of the
British.

They contented themselves, therefore, with occupying the ground so easily won, and halted within cannon-shot of their second line of defence; and it was not till the enemy had established themselves on the heights in their rear, in front of Alexandria, that they again moved forward to the charge. They then advanced with admirable coolness, and in parade order, but in ordinary time only, as if at a review, under a murderous fire of cannon shot. The attack was not conducted with the vigour and rapidity necessary to ensure decisive success, nor was any attempt made to turn a position which his great superiority of numbers would have enabled the English general so easily to outflank. The consequence was, that the British sustained a loss double of that of their adversaries; * and though the second position was at length abandoned by the French, who withdrew the bulk of their forces within the walls of the town, yet this was done in perfect order, and without any loss of artillery; whereas, had Abercromby possessed the confidence in himself and his soldiers which subsequent triumphs gave to Wellington or Picton,² he would have carried the position of the

² Wils. 20, .
23. Regn.
215, 219.
Jom. xiv.
327, 328.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 229.

* The English lost 1200, the French 500 men in this affair. It is impossible to refuse a tribute of admiration to the skill of the generals and valour of the soldiers, which, with such inferior forces, enabled the Republicans, at so slight a cost, to inflict so serious a loss upon their adversaries.—See WILSON, 23; REGNEN, 217, 219; and *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 227.

enemy, by a combined attack in front and flank, in half an hour, and entered Alexandria along with their broken battalions.

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XXXIV.

1801.

The position now occupied by the British was by nature strong; the right was advanced before the rest of the line nearly a quarter of a mile, on high ground, and extended to the large and magnificent ruins of a Roman palace within fifty yards of the sea; their left rested on the lake Maadieh; the intervening space, about a mile in breadth, consisted of a succession of low sand-hills. In front of the position was a level sandy surface, which commenced before the left, and extended as far as the French lines; on this plain cavalry could act, but as they approached the British videttes, they found the ground strewed with large stones, the remains of Roman edifices which formerly had covered all that part of the shore. Gun-boats in the sea and the lake Maadeih, protected each flank; on the left, in front of the lines occupied by the troops, was a redoubt mounted by twelve pieces of cannon; two were placed on the ruins of the Roman palace, and in the centre slight works were thrown up to aid the fire of the musketry. In this position the British army, now reduced by sickness, the sword, and detachments to the rear, to eleven thousand five hundred men, with thirty-six pieces of cannon, awaited the attack of the enemy.¹

27.
Description
of the ground
now taken up
by the British
army.

¹ Wils. 24,
25, 30.
Regn. 220,
222. Jom.
xiv. 330.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 232.

The position of the French was still stronger. A high ridge of hills extended from the sea to the canals of Alexandria; along this elevated ground their troops were placed, with fort Cretin rising in deceitful grandeur in the centre, and fort Caffarelli in the rear of the left. Their generals were at first fearful that the advance of the English had cut off the dikes which formed their line of communication with Menou; but that commander discovered a circuitous route, by which he was enabled to reach Alexandria, and on the evening of the 19th, the whole disposable French troops, eleven thousand strong, including fourteen hundred cavalry, with forty-six pieces of cannon, were drawn up in this imposing position. Every thing conspired to recommend early and decisive operations; the ancient fame and tried prowess of the Egyptian army left no room for doubt that they would speedily drive the presumptuous islanders into the sea; ² while, by protracting operations, time would be

28.
Position of
the French.

² Wils. 25.
Jom. xiv.
329, 330.
Regn. 222,
223. Hard.
viii. 152.

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XXXIV.
—
1801.

29.
Interesting
recollections
connected
with the spot.

afforded for the Grand Vizier to cut off the garrisons on the frontier of Syria, and for the Indian army to menace their rear from the Red Sea.

The ground occupied by the two armies was singularly calculated to awaken the most interesting recollections. England and France were here to contend for the empire of the East in the cradle of ancient civilisation, on the spot where Pompey was slain to propitiate the victorious arms of Cæsar, and under the walls of the city which is destined to perpetuate to the latest generations the prophetic wisdom of Alexander. Every object which met the eye was fraught with historic renown. On the right of the French line rose Pompey's Pillar, on the left Cleopatra's Needle; in the distance were seen the mouldering walls and Eastern domes of Alexandria, while on the extreme horizon, stretching into the sea, appeared the far-famed tower of Pharos. The British, as well as their antagonists, felt the influence of the scene and the grandeur of the occasion; and these ancient rivals in military renown prepared to join in their first serious contest since the Revolution, with a bravery worthy of the cause in which they were engaged, and the animating scenes amid which they stood.¹

¹ Wils. 25.

30.
Battle of
Alexandria.
Repulse of
the French
on the right.

On the 20th, the castle of Aboukir, with its garrison of one hundred and ninety men, surrendered. On the morning of the 21st, the army was under arms at three o'clock, eagerly expecting the attack which the movements of the preceding evening had led them to anticipate. A gloomy mist covered the plain, through which every eye was painfully striving to pierce; every ear was straining to catch the smallest sound; the eastern horizon was anxiously regarded, but though the gray of the morning was perceptible, it seemed reluctant to break. Suddenly the report of a musket was heard, followed by two cannon shots on the left; the field-officers, thinking the attack was to commence there, were already galloping in that direction, when a sharp rattle broke out on the right, followed by loud shouts which too surely announced that the action had begun in good earnest in that quarter. In fact the enemy, under Lanusse, were advancing in great force against the Roman ruins, where the 58th and 23d regiments were placed. The English officers no sooner saw the glazed hats of the Republicans emerging through the mist, than they ordered a discharge,

and the troops poured in a fire by platoons, so heavy and well directed, that the French were compelled to swerve to the left, and in making this movement the brave Lanusse received a mortal wound.¹ His division was so disconcerted by this event, and by the fire of the English, which was kept up with uncommon vigour, both on their front and flank, that they broke and fled in confusion behind the sand-hills.

But at this instant General Rampon advanced at the head of a fresh column, two thousand strong, and, joining the broken remains of Lanusse's division, renewed the attack with greater force, and succeeded in turning the Roman ruins so as to take the troops who defended them both in front and flank. Menou supported this attack by a grand charge with all his cavalry on the right and right centre. No sooner did Sir Ralph perceive the cavalry advancing, than he moved up the 42d and 28th regiments from the second line to the support of the menaced wing, but soon after it arrived in the fire, the first of these corps was suddenly charged in flank by the Republican horse, and broken. Notwithstanding this, the brave Highlanders formed in little knots, and standing back to back, resisted the cavalry when they endeavoured to cut them down. The 28th regiment was maintaining a severe action in front, when they were startled by hearing French voices behind their line; the rear rank had just time to face about, when it was assailed by a volley from a regiment which had got round under cover of the mist; and these gallant troops, without flinching, stood back to back, and maintained this extraordinary contest for a considerable time. But this bold irruption of the French soon exposed them to the same dangers with which they had threatened the English. The British reserve advanced in admirable order, and threw in a close and well-directed fire upon the attacking column;² the Republicans, in their turn, were assailed at once in front and flank, and driven into the ruins, where a battalion which, by its great success in the Italian wars, had acquired the surname of the Invincibles, was obliged to lay down its arms, after having lost above two-thirds of its numbers.

The French cavalry also, having now lost half their numbers by the close and well-directed fire of the English

CHAP.
XXIV.
1801.

¹ Wilson, 31,
32. Ann.
Reg. 1801,
230. Regn.
226. Jom.
xiv. 334, 335.

31.
Rampon
restores the
combat on the
right. Des-
perate con-
flict between
the High-
landers and
Invincibles.

² Wils. 31,
33. Ann.
Reg. 1801,
230, 231.
Regn. 226,
227. Jom.
xiv. 334, 335.

32.
Defeat of the
French.

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XXXIV.
1801.

infantry, prepared to cut their way back to their own lines. For this purpose they charged the English reserve with the utmost fury ; but those steady men, with admirable coolness, opened their ranks so as to let the squadrons sweep through, and instantly closing them again, and wheeling about, threw in so deadly a volley upon the disordered horsemen, that they almost all, with their commander Roize, perished on the spot. The remnant, both foot and horse, of the force which had made this formidable attack, escaped in confusion from the scene of slaughter, and regained in dismay the French position. The defeat of this desperate attack terminated the important operations of this eventful day. On the left of the English position the operations of the Republicans were confined to a distant cannonade ; and a more serious attack on the centre was repulsed by the rapid and destructive fire of the English guards. At length Menou, finding that all his efforts had proved unsuccessful, ordered a general retreat, which was effected in the best order to the heights of Nicopolis in his rear, under cover of the cannon placed on that formidable position. The loss of the English amounted to fifteen hundred killed and wounded ; that of the French to above two thousand ; but this was of comparatively little importance. They had lost the character of invincibility ; the charm which had paralysed the world was broken ; and on the standards taken by the victors, they pointed with exultation to the names, “ Le Passage de la Scrivia, le Passage du Tagliamento, le Passage de l’Isonzo, la Prise de Gratz, le Pont de Lodi.”¹

¹ Wils. 33,
38. Regn.
228, 231.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 232.
Joni. xiv.
345, 337.
Hard. viii.
153, 154.

33.
Wound and
death of Sir
Ralph Aber-
cromby.

But this important triumph was mingled with one mournful recollection. Sir Ralph Abercromby, who had the glory of first leading the English to decisive victory over the arms of revolutionary France, received a mortal wound in the early part of the day, of which he died a few days afterwards. No sooner did that gallant veteran hear of the furious irruption of the French cavalry into the lines on the right, than he mounted his horse and galloped in that direction ; he arrived while it was yet dark, when almost unattended by his aides-de-camp, whom he had despatched in various directions, on the ground over which the cavalry were sweeping, and was assailed by the French dragoons, one of whom he dis-

armed in a personal conflict. Soon after, however, he received a wound from a musket-shot in the thigh, which compelled him to dismount, and make the best of his way on foot to the redoubt on the right of the guards, where he remained for the rest of the day, walking about, exposed to a terrible cannonade, insensible alike to the pain of his wound and the danger of his situation. With anxious hopes he watched the progress of the action, every part of which was visible from that elevated station, and had the satisfaction of seeing the French retire and the victory finally decided before the loss of blood began to darken his eyes. He lived till the morning of the 29th, expressing no solicitude but for the issue of the struggle; and bore a painful operation for the extraction of the ball with the greatest firmness. But it had penetrated so far, that it could not be reached by the skill of the surgeons, and he sank at length in the arms of glory, leaving a name enshrined in the grateful recollection of his country.¹

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XXXIV.
1801.

¹ Wils. 48.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 232.

The battle of Alexandria not only delivered Egypt from the Republican yoke; it decided, in its ultimate consequences, the fate of the civilised world. The importance of a triumph is not always to be measured by the number of troops engaged; twenty-four thousand Romans under Cæsar at Pharsalia, changed the face of antiquity; thirty-five thousand Greeks under Alexander subverted all the empires of the East; thirty thousand Republicans at Marengo seated Napoleon on the consular throne, and established a power which overturned nearly all the monarchies of Europe. The contest of twelve thousand British with an equal number of French, on the sands of Alexandria, in its remote effects overthrew a greater empire than that of Charlemagne, and rescued mankind from a more galling tyranny than that of the Roman emperors. It first elevated the hopes and confirmed the resolution of the English soldiers; it first broke the charm by which the continental nations had so long been enthralled; it first revived the military spirit of the English people, and awakened the pleasing hope, that the descendants of the victors at Cressy and Azincour had not degenerated from the valour of their fathers. Nothing but the recollection of this decisive trial of strength could have supported the British nation through the arduous conflict which awaited

34.
Immense
moral consequences of
this victory.

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

¹ Bour. iv.
299. D'Abr.
v. 302. Jom.
xiv. 336.

^{35.}
Its first effects
are not very
decisive.
Surrender of
Damietta.

April 19.
May 9.

² Ann. Reg.
1801, 233.
Jom. xiv.
338, 339.

them on the renewal of the war, and induced them to remain firm and unshaken amidst the successive prostration of every continental power, till the dawn of hope began to appear over the summit of the Pyrenees, and the eastern sky was reddened by the conflagration of Moscow. The continental nations, accustomed to the shock of vast armies, and to regard the English only as a naval power, attached little importance to the contest of such inconsiderable bodies of men on a distant shore; but the prophetic eye of Napoleon at once discerned the magnitude of its consequences, and he received the intelligence of the disaster at Alexandria with a degree of anguish equalled only by that experienced from the shock of Trafalgar.¹*

But though destined in its ultimate effects to produce these important consequences, the victory of Alexandria was not at first attended by results at all commensurate to the ardent anticipations of the British people. The movements of the English army were for long cautious and dilatory. But, though their operations were not brilliant, they were skilful, and ultimately produced the desired results. For some days after the battle they remained on the ground where they had so bravely combated, and the French occupied the heights of Nicopolis—both parties being busied in repairing their losses, and restoring the strength of their forces. At length, a reinforcement of six thousand Albanians having arrived in the bay of Aboukir, they were joined by a British detachment of a thousand men, and the combined forces approached Rosetta, situated on one of the mouths of the Nile.² On their approach, the French garrison retired to Damietta, leaving a hundred and fifty men in fort Julien, who, after a spirited resistance, surrendered on the 19th

* "I can with safety affirm," said Junot, "that Napoleon's design was to have made Egypt the point from which the thunderbolt was to issue which was to overwhelm the British empire. I can easily sympathise, therefore, with the cruel agony which he underwent when he pronounced these words, 'Junot, we have lost Egypt.'" The First Consul never let those around him know to what a degree he was afflicted by the stroke which he received from England on that occasion. Junot alone was fully acquainted with it; it was only to the eyes of those who had enjoyed his early intimacy that he raised the veil which concealed the anguish of his heart. Junot wept like a child when he recounted what the First Consul had said during the two hours that he was with him after he received intelligence of that disastrous event. "My projects and my dreams alike have been destroyed by England," said that great conqueror. — DUCHESS OF ARBANTES, v. 202, 203.

April. Shortly after the English army was reinforced by three thousand men, who landed at Aboukir in the beginning of May, and General Hutchinson, who had now succeeded to the command, resolved to commence offensive operations.

Meanwhile divisions, the natural result of such unwonted disasters, broke out among the French generals. General Regnier strongly urged the expedience of leaving garrisons only in Alexandria, Cairo, and other important points, and concentrating the mass of the troops at Ramanieh, in a situation either to fall upon the English army, if they should leave their lines to attack Rosetta or Alexandria, or to crush the Grand Vizier if he should attempt to cross the desert. But nothing could induce Menou to adopt any thing but half measures. He detached four thousand troops to relieve Rosetta, who arrived on the Nile too late to disengage that place, and retired to El-Aft, where they threw up intrenchments, and awaited the movements of the English; but he himself remained at Alexandria, obstinately persisting in the belief that the Grand Vizier would never cross the desert, that the English would not venture to quit their position, and that if he remained firm a little longer, they would again betake themselves to their vessels. Meanwhile General Hutchinson was rapidly circumscribing his limits at Alexandria; he cut the isthmus which separated the lake Maadieh from the dried bed of the lake Marcotis, and filled with the sea that monument of ancient industry, which in a great degree isolated Alexandria from the rest of Egypt; while the British flotilla ascended the Nile, and captured an important convoy descending that river for the use of its garrison. These disasters produced the greatest discouragement in the French army; the dissensions among the officers increased in vehemence, and General Regnier's language in particular became so menacing, that the commander-in-chief, apprehensive that he might, with the concurrence of the army, assume the command, had him arrested and sent back to France.¹*

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1801.

36.
Divisions
break out
among the
French gene-
rals, and in-
decisive mea-
sures of
Menou.

April 13.

¹ Journ. xiv.
339, 340.
Regn. 235.
252. Wils.
56.

* The characters of Menou and Regnier are thus given by Napoleon:—"Menou appeared to have all the qualities fitted for the command; he was learned, upright, and an excellent civil governor. He had become a Mussulman, which, how ridiculous soever, was agreeable to the natives of the

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XXXIV.

1801.

37.

General
Hutchinson
assumes the
command,
advances to-
ward Cairo,
and takes
Ramanieh.

May. 7.

The detachment of La Grange, with four thousand men, having reduced the garrison of Alexandria to little more than six thousand, General Hutchinson at length moved forward, with the main body of his forces, towards Ramanieh, in order to menace Cairo, and carry the war into the upper parts of Egypt. Four thousand British and six thousand Turks, in the first instance, advanced against the intrenched position of La Grange at El-Aft. On the approach of such considerable forces, the French general retired to the fortified position of Ramanieh, an important post on the Nile, from which the canal branches off which connects it with Alexandria, where he collected four thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and forty pieces of cannon. After a sharp skirmish, however, this position was abandoned, and the advance of Hutchinson having cut off their retreat to Alexandria, the Republicans were compelled to fall back upon Cairo, which they reached a few days afterwards. The capture of Ramanieh was an important step in the campaign, as it completely isolated the troops at Cairo from those at Alexandria, cut off the chief supplies from the latter city, and rendered all attempt at co-operation impossible between them. The fruits of this acquisition soon appeared in the capture of a convoy of four hundred men and six hundred camels, bound for Alexandria, which, in the pathless solitudes of the Desert, fell a prey to the activity and vigilance of the English cavalry.¹

¹ Jom. xiv.
339, 341.
Wils. 84, 96.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 234.

38.

General Bel-
liard is de-
feated near
Cairo.

- Meanwhile the Grand Vizier, encouraged by the unwonted intelligence of the defeat of the French forces, and relieved by the cessation of the plague in his army, one great cause of his weakness, mustered up courage to cross the desert, which separates Syria from Egypt, and in the middle of April drew near to the French fortified position on the frontiers of the former province, at the head of
- twelve thousand men. At his approach, the Republicans evacuated Salahieh and Balbeis, on the edge of the desert, and Damietta, at the mouth of one of the branches of the

country; a doubt hung over his military capacity, but none over his personal courage; he had acted well in La Vendée and at the assault of Alexandria. General Regnier was more habituated to war; but he wanted the chief quality in a general-in-chief; excellent when second in command, he was unfit to take the lead. His character was silent and solitary; having no knowledge of the means of electrifying, ruling, or guiding mankind."—NAP. in MONTH. i. 73, 74.

Nile, and drew back all their forces to Cairo. The arrival of La Grange with the troops of Ramanieh having increased the disposable force of General Belliard to ten thousand veterans, he moved forward at the head of six thousand chosen troops to El-Hanka, to meet the Turkish force. But the Mussulmans were now under very different direction from that which led them to destruction at Helopolis. Major Hope,* afterwards one of the most distinguished lieutenants of Wellington, was with the artillery, and Major Holloway directed all the movements of the Grand Vizier. These able officers brought up the Turkish artillery and infantry to the fight in a wood of date-trees, where the superiority of European discipline was not so decisive as in the open plain; while a skilful movement of the cavalry towards their rear threatened to cut off the enemy's retreat to Cairo. The consequence was, that after an indecisive action of five hours, Belliard retreated to the capital; a result so different from any which had yet attended their warfare with the Republicans, that it elevated immensely the spirits of the Ottomans, and, what was of still greater consequence, disposed them to resign themselves implicitly to the guidance of the British officers attached to their staff.¹

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XXXIV.
1801.

¹ *Jom.* xiv.
342, 343.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 235.
Wils. 110,
111.

This important advantage having thrown the enemy on all sides back into the capital, and the success of the Turks having proved that under proper guidance some reliance could be placed upon them in active operations, General Hutchinson resolved to advance immediately against Cairo, although the promised co-operation of the troops from the Red Sea could not be calculated upon, as, from the prevalence of contrary winds in that dangerous strait, they had been detained much beyond the appointed time. The English army invested that capital on the 20th May on the left, while the Grand Vizier did the same on the right bank of the Nile. The fortifications of the town, begun by Kleber, had been assiduously continued by Menou; but they were too extensive, stretching over a circumference of fourteen miles, to be adequately guarded by nine thousand men, to which the

39.
Cairo is invested, and its garrison capitulates.

May 20.

* Afterwards General Sir John Hope and Earl of Hopetoun, who commanded Wellington's left wing during the campaign in the south of France.

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

May 22.

¹ *Jom.* xiv.
345, 346.
Wils. 157,
265. *Ann.*
Reg. 1801,
236, 237.

40.
Advance of
Sir David
Baird's divi-
sion from the
Red Sea.

July 9.

² *Wils.* 171,
172. *Ann.*
Reg. 1801,
237.

effective part of the garrison was now reduced. Although, therefore, General Baird, with the Indian army, had not yet arrived, there could be no doubt that he would make his appearance in the rear if the siege were continued for any length of time. Impressed by these considerations, and fearful that by delay he might not obtain equally favourable terms, Belliard, on the day following, proposed a capitulation on the same conditions as had been agreed to the year before at El-Arish, viz. that the army should be conveyed to France within fifty days, with its arms, artillery, and baggage. This was immediately agreed to. The troops embarked on the Nile, in virtue of this capitulation, amounted to 13,672, besides the civil servants, and they left in the hands of the British 320 pieces of heavy cannon, besides the field pieces of the corps which they carried with them; an astonishing conquest to have been achieved by a European force of smaller amount, and a lasting monument to the importance of the triumph gained by the British arms on the sands of Alexandria.¹

Shortly after this capitulation was signed, the army of General Baird, six thousand four hundred strong, of whom 3600 were British and 2800 Sepoys, appeared on the banks of the Nile from India. They had sailed from Bombay in the end of December, but unfortunately the monsoon had set in before they arrived at the mouth of the Red Sea, which rendered it impossible for them to reach their original destination, which was Suez, in time to operate as a diversion to the British force when it first landed at the mouth of the Nile. After struggling hard with contrary winds for above two months, in the course of which two transports were lost, the expedition arrived at Cosseir, in Upper Egypt, in the beginning of July, and preparations were instantly made for crossing the desert which separates the Red Sea from Thebes. This passage is one hundred and forty miles long; and as it was the first instance recorded in history of a European army, with the artillery and encumbrances of modern warfare, crossing one of the Eastern deserts, it is in a peculiar manner worthy of observation.²

• The first detachment began its march from Cosseir, and in nine days it arrived at Kinneh on the Nile. The road

across the arid wilderness lies almost the whole way through a succession of ravines, winding amongst hills varying from five to fifteen hundred feet in height. These hills are very remarkable, rising often perpendicularly on either side of the valley, as if scarped by art, in other places rather broken and overhanging, as if they were the lofty banks of a mighty river, and the traveller traversing its dry and naked bed. Now you are quite land-locked; soon you open on lateral valleys, and see upon heights in their distance small square towers. Depots of provisions had been provided at the eight stations where the army halted, and wells dug by the Arabs, from which a tolerable supply of water was obtained, though in many places rather of a brackish quality. Not a dwelling was to be seen, and hardly any traces of vegetation were discovered along this dreary tract; nothing met the eye but bare and arid rocks in the mountains, and loose sand or hard gravel in the hollows. The sufferings of the soldiers from heat and thirst were very great; for though they marched only during the night, yet the atmosphere, heated to 115 degrees of Fahrenheit in the shade during the day, was at all times sultry and oppressive in the highest degree. It was soon found that it was impossible by drinking to allay the thirst, and that indulgence in that respect only augmented the desire; a little vinegar mixed with water proved the only effectual relief. Every where the cannon and ammunition wagons passed with facility over the hard surface, drawn by oxen brought from India. No words can describe the transports of the soldiers when at Rensch they first came in sight of the Nile, flowing in a full majestic stream in the green plain at their feet. The bonds of discipline were unavailing to prevent a tumultuous rush of men, horses, camels, and oxen, when they approached its banks, to plunge into the waves. With speechless delight the parched men and animals plunged their heads, arms, and bodies into the cool stream, and drew in long draughts of its delicious water.* At length by great efforts the army

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XXXIV.

1801.

41.

Their march
from Coaseir
to Thebes
across the
Desert.
July 29.

*——— “A ciascun giova
La chioma averne, non che 'l manto aspersa.
Chi bee ne' vetri, e chi negli elmi a prova:
Chi tien la man nella fresca onda immersa.
Chi se ne spruzza il volto e chi le temple,
Chi scaltro a miglior uso i vaal n'empie.”—*Ger. Lib. xiii. 77.*

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

¹ Scherer's
Egypt, 68,
69. Wils.
171, 173.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 237.

42.
General
Hutchinson
moves against
Menou at
Alexandria.

² Wils. 194,
200. Jom.
xiv. 850, 851.
Regn. 280,
284.

Aug. 17.

was assembled at Thebes with very little loss, considering the arduous service they had undergone. They there gazed with wonder at the avenues of sphinxes and the stately temples which are destined to transmit to the latest posterity the wonders of ancient Egypt, and, embarking on the Nile, fell down in boats in nine days, a distance of three hundred miles, to Grand Cairo, where they arrived on the 10th August. There, for the first time in the history of the world, the sable Hindoos from the banks of the Ganges, the swarthy Asiatics from the plains, of the Euphrates, and the blue-eyed English from the shores of the Thames, met in arms at the foot of the Pyramids.^{1*}

When Menou was informed of the capitulation of Cairo, he professed himself highly incensed at its conditions, and loudly proclaimed his resolution to bury himself under the ruins of Alexandria. He refused to take advantage, in consequence, of the proposal made to him to accede to the capitulation of the capital, and embark on the same terms for France. This determination was founded on intelligence he had received by the brig Lodi, which had eluded the vigilance of the English cruisers and penetrated into Alexandria, of the approach of Admiral Gantheaume, with seven sail of the line and five thousand men, accompanied by the most peremptory orders from the First Consul to hold out to the last extremity. Finding that the reduction of this last stronghold could only be effected by force, General Hutchinson, after the embarkation of General Belliard and his division, brought down the greater part of his troops from Cairo; and, in the beginning of August, commenced active operations, at the head of sixteen thousand men, against Alexandria. A flotilla was rapidly collected on the lake Mareotis, but to complete the investment of the place, it was necessary to reduce fort Marabon, situated on a tongue of land which unites the town to the opposite side of the lake, and the only inlet by which the garrison received supplies of provisions from the Arabs.² Four thousand men were embarked in the flotilla, and landed

* A singular incident occurred on this occasion. When the Sepoy regiments came to the monuments of ancient Egypt, they fell down and worshipped the images; another proof among the many which exist, of the common origin of these early nations. I have heard this curious fact from several officers who were present on the occasion.

near the fort on the 17th, while a feint was made of a general attack on the heights of Nicopolis by General Hutchinson.

These operations were completely successful ; the landing of the troops was effected with very little opposition : batteries were rapidly constructed, and so heavy a fire kept up, both by land and sea, that the fort was soon reduced to a heap of ruins ; and the garrison, consisting of a hundred and sixty men, was compelled to capitulate. At the same time, some of the advanced redoubts of the Republicans were carried on the heights near the sea ; and a column of six hundred men, detached by Menou to recover them, driven back by Colonel Spencer, at the head of seven companies of the 30th, with the most distinguished gallantry. In endeavouring to set fire to the English flotilla, the French burned their own schooners on the lake ; while the light vessels of the fleet boldly sailed into the harbour of Alexandria, and opened a cannonade upon the enemy's squadron in the inner port. On the following day General Coote followed up these successes ; and advancing along the isthmus beyond Marabon, opened his trenches in front against fort Le Turc, which was soon breached by a formidable artillery. These disasters at length wakened Menou from his dream of security ; he forgot his resolution to conquer or die, and consented to a capitulation, in virtue of which the French were to surrender Alexandria, with all its artillery, and be transported back to France, with their arms, baggage, and ten pieces of cannon only. It was agreed between the military commanders, that the collections of antiquities and drawings which had been made by the artists and learned men who accompanied the expedition should be surrendered to the British ; but as the French *savans* made the most vigorous remonstrances against such a condition, and threatened to destroy them rather than that they should fall into the hands of the victors, General Hutchinson, with a generous regard to the interests of science, and the feelings of these distinguished persons, agreed to depart from the stipulation, and allow those treasures of art to be forwarded to France. The sarcophagus of Alexander, now in the British Museum, was, however, retained by the British, and formed the glorious trophy of their memorable triumph.¹

CHAP.
XXIV.

1801.

43.

Progress of
the siege, and
surrender of
Menou.

Aug. 27.

Aug. 31.

¹ Ann. Reg.

1801, 238.

239. Wils.

194, 212.

Jom. xiv. 850.

853. Regn.

280, 288.

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

44.
Results of
this cam-
paign.1 Wils. 179,
216, 217.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 239.
Jom. xiv. 352,
353; Regn.
280, 289.

The military results of this conquest were very great. Three hundred and twelve pieces of cannon, chiefly brass, were found upon the works of Alexandria, besides seventy-seven on board the ships of war. No less than 195,000 pounds of powder, and 14,000 gun cartridges were taken in the magazines; while the soldiers taken were 10,011, independent of 500 sailors and 665 civil servants. The total troops who capitulated in the whole of Egypt were above 24,000, all tried veterans of France; an astonishing success to have been achieved by a British force which had hardly ever seen a shot fired, and even including those who came up from India six weeks after Cairo had surrendered, never amounted to the same numerical strength. ¹*

* The troops who capitulated at Cairo, exclusive of civil servants, were:—

2 Wilson,
179, 217.

At Alexandria	13,672
	10,528
	24,200 ²

which, supposing 4000 lost in the previous engagements, leaves a total of 28,000 men to oppose the British in Egypt, having at their command in heavy cannon and field-pieces above 700 guns. The amount of the force which the French had in this contest, is ascertained by the best possible evidence, that of an unwilling witness, perfectly acquainted with the facts, and never disposed to exaggerate the amount of his beaten troops. "In March 1801," says Napoleon, "the English disembarked an army of 18,000 men, without artillery or cavalry horses: it should have been destroyed. The army, vanquished after six months of false manoeuvres, was disembarked on the shores of Provence still 24,000 strong. When Napoleon quitted it, in the end of August 1799, it amounted in all to 28,500 men. As the British and Allied forces did not enter simultaneously into action, but, on the contrary, at an interval of several months from each other, the victory must have remained with the French if they had had a general of capacity at their head, who knew how to avail himself skilfully of the advantages of his central position."³ The British forces which came with Sir Ralph Abercromby were, 16,599
Landed in April, 3,000
Came with Sir David Baird, 5,919

3 Nap. in
Month, i. 80,
81, and ii.
216.4 Wilson,
270, 308.5 Wilson,
116.

Total British and Indian troops, 25,518⁴
The army of the Grand Vizier, which advanced against Cairo after the battle of Alexandria, was only 14,000 strong, and in such a state of disorganisation as to be capable of effecting very little in the field;⁵ and the corps which landed at Rosetta numbered only 6000 men, and effected very little against the enemy. When, therefore, it is recollected that the campaign was really concluded by the capitulation of General Belliard at Cairo on the 26th June, that the forces from the Red Sea only landed at Cosseir on the 8th July, and arrived at Cairo on the 10th August, and consequently that the contest was decided by 19,500 British against 28,000 French, having the advantage of a central position and possession of all the fortified places in the country, it must be admitted that modern history has few more glorious achievements to commemorate.

This being the first great disaster which the Republicans had sustained by land since the commencement of the Revolution, and it having fallen on so distinguished a portion of their army as that which had gone through the Italian and Egyptian campaigns, they have been indefatigable in their endeavours to under-rate the credit due to the English troops on the occasion; forgetting, that if the British acted feebly, what must the French have done, when, with such a superiority of force, they were compelled to capitulate. It is true, that the movements of Hutchinson after the battles of 21st March were slow and cautious; but

After the reduction of Alexandria, the greater part of the army, with General Hutchinson, returned to England, leaving twelve thousand men, including the Indian troops, to secure the country, until a general peace. The European officers and soldiers were much struck by the luxury of their comrades in the Indian service, and, accustomed to sleep on the bare sand, with no other covering than a tented canopy, beheld with astonishment the numerous retainers and sumptuous equipages which attested the magnificence of Asiatic warfare. But Sir David Baird soon showed that if his troops had adopted the pacific habits of the soldiers of Darius, they had not forgotten the martial qualities of those of Alexander, and their morning exercises in the camp of Alexandria exhibited a combination of activity and discipline never surpassed by the finest troops of the Western world.¹

The expulsion of the French from Egypt was followed by a piece of treachery on the part of the Ottomans, which, if not firmly resisted by the English commander, would have brought indelible disgrace on the British name. The Turkish Government, aware of the insecure tenure by which their authority in Egypt was held, as long as the Beys retained their ascendancy in the country, had secretly resolved upon extirpating them; and in order to carry this design into effect, seven of the chiefs

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

45.
Sir David Baird with half the army is left in Egypt.

¹ Wilson.
177. Ann.
Reg. 1801,
239.

46.
Attempted treachery of the Turks.

that they were not unreasonably so, is proved by the consideration that he had to advance with less than half his army against a force at Grand Cairo which amounted to 13,000 men, and could send 10,000 into the field, and that even after all he arrived at the scene of action, and concluded the capitulation of Cairo, six weeks before the arrival of the troops from the Red Sea, with no more than 4500 Europeans, and a disorderly rabble of 25,000 Turks, hardly provided with any battering train.² All the ingenuity of the French cannot get rid of the important fact, that, by Hutchinson's advance to Ramanieh, he separated their armies at Cairo and Alexandria from each other, and enabled him, with a force greatly inferior to the two taken together, to be superior to both at the point of attack; the surest test, as Napoleon justly observes, of a good general. The British officers, after Alexandria was taken, discovered that the works on the heights of Nicopolis, and, in particular, forts Cretin and Caffarelli, were in such a state that they could have opposed no effectual resistance to a vigorous attack, and they were thus led to regret that they had been induced by their imposing appearance to relinquish the active pursuit of their advantages before Menou's³ arrival on the 13th March;³ but if they had done so, and Alexandria had thereby fallen, it is doubtful whether the ultimate success of the expedition would not have been endangered; as it would have only deprived the enemy of 4000 men, and led to the concentration of the remainder, above 20,000 strong, in the central position at Cairo, from whence they might have destroyed either the Grand Vizier, Sir D. Baird, or General Hutchinson, as they successively approached the interior of Egypt, whereas, by the retention of Alexandria, that dispersion of force was occasioned, which ultimately proved fatal to them in the campaign.

² Wilson,
158.

³ Wilson,
212

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1801.

were invited to Alexandria, to hold a conference with the Capitan Pasha, by whom they were received with every demonstration of respect, and invited on board a British vessel. But when they got into the boats which were to convey them thither, they took fright, and desired to be returned ashore, and this having been refused, a struggle ensued, in the course of which three of the Beys were killed, and four wounded. This frightful violation of all public faith, though by no means unusual among Asiatic despots, excited the most lively indignation in the British army; General Hutchinson immediately put his troops under arms, and made such energetic remonstrances to the Capitan Pasha, that he was obliged to surrender up the four Beys who had been wounded, and the bodies of the slain, who were interred with military honours at Alexandria. This resolute conduct completely cleared the British from all imputation of having been accessory to the intended massacre, though it was far from allaying the indignant feelings of the English officers, many of whom openly declared that the Capitan Pasha should have been seized in the centre of his camp, and hung by the yard-arm of the frigate to which he intended to have conveyed the victims of his treachery.¹

¹ Wilson,
245. Ann.
Reg. 1801,
240. Dum.
iv. 173, 174.

47.
Change in the
government
of Egypt,
which falls to
the Turks.

When left to their own resources, however, the Mameluke chiefs were totally unable to maintain their former government in Egypt. Many of them had fallen in the contest with France; their redoubtable cavalry had perished; and out of the whole militia of the province scarcely two thousand could be mustered in arms, when the Europeans withdrew. They were compelled to relinquish, therefore, their old sovereignty on the banks of the Nile, and accept the offer of the Grand Seignior, to surrender on favourable terms the province into the hands of the Osmanlis. A pasha was established, who soon became the real sovereign of the country, and long contrived, by the regular payment of his tribute, to maintain himself undisturbed in his dominions. Under his able and undivided administration, order began to reappear out of chaos; life became comparatively secure, though excessive taxation was established, and the national resources were prodigiously augmented. By this means one singular and lasting consequence resulted from the French residence in

Egypt. The old anarchical tyranny of the Mamelukes was destroyed; a powerful government established on the banks of the Nile, which, in the end, crushed the Wahabees in Arabia, extended itself over Syria, as far as the defiles of Mount Taurus, and was only prevented, by the intervention of France and Russia, from utterly overturning the dominion of the Osmanlis. Thus every thing conspired to bring about the great Oriental Revolution of the nineteenth century. The power of the Turks, the chief bulwark of Mahometanism, was weakened alike by the victories of the French and the conquests of their opponents; and the Crescent, long triumphant in the East, was at length struck down, not less by the ultimate effects of the ambition of the Republicans, who ridiculed every species of devotion, than by the enthusiasm of the Moscovites, who sought an entrance to Paradise through the breach of Constantinople.

But neither of the victorious states foresaw those remote consequences, which as yet lay buried in the womb of fate; and the demonstrations of joy at the surrender of Alexandria were as ardent on the shores of the Bosphorus as the banks of the Thames. The cannon of the seraglio were fired, the city was splendidly illuminated, medals were struck to be distributed among the English who had served in Egypt, and a palace built for the British ambassador at Pera, as a lasting monument of the gratitude of the Ottoman empire. In London, the public thankfulness, if less noisy, was still more sincere. The people of England hailed this great achievement as a counterpoise to all the disasters of the war; as a humiliation of France on that element where it had been so long victorious, and a check to its ambition in that quarter where its hopes had been most sanguine; as the harbinger of those greater triumphs which would await them, if the enemy should carry into execution their long threatened invasion of the British islands. Under the influence of these sentiments the early disasters of the war were forgotten; the fears, the asperity of former times, were laid aside; and the people, satisfied with having redeemed their honour in military warfare by one great triumph, looked forward without anxiety to the cessation of the contest, in the firm belief that they

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1801.

48.
Extravagant
rejoicings in
Constanti-
nople and
London at
these events.

CHAP.
XXIV.

1801.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1801, 239.

49.

Great naval
exertions of
Napoleon to
preserve
Egypt.

Jan. 7.

March 20.

50.
Third un-
successful
attempt of
Napoleon for
the relief of
Egypt.
May 20.

could renew it without apprehension whenever the national safety required that it should be resumed.¹

Although the French were thus expelled from Egypt, it was not without the greatest efforts on the part of Napoleon to preserve so important an acquisition, that it eluded his grasp. By great exertions a squadron of seven ships of the line and five frigates, having on board six thousand men and vast supplies of all sorts, had been made ready for sea, and sailed from Brest in the beginning of January; it eluded the vigilance of two British squadrons which were detached in pursuit under Sir John Borlase Warren and Sir Richard Bickerton, passed the Straits of Gibraltar, and crept along the coast of Africa, almost to within sight of the Pharos of Alexandria. But there one of its frigates, the *Africaine*, was encountered and captured by the English frigate *Phœbe*, of equal force; and the admiral, discouraged by this disaster, and alarmed at the accounts he received of the strength of Lord Keith's squadron off the coast of Egypt, which, united to that of Bickerton, now amounted to seventeen sail of the line, renounced his enterprise, and returned to Toulon. One of his frigates, however, the *Régénéré*, passed, under false colours, through the British fleet, and made its way into Alexandria: and this the First Consul considered as decisive evidence that the whole, if directed with equal skill, might have reached the same destination. Gantheaume, therefore, received positive orders to put again to sea, and at all hazards to attempt the relief of Egypt. He set sail accordingly on the 20th March, avoided Sir John Borlase Warren's squadron, which he met off Sardinia, and continued his route towards the coast of Africa; but Warren instantly made sail in the same direction, and arrived off Alexandria on the 23d April. No sooner was the French admiral informed of this than he again turned about, and regained Toulon without any disaster.

Irritated beyond measure by these repeated failures, Napoleon transmitted peremptory orders to the admiral to put to sea a third time, and endeavour, at all hazards, to convey the reinforcements he had on board into Alexandria. He set sail accordingly on the 20th May, threw succours in passing to the Republican force besieging

Porto Ferrai in the isle of Elba ; increased his squadron by three frigates prepared for him by General Soult at Brundisium, and arrived in sight of the coast of Egypt, for the third time, on the 8th June. One of his brigs, the *Heliopolis*, reached Alexandria on the day following ; but when Gantheaume was making preparations for landing the troops on the sands to the westward of that town, his look-out frigates made signals that the English fleet, consisting of forty sail, of which eighteen were of the line, was approaching. It was no longer possible to effect the object of the expedition ; in a few hours longer the squadron would be enveloped in the enemy's fleet, and the landing of the troops on the desert shore without stores or provisions, would expose them to certain destruction. Gantheaume, therefore, refused to accede to the wishes of the officers of the army, who were desirous to incur that perilous alternative, and made sail again for the coast of France. On his route homewards he fell in with the *Swiftsure*, of seventy-four guns, which Captain Hallowell defended long with his accustomed gallantry ; but he was at length obliged to surrender to the vast superiority of the Republican force, and with this trophy the admiral regained the harbour of Toulon. The French journals, long accustomed to continued disasters at sea, celebrated this gleam of success as a memorable triumph, and loudly boasted of the skill with which their fleet had traversed the Mediterranean and avoided the English squadrons ; "a melancholy reflection," says the historian of Napoleon, "for a country and its admirals, when skill in avoiding a combat is held equivalent to a victory."¹

This effort, however, was not the only one made by the First Consul for the relief of Egypt. His design was to support Gantheaume by a combined squadron of fifteen ships of the line, drawn from the harbours of France and Spain. For this purpose great efforts had been made by the Spanish marine ; six ships of the line at Cadiz had been placed under the orders of the French admiral, Dumanoir ; and six others had reached that harbour from Ferrol, while the English blockading squadrons, under Sir John Borlase Warren and Sir Richard Bickerton, had left their stations off these harbours in search of Admiral

CHAP.
XXIV.
1801.

June 24.

¹ Bign. ii. 34,
36. Jom.
xiv. 363, 365.
Dum. vii.
108, 112.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 248.

^{51.}
Naval action
in the bay of
Algésiras.

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1801.

June 13.

¹ James, iii.
164, 168.
Dum. vii.
118, 120.
Jom. xiv.
366.

52.
In which the
British are
worsted.
July 6.

Gantheaume; and Admiral Linois, with three ships of the line, was to join them from Toulon. The British Government, justly alarmed at such a concentration of force in the isle of Leon, hastily despatched Sir James Saumarez with seven ships of the line and two frigates, to resume the blockade of Cadiz; and he had hardly arrived off the harbour's mouth, when advices were received that Admiral Linois, with three ships of the line and one frigate, was approaching from the Mediterranean. No sooner did the French admiral find that the blockade of Cadiz had been re-established by a force superior to his own, than he abandoned all hope of effecting the prescribed junction, and fell back to Algesiraz bay, where he took shelter under the powerful batteries which defend its coasts. Thither he was followed by Sir James Saumarez, whose squadron was now reduced to six ships of the line by the detachment of one of his vessels to the mouth of the Guadalquivir; and the British admiral resolved upon an immediate attack, notwithstanding that the forts and batteries and gun-boats, now manned by gunners from the French ships, presented the most formidable appearance.¹

The British fleet stood into the bay, led by Captain Hood in the Venerable, with springs on their cables, and in a short time the action began. The Audacious and Pompey successively approaching, gallantly took their stations alongside of the French vessels, between them and the batteries on shore. The wind, however, fell shortly after the leading ships got into action, so as to prevent the remainder of the squadron from advancing to their support; and when at length a light breeze from the south enabled the Hannibal to work into the scene of danger, she grounded in such a situation as to be exposed to the shot of the French squadron on one side, and of the formidable batteries of Almirante and St. Jago on the other, while fourteen gun-boats, securely posted under her stern, kept up with great vigour a destructive raking fire, to which no return could be made. To complete the disaster, the wind totally failed soon after, so as to render it impossible for the other vessels, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, to render any effectual assistance; and the boats, which had been destined to storm the batteries on the islands,

were all required to tow the line-of-battle ships which were still afloat, so as to bring their broadsides to bear upon the enemy. After several gallant attempts, therefore, on the part of Sir James Saumarez and his squadron, to throw themselves between the batteries and the grounded vessel, they were compelled to draw off, leaving her to her fate, and after an honourable resistance, she struck her colours.¹

The loss of the British in killed and wounded in this action was 361, that on the part of the French and Spaniards, 586; but the unwonted occurrence of the retreat of the former, and the capture of one of their line-of-battle ships, diffused the most extraordinary joy throughout France, in which the First Consul warmly participated.* It was publicly announced at the theatres, and in the gazette published on the occasion, that three French sail of the line had completely defeated six British, and captured one of their number, without the slightest mention of the batteries on shore, to which the Spanish official account, with more justice, ascribed the failure of the attack.† But these transports were of short duration, and an awful catastrophe was destined to close the naval strife between the two nations. After the battle, the English fleet repaired to Gibraltar, and the utmost efforts were made, night and day, to get the squadron again ready for sea. But it was found that the Pompey was so much damaged that she could not be set afloat in time, and therefore her crew were distributed

**CHAP.
XXXIV.**

1801.

¹ James, iii.
164, 172.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 249.
Dum. vii.
118, 121.
Jom. xiv.
366, 368.

53.
Great rejoicings in
France at
this event.

* "The First Consul," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "recounted this triumph to us with the most lively satisfaction, with eyes literally overflowing with joy at this unlooked-for event. Naval victories were rare at that period, and Napoleon felt the full satisfaction arising from this one. Admiral Linois received the sole recompense which it was in his power at that period to bestow, a sabre of honour. All those who have narrowly studied the character of Napoleon, must have seen that the ruling passion of his great mind was the humbling of England. It was his constant object of study; and I can safely affirm that, during the fourteen years that he held the reins of power, during which I certainly saw him very frequently, he was constantly set upon that object, and passionately desirous of the glory which it would produce. He constantly thought that he could give France the means of combating that power on equal terms, and subduing it; all his measures tended towards that end."—D'ABRANTES, v. 254, 256.

† "The action," says the Madrid Gazette extraordinary, "was very obstinate and bloody on both sides, and likewise on the part of our batteries, which decided the fate of the day. It is to the hot and sustained fire of fort St. Jago that we owe the capture of the English ship, for her bold manœuvre of attempting to pass between the French admiral's ship and the shore made her ground, and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions to get her afloat, it was found impossible, and the fire of the batteries very soon compelled her to strike."—See JAMES, iii. 173.

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

1 James, iii.
179, 181.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 252.
Jom. xiv.
369. Dum.
vii. 128.

54.
The British
squadron sets
sail from
Gibraltar.

2 Brenton, ii.
39. James,
iii. 180.

55.
Second battle
of Algesiraz,
and terrible
catastrophe
in the
Spanish fleet.

through the other vessels, and on the morning of the 12th July, the fleet stood out to sea to avenge the affront they had received. Meanwhile, the Spanish squadron at Cadiz, consisting of six ships of the line and three frigates, two of the former bearing 112 guns each, had joined the shattered French fleet in Algesiraz bay, and the combined force was moving towards the isle of Leon, at the time that the English squadron, consisting of five ships of the line and one frigate, was working out of the harbour of Gibraltar.¹

Nothing in war could be conceived more animating than the circumstances under which the British fleet then set forth to redeem the honour of their flag. The combined squadron, consisting of nine ships of the line and four frigates, was proudly and leisurely moving towards Cadiz, with all sails set and a favourable wind, bearing with them their prize, the Hannibal, which they had contrived to get afloat, in tow of the Indienne frigate; the anxiety of the sailors to rescue her from their hands was indescribable; the day was clear, the rock covered with spectators, and loud shouts hailed every successive British vessel which cleared the pier-head of Gibraltar to proceed on the perilous service. The mole, the quays, the batteries, the cliffs, were crowded with anxious multitudes, eager to witness the approaching conflict; the band of the Admiral's ship, the Cæsar, played the popular air, "Come, cheer up, my lads, 'tis to glory we steer," while the military bands of the garrison made the rock re-echo with the notes of "Britons, strike home!" So thrilling was the interest of the scene, so overpowering the feelings which it excited, that the foreigners who witnessed it wished they had been Englishmen; and even the wounded begged to be taken on board to share in the honours of the approaching conflict.²

It was in truth a proud sight for the English garrison to behold their fleet, of five ships of the line, only ten days after a bloody encounter, again put to sea to give chase to an enemy's squadron of nine line-of-battle ships, six of which were perfectly uninjured, and which contained two three-deckers of stupendous magnitude. The Hannibal soon fell astern, and with the frigate which had her in tow, returned to Algesiraz; but the remainder of the squadron cleared Cabritta point, and stood away, as

darkness set in, with all sail towards Cadiz. At ten at night, a fresh breeze filled the sails of the English fleet; they gained rapidly on the enemy, and Sir James gave orders that they should engage the first vessels which they could overtake. At eleven, the leading ship, the *Superb*, opened its fire upon the *Real Carlos*, of 112 guns. The first broadside, which was wholly unexpected, from the approach of the English vessel not being perceived in the dark, brought down part of the masts and rigging of the *Real Carlos*, which fell athwart the bows of the *Superb*; and the next set the sails thus lying across, which had been recently tarred, on fire: the flames, fanned by the tempestuous gale, spread with frightful rapidity, and the remaining masts and rigging were in a few minutes in a blaze. Deeming this gigantic adversary so far disabled, that she must fall into the hands of the remainder of the fleet as they came up, the *Superb* passed on, and in half an hour overtook and engaged the *St. Antoine*, of 74 guns, which soon struck her colours. The *Cæsar* and *Venerable* came up in succession, and the chase was continued all night, in the midst of a tempestuous gale, by the light of the discharges which at intervals flashed through the gloom, and the awful conflagration of the burning ship, which gleamed upon the waves for miles around.¹ But while the sailors were making the greatest efforts, and constantly nearing the enemy, a terrible catastrophe occurred, which for a moment daunted the stoutest hearts. The *Superb*, after having disabled the *Real Carlos* on her starboard, passed on, poured a broadside on the larboard into the *San Hermenegildo*, also of 112 guns, and soon outstripped both her first-rate antagonists. In the darkness of the night these two Spanish ships, mutually mistaking each other for an enemy, were involved in a mortal combat; the violence of the wind spread the flames from the one to the other, the heavens were illuminated by the awful conflagration, and at midnight they both blew up with an explosion so tremendous as to shake Cadiz to its foundations, and spread a thrill of horror through every soul that witnessed it. Out of two thousand men, of whom their crews consisted, not more than 250 were saved by the English boats, the remainder being blown

¹Thiers' *Cons.*
et l'Emp.
iii. 127, 129.

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

¹ James, iii.
180, 183.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 253.
Jom. xiv.
369. Dum.
vii. 130, 132.

56.
Defeat of the
French.

into the air, or lost in the waves on that tempestuous night.¹*

When morning dawned, both fleets were extremely scattered, the Venerable and Thames being far ahead of the rest of the British squadron, and the French ship Formidable, of eighty guns, in the rear of the French fleet, at some distance from the remainder of their vessels. The British ships instantly gave chase, and soon brought her to action. It began within musket shot; and shortly the hostile ships were abreast of each other, within pistol range, and a tremendous fire was kept up on both sides. Undismayed by the superiority of the force brought against him, the French captain, Tronde, made the most gallant resistance, which was soon rendered equal, by the Thames unavoidably falling behind, and dropping out of the action. The fire of the Venerable, however, directed at the hull of her opponent, was beginning to tell severely on the enemy's crew, when the French gunners, by a fortunate discharge, succeeded in bringing down her mainmast, and with it most of her rigging, so that she fell behind, and soon after her other masts went by the board, and she struck on the shoals of San Pedro.† In this desperate situation Captain Hood still maintained a contest with the stern chasers of the Formidable, and gave time for two other ships of the line to come up; upon the appearance of which the enemy relinquished their design of attacking the disabled vessel, and crowding all sail, stood in for Cadiz harbour, where they were soon after moored in safety. The intelligence of this bold and fortunate engagement, in which a British fleet

* It is asserted by M. Thiers in his "Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire," that the Spanish ship Real Carlos was set on fire by red hot shot, heated for that purpose on board the Superb. This is an entire mistake. The fire arose from the sails of the Spanish ship taking fire from the broadside of the Superb, as she passed, almost touching her first-rate antagonist. There was not a heated shot fired from the Superb, nor any furnace on board. See a very interesting letter, from Mr. Outram, the surgeon of the vessel at the time, in *The Glasgow Courier*, October 15th, 1845. And Thiers' *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, iii. 127, 128.

† An incident, highly characteristic of the English sailors, occurred in this action. In its voyage through the Mediterranean, the French fleet had fallen in with, and captured, the brig Speedy, of fourteen guns, commanded by Captain LORD COCHRANE, and that gallant officer, with his little crew, was on board the Formidable when the action took place in the bay of Algeiraz. At every broadside the vessel received from the English, these brave men gave three cheers, regardless alike of the threats of instant death from the French if they continued so unseemly an interruption, and the obvious danger that they themselves might be sent to the bottom by the discharges of their friends.

so severely handled an enemy's squadron of nearly double its own force, excited the greater joy in Great Britain, that the preceding failure in Algesiraz bay had somewhat mortified a people, nursed by long-continued success to unreasonable expectations of constant triumph on their favourite element. On the other hand, the frightful catastrophe of their two first-rate men-of-war spread the utmost consternation through the Spanish peninsula, and increased that strong repugnance which the Castilian youth had long manifested for the naval service.¹

Contemporaneous with these maritime operations was a measure from which Napoleon anticipated much in the way of forming a counterpoise to the vast colonial acquisitions made by Great Britain during the war; and this was an attack upon Portugal, the ancient and tried ally of England. The French, according to their own admission, had no cause of complaint against that power; the only motive of the war was to provide an equivalent to the maritime conquests of England. "We only wished," says Bignon, "to enter that kingdom in order to leave it, and stipulate as the condition of that retreat some considerable concession from Great Britain." The most obvious means of effecting this object was to interest Spain in its execution, and this was adroitly managed by the First Consul. In the treaty of Luneville, as already observed, it had been stipulated that the grand duchy of Tuscany should be ceded by the Austrian family, and erected into a separate principality in favour of Don Louis, a prince of the Spanish family; and that duchy was soon after constituted a royal domain, under the title of the kingdom of Etruria. Etrope was at a loss at first to divine what was the motive for this sudden condition in favour of the Spanish house of Bourbon; but it was soon made manifest, when it appeared that a treaty had been concluded between France and Spain, the object of which was, "to compel the court of Lisbon to separate itself from the alliance of Great Britain, and cede, till the conclusion of a general peace, a fourth of its territory to the French and Spanish forces."²

This flagrant and unprovoked invasion of the rights of a pacific state, took place at the very time when France

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1801.

¹ James, iii. 184, 185.
Ann. Reg. 1801, 258.
Jom. xiv. 368, 371.
Dum. vii. 132, 135.
Bign. ii. 38, 39.
Thiers' Cons. iii. 127, 130.

57.
Attack of Napoleon on Portugal.
Treaty with Spain for this purpose.

Oct. 1, 1800.
² Bign. ii. 10.
Ann. Reg. 1801, 256.

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

58.
Napoleon's
real object in
this attack.

Dec. 1800.

March 8,
1801.

¹ Bign. ii. 11.

² Jom. xiv.

289, 290.

Ann. Reg.

1801, 256.

Dum. vii. 61,

62.

was loudly proclaiming the principles of the armed neutrality, and the utter injustice of one belligerent interfering with the trade or alliances of independent powers. But it soon appeared that the First Consul's tenderness for neutral rights was all on one element, where he was weakest; and that on the other, where his power was well-nigh irresistible, he was prepared to go the utmost length of warlike aggression, and compel every other state to enter into his projects of hostility against Great Britain. So early as December, 1800, when the victory of Hohenlinden had relieved him of all anxiety on the side of Germany, he had given orders for the formation of an army of observation at Bourdeaux, which gradually drew towards the Pyrenees, and was increased to twenty thousand men. This was followed, some months afterwards, by a declaration of war on the part of Spain, against the Court of Lisbon. The ostensible grounds of complaint on which this step was rested, was the refusal by the Court of Lisbon to ratify a peace with France, signed by its plenipotentiary in 1797; accompanied with a complaint that she had furnished protection to the English fleets and sailors, and insulted the French in the harbour of Carthagena. The real reasons for the war were very different. "The Courts of Lisbon and Madrid," says the French historian, "united by recent intermarriages, had no real subjects of dispute. They were drawn into the contest because the one was attached to the political system of France, the other to that of Great Britain."¹ Spain was at this time entirely under the guidance of the Prince of Peace, a vain and ambitious favourite, who had risen from an obscure origin, by court intrigue, to an elevation little short of the throne, and threw himself willingly into the arms of France, in order to seek an effectual support against the pride and patriotism of the Castilian noblesse, who were exceedingly jealous of his authority. Guided by such a ruler, Spain made herself the willing instrument of France in this tyrannical aggression. She afterwards expiated her fault in oceans of blood.²

In this extremity the Portuguese Government naturally turned to England for support, and offered, if she would send an army of twenty-five thousand men, to give her

The Portuguese apply to England for aid, which is refused.

¹ Ann. Reg. 256, 257.
Dum. vii. 63.
Jom. xiv. 294.

the command of the native forces. Had it been in the power of Great Britain to have acceded to this offer, the desperate struggle of the Peninsula might have been accelerated by eight years, and the triumphs of Busaco and Vimiera graced the conclusion of the first part of the war. But it was thought impossible to make such an effort; her chief disposable force was already engaged in Egypt; and the great contest in the north, as yet undecided, required all the means which were at the disposal of her Government.¹ All that could be done, therefore, was to send a few regiments to Lisbon, with a loan of £300,000, in order if possible to procure a respite from the impending danger till the general peace, which it was already foreseen could not be far distant.

Deprived in this manner of any effectual external aid, the Portuguese Government, to appearance at least, was not wanting to its ancient renown. An animated proclamation was put forth, in which the people were reminded of their ancestors' heroic resistance to the Romans, and their imperishable achievements in the southern hemisphere; new armaments were ordered, works hastily constructed, a levy *en masse* called forth, and the plate borrowed from the churches to aid Government in carrying on the means of defence. But during all this show of resistance, there was a secret understanding between the Courts of Lisbon and Madrid; the regular troops on the frontier, about twenty thousand strong, were scarcely increased by a single soldier; and when, in the end of May, the Spanish army of thirty thousand combatants invaded the country, they experienced hardly any resistance. Jurumenha and Olivenza at once opened their gates; Campo Mayor, though amply provided with every thing requisite to sustain a siege, only held out a fortnight; and the Portuguese, flying in disorder, made haste to throw the Tagus between them and the enemy. Even Elvas, which never lowered its colours in a more glorious subsequent strife, surrendered, and in a fortnight after the war commenced, this collusive contest was terminated by the signature of preliminaries of peace at Abrantes. By this treaty, which was ratified on September 29th, Olivenza, with its circumjacent territory, was ceded to Spain, and the ports of Portugal were shut against the English flag.²

60.
The Portuguese make no resistance, and peace is concluded.

May 20.

June 6.

² Bign. ii. 12,
13. Jom. xiv.
298, 299.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 258.

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

61.

Which the
First Consul
refuses to
ratify, and a
French army
invades Por-
tugal.

June 28.

July 23.

1 Bign. ii. 13.
note.

62.

Peace con-
cluded by
enormous
pecuniary
spoliation ;
and Napoleon
offers Han-
over to Prus-
sia, which is
declined.

No sooner were the terms of this treaty known in France, than the First Consul refused to ratify them. Not that he had either any animosity or cause of complaint against the Cabinet of Lisbon, but that by this pacification the main object of the war was lost, namely, the occupation of such a portion of the Portuguese territory by the French troops, as might give weight to the demands of France for restitution of her conquered colonies from Great Britain. The French army of observation, accordingly, under Leclerc and St. Cyr, five-and-twenty thousand strong, which had advanced to Ciudad Rodrigo, entered Portugal, invested Almeida, and threatened both Lisbon and Oporto. The Portuguese Government now commenced serious preparations ; six sail of the line were detached from Lisbon to reinforce the English blockading squadron off Cadiz, and such efforts as the time would admit were made to reinforce the army on the frontier. But the contest was too unequal ; and England, anticipating the seizure of the continental dominions of the house of Braganza, had already taken possession of the island of Madeira, to secure its colonial dominions from insult, when the tempest was averted by external events. The near approach of an accommodation between France and England, made it a greater object for the First Consul to extend his colonial acquisitions, than to enlarge his conquests on the continent of Europe ; while the arrival of a convoy with a great supply of silver from Brazil, gave the Portuguese Government the means both of satisfying his pecuniary demands, and gratifying the cupidity of his inferior agents. To use the words of a French historian—"The Portuguese Government holding the purse, threw it at the feet of the robbers, and thus saved itself from destruction."¹

Bribes were liberally bestowed on the French generals,* and so completely did this seasonable supply remove all difficulties, that a treaty was soon concluded, in virtue of which Olivenza, with its territory, was confirmed to Spain, the harbours of Portugal were closed against English ships, both of war and commerce, one half of Guiana, as far as the Carapanatuba stream, was ceded to France, and the commerce of the Republic was placed on the footing of the most favoured nations. By a less honour-

* Leclerc got five million francs, or £200,000, for his own share.—HARD. viii. 136.

able and secret article, the immediate payment of twenty million francs (£800,000) was made the condition of the retreat of the French troops. As the war approached a termination, the anxiety of Napoleon to procure equivalents for the English colonial acquisitions became more vehement. With this view, he made propositions to Prussia to seize Hanover; an insidious though tempting offer, which would have rendered that power permanently a dependant on France, and totally altered the balance of European politics. But the Prussian Cabinet had good sense enough, at that time at least, to see that no such gratuitous act of spoliation was likely to prove a permanent acquisition, and declined the proposal.¹

Meanwhile Napoleon, relieved by the treaty of Luneville from all apprehensions of a serious continental struggle, bent all his attention to Great Britain, and made serious preparations for invasion on his own side of the Channel. Though not of the gigantic character which they assumed in a later period of the contest, after the renewal of the war, these efforts were of a kind to excite the serious attention of the English Government. From the mouth of the Scheldt to that of the Garonne, every creek and headland was fortified, so as to afford protection to the small craft which were creeping round the shore from all the ports of the kingdom, to the general rendezvous of Dunkirk and Boulogne. The latter harbour was the general point of assemblage; gun-boats and flat-bottomed praams were collected in great quantities, furnaces erected for heating shot, immense batteries constructed, and every preparation made, not only for a vigorous defence, but for the most energetic offensive operations. By an ordinance of July 12th, the flotilla was organised in nine divisions; and to them were assigned all the boats and artillerymen which had been attached to the armies of the Rhine and the Maine, which had been brought down those streams to the harbours on the Channel. The immensity of these preparations was studiously dwelt upon in the French papers; nothing was talked of but the approaching descent upon Great Britain; and fame, ever the first to sound the alarm, so magnified their amount,² that, when a few battalions pitched their tents on the heights of

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1801.

¹ Bign. ii. 14,
17, 18.
Hard. viii.
134, 136.
Dum. vii. 264.
Pièces Just.

63.
Preparations
for the inva-
sion of Eng-
land.

² Dum. vii.
140, 144.
Jom. xiv.
380, 381.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 263.

CHAP.
XXXIV.1801.
64.Apprehen-
sions of the
British Go-
vernment.

Boulogne; it was universally credited in England that the army of invasion was about to take its station preparatory to the threatened attempt.

Though not participating in the vulgar illusion as to the imminence of the danger, the English Government had various weighty reasons for not disregarding the preparations on the southern coast of the Channel. The fleets of Great Britain in the narrow seas were, indeed, so powerful, that no attempt at invasion by open force could be made with any chance of success; * but it was impossible to conceal the alarming fact, that the same wind which wafted the French flotilla out of its harbours might chain the English cruisers to theirs; and the recent expeditions of Gantheaume in the Mediterranean, and of Hoche to the coast of Ireland, had demonstrated that, notwithstanding the greatest maritime superiority, it was impossible at all times to prevent a vigilant and active enemy from putting to sea during the darkness of the autumnal or winter months. It was easy too to foresee, that even although ultimate defeat might attend a descent, incalculable confusion and distress would necessarily follow it in the first instance. It was to be expected, also, that the destruction of the armament might influence the issue of the negotiations for peace; and that, if the First Consul saw that his flotilla was not secure from insult even in his own harbours, he would probably abate something of the pretensions which his extraordinary successes had induced him to bring forward.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1801, 266.
Jom. xiv.
385.

65.
Attack on the
flotilla at
Boulogne by
Nelson.

Influenced by these views, the British Government prepared a powerful armament of bombs and light vessels in the Downs, and intrusted the command to Lord Nelson, whose daring and successful exploits at Aboukir and the Nile pointed him out as peculiarly fitted for an enterprise of this description. On the 1st August he set sail from Deal at the head of three ships of the line, two frigates, and thirty-five bombs, brigs, and smaller vessels, and stood over to the French coast. He himself strongly urged that the expedition, aided by a few thousand troops, should be sent against Flushing; but the Cabinet

* England at this period had fourteen ships of the line under Admiral Cornwallis off Brest, and seventeen in the German Ocean observing the Dutch harbours.—JAMES, iii. Ap. No. 2, and DUMAS, vii. 144.

resolved that it should proceed against Boulogne, and thither accordingly he went, much against his inclination. After a reconnoissance, attended with a slight cannonade on both sides, soon after his arrival, a more serious attack took place on the night of the 15th August. But in the interval the French line of boats had been rendered well-nigh unassailable. Every vessel was defended by long poles headed by iron spikes projecting from their sides; strong nettings were braced up to their lower yards; they were moored head and stern across the harbour-mouth in the strongest possible manner, chained to the ground and each other, and on board each was from fifty to an hundred soldiers, every one of whom was provided with three muskets, as in defending a breach threatened with assault. In addition to this the whole were immediately under the guns of the batteries on shore, and every eminence capable of bearing a cannon had been armed with a powerful array of artillery.¹

Notwithstanding these formidable circumstances, Nelson commenced the attack at midnight in four divisions of boats. The second division, under Captain Parker, first closed with the enemy; and in the most gallant style instantly endeavoured to board. But the strong netting baffled all their efforts, and as they were vainly endeavouring to cut their way through it, a discharge of musketry from the soldiers on board killed or wounded above half their number, including their gallant leader Captain Parker, who was desperately maimed while cheering on his men. The darkness of the night, and the rapidity of the tide, which prevented the other divisions from getting into action at the same time as Captain Parker's, rendered the attack abortive, notwithstanding the most gallant efforts on the part of the seamen and marines engaged in the service. One of the commanders of the French division behaved like a generous enemy. He hailed the boats as they approached, and called out in English, "Let me advise you, brave Englishmen, to keep off; you can do nothing here; it is only shedding the blood of gallant men to attempt it." After four hours of gallant but unequal combat, the assailants were obliged to retire, with the loss of 172 men killed and wounded;²

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1801, 271.
South. ii. 176.
Jom. xiv. 386.

66.
Which is
defeated.

² Southey, ii.
176, 180.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 271.
Jom. xiv.
387. Dum.
vil. 149, 159.
Bign. ii. 59,
60.

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

67.
First proposal
for the intro-
duction of
steam into
naval opera-
tions.

1 Fulton.

but Nelson declared, that "If all the boats could have arrived at their destined points at the periods assigned to them, not all the chains in France could have prevented our men from bringing off the whole of the vessels."

A singular circumstance occurred at this time, which demonstrates how little the clearest intellect can anticipate the ultimate result of the discoveries which are destined to effect the greatest changes in human affairs. At the time when all eyes in Europe were fixed on the Channel, and the orators in the French tribunate were wishing for "a fair wind and thirty-six hours," an unknown individual¹ presented himself to the First Consul, and said, "The sea which separates you from your enemy gives him an immense advantage. Aided alternately by the winds and the tempests, he braves you in his inaccessible isle. This obstacle, his sole strength, I engage to overcome. I can, in spite of all his fleets, at any time, in a few hours transport your armies into his territory, without fearing the tempests, or having need of the winds. Consider the means which I offer you." The plan and details accompanying it were received by Napoleon, and by him remitted to a commission of the most learned men whom France could produce, who reported that the scheme was *visionary and impracticable*, and in consequence it, at that time, came to nothing.² Such was the reception which STEAM NAVIGATION received at the hands of philosophy; such is the first success of the greatest discovery of modern times since the invention of printing; of one destined in its ultimate effects to produce a revolution in the channels of commerce, alter the art of naval war, without the overthrow of empires, change the face of the world. The discovery seemed made for the age; and yet genius and philosophy rejected it at the very time when it was most required, and when it seemed calculated to carry into effect the vast projects which were already matured by the great leader of its most formidable forces.

68.
Its probable
effect on
future naval
wars.

But the continental writers were in error when they supposed that this vast acquisition to nautical power would, if it had been fully developed at that time, have led to the subjugation of Britain; the English maritime superiority would have appeared as clearly in the new

method of carrying on naval war as it had in the old. Steam navigation has in a great degree altered the mode of carrying on naval warfare, but it has made no change on its principles, or the elements of strength by which ultimate success is to be attained. Gunpowder has changed in a considerable degree the arms of land contests; but the principles of the military art, the sources of military strength, are the same as they were in the days of Hannibal and Cæsar. Albion would have been encircled by steam vessels; if the French boats, aided by such auxiliaries, could have braved the wind and the tide, the English cruisers would have been equally assisted in the maintenance of their blockade; the stoutest heart and the last guinea would have finally carried the day, whatever changes occurred in the mode of carrying on the contest; the land of coal and iron would have maintained its superiority in the warfare of fire. Even if their wooden walls had been broken through, the future conquerors of Vittoria and Waterloo had no cause for despondency, if the war came to be conducted by land forces on their own shores.

But these warlike demonstrations were a mere cover on both sides to the real intentions of the two Cabinets; and in the midst of the hostile fleets and armies which covered the Channel and the coasts of France, couriers were incessantly passing, carrying despatches, containing the negotiations for a general peace. In truth, the war had now ceased to have any present or definite object with both the powers by whom it was maintained, and they were driven to an accommodation from the experienced impossibility of finding any common element in which their hostilities could be carried on. After the loss of all her colonies, the ruin of her commerce, and the disappearance of her flag from the ocean, it was as impossible for France to find a method of annoying Great Britain, as it was for England to discover the means of reducing the continental power of her enemy, after the peace of Luneville had prostrated the last array of the military monarchies of Europe. Even if their mutual hostility were inextinguishable, still both had need of a breathing-time to prepare for a renewal of the contest; the former that she might regain the commerce and colonies on

69.
Negotiations
for peace be-
tween France
and England.

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

70.
First propo-
sals of Eng-
land, which
are refused.
March 21.

which her naval strength depended, the latter that she might restore the finances which the enormous expenses of the contest had seriously disorganised.

April 2.

So early as the 21st March, the British Cabinet had signified to M. Otto, who still remained in London to superintend the arrangements for the exchange of prisoners, that they were disposed to renew the negotiations which had so often been opened without success ; and it was agreed between the two governments that, without any general suspension of arms, the basis of a ² treaty should be secretly adjusted. When the terms, however, first came to be proposed, there appeared to be an irreconcilable difference between them ; nor was this surprising, for both had enjoyed a career of almost unbroken success upon their separate elements, and each was called on to make sacrifices for peace, which it was quite evident could not be exacted from them by force of arms if the contest was continued. Lord Hawkesbury's first proposals were, that the French should evacuate Egypt, and that the English should retain Malta, Ceylon, Trinidad, and Martinique, and evacuate all the other colonies which they had conquered during the war ; acquisitions which, how great soever, did not seem disproportionate to the vast continental additions received by France in the extension of her frontier to the Rhine, and the establishment of a girdle of affiliated republics round the parent state. But to these conditions the First Consul refused to accede. "The resolution of the First Consul," says the historian of his diplomacy, "was soon taken. France could neither surrender any part of its ancient domains nor its recent acquisitions."¹

¹ *Jom. xiv.*
379. *Bign.*
ii. 68.

71
Napoleon's
views in the
negotiation.
July 23.

The views of Napoleon were developed in a note of M. Otto, on the 23d July, after the dissolution of the northern confederacy had relieved England of one of the greatest of her dangers, and disposed France to proceed with more moderation in the negotiation, and her defeat on the banks of the Nile had deprived her of all hopes of retaining that colony by force of arms. He proposed that Egypt should be restored to the Porte ; that the republic formed of the seven Ionian islands should be recognised ; that the harbours of Italy should be restored to the Pope and the King of Naples, Port Mahon ceded

to Spain, and Malta to the Knights of Jerusalem, with the offer to raze its fortifications. In the East Indies, he offered to abandon Ceylon to Great Britain, upon condition that all the other colonial conquests of England, in both hemispheres, should be restored, and in that event, he agreed to respect the integrity of Portugal.¹ Lord Hawkesbury, in answer, suggested some arrangement by which Malta might be rendered independent of both parties, and insisted for the retention of some of the British conquests in the West Indies.² The negotiations were prolonged for several months, but at length the difficulties were all adjusted, and the preliminaries of a general peace signed at London on the 1st October.³

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1801.

¹ Note, 23d July.

² Note, 5th August.

³ Bign. ii. 73, 76. Jom. xiv. 383.

By these articles, it was agreed that hostilities should immediately cease by land and sea between the contracting parties; that Great Britain should restore its colonial conquests in every part of the world, Ceylon in the East and Trinidad in the West Indies alone excepted, which were ceded in entire sovereignty to that power; that Egypt should be restored to the Porte, Malta and its dependencies to the order of St. John of Jerusalem, the Cape of Good Hope to Holland, but opened alike to the trade of both the contracting powers; the integrity of Portugal guaranteed; the harbours of the Roman and Neapolitan states evacuated by the French, and Porto Ferrajo by the English forces; a compensation provided for the House of Nassau; and a new republic created in the Seven Islands of the Adriatic, which was recognised by the French Republic. The fisheries of Newfoundland were restored to the situation in which they had been before the war, reserving their final arrangement to the definitive treaty.* Though the negotiations had been so long in dependence, they had been kept a profound secret from the people of both countries, and their long continuance had sensibly weakened the hope of their being brought to a satisfactory result. Either from accident or design, this impression had been greatly strengthened, recently before

72.
Preliminaries
signed at
London.
Oct. 1. 1801.

* The clause regarding Malta, which became of so much importance in the sequel, from being the ostensible ground of the rupture of the treaty, was in these terms: "The island of Malta, with its dependencies, shall be evacuated by the English troops, and restored to the order of St. John of Jerusalem. To secure the absolute independence of that isle from both the contracting parties, it shall be placed under the guarantee of a third power to be named in the definitive treaty."—DUMAS, vii. 319, and *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 18, 19.

CHAP.
XXXIV.

1801.

¹ Bign. li. 77.
Jom. xiv.
393, 394.
Martens, vii.
377.

73.
Transports of
joy on the
occasion,
both in
France and
England.

the signature of the preliminaries ; and the very day before, the report had gone abroad in London, that all hope of an amicable adjustment was at an end, and that interminable war was likely again to break out between the two nations.¹

In proportion to the desponding feelings occasioned by this impression, were the transports of joy excited by the appearance of a London Gazette Extraordinary on the 2d October, announcing the signature of the preliminaries on the preceding day. The three per cents instantly rose from 59 to 66 ; the *tiers consolide* at Paris from 48 to 53. Universal joy pervaded both capitals. These feelings rapidly spread through the whole British nation, as the arrival of the post announced the joyful intelligence ; and the public satisfaction was at its height, when on the 12th of the same month Colonel Lauriston arrived, bearing the ratification of the treaty by the French Government. Never since the restoration of Charles II. had such transports seized the public mind. The populace insisted on drawing the French envoys in their carriage ; and they were conducted by this tumultuary array, followed by a guard of honour from the household brigade, through Parliament Street to Downing Street, where the ratifications were exchanged, and at night a general illumination gave vent to the feelings of universal exhilaration. Nor was the public joy manifested in a less emphatic manner at Paris. Hardly had the cannon of the Tuileries and the Invalides announced the unexpected intelligence, when every one stopped in the streets and congratulated his acquaintance on the news ; the public flocked in crowds to the theatres, where it was officially promulgated, and in the evening the city was universally and splendidly illuminated. There seemed no bounds to the prosperity and glory of the Republic, now that this auspicious event had removed the last and most inveterate of its enemies.²

² Dum. vii.
208, 209.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 277.
Jom. xiv.
394, 395.

74.
But the peace
is severely
stigmatised
in England
by many.

But while these were the natural feelings of the inconsiderate populace, who are ever governed by present impressions, and were for the most part destitute of the information requisite to form a rational opinion on the subject, there were many men gifted with greater sagacity and foresight in Great Britain, who deeply lamented the conditions by which peace had been purchased, and

from the very first prophesied that it could be of no long endurance. They observed, that the war had been abruptly terminated, without any one of the objects being gained for which it was undertaken : that it was entered into in order to curb the ambition, and stop the democratic propagandism of France, and in an especial manner prevent the extension of its authority in the Low Countries ; whereas by the result its power was immensely extended, its frontier advanced to the Rhine, its influence to the Niemen, and a military chieftain placed at its head, capable of wielding to the best advantage its vast resources. That, supposing the destruction of some, and the humiliation of other powers, had absolved England from all her ties with the continental states, and left her at full liberty to consult only her own interest in any treaty which might be formed, still it seemed at best extremely doubtful whether the preliminaries which had been signed were calculated to accomplish this object. That they contributed nothing towards the coercion of France on one element, while they gave that power the means of restoring its fleets, and recruiting the sinews of war on another ; and that thus the result necessarily would be, that England would be compelled to renew the contest again, and that too at no distant period, in order to maintain her existence, and she would then find her enemy's resources as much strengthened as her own were weakened during its cessation. That during the struggle we had deprived France of all her colonies, blockaded her harbours, ruined her commerce, and almost annihilated her navy, and therefore had nothing to fear from her maritime hostility ; but would this superiority continue, if, in pursuance of this treaty, we restored almost all her colonial possessions, and enabled her, by a successful commerce, in a few years to revive her naval power ? If, therefore, the principle, so long maintained by Great Britain, had any foundation, and the hostility of revolutionary France was implacable, it was evident that England had every thing to fear and nothing to hope from this pacification ; and while she unbuckled her own armour, and laid aside her sword, she was in truth placing in the hands of her redoubtable adversary the weapons,

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Arguments
used against
it in the
country.

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75.
Arguments
urged in sup-
port of it by
the Administra-
tion.

and the only weapons, by which ere long that enemy might be enabled to aim mortal strokes at herself.

The partisans of administration, and the advocates for peace throughout the country, opposed to these arguments considerations of another kind, perhaps still more specious. They contended, that the real question was not, what were the views formed, or the hopes indulged, when we entered into the war, but what were the prospects which could rationally be entertained, now that we had reached its tenth year? Without pretending to affirm that the resources of Great Britain were worn out, or peace had become a matter of necessity, still it was impossible to dispute that, in consequence of the cessation of continental hostilities and the dissolution of the last coalition, the prospect of effectually reducing the military power of France had become almost hopeless. That thus the question was, whether, after it had become impossible, by the disasters of our allies, to attain one object of the war, we should obstinately and single-handed maintain the contest, without any definite end to be gained by its prosecution? Though the frontiers of France had been extended, and her power immensely increased, still the revolutionary mania, by far the greatest evil with which Europe was threatened, had been at length effectually extinguished. Thus the contest had ceased to be, as at first, one of life and death to England, and had returned to the usual state of warfare between regular governments, in which the cost of maintaining it was to be balanced by the advantages to be gained from its prosecution. Without doubt the return of peace, and the restoration of her colonies, would give France the means of increasing her naval resources, but it would probably do the same in an equal or greater degree to Great Britain, and leave the maritime power of the two countries in the same relative situation as before. It is impossible to remain for ever at war, solely in order to prevent your enemy repairing the losses he has sustained during the contest; and the enormous expenses with which the struggle is attended will, if much longer continued, involve the finances of the country in inextricable embarrassment; it is surely, therefore, worth while trying, now that a regular government is established in the Republic,

whether it is not possible to remain with so near a neighbour on terms of amity; and it will be time enough to take up arms again, if the conduct of the First Consul shall come to demonstrate that he was not sincere in his professions, and that a renewal of the contest would be less perilous than a continuance of peace.¹

The termination of hostilities between France and England speedily drew after it the accommodation of the differences of the minor powers engaged in the war. No sooner were the preliminaries signed with Great Britain, than Napoleon used his utmost efforts to conclude a treaty on the most favourable terms with the Ottoman Porte. On this occasion the finesse of European diplomacy prevailed over the plain sense and upright dealing of the Osmanlis. The news of the surrender of Alexandria reached Paris on the 7th October, six days after the preliminaries had been signed with England; instantly the Turkish ambassador, Esseyd Ali Effendi, who had long been in a sort of confinement, was sent for, and before he was aware of the important success which had been gained by his countrymen, persuaded to agree to a treaty, which was signed two days afterwards. In this negotiation, the French diplomatists made great use of their alleged moderation in agreeing to the restoration of Egypt, which they knew was already lost, and so worked upon the fears of the ambassador by threats of a descent from Ancona and Otranto, that he consented to give to the Republican commerce in the Levant the same advantages which the most favoured nations enjoyed; and, at the same time, the Republic of the Seven Ionian Islands was recognised as an independent state.² Thus, by the arts of M. Talleyrand, were the French, who, in defiance of ancient treaties, had done all in their power to wrest Egypt from the Turks, placed on the same footing with the English, by whose blood and treasure it had been rescued from their grasp.

In the end of August, a definitive treaty was concluded between France and Bavaria, by which the latter power renounced in favour of the former all their territories and possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, and received, on the other hand, a guarantee for its dominions on the right bank. The preliminaries, signed at Morfontaine on

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¹ Ann. Reg.
1801, 278,
279.

76.
Peace be-
tween France
and Turkey.

Oct. 9.

² Jom. xiv.
398. Ann.
Reg. 1801,
280, and
State Papers,
292. Mar-
tens, vii. 394.

77.
And with Ba-
varia, Ame-
rica, and the
lesser powers.
Aug. 24.

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Sept. 9.

Oct. 8.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1801. State
Papers, 291,
297, 300.

Jon. iv.
399. Mar-
tens, vii. 365,
and 96, 65,
and 386.

78.

Important
treaty be-
tween France
and Russia.

September 30, 1800, between France and America, were ratified by a definitive treaty, which somewhat abridged the commercial advantages stipulated in favour of the Republic, although it placed the French on the footing of the most favoured nations. But notwithstanding all his exertions, the First Consul was obliged to forego the peculiar advantages which, in the treaty of 1778, the gratitude of the Americans to Louis XVI. had granted to the subjects of France. Finally, a treaty of peace was, on October 8th, concluded between France and Russia, and on December 17th, between the same power and the Dey of Algiers.¹

The public articles of the Russian treaty merely re-established the relations of the two empires on the footing on which they stood prior to the commencement of hostilities; but it contained also several secret articles, which ultimately became of the greatest importance in the complicated system of European diplomacy. The first article related to the division of the indemnities provided by the treaty of Luneville for the princes dispossessed on the left bank of the Rhine. The two cabinets bound themselves "to form a perfect concert, to lead the parties interested to adopt their principles, which are to preserve a just equilibrium between the houses of Austria and Prussia." The second article provided, that the high contracting parties should come to an understanding to arrange on amicable terms the affairs of Italy and of the Holy See. The sixth article stipulated that, "The First Consul and the Emperor of Russia shall act in concert in relation to the King of Sardinia, and with all the regard possible to the actual state of affairs." The ninth article guaranteed the independence of the republic of the Seven Islands; "and it is specially provided that those isles shall contain no foreign troops." Finally, the eleventh article, the most important of the whole, declares— "As soon as possible after the signature of the present treaty, and these secret articles, the two contracting parties shall enter upon the consideration of the establishment of a general peace, upon the following basis: 'To restore a *just equilibrium in the different parts of the world, and to ensure the liberty of the seas,* binding themselves to act in concert for the attainment of these objects by all measures, whether of conciliation or

vigour, mutually agreed on between them, for the good of humanity, the general repose, and the independence of governments.'” So early had these great potentates taken upon themselves to act as the arbiters of the whole affairs of the civilised world! These secret articles were in the end the cause of all the differences which ensued between those powers, and brought the French to Moscow and the Russians to Paris. So often does overweening ambition overvault itself, and fall on the other side.¹

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¹ Bign. ii. 90,
93.

The preliminary articles of the peace between Great Britain and France underwent a protracted discussion in both Houses of Parliament, immediately after the opening of the session in November 1801. The eyes of all the world were fixed on the only assembly in existence, where the merits of so important a treaty, and the mighty interests it involved, could receive a free discussion. It was urged by Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and the war party in both houses, “By the result of this treaty we are in truth a conquered people. Buonaparte is as much our master as he is of Spain or Prussia, or any of those countries which, though nominally independent, are really subjected to his control. Are our resources exhausted? Is the danger imminent, that such degrading terms are acceded to? On the contrary, our wealth is unbounded, our fleets are omnipotent, and we have recently humbled the veterans of France, even on their own element! We now make peace, it seems, because we foresee a time at no distant period when we shall be obliged to do so; we capitulate, like General Menou, when we have still some ammunition left. The first question for every independent power inheriting a glorious name to ask itself is, ‘Is the part I am to act consonant to the high reputation I have borne in the world?’ Judging by this standard, what shall we say of the present treaty? France gives up nothing; for Egypt, at the time of its conclusion, was not hers to give. England, with the exception of Trinidad and Ceylon, gives up every thing. By the result of the treaty, France possesses in Europe all the continent, excepting Austria and Prussia; in Asia, Pondicherry, Cochin, Negapatam, and the Spice Islands; in Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, Goree, and Senegal; in the Mediterranean, every fortified port excepting

79.
Debates in
Parliament
on the peace.
Arguments
against it as
degrading to
England.

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Gibraltar, so that that inland sea may now be truly called a French lake; in the West Indies, part at least of St. Domingo, Martinique, Tobago, St. Lucie, Guadaloupe, Curaçoa; in North America, St. Pierre, Miguelon, and Louisiana, in virtue of a secret treaty with Spain; in South America, Surinam, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo, and Guiana, as far as the river of the Amazons. Such is the power which we are required to contemplate without dismay, and under the shadow of whose greatness we are invited to lie down with perfect tranquillity and composure. What would the Marlboroughs, the Godolphins, the Somers, or such weak and deluded men as viewed with jealousy the power of Louis XIV., have said to a peace which not only confirms to France the possession of nearly the whole of Europe, but extends her empire over every other part of the globe?

80.
It gives no
security
against
French ag-
gression.

“But it is said, that France, and the First Consul will stop short in the career of ambition; that they will be satisfied with the successes they have gained, and that the progress of the Revolution will terminate at the elevation it has already attained. Is such the nature of ambition? Is it the nature of French revolutionary ambition? Does it commonly happen that either communities or single men are cured of the passion for aggrandisement by unlimited success? On the contrary, if we examine the French Revolution, and trace it correctly to its causes, we shall find that the scheme of universal empire was, from the beginning, what was looked forward to as the consummation of its labours; the end first in view, though the last to be accomplished; the *primum mobile* that originally set it in motion, and has since guided and governed all its movements. The authors of the Revolution wished, in the first instance, to destroy morality and religion, but they wished these things, not as ends, but as means in a higher design. They wished for a double empire, an empire of opinion, and an empire of political power; and they used the one of these as the means of attaining the other. When there is but one country intervenes between France and universal dominion, is it to be supposed that she will stop of her own accord, and quietly abandon the last fruit of her efforts, when it is just within her grasp?

"But the peace is founded, it would appear, on another hope; on the idea that Buonaparte, now that he has become a sovereign, will no longer be a supporter of revolutionary schemes, but do his utmost to maintain the rank and authority which he has so recently acquired. But although nothing seems more certain than that, in that quarter at least, the democratic mania is for the present completely extinguished, yet it by no means follows from that circumstance that it does not exist, and that too in a most dangerous form, in other states in close alliance with the present ruler of France. Though the head of an absolute monarchy in that kingdom, he is adored as the essence of Jacobinism in this country; and maintains a party here, only the more dangerous that its members are willing to sacrifice to him not only the independence of their country, but the whole consistency of their previous opinions. If any doubt could exist in any reasonable mind that the grand object of the First Consul, as of all preceding governments in France, has been the destruction of this country, it would be removed by the conduct which has been pursued, and the objects that have been insisted for in this very treaty. What can be the object of demanding so many settlements in South America and the West Indies, the Cape, and Cochin-China, and Malta, so recently won by our arms, if it be not that of building up a maritime and colonial power, which may in time come to rival that of this country? It does not augur very favourably of the intentions of a party in any transaction, that his conduct throughout has been marked by the clearest proofs of duplicity and fraud. Now, what shall we think of the candour and fairness which, in a treaty with us, proposes the evacuation of Egypt at the very time when they knew, though we did not, that at that moment all their soldiers in Egypt were prisoners of war? Where was their good faith to the Turks, when in the same circumstances they, knowing the fact and the Turks not, took credit from them for this very evacuation? What is this but ensuring the lottery-ticket at the moment when they know it has been already drawn?

"What, it is said, are we to do? War cannot be eternal, and what prospect have we of reaching a period when it may be terminated under circumstances upon the whole

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81.
The alleged
inveteracy of
Napoleon
against Great
Britain.

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82.

Alleged im-
possibility of
peace being
maintained.

more favourable ? The extent to which this delusion has spread, may truly be said to have been the ruin of the country. The supporters of this opinion never seem to have apprehended the important truth, that if France is bent upon our destruction, there must be perpetual war till one or the other is destroyed. This was the conduct of the Romans, who resolved that Carthage should be destroyed, because they were sensible that if that was not done, it would speedily be their own fate. If we are to come at last only to an armed truce, would it not have been better to have suspended the war at once in that way, than taken the roundabout course which has now been adopted ? The evils of war are indeed many ; but what are they compared to those of the armed, suspicious, jealous peace which we have formed ? Against all its own dangers war provided ; the existence of our fleets upon the ocean, restrained effectually all those attempts which will now be directed against our possessions in every quarter of the globe. In peace, not the least part of our danger will arise from the irreligious principles and licentious manners which will be let loose upon our people, and spread with fatal rapidity, from the profligacy of the neighbouring capital. French Jacobinism will soon break through stronger bulwarks than the walls of Malta. The people of this country have enjoyed, in such an extraordinary degree, all the blessings of life during the war, public prosperity has increased so rapidly during its continuance, that they have never been able to comprehend the dangers which they were engaged in combating. If they had, we never should have heard, except among the ignorant and disaffected, of joy and exultation through the land, at a peace such as the present. When a great military monarch was at the lowest ebb of his fortunes, and had sustained a defeat which seemed to extinguish all his remaining hopes, he wrote from the field of battle : ' We have lost all except our honour.' Would to God that the same consolation, in circumstances likely to become in time not less disastrous, remained to Great Britain !

" France, it is true, has made great acquisitions ; she has made the Rhine the boundary of her empire ; but on our side we have gained successes no less brilliant and

striking ; we have multiplied our colonies, and our navy has rode triumphant in every quarter of the globe. We had rescued Egypt, we had captured Malta and Minorca, and the Mediterranean was shut up from the ships of France and Spain. In the East Indies we had possessed ourselves of every thing except Batavia, which we should have taken, if it had been worth the cost of an expedition. We had made ourselves masters of the Cape, an important and necessary step towards Eastern dominion. In the West Indies, we had every thing desirable, Martinique, Trinidad, St. Lucie, and Guadaloupe ; while on the continent of South America we had an absolute empire, under the name of Surinam and Demerara, almost equal to the European power to which we have now restored it. But what have we done with these immense acquisitions, far exceeding in present magnitude, and ultimate importance, all the conquests of France on the continent of Europe ? Have we retained them as pledges to compel the restoration of the balance of European power, or, if that was impossible, as counterpoises in our hands to the acquisitions of France ? No ! we have surrendered them all at one fell swoop to our implacable enemy, who has thus made as great strides towards maritime supremacy in one single treaty, as he had effected toward continental dominion in nine successful campaigns.”¹

To these powerful and energetic arguments, it was replied by Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington, who on this occasion found an unexpected but powerful ally in Mr. Pitt, “After the conclusion of peace between France and the great continental powers ; after the dissolution of the confederacy of the European monarchies, a confederacy which Government had most justly supported to the utmost of their power, the question of peace became merely one of time, and of the stipulations to be obtained for ourselves. With regard to the terms which were obtained, they were perhaps not so favourable as could have been wished, but they were decidedly preferable to a continuance of the contest, after the great objects for which it was undertaken were no longer attainable ; and the difference between what we had attained, and the retaining all we had given up, would not have justified us in protracting the war. Minorca

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83.
Successes
gained during
the war urged
as arguments
against the
peace.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 86,
139, 165, 174.

84.
Answer made
by the Go-
vernment
and Mr. Pitt.
Gains of the
kingdom by
the peace.

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was a matter of little importance, for experience has proved that it uniformly fell to the power which possessed the preponderating naval force in the Mediterranean; and although it was certainly a matter of regret that we could not have retained so important an acquisition as Malta, yet, if we could not do this, no better arrangement could have been made as to its future destination, than had been provided for in the present treaty. Ceylon in the East, and Trinidad in the West Indies, are both acquisitions of great value; and although it would be ridiculous to assert that they afforded any compensation for the expense of the war, yet, if, by the force of external events over which we had no control, the chief objects of the struggle have been frustrated, it becomes a fit subject of congratulation, that we have obtained acquisitions and honourable terms for ourselves at the termination of a contest, which to all our allies had been pregnant with disaster.

85.
The original
objects of the
war had be-
come unat-
tainable.

"The great object of the war on the part of Great Britain was *security*; defence of ourselves and our allies in a war waged against most of the nations of Europe, and ourselves in particular, with especial malignity. In order to obtain this, we certainly did look for the subversion of the government which was founded on revolutionary principles; but we never insisted as a *sine qua non* on the restoration of the old government of France; we only said, at different times, when terms of accommodation were proposed, there was no government with which we could treat. It doubtless would have been more consistent with the wishes of Ministers, and the interest and security of this country, if such a restoration could have taken place; and it must ever be a subject of regret that efforts corresponding to our own were not made by the other powers of Europe for the accomplishment of that great work: but in no one instance did we ever insist upon restoring the monarchy. There were periods during the continuance of the war in which we had hopes of being able to put together the shattered fragments of that great and venerable edifice; to have restored the exiled nobility of France; to have re-established a government, certainly not free from defects, but built upon regular foundations, instead of that mad system of

innovation which threatened, and had nearly effected, the destruction of Europe. This, it was true, had been found not attainable, but we had the satisfaction of knowing that we had survived the revolutionary fever, and we had seen the extent of its principles abated. We had seen Jacobinism deprived of its fascination ; we had seen it stript of the name and pretext of liberty ; it had shown itself to be capable of destroying only, but not of building, and that it must necessarily end in military despotism.

“But being disappointed in our hopes of being able to drive France within her ancient limits, and to make barriers against her future incursions, it became then necessary with the change of circumstances to change our plans ; for no error could be more fatal than to look only at one object, and obstinately pursue it, when the hope of accomplishing it no longer remained. If it became impossible for us to obtain the full amount of our wishes, wisdom and policy both required that we should endeavour to obtain that which was next best. In these propositions there was no inconsistency, either in the former conduct or language of Ministers, in refusing to treat with the person who now holds the destiny of France ; for it was even then announced, that if events should take the turn they have since done, peace would no longer be objectionable. Much exaggeration prevails as to the real amount of the additional strength which France has acquired during the war. If, on the one hand, her territorial acquisitions are immense, it must be recollected, on the other, what she has lost in population, commerce, capital, and industry. The desolation produced by convulsions such as that country has undergone, cannot be repaired even by large acquisitions of territory. When, on the other hand, we contemplate the immense wealth of this country, and the natural and legitimate growth of that wealth, so much superior to the produce of rapacity and plunder, it is impossible not to entertain the hope, founded in justice and nature, of its solidity.

“When to these results we add the great increase of our maritime power, the additional naval triumphs we have obtained, the brilliant victories of our armies, gained over the flower of the troops of France, we have the satisfaction of

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86.
Necessity
thence accru-
ing for a
change of
object.

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87.

The true
amount of the
gains of
France by the
war stated ;
and those of
Great Britain
by the peace.

thinking, that, if we have failed in some of our wishes, we have succeeded in the main object of adding strength to our security, and at the same time shed additional lustre over our national character. Nor are our colonial acquisitions to be overlooked in estimating the consolidation of our resources. The destruction of the power of Tippoo Saib in India, who has fallen a victim to his attachment to France and his perfidy to us, cannot be viewed but as an important achievement. The union with Ireland, effected at a period of uncommon gloom and despondency, must be regarded as adding more to the power and strength of the British empire than all the conquests of France have effected for that country. If any additional proof were required of the increase of national strength to England, it would be found in the unparalleled efforts which she made in the last year of the war, contending at once against a powerful maritime confederacy in the north, and triumphing over the French on the sands of Egypt ; while at the same time the harbours of Europe were so strictly blockaded, that not a frigate even could venture out to sea but under the cover of mist or darkness. Finally, we have seen that proud array of ships, got together for the invasion of this country, driven for shelter under their own batteries, and only preserved from destruction by the chains and nets thrown over them at their harbour mouths.

88.

Desirable-
ness of peace
on any terms
consistent
with honour.

“ After nine years of ceaseless effusion of blood ; after contracting an increase of debt to the amount of above two hundred millions ; after the indefatigable and uninterrupted exertions of this country, and, it may be added, after its splendid and unexampled achievements, there is no one who can deny that peace is eminently desirable, if it can be purchased without the sacrifice of honour. This country never volunteered into a war with France ; she was drawn into it against her will by the intrigues of the Republicans in her own bosom, and the disaffection, sedition, anarchy, and revolt which they propagated without intermission in all the adjoining states. But that danger has now totally ceased ; the revolutionary fervour of France is coerced by a military chieftain far more adequate to the task than the exiled race of monarchs would have been ; and the only peril that now exists is

that arising from her military power. But if war is to be continued till adequate security against that danger is obtained, when will it terminate? Where are the elements to be found of a new coalition against France; and how can Great Britain, burdened as she is with colonial possessions in every part of the world, descend single-handed into the continental arena with her first-rate antagonist? Peace can now, for the first time since the commencement of the war, be obtained without compromising the interests of any existing ally of England. Austria, Sardinia, Russia, Prussia, Spain, Holland, the original parties to the alliance, have successively, at different periods, dropped out of it, and requested to be liberated from their engagements. We did not blame them for having done so; they acted under the influence of irresistible necessity; but unquestionably they had thereafter no remaining claim upon Great Britain. In so far, therefore, as we stipulated any thing in favour of powers which had already made peace, we acted on large and liberal grounds, beyond what we were bound to have done either in honour or honesty.

"In this respect the stipulations in favour of Naples, which had not only excluded our shipping from her harbours, but joined in an alliance against us, were highly honourable to the British character. The like might be said of the provisions in favour of Portugal; while the Ottoman Porte, the only one of our allies who remained fighting by our side at the conclusion of the contest, has obtained complete restitution. The Seven Islands of the Adriatic, originally ceded by France to Austria, and again transferred by Austria to France, might, from their situation, have been highly dangerous in the hands of the latter power to the Turkish dominions, and therefore they have been erected into a separate republic, the independence of which is guaranteed. We have even done something in favour of the House of Orange and the King of Sardinia, although, from having left the confederacy, they had abandoned every claim excepting on our generosity. And thus, having faithfully performed our duties to all our remaining allies, and obtained terms, which, to say the least of them, took nothing from the security of this country, was it expedient to continue the contest for the

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89.
Fidelity and
generosity of
Great Britain
toward
her allies.

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sake of powers who had abandoned our alliance, and themselves given up as hopeless the objects we had originally entertained; and in which they were more immediately interested than ourselves? Compare this peace with any of those recorded in the former history of the two nations, and it will well stand the comparison. By the treaty of Ryswick and Aix-la-Chapelle we gained nothing; by that of Versailles we lost considerably: it was only by the peace of Utrecht in 1713, and that of Paris in 1763, that we made any acquisitions; but if we compare the present treaty with either of these, it will be found that it is by no means inferior either in point of advantage or the promise of durability. Minorca and Gibraltar, obtained by the former, and Canada and Florida, by the latter, will not bear a comparison with Ceylon, the Mysore, and Trinidad, the glorious trophies of the present contest."¹

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxvi. 36, 38.

In the Commons no division took place on the preliminaries. In the Lords the House divided, 114 to 10, in favour of the Ministers; but in the minority were found the names of Earls Spencer, Grenville, and Caernarvon.²

² Ibid. 191.

90.
Definitive
treaty signed
at Amiens.

The definitive treaty of peace was signed at AMIENS, on the 27th March, 1802. Its conditions varied in no material circumstance from the preliminaries agreed to at London nine months before. The fisheries in Newfoundland were replaced in the condition in which they were before the war;³ an "adequate compensation" was stipulated for the House of Orange,⁴ and it was agreed that Malta should be placed in a state of entire independence of both powers; that there should be neither English nor French *langues*, or branches of the order; that a Maltese *langue* shall be established, and the King of Sicily invited to furnish a force of 2000 men to form a garrison to the fortresses of the island and its dependencies, along with the Grand Master and order of St. John; and that "the forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependencies within three months after the exchange of the ratifications, or sooner, if it can be done." The cession of Ceylon and Trinidad to Great Britain, and the restoration of all the other conquered colonies to France and Holland, the integrity of

³ Art. 15.

⁴ Art. 18.

the Ottoman dominions, and the recognition of the republic of the Seven Islands, were provided for as in the preliminary articles.¹ A long debate ensued in both Houses on the definitive treaty, in which the topics already adverted to were enlarged on at great length. Government were supported by a majority of 276 to 20 in the Lower, and 122 to 16 in the Upper House.²

Such was the termination of the first period of the war, and such the terms on which Great Britain obtained a temporary respite from its perils and expenses. On calmly reviewing the arguments urged both in the legislature and in the country on this great question, it is impossible to resist the conclusion, that the advocates of peace were correct in the views they entertained of the interests of the country at that period. Even admitting all that Mr. Windham and Lord Grenville so strongly advanced as to the magnitude of the sacrifices made by Great Britain, and the danger to which she was exposed from the territorial acquisitions and insatiable ambition of France, to be well founded, still the question remained, was it not incumbent on a prudent government to make at least the trial of a pacification, and relieve the country, though it should be but for a time, from the burdens and anxiety of war, on the faith of a treaty solemnly acceded to by the new ruler of its antagonist? The government of the First Consul, compared to any of the revolutionary ones which had preceded it, was stable and regular; the revolutionary fervour, the continuance of which had so long rendered any safe pacification out of the question, had exhausted itself, and given place to a general and anxious disposition to submit to the ruling authority. The dissolution of the last coalition had rendered hopeless, at least for a very long period, the reduction of the military power of France; and the maritime superiority of England was so decided, as to render any danger to her own independence a distant and problematical contingency.

In these circumstances, it seems indisputable that it was the duty of Government, if it could be done without dishonour, to bring to a conclusion a contest of which the burdens were certain and immediate, and the advantages remote, if not illusory. It was worth while putting the sincerity of the First Consul's professions of moderation

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¹ See the treaty in Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 559. Ann. Reg. 1802. State Papers, 62. Martens, vii. 404.
² Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 733, 827.

91. Reflections on the peace, which appears to have been expedient.

92. Advantages of the peace.

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to such a test as might relieve them of all responsibility, in the event of their being obliged, at a subsequent period, to renew the contest. The fact of this having ultimately been found to be the case, and of the peace of Amiens having turned out only an armed truce, is no impeachment whatever of the justice of these views; it, on the contrary, affords the strongest corroboration of them. England lost none of her means of defence during the intermission of hostilities, and she avoided the heavy responsibility which otherwise would have lain upon her to the latest generation, of having obstinately continued the war, when peace was within her power, and compelled Napoleon, although otherwise inclined, to continue a contest which ultimately brought such unparalleled calamities on the civilised world. Nor could the terms of the treaty be impugned as disgraceful, with any degree of justice towards Great Britain, when she terminated a strife, which had proved so disastrous to the greatest continental states, with her constitution untouched, and without the cession of a single acre which belonged to her at its commencement; while France, accustomed to such large acquisitions at every pacification, was compelled to surrender territories belonging to herself, or her allies, larger than the whole realm of England, and even, in their existing state, of first-rate importance.

93.

Vast increase
of the naval
and military
resources of
England dur-
ing the war,
as compared
with France.

For these important advantages, Great Britain was indebted to the energy of her population, and the happy circumstances of her maritime situation, which enabled her to augment her commerce and increase her resources at the very time when those of all the other belligerent powers were wasting away under the influence of a protracted and desolating contest. The increase of the wealth, population, commerce, and industry of these islands, was unprecedented during its whole continuance, and was so great as fully to justify Mr. Pitt's observation, that it left the relative strength of the two powers nearly the same at its termination as at its commencement. Great as the increase of the French army had been, that of the British had been still greater, and, but for the immense surface which she had to defend, and the vast colonial possessions she was called on to protect, England might have descended with confidence into the continental arena, and

measured her strength, single-handed, with the conqueror of Europe.* On the 1st February, 1793, the British navy consisted of 153 sail of the line and 133 frigates; whereas at its close it numbered no less than 202 sail of the line, and 277 frigates, manned by 120,000 seamen and marines.† The navy of France was, at the commencement of the war, 83 sail of the line and 77 frigates, manned by 80,000 seamen; at its termination it consisted only of 39 sail of the line and 35 frigates.¹ That is, at the outset, the English sail of the line and frigates together were not double those of the enemy; whereas at its close they were above *six times* their number.²

The British during the war took or destroyed 58 ships of the line and 126 frigates, belonging to the enemy. Napoleon calculates a fleet of 30 ships of the line, and frigates in proportion, as equal to an army of 120,000 men; measured by that standard, the British navy in 1801 was equivalent to a land force of above 800,000 men. Nor had the military resources of the empire increased in a less striking manner. In 1793, the army amounted only to 64,000 regular soldiers and 12,000 fencibles in the

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¹ Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 47.

² Peuchet, Stat. de la France, 591.

94.
Progress of the military and naval forces on both sides during the war.

* General Mathieu Dumas estimates the regular force of France, after the peace of Luneville, at 277,000 men, exclusive of the coast-guards, the gendarmerie, the depôts of the corps, and the national guard on active service. It is a most moderate computation to take these at 73,000 more.

In 1805 the military establishment of France consisted of the following forces:—

Infantry of the line,	341,000	Light cavalry,	60,500
Light infantry,	100,000	Heavy cavalry,	17,000
Infantry,	441,000	Cavalry,	77,500
Foot and horse artillery, pontooneers, engineers, &c.			53,500
Imperial guard,			8,500
Gendarmerie,			15,600

This would amount to a total of—

Infantry,	441,000
Cavalry,	77,500
Artillery and Engineers,	53,500
Imperial Guard,	8,500
Gendarmerie,	15,600

Total, 596,100 men.

—See DUMAS, vi. 70-71; and PEUCHET, *Statistique de la France*, 576, 580.

† The total British navy on 1st October 1801, was—

Line in commission,	104
Line in ordinary, and building,	98
Frigates in commission,	126
Frigates in ordinary, and building,	151
Sloops, brigs, &c.	302

Total, 781

—See JAMES, vol. iii. tab. 10, *ad fin.*

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¹ Ann. Reg.
xxxiii. 250.
Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 15.
Jom. i. 224.
St. Cyr. i. 36.
Introd. Etat.
de France,
573. Dum.
vi. 70, 71.

95.
Comparative
increase in
revenue of
France and
England dur-
ing the war.

² Lac. vi.
110. Etat
de la Dette
Publique, 8.
Young, i.
577.

³ Ann. Reg.
1793, 250.
Moreau and
Febrer's
Tables. Peb.
154. Bign. ii.
130, 131.

British isles and its colonial dependencies; whereas in 1801 they had increased to the immense force of 380,000 men, besides 100,000 volunteers.* The French army in 1793 consisted of 150,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery, exclusive of 77,000 provincial troops; in 1801, they amounted to 350,000 regular soldiers, exclusive of the national guards, who were twice as numerous.¹ During the war the British navy increased a half, while the French declined to a half. The British army was more than doubled, and the French increased in nearly the same proportion.

The French revenue, notwithstanding all its territorial acquisitions, was diminished, while the permanent income of England was nearly doubled; the French debt, by the destruction of two-thirds of its amount, was diminished, while that of England was doubled; the French exports and imports were almost annihilated, while the British exports were doubled, and the imports had increased more than fifty per cent.; the French commercial shipping was almost destroyed, while that of England had increased nearly a third. The regular revenue of France in 1789, (for no approximation even to a correct estimate can be formed of its amount during the period of confiscation and assignats,) had reached 469,000,000 francs, or £18,800,000; ² while that of England amounted to £16,382,000. At the termination of the war, the revenue of France was 450,000,000 francs, or £18,000,000, and its total expenditure 560,000,000 francs, or £22,400,000; while the permanent revenue of England at the same period amounted to £28,000,000, exclusive of £8,000,000 war taxes, and its total expenditure to £61,617,000.³†

The public debt of France, which, at the com-

* Regulars,	168,000
Militia,	80,008
Native troops in India,	130,000
Volunteers in Britain,	100,000
	<hr/>
	478,000

† M. Necker, in 1788, estimated the total revenue of Old France at 585,000,000 francs; whereas in 1801, notwithstanding the great addition to its territory which the Republic had received from the Low Countries, Savoy, Nice, and the frontier of the Rhine, which yielded an addition of 100,000,000 francs yearly, it had fallen to 450,000,000 francs, a striking proof how immensely the resources of the country had diminished during the Revolution. Before the increase of its territory, the territorial revenue of France was 1,200,000,000 francs; after it had been swelled by a fifth of superficial surface, it was only 850,000,000.

mencement of the Revolution, was 5,587,000,000 francs, or £249,000,000, and occasioned an annual charge of 259,000,000 francs, or £10,450,000, was still very considerable, amounting to 1,380,000,000 francs, or £55,000,000, and occasioning an annual charge of 69,000,000 francs, or £2,800,000, at the termination of the war, notwithstanding the extinction of two-thirds of its amount during its continuance, and the unexampled measures of spoliation by which its expenses had been defrayed.¹ * The public debt of England in 1792, was £244,440,000, and occasioned an annual charge, including the sinking fund, of £9,317,000; while, at the termination of the war in 1801, it had risen to £484,465,000, funded and unfunded, of which £447,000,000 was funded, and £37,318,000 unfunded. The annual charge of this immense burden had swelled to £21,661,000, of which £8,653,000 was for the debt existing before 1792, £13,025,000 for that created since that period, and £4,649,000 for the sinking fund.²

The imports of France in 1787, amounted to 349,725,000 francs, or about £14,000,000; the exports to 310,000,000 francs, or £12,500,000.³ At the same period the exports of British manufactures were £14,700,000, and of foreign merchandise £5,460,000, and the imports £18,680,000.⁴ In 1801, the French imports and exports were almost annihilated; the imports from the West Indies had fallen to £61,000, and the exports to the same quarter to £41,000;⁵ whereas the British exports in that year were £24,440,000 manufactures, and £17,166,000 foreign and colonial produce, and the imports £29,900,000; amounting in real value to about £54,000,000.⁶ Nor had the British shipping undergone a less striking increase; the tonnage, which, at the commencement of the war, was

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96.
Public debts
of the two
countries.1 *Etat de la*
Dette Pub. 8,
9. *Gæta*, i.
199. *Peu-*
chet, 500.
Young, ii.
578.2 *Moreau's*
Tables. Pub.
154, 246.97.
Exports and
imports of
both.3 *Young's*
Travels, ii.
501.4 *Mr. Adding-*
ton's finance
resolutions.5 *Parl. Hist.*
xxxvi. 787.6 *Parl. Hist.*
xxxv. 1563.
Febrer's
Tables, 340.

Greater lightness of taxation was certainly not the cause of the diminution, for the direct land and window tax of that latter year amounted to 265,000,000 francs, or £10,750,000, a sum equivalent to at least double that amount in the British islands, if the difference of the value of money in the two countries is taken into account. Dupin estimates the income derived from the soil in France, in 1828, at 1,626,000,000 francs, or £65,000,000. Supposing the increase of cultivation between 1801 and 1828 to counterbalance the reduction of territory by the peace of Paris in 1815, it follows that the French landholders in 1801 paid about a sixth, or sixteen per cent. on their incomes.—See NECKER's *Compte Rendu*, 1785; *Stat. de la France*, 514; GÆTA, i. 189, 310; BIGNON, ii. 130; and DUPIN, *Force Commerciale de France*, ii. 266.

* In 1789, according to the Duke of Gaeta, a deficit of 54,000,000 francs, or £2,150,000 yearly, was made "the apology for the Revolution." In 1801, when it was closed, it was above 100,000,000 francs annually, or £4,000,000 sterling.—GÆTA, i. 189.

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1 Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 1563,
and xxxvi.
787.98.
Reflections
on the im-
mense efforts
made by
England dur-
ing the war.

1,600,000 tons, having risen in 1801 to 2,100,000; and the mercantile seamen who, at the former period, were 118,000, having at the latter increased to 143,000, exclusive of 120,000 seamen and marines employed in the royal navy.¹*

Nothing but this continual and rapid increase in the resources of the British empire, during the course of the struggle, could have accounted for the astonishing exertions which she made towards its close, and the facility with which, during its whole continuance, the vast supplies required for carrying it on were raised without any sensible inconvenience to the country. When we reflect that, during a war of nine years' duration, the yearly expenditure of the nation varied from forty to sixty millions; that loans to the amount of twenty or thirty millions were annually contracted; and that the British fleets covered the seas in every quarter of the globe, we are lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the efforts made by a state so inconsiderable in extent, and with a population, even at the close of the period, and including Ireland, not exceeding fifteen millions.[†] But the phenomenon becomes still more extraordinary when the efforts made at the termination of the struggle are considered; and the British empire, instead of being exhausted by eight years' warfare, is seen stretching forth its giant arms at once into every quarter of the globe, striking down the throne of Tippoo Saib by as great a force as combated under the

* The revenue and charges of the Indian Empire in the year 1793, and 1799, and 1800, were as follows:—

	1793.	1799.	1800 & 1801.
Revenues—Bengal,	£5,454,000	£6,259,000	£6,339,000
Madras,	1,296,000	2,004,000	3,273,000
Bombay,	147,000	346,000	300,475
	£6,897,000	£8,609,000	£9,912,475
Charges—Bengal,	£3,131,000	£3,952,000	£4,422,000
Madras,	1,578,000	2,857,000	3,723,000
Bombay,	524,000	996,000	1,051,000
	£5,233,000	£7,807,000	£9,196,000
Surplus,	1,664,000	802,000	716,475
—Parl. Hist. xxxv. 15. <i>East India Budget</i> , and <i>Ann. Reg.</i> 1793, p. 78, and 1801, p. 164, <i>Ap. to Chronicle</i> .			
† Population of Great Britain in 1801,			10,942,000
Ireland, about			4,000,000
			14,942,000

—See *PERIER's Tables*, 332.

standards of Napoleon at Marengo ; * while it held every hostile harbour in Europe blockaded by its fleets, and sent forth Nelson to crush the confederacy of the northern powers at the very moment that it accumulated its forces in Europe and Asia against the Republican legions on the sands of Egypt. It had been frequently asserted, that the naval forces of England were equal to those of the whole world put together ; but the matter was put to the test in spring 1801, when, without raising the blockade of a single harbour from the Texel to Calabria, she sent eighteen ships of the line with Abercromby to the mouth of the Nile, while nineteen under Nelson dissolved by the battle of Copenhagen the northern confederation. The annals of Rome contain no example of a similar display of strength, and few of equal resolution in exerting it.

The contemplation of this astonishing display of strength at the close of the struggle, compared with the feeble and detached exertions made at its commencement, is calculated to awaken the most poignant regret at the niggardly use of the national resources so long made by Government, and the inexplicable insensibility to the magnitude of the forces at her command, which so long paralysed the might of England, during the earlier years of the war. From a return laid before the House of Commons, it appears that the number of men that had been raised for the service of the army from the commencement of hostilities down to the close of 1800, was 208,808, being at the rate of 26,000 a-year on an average during its continuance. France, with a population hardly double that of Great Britain, raised 1,500,000 men in 1793 alone. It is in the astonishing disproportion of the land forces of this country either to her naval armaments, her national strength, or the levies of her antagonist, that the true secret of the long duration, enormous expenditure, and numerous disasters of the war is to be found.¹

Secure in her insular situation, protected from invasion by invincible fleets, and relieved from the most disastrous

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99.
Compared
with the nig-
gardly exer-
tions at its
commence-
ment.

¹ Parl. Ret.
Dec. 31, 1800.
Ann. Reg.
1800, 40.

* Thirty-five thousand British and Sepoy troops formed the siege of Seringapatam in May, 1799. Thirty-one thousand French combated under the First Consul at Marengo.

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1801.

100.
Disastrous
effects of this
parsimonious
spirit in the
outset.

consequences which resulted from defeat to the continental powers, England was at liberty to employ her whole disposable force against the enemy, yet she never brought 25,000 native troops into the field at any one point. Had she boldly levied 100,000 men in 1793, and sent them to Flanders after the rout in the camp of Cæsar, when the French troops were shut up in their intrenched camps, and could not be brought by any exertions to face the Allies in the field, she would beyond all question have encamped under the walls of Paris in two months. At the same time, and by the aid of so great a diversion, the royalists of the south and west would have obtained a decisive superiority over the anarchical faction in the capital, and the Revolution have been at an end. During the nine years of the war, upwards of £100,000,000 was paid in army, and a still larger sum in naval expenses; while in 1793 the military charges were not £4,000,000, and in the latter and more expensive years of the war, amounted annually to £12,000,000. If a fifth part of this total sum had been expended in any one of the early years in raising the military force of England to an amount worthy of her national strength and ancient renown, triple the British force which overthrew Napoleon at Waterloo, might have been assembled on the plains of Flanders, and the war terminated in a single campaign.* The incessant clamour of the Opposition against any increase in the expenditure at the outset, and when it might have averted future disaster, was the main cause of this deplorable result, and of the immense debt which burdened the nation at the conclusion of the contest.

101.
Great part of
this prosper-
ity was ow-
ing to the
paper cur-
rency.

If the rapid growth of wealth, power, and prosperity in the British islands during this memorable contest, had been all grounded on a safe and permanent foundation,

* The expenses of the army and navy, during the war, were as follow :—

		Army.	Ordnance.	Navy.
1792,	...	£1,819,000	£422,000	£1,485,000
1793,		3,993,000	783,000	3,971,000
1794,		6,641,000	1,345,000	5,525,000
1795,		11,610,000	2,321,000	6,315,000
1796,		14,911,000	1,954,700	11,833,000
1797,		15,488,000	1,643,000	13,033,000
1798,		12,852,000	1,303,000	13,449,000
1799,		11,840,000	1,500,000	13,642,000
1800,		11,941,000	1,695,000	13,619,000
1801,		12,117,000	1,639,000	15,857,000

—See *FEHRER'S Tables*, 154.

it would have presented a phenomenon unparalleled in such circumstances in any age or country. But though part of this extraordinary increase was undoubtedly a real and substantial addition to the industry and resources of the empire, arising from the vast extension of its colonial possessions, and the monopoly of almost all the trade of the world in its hands,* yet part was to be ascribed to other causes, attended in the outset with deceptive and temporary advantages, and in the end with real and permanent evils. Like an extravagant individual, who squanders in the profusion of a few years the savings of past centuries, and the provision of unborn generations, the Government of England threw a fleeting lustre over its warlike administration, by trenching deep on the capital of the nation, and creating burdens little thought of at the time, when the vast expenditure was going forward, but grievously felt in subsequent years, when the excitation of the moment had passed away, and the bitter consequences of the debt which had been contracted remained. But this was not all. England, during those eventful years, drank deep at the fountains of paper currency, and derived a feverish and unnatural strength from that perilous but intoxicating draught.

From the accounts laid before Parliament, it appears that the notes of the Bank of England in circulation, had increased upwards of a half, from 1793 to 1801,† and that

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102.
Vast increase
of the paper
currency dur-
ing the war.

* The operation of these causes appeared, in an especial manner, in the vast increase of our export of foreign and colonial merchandise during the war, which, on an average of six years, ending 5th January 1793, was £5,468,000; and in the year ending 5th January 1801, had risen to the enormous sum of £17,166,000; being more than triple its amount at the commencement of the contest.—See MR. ADDINGTON'S *Finance Resolutions*, 1801.—*Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1564.

† Circulation in Bank of England Notes.			Commercial Paper discounted at the Bank.	Gold Coined.
1792,	...	£11,006,000	No account kept.	£1,171,000
1793,	...	11,888,000		2,747,000
1794,	...	10,744,000		2,558,000
1795,	...	14,017,000	£2,946,000	493,000
1796,	...	10,729,000	3,505,000	464,000
1797,	Feb. 28,	9,674,000	5,350,000	2,000,000
1798,	Aug. 31,	11,114,000	5,870,000	2,067,000
1798,	...	13,095,000	4,490,000	449,000
1799,	...	13,389,000	5,403,000	189,000
1800,	...	16,844,000	6,401,000	450,000
1801,	...	16,213,000	7,905,000	437,000

—See *Appendix to Report on Bank*, 1832, and *PERRER'S Tables*, 254, 260, and 279.

The slightest consideration of this most instructive Table is sufficient to

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¹ Lords' Report on Banks, Ap. No. 39, and Lords' Report on Corn, 1814, No. 12.

the commercial paper under discount at the same establishment, during the same period, had more than tripled. The effect of this great increase speedily appeared in the prices of grain, and every other article of life. Wheat which, on an average of five years prior to 1792, had sold at 5s. 4d. a-bushel, had risen, on an average of five years, ending with 1802, to 10s. 8d., and on an average of five years ending 1813, to 14s. 4d. a-bushel.^{1*} Thus, during the progress of the war, the prices of the necessities of life were at one time nearly tripled, and even at the peace of Amiens had permanently more than doubled. The effect of this of course was, that the money price of all the other articles of life rapidly rose in the same proportion; rents advanced; all persons who lived by buying and selling found their commodities constantly rising in value; credit, both public and private, immensely improved; industry was vivified by the progressive rise in the value of its produce; and difficulties were overcome by the rapid diminution in the weight of money debts. It is to the influence of this cause, combined with the vast expenditure of Government, and the concentration of almost all the colonial trade of the world in the hands of Great Britain, in consequence of her maritime superiority, that the extraordinary prosperity of the empire during the latter years of the war is to be ascribed. But it was not unmixed good which accrued to the nation, even for a time, from these violent changes. The whole

demonstrate to what source the crisis of February 1797 was owing. The paper of the bank was then contracted from fourteen millions, its amount in 1795, to nine millions. This was doubtless owing to necessity. The bank directors finding a steady demand for specie setting in upon them, in consequence of the panic of an invasion and the general desire to get gold for hoarding, vigorously set about contracting the currency by refusing discounts, thinking the gold coin going abroad; when in fact it was secreted in deposits at home. Thus the contraction of the currency did vast injury to credit, without restoring the circulation of specie. It unavoidably brought about the general panic which rendered the suspension of cash-payments in that month unavoidable, and landed the nation in the bottomless pit of paper currency, inconvertible into gold, and all the prodigious change of prices with which it was necessarily attended.

* The prices of wheat from 1790 to 1801 were as follow:—

Per Quarter.				Per Quarter.			
1790,	...	£2 13 2	...	1796,	...	£3 12 0	
1791,	...	2 7 0	...	1797,	...	2 12 0	
1792,	...	2 2 4	...	1798,	...	2 9 8	
1793,	...	2 8 8	...	1799,	...	3 7 4	
1794,	...	2 11 0	...	1800,	...	5 12 8	scarcity.
1795,	...	4 7 0	...	1801,	...	5 18 0	scarcity.

—See *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 167, *App. to Chron.*

class of annuitants, and all dependent on a fixed money income, suffered as much as the holders of commodities gained by their effects; creditors were defrauded as much as debtors were relieved, and almost as great a transference of property was ultimately effected by the silent operation of the alternation of prices which followed this great experiment, as was produced in other countries by the direct convulsions of a revolution.

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But without anticipating these ultimate effects, which as yet lay buried in the womb of time, and might perhaps have been avoided by a more manly adherence to the principles of Mr. Pitt's financial policy than was deemed practicable in later times, it is impossible to conclude the history of this first period of the war without rendering a just tribute to the memory of those illustrious and high-minded men, who bore the British nation victorious through the greatest perils which had assailed it since the Norman Conquest; who, clearly perceiving, amidst all the delusion of the times, the disastrous tendency of the revolutionary spirit, "struggled with it when it was strongest, and ruled it when it was wildest;" who amidst the greatest perils disdained to purchase safety by submission, and, undismayed alike by foreign disaster and domestic treason, held on their glorious way conquering and to conquer. No other monument is required to the memory of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Burke but the British empire, as they left it at the peace of Amiens, unconquered by force, undivided by treason, unchanged in constitution, untainted in faith, the bulwark of order, the asylum of freedom, the refuge of religion; contending undauntedly against the world in arms, covering the ocean with its fleets, encircling the earth in its grasp; the ark which bore the fortunes of humanity amidst the waves of the Deluge, and to which alone the eye of hope was turned, from all the suffering realms of the earth.*

103.
Glorious state
and character
of England
at the conclu-
sion of the
contest.

* In making these observations, the author is fully aware of the burdens consequent on Mr. Pitt's administration, and the disastrous effects which have in the end followed the change of prices begun in 1797. What he rests upon is, that this change was forced upon the British statesman by overwhelming necessity, and that Mr. Pitt had provided a system of finance, which, if steadily adhered to by his successors, as it might have been, and not disturbed by an unnecessary and disastrous contraction of the currency in 1810, would have discharged the whole debt contracted in the revolutionary war before the year 1845, that is, in the same time that it was created.—See *infra*, on Mr. Pitt's financial policy, chapter xli.

CHAPTER XXXV.

RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIETY IN FRANCE BY NAPOLEON
DURING THE CONTINENTAL PEACE.
OCTOBER 1801—MAY 1803.

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XXXV.

1801.

1.
Deplorable
internal state
of France
when Napo-
leon succeed-
ed to the
helm.

WHEN Napoleon seized the reins of power in France, he found the institutions of civilisation and the bonds of society dissolved, to an extent of which the previous history of the world afforded no example. Not only was the throne overturned, the nobles exiled, their landed estates confiscated; the aristocracy destroyed; but the whole institutions of religion, law, commerce, and education, had been overturned. There remained neither nobles to rule, nor priests to bless, nor teachers to instruct the people. Commerce no more spread its benign influence through the realm, and manufacturing industry, in woful depression, could not maintain its numerous inhabitants. The great cities no longer resounded with the hammer of the artisan, and the village bells had ceased to call the faithful to the house of God. The chateaux in ruins existed only to awaken the melancholy recollection of departed splendour, and the falling churches to attest the universal irreligion of the inhabitants; the ocean was no more whitened by the sails of its commerce, nor the mountains enlivened by the song of its shepherds. Even the institutions of charity, and the establishments for the relief of suffering, had shared in the general wreck. The monastery no longer spread its ample stores to the poor; and the hospital doors were closed against the numerous supplicants who laboured under wounds or disease. Hardened by want, and steeled against pity by the multiplicity of the objects claiming its attention, humanity itself seemed to be closing in the human heart. Every one, engrossed in the cares of self-preservation, and destitute of

the means of relieving others, turned with callous indifference from the spectacle of general misery. In one class only the spirit of religion glowed with undecaying lustre, and survived the wreck of all its institutions. Persecuted, reviled, and destitute, the Sisters of Charity still persevered in their pious efforts to assuage human suffering; and sought out the unfortunate alike among the ranks of the Republicans who had overturned, as of the Royalists who had bled for the faith of their fathers.*

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To restore the institutions which the insanity of former times had overturned, and draw close again the bonds which previous guilt had loosened, was the glorious task which awaited the First Consul. The powers which he possessed for it were great, but the difficulties attending its execution were almost insurmountable. On the one hand, he was at the head of a numerous, brave, and experienced army, flushed by victory, and obedient to his will; the whole remaining respectable classes of the state had rallied round his standard; and all ranks, worn out with revolutionary contention and suffering, were anxious to submit to any government which promised them the first of social blessings, peace and protection. On the other, almost all the wealth and all the nobility of the state had disappeared during the Revolution; the church was annihilated; the nobles were guillotined or in exile; the merchants banished or insolvent; and great part of the landed property of the country had passed into the hands of several millions of small holders, who might be expected to be permanently resolute in maintaining their possessions against the dispossessed proprietors. That society could not long go on, nor any durable government be established, without some national religion, or some connexion between the throne and the altar, was sufficiently evident; but how was either to be reconstructed in the midst of an infidel generation, and by the aid of the very men who

2.
Means which were at his disposal to reconstruct society; and difficulties which he had to encounter.

* It is not to be supposed that the revolutionary governments had done nothing for education. On the contrary, the Polytechnic School, and many other institutions, particularly a school of medicine, and the Institute itself, were owing to their exertions. But in the distracted state of the country, and when the care of self-preservation came home to every one, little attention could be paid to the education of the young; and by destroying every sort of religious tuition, the Convention had cut off the right hand of public instruction, the only branch of it which is of paramount importance to the poor.—See THIBAUDEAU, 123.

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had contributed to their destruction? That a constitutional monarchy could not exist without a representative system, founded on all the great interests of the state, and tempered by the steadiness of an hereditary aristocracy, was indeed apparent; but where were the elements of it to be found, when the former had almost all been crushed during the convulsions of the Revolution, and the latter, destitute and exiled, was the object of inveterate jealousy to the numerous classes who had risen to greatness by its overthrow?

3.
He resolves to
make the at-
tempt.

These difficulties were so great that they would probably have deterred any ordinary conqueror from the attempt; and he would have been content to accept the crown which was offered him, and leave to others the herculean task of closing the wounds of the Revolution. But Napoleon was not a man of that character. He believed firmly that he was the destined instrument in the hand of Providence to extinguish that terrible volcano, and he was conscious of powers equal to the undertaking. From the very outset, accordingly, he began, cautiously indeed, but firmly and systematically, to coerce the democratic spirit, and reconstruct those classes and distinctions in society which had disappeared during the preceding convulsions, but which were the indispensable bulwarks of the throne. The success with which his efforts were attended, is a more glorious monument to his memory than all the victories which he won.

4.
Constitution-
al freedom
was then im-
possible in
France.

Those who reproach Napoleon with establishing a despotic government, and not founding his throne on the basis of a genuine representation of the people, would do well to show how he could have framed a counterpoise to democratic ambition, or a check on regal oppression, out of the representatives of a community from which all the superior classes of society had been violently torn. They should point out how the turbulent passions of a Republican populace could have been moulded into habitual subjection to a legislature, distinguished in no way from their own members, and a body of titled senators, destitute of wealth, consideration, or hereditary rank; how a constitutional throne could have subsisted without either any support from the loyal, or any foundation in the religious feelings of its subjects; and how a

proud and victorious army could have been taught that respect for the majesty of the legislature which is the invaluable growth of centuries of order, but which the successive overthrow of so many previous governments in France had done so much to destroy. After its patricians had been cut off by the civil wars of Sylla and Marius, Rome sank necessarily and inevitably under the despotic rule of the emperors. When Constantine founded a second Rome on the shores of the Bosphorus, he perceived it was too late to attempt the restoration of the balanced constitution of the ancient republic. On Napoleon's accession to the consular throne, he found the chasms in the French aristocracy still greater and more irreparable. The only remaining means of righting the scale was by throwing the sword into the balance. The total failure of all subsequent attempts to frame a constitutional monarchy out of the elements which the Revolution had left in the society of France, proves that Napoleon rightly appreciated its political situation, and seized upon the only means of restoring tranquillity to its troubled waters.*

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Circumstances soon occurred which called forth the secret but indelible hatred of the First Consul at the Jacobin faction. The conspiracy of Arena and Ceracchi, which failed at the opera, had been traced to some ardent enthusiasts of that class; and soon after a more formidable attempt at his assassination gave rise to a wider proscription of their associates. On the day on which the armistice of Steyer was signed, Napoleon went to the opera. Berthier, Lannes, and Lauriston were with him in the carriage. In going from the Tuileries to the theatre, in the Rue de Richelieu, his carriage passed through the Rue St. Nicaise; an overturned chariot in that narrow thoroughfare almost obstructed the passage, but the coachman, who was driving rapidly, had the

5.
Explosion of
the infernal
machine.

Dec. 24, 1800.

* "There is, in the English constitution," said Napoleon, "a body of noblesse which unites to the lustre of descent a great part of the landed property of the nation. These two circumstances give it a great influence over the people, and interest attaches it to the government. In France, since the Revolution, that class is totally wanting. Would you re-establish it? If you compose it of the men of the Revolution, it would be necessary to concentrate in their hands a large portion of the national property, which is now impossible. If it were composed of the ancient noblesse, this would soon lead to a counter revolution."—See THIBAUDEAU, 291.

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address to pass it without stopping. Hardly had he got through when a terrible explosion broke all the windows of the vehicle, struck down the last man of the guard, killed eight persons, and wounded twenty-eight, besides occasioning damage to the amount of two hundred thousand francs (£8000,) in forty-six adjoining houses. Napoleon drove on without stopping to the opera, where the audience were in consternation at the explosion, which was so loud as to be heard over all Paris. Every eye was turned to him when he entered, but the calm expression of his countenance gave not the slightest indication of the danger which he had escaped. Speedily, however, the news circulated through the theatre, and the First Consul had the satisfaction of receiving, in the thunders of applause which shook its walls, the most fervent expressions of attachment to his person.¹

¹ Thib. 23.
24. Bour. iv.
199, 200.
D'Ab. iv. 108,
110.

⁶.
Napoleon at
once ascribes
it to the Ja-
cobins.

Before the piece had terminated, Napoleon returned to the Tuileries, where a crowd of public functionaries was assembled from every part of Paris to congratulate him on his escape. He anticipated all their observations by commencing in a loud voice, "This is the work of the Jacobins; it is they who have attempted to assassinate me. Neither the nobles, nor the priests, nor the Chouans had any hand in it. I know on what to form my opinion, and it is in vain to seek to make me alter it. It is the Septembrisers, those wretches steeped in crime, who are in a state of permanent revolt, in close column, against every species of government. Three months have hardly elapsed since you have seen Ceracchi, Arena, and their associates, attempt to assassinate me. Again, it is the same clique, the blood-suckers of September, the assassins of Versailles, the brigands of 31st May, the authors of all the crimes against government, who are at their hellish work. It is the tribe of artisans, and journalists who have a little more instruction than the people, but live with them, and mingle their passions with their own ardent imaginations, who are the authors of all these atrocities. If you cannot chain them you must exterminate them; there can be no truce with such wretches; France must be purged of such an abominable crew." During this vehement harangue, delivered with the most impassioned gesticulations, all eyes were turned

towards Fouché, the well-known leader of that party, and stained at Lyons and the Loire with some of its most frightful atrocities. Alone, he stood in a window recess, pale, dejected, hearing every thing, answering nothing. The crowd of courtiers broke into exclamations, the echo of the First Consul's sentiments. One, gifted with more courage than the rest, approached, and asked the minister of police why he made no reply, "Let them go on," said he. "I am determined not to compromise the safety of the state. I will speak when the proper time arrives. He laughs securely who laughs the last."¹

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¹ Thib. 27,
28. Bour. iv.
201, 202.
D'Ab. iv. 110,
114.

On the following day a public audience was given to the prefect of the Seine, and the twelve mayors of Paris. Napoleon said: "As long as that handful of wretches attacked me alone, I left to the laws the charge of chastising their offences; but since, by a crime without example, they have endangered the lives of a part of the population of Paris, their punishment must be as rapid as extraordinary. They consist of a hundred miscreants who have brought disgrace on liberty by the crimes committed in its name; it is indispensable that they should be forthwith deprived of the means of inflicting further injuries on society." This idea was more fully unfolded at a meeting of the Council of State which took place on the same day. It was proposed to establish a special commission to try the offenders; but this was far from meeting Napoleon's views, who was resolved to seize the present opportunity to inflict a death-blow on the remnant of the Jacobin faction. "The action of a special tribunal," said he, "would be too slow; we must have a more striking punishment for so extraordinary an offence; it must be as rapid as lightning; it must be blood for blood. As many of the guilty must be executed as there fell victims to their designs, say fifteen or twenty; transport two hundred, and take advantage of this event to purge the Republic of its most unworthy members. This crime is the work of a band of assassins, of September-brisers,* whose hands may be traced through all the crimes of the Revolution. When that party sees a blow struck at its headquarters, and that fortune has abandoned

7.
Speech which
he made on
the occasion
to the autho-
rities of Paris.

* In allusion to the massacres in the prisons in September 1792.

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its chiefs, every thing will return to established order; the workmen will resume their labours; and ten thousand men, who, in France, are ranged under its colours, will abandon it for ever. That great example is necessary to attach the middle classes to the throne; the industrious citizens can have no hope as long as they see themselves menaced by two hundred enraged wolves, who look only for the proper moment to throw themselves on their prey.

8.
He refuses to
listen to any
attempt to ex-
culpate them.

"The metaphysicians are the men to whom we owe all our misfortunes. Half measures will no longer do; we must either pardon every thing, like Augustus, or adopt a great measure which may be the guarantee of the social order. When, after the conspiracy of Catiline, Cicero caused the guilty to be strangled, he said he had saved his country. I should be unworthy of the great task which I have undertaken, and of my mission, if I evinced less firmness on this trying occasion. We must regard this affair as statesmen, not as judges. I am so convinced of the necessity of making a great example, that I am ready to call the accused before me, interrogate them, and myself subscribe their condemnation. It is not for myself that I speak; I have braved greater dangers; my fortune has preserved me, and will preserve me; but we are now engaged with the social order, with the public morality, the national glory." In the midst of this energetic harangue, it was evident that Napoleon was losing sight of the real point to be first considered, which was, who were the guilty parties. Truguet alone had the courage to approach this question, by suggesting that there were different classes of guilty persons in France; that there were fanatics as well as Jacobins who misled the people, and that the priests, whose denunciations against the holders of the national domains had already appeared in several recent publications, might possibly be the authors of the infernal project.

9
Napoleon's
reply to Tru-
guet.

Napoleon warmly interrupted him, "You will not make me alter my opinion by such vain declamations; the wicked are known; they are pointed out by the nation. They are the Septembrisers, the authors of every political crime in the Revolution, who have ever been spared or protected by the weak persons at the head of

affairs. Talk not to me of nobles or priests. Would you have me proscribe a man for a title, or transport ten thousand grey-haired priests? Would you have me prosecute a religion, still professed by the majority of Frenchmen, and by two-thirds of Europe? La Vendée never was more tranquil; the detached crimes which still disgrace its territory are the result merely of ill-extinguished animosities. Would you have me dismiss all my counsellors excepting two or three; send Portalis to Sinnimari, Devaine to Madagascar, and choose a Council from the followers of Babœuf? It is in vain to pretend that the people will do no wrong but when they are prompted to it by others. The people are guided by an instinct, in virtue of which they act alone. During the Revolution they frequently forced on the leaders who appeared to guide them; the populace directing itself is an unmuzzled tiger. I have a dictionary of the men employed in all the massacres. The necessity of the thing being once admitted, our duty is to attain it in the most efficacious way. Do they take us for children? Do not hope, citizen Truguet, that you would, in the event of their success, be able to save yourself by saying, 'I have defended the patriots before the Council of State.' No, no. These patriots would sacrifice you as well as us all." He then broke up the Council, and when passing Truguet, who was endeavouring to say something in his vindication, said aloud, "Come now, citizen, all that is very well for the *soirées* of Madame Condorcet or Mademoiselle Garat, but it won't do in a council of the most enlightened men of France."¹

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These vehement apostrophes from a man vested with despotic authority cut short all discussion, and the Council found itself compelled, notwithstanding a courageous resistance from some of its members, to go into the arbitrary designs of the First Consul. The public mind was prepared for some great catastrophe by repeated articles in the public journals, drawn up by the Minister of Police,* in which that astute counsellor, suppressing his

¹ Thib. 33,
34.

10.
A coup-d'état
is resolved on
against the
Jacobins.

* In one of these, the Minister of Police addressed the following report to the First Consul:—

"It is not against ordinary brigands, for whose coercion the ordinary tribunals are sufficient, and who menace only detached persons or articles of property, that the Government is now required to act: it is the enemies of

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private information, directed the thunders of the executive against his former associates. But while these measures were in preparation, Fouché and the First Consul received decisive information that it was the Royalists, and not the Jacobins, who were the real authors of the conspiracy, and a clue was obtained which promised soon to lead to the discovery of the guilty parties. The Minister of Police, therefore, received secret instructions not to allude in his report against the Republicans to the affair of the infernal machine, but to base the proposed *coup-d'état* generally on the numerous conspiracies against the public peace; and on this report Napoleon urged the immediate delivery to a military commission of eighteen, and transportation of above a hundred persons, without either trial or evidence taken against them. In vain Thibaudeau and Roederer urged in the Council of State, that there was no evidence against the suspected persons, and that it was the height of injustice to condemn a crowd of citizens, untried and unheard, to the severe punishment of transportation. The First Consul, though well aware that they had no connexion with the late conspiracy, was resolved not to let slip the opportunity of getting quit at once of so many dangerous characters.¹

¹ Thib. 43,
49. Bour. iv.
205, 207.

11.
Napoleon's
reasons for
transporting
the Jacobins,
though inno-
cent.

"We have strong presumptions, at least," said he, "if not proofs against the Terrorists. The Chouannerie and emigration are maladies of the skin, but Terrorism is a disease of the vital parts. The Minister of Police has purposely omitted the mention of the late conspiracy, because it is not for it that the measure is proposed. If that reserve were not observed, we should compromise our character. The proposed step is grounded upon considerations independent of the late event; it only fur-

entire France who are now at the bar; men who threaten every instant to deliver it up to the fury of anarchy.

"These frightful characters are few in number, but their crimes are innumerable. It is by them that the convention has been attacked with an armed force in the bosom of the sanctuary of the laws: it is they who have endeavoured so often to render the committees of Government the agents of their atrocious designs. They are not the enemies of this or that government, but of every species of authority.

"They persist in an atrocious war, which cannot be terminated but by an extraordinary measure of the supreme police. Among the men whom the police has denounced, many were not found with the poniard in their hands; but all were equally capable of sharpening and using it. In disposing of them we must not merely punish the past, but provide a guarantee of social order in future."—See THIBAudeau, 43, 44, and BOURRIENNE, iv. 204, 205.

nished the occasion for putting them in force. The persons included in the lists will be transported for their share in the massacres in the prisons on September 2d; for their accession to the Jacobin revolt of 31st May; for the conspiracy of Babœuf, and all that they have done since that time. Such a step would have been necessary without the conspiracy, but we must avail ourselves of the enthusiasm it has excited to carry it into execution." In pursuance of these views, an *arrêt* was proposed by the Council of State, and adopted by the Senate, which condemned to immediate transportation no less than a hundred and thirty individuals, among whom were nine persons who had been engaged in the massacres of September, and several members of the Convention, Choudien, Taillefer, Thirion, and Talot, Felix Lepelletier, and Rossignol, well known for his cruelty in the war of La Vendée. The decree was forthwith carried into execution, and thus did the arbitrary tyranny which the Jacobins had so long exercised over others, at length, by a just retribution, recoil upon themselves.^{1*}

In less than a month afterwards, Fouché made a second report upon the conspiracy of the infernal machine, in which he admitted, that when these measures of severity were adopted against the Jacobins, he had other suspicions; that George Cadoudal and other emigrants had successively disembarked from England; and that the horse attached to the machine had furnished a clue to the authors of the plot, who had at length been detected in the house of certain females of the Royalist party. Saint Regent and Carbon accordingly, the really guilty persons, were tried by the ordinary tribunals, condemned, and executed.

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¹ Thib. 42,
51. Bour. iv.
205, 206.

12.
It is afterwards discovered that the Chouans were the really guilty parties.

* The *Senatus Consultum* was in these terms:—"Considering that the constitution has not determined measures necessary to be taken in certain emergencies; that in the absence of any express directions, the Senate is called upon to give effect to the wishes of the people, expressed by that branch of the constitution of which it is the organ; that according to that principle, the Senate is the natural judge of any conservative measures proposed in perilous circumstances by the Government; and considering that the measure proposed by the Council of State seems to be based on necessity and public expedience, the Senate declares that that measure is conservative of the constitution." Upon this decree being obtained, the Council of State decided that their resolution was obligatory on the constituted authorities, and that it should be promulgated, like the laws and acts of the Government, but without receiving the sanction of the Legislative Body and the Tribunal; and it was immediately put in force without their concurrence.—See THIBAUDEAU, 51, 52.

Terms of the
Senatus Consultum.

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Not a shadow of doubt could now remain that the conspiracy had been the work of the Royalists; but Napoleon persisted, though he saw that as clearly as any one, in carrying into effect the sweeping decree of transportation against the Jacobins. "There is not one of them," he said to those who petitioned for a relaxation of the sentence in favour of certain individuals, "who has not deserved death a hundred times over, if they had been judged by their conduct during the Revolution; these wretches have covered France with scaffolds, and the measure adopted in regard to them is rather one of mercy than severity; the attempt of the infernal machine is neither mentioned as a motive nor the occasion of the *Senatus Consultum*; with a company of grenadiers I could put to flight the whole faubourg St. Germain, with its Royalist *coteries*; but the Jacobins are men of determined character, whom it is not so easy to make retreat. As to the transportation of the Jacobins, it is of no sort of consequence; I have got quit of them; if the Royalists commit any offence, I will strike them also." ¹*

¹ Thib. 51.
62. Bour. iv.
212, 213, 214.

13.
Napoleon
creates the
Duke of
Parma King
of Etruria.

May, 1801.

The next important step of Napoleon was the exhibition of a king of his own creation, to the astonished Parisians. By a convention with Spain, it was stipulated that the province of Tuscany, ceded to the Infanta of Spain, Marie-Louise, third daughter of Charles IV., and the Duke of Parma, her husband, should be erected into a monarchy, under the title of the kingdom of Etruria. In May 1801, the newly created king, Louis I., with his young bride, arrived in Paris, on his way from Madrid to Florence, and was received with extraordinary distinction both on the road and in the capital. Numerous *fêtes* succeeded each other in honour of the royal pair, among which those of M. Talleyrand, in his villa at Neuilly, was remarked as peculiarly magnificent. The young king early evinced

* It is a curious and instructive fact, that no sooner was the determination of the First Consul, in regard to the Jacobins, known, than a multitude of revelations flowed in from the prefects, mayors, and magistrates over all France, implicating the Republicans still further in the conspiracy, and detailing discoveries of the vast Jacobin plot which was to have burst forth in every part of the country, the moment intelligence was received of the leading stroke given in the capital! A striking instance of the distrust with which the officious zeal of such authorities should be received, and of the necessity of the executive not letting their wishes be known, if they would in such circumstances preserve the semblance even of justice in their proceedings. — See THIBAUDEAU, 53, 63; BOURRIENNE, iv. 212.

symptoms of that imbecility of character by which he was afterwards distinguished; but it was deemed of importance to accustom the court of the First Consul to the sight of royalty, and the Parisians to the intoxicating idea that, like the Roman Senate, they were invested with the power of making and unmaking kings. He was gratified by the demonstration that he could confer Royalty, while he declined its honours himself. Napoleon received the reward of this policy in the transports with which, when he was present, the celebrated lines of Voltaire in the tragedy of *Œdipus* were received at the theatre—¹

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“ Le Trone est un objet qui n'a pu me tenter.
Hercule à ce haut rang dedaignait de menter:
Toujours libre avec lui, sans sujets et sans maître
J'ai fait des souverains, et n'ai pas voulu l'être.” *

¹ Thib. 64.
69. Rour. iv.
270, 273.

But it was not merely by such exhibitions of royalty that Napoleon endeavoured to prepare the French nation for his own assumption of the crown. At the time when the public mind was strongly excited by the danger which the state had run from the success of the infernal machine, a pamphlet appeared with the title, “Parallel between Cæsar, Cromwell, and Buonaparte,” in which the cause of royalty and hereditary succession was openly advocated. It excited at first a great sensation, and numerous copies were sent to the First Consul from the prefects and magistrates, with comments on the dangerous effects it was producing on the public mind. Fouché, however, soon discovered that it had issued and been distributed from the office of the minister of the interior, and shortly after that it came from the pen of Lucien Buonaparte. Napoleon affected to be highly indignant at this discovery, and reproached Fouché with not having instantly sent his imprudent brother to the Temple; but the cautious minister was too well informed to put the hint in execution, as Lucien had shown him the original manuscript corrected by the hand of the First Consul himself. However, it was necessary to disavow the production, as its effect proved that it had prematurely disclosed the designs of the fortunate usurper, and therefore Lucien was sent into an honourable exile, as ambassador at Madrid, with many reproaches from

14.
Parallel published by authority, between Cæsar, Cromwell, and Napoleon.

* *Œdipe*, Act ii. s. 5.

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Napoleon for having allowed the device to be discovered. "I see," said Napoleon to his secretary, "that I have been moving too fast; I have broken ground too soon; the pear is not yet ripe." He received secret instructions to exert all his influence at the court of Spain, to induce that power to declare war against Portugal, in order to detach the whole peninsula from the alliance with England, and shut its harbours against the British flag.¹

¹ Bour. iv.
217, 220.

15.
Debate on the
lists of eligi-
bility in the
Council of
State.

The numerous complaints against the lists of eligibility which formed so important and remarkable a feature in the constitution under the Consulate, induced Napoleon to bring that subject again under the consideration of his State Council. It was justly objected against this institution, that it renewed, in another and a more odious form, all the evils of privileged classes which had occasioned the Revolution; that to confine the seats in the legislation, and all important offices under government, to five thousand individuals, out of above thirty millions of souls, was to the last degree unjust, and seemed peculiarly absurd at the close of a Revolution, the main object of which had been to open them indiscriminately to all the citizens, and which had arisen from the exclusive privileges of an hundred and fifty thousand. It became necessary to consider whether these complaints should be attended to, as the time was approaching when a fifth of the legislative body and tribunate were to be renewed, in terms of the constitution, and therefore the lists, already formed, were about to be forwarded to the electors. It was urged by the advocates for a change in the Council of State, that "public opinion had strongly pronounced itself against these lists, because they at once deprive a great body of citizens of that result of the Revolution which they most prized, eligibility to every public function. Out of delicacy to five thousand persons, who are inscribed in the highest class of these lists, you leave the seeds of a dangerous discontent in a hundred times that number. Doubtless it is not impossible from these lists to make for a few years a suitable choice of representatives; but such a result would only the more confirm a system radically vicious, and augment the difficulty which will hereafter be experienced in correcting it."

The First Consul replied:—"The institution of the lists

is objectionable. It is an absurd system, the growth of the ideology which, like a malady, has so long overspread France. It is not by such means that a great nation is reorganised. Sovereignty is inalienable. Nevertheless, bad as the system is, it forms part of the constitution ; we are only intrusted with its execution. It is impossible, besides, to let the people remain without any species of organisation : better a bad one than none at all. It is an error to suppose that society is organised merely because the constitution has created the powers of government. The supreme authority must have intermediate supports, or it has neither any stability nor any hold of the nation. We must not think, therefore, of abandoning the lists without substituting something else in their room. It is admitted that they form at present a sufficient body out of which to choose the Legislature ; the constitution has established them ; they form an organic law of the state ; all France has aided in their construction ; in the rural districts in particular they are universally approved of. Why, then, should we overlook the people of France, and their expressed approbation, merely because Paris has made a bad choice for her share of the list, and her citizens reckon the departments as nothing ? It is better for the Government to have to deal with a few thousand individuals than a whole nation. What harm can there be in going on for two or three years longer with these lists ? They form the sole channel by which the influence of the people is made to bear on the Government. It will be time enough at the close of that period to consider what changes should be made on it." Guided by these considerations, the Council resolved that the lists should remain unchanged. They were already regarded as the nucleus of a new nobility instead of that which had been destroyed, and as an indispensable attendant on the throne which was anticipated for the First Consul.¹

The opposition, however, were not discouraged. The subject of the lists was warmly debated both in the Council of State and before the legislature, and the maintenance of the existing system only carried by a majority of 56 to 26 in the Tribunate, and 239 to 36 in the Legislative Body. It is not surprising that this article of the constitution excited a violent opposition in the popular

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16.
Admirable
views of Na-
poleon on the
subject.

¹ Thib. 69,
74.

17.
Decision on it
by the Legis-
lature.

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party, seeing that it overturned the whole objects for which the nation had been fighting during the Revolution. "The law," says Thibaudeau, "called to the honours and the advantages of eligibility for offices in the communes, 50,000 individuals; to eligibility for offices in the departments, 50,000; to eligibility for the legislature or national offices, 5000. The whole of the other inhabitants were altogether excluded both from the rights of election and eligibility. The partisans of representative governments regarded this as far too narrow a circle in a country embracing thirty millions of souls. But the public in general took very little interest in this matter, justly observing, that as the electors were no longer intrusted with the choice of representatives, or of persons to fill any offices, but only of a large body of candidates from whom the selection was to be made by the government, it was of very little consequence whether this privilege was confined to many or few hands.¹

¹ Thib. 200.

18.
Legion of
Honour,
Napoleon's
arguments in
favour of it,
in the Council
of State.

But Napoleon's views in this important particular went much further, and he resolved to establish an order of nobility, under the title of the **LEGION OF HONOUR**, which should gradually restore the gradation of ranks in society, and at the same time attach the people to its support. This important matter was brought before the Council of State in May 1801. It met with more opposition than any other measure of the Consulate; the debates on it in the Council of State are in the highest degree curious and instructive. "The eighty-seventh article of the constitution," said Napoleon, "sanctions the establishment of military honours, but it has organised nothing. An *arrêt* has established arms of honour, with double pay as a consequence; others with a mere increase; there is nothing formal or regular constructed. The project I propose to you gives consistence to the system of recompenses; it is the beginning of organisation to the nation." It was proposed by General Mathieu Dumas that the institution should be confined to military men, but this was strongly combated by the First Consul. "Such ideas," said he, "might be well adapted to the feudal ages, when the chevaliers combated each other man to man, and the bulk of the nation was in a state of slavery; but when the military system changed, masses of infantry, and phalanxes

May 4, 1801.

constructed after the Macedonian model, were introduced, and after that it was not individual prowess, but science and skill, which determined the fate of nations. The kings themselves contributed to the overthrow of the feudal *régime*, by the encouragement which they gave to the commons; finally, the discovery of gunpowder, and the total change it induced in the art of war, completed its destruction. From that period the military spirit, instead of being confined to a few thousand Franks, extended to all the Gauls. Power was strengthened rather than weakened by the change; it ceased to be exclusive in its operation, and from being founded solely on military prowess, it came to be established also on civil qualities.

“What is it now which constitutes a great general? It is not the mere strength of a man six feet high, but the *coup d’œil*, the habit of foresight, the power of thought and calculation; in a word, pacific qualities, not such as you find in a lawyer, but such as are founded on a knowledge of human nature, and are suited to the government of armies. The general who can now achieve great things is he who is possessed of shining civil abilities; it is their perception of the strength of his talents which makes the soldiers obey him. Listen to them at their bivouacs; you will invariably find them award the preference to mental over physical qualities. Mourad Bey was the most powerful man among his Mamelukes; without that advantage he never could have been their leader. When he first saw me, he could not conceive how I could preserve authority among my troops; but he soon understood it, when he was made acquainted with our system of war. In all civilised states force yields to civil qualities. Bayonets sink before the priest who speaks in the name of Heaven, or the man of science who has gained an ascendancy by his knowledge. I predicted to all my military followers that a government purely military would never succeed in France till it had been brutalised by fifty years of ignorance. All their attempts to govern in that manner accordingly failed, and involved their authors in their ruin. It is not as a general that I govern; but because the nations believe me possessed of the ability in civil matters necessary for the head of affairs; without

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19.
Military supremacy secured by civil qualifications.

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20.

His argu-
ment for the
extension of
the honour to
civilians.

that I could not stand an hour. I knew well what I was about, when, though only a general, I took the title of Member of the Institute; I felt confident of being understood by the lowest drummer in the army.

"We must not reason from ages of barbarity to these times. France consists of thirty millions of men, united by intelligence, property, and commerce. Three or four hundred thousand soldiers are nothing in such a mass. Not only does the general preserve his ascendancy over his soldiers chiefly by civil qualities, but when his command ceases he becomes merely a private individual. The soldiers themselves are but the children of citizens. The tendency of military men is to carry every thing by force; the enlightened civilian, on the other hand, elevates his views to a perception of the general good. The first would rule only by despotic authority; the last subject every thing to the test of discussion, truth, and reason. I have no hesitation, therefore, in saying, that if a preference was to be awarded to the one or the other, it belongs to the civilian. If you divide society into soldiers and citizens, you establish two orders in what should be one nation. If you confine honours to military men, you do what is still worse, for you sink the people into nothing."¹ Moved by these profound observations, the Council agreed that the proposed honours should be extended indiscriminately to civil and military distinction.

¹ Thib. 75,
81.

21.

Arguments
against it by
Thibaudeau.

But the most difficult part of the discussion remained, the consideration of the expedience of the institution itself, even in its most extended form. Great opposition was manifested to it in the capital, from its evident tendency to counteract the levelling principles of the Revolution. It was strongly opposed, accordingly, in the Council of State, the Tribunate, and the Legislative Body, and all the influence of the First Consul could only obtain in these different assemblies a feeble majority. It was urged in the Council of State, by Thibaudeau and the opponents of the measure,—"That it was diametrically opposed to all the principles of the Revolution. The abolition of titles did not take place during those disastrous days which threw into discredit every thing, even of the best character, which was then established; it was the Constituent Assembly who made the change at one

of the most enlightened periods of the Revolution. The nation is profoundly influenced by the feeling of honour; but that principle, strong as it is, yields to the universal passion for equality. It was these two powerful motives, combined with the love of freedom and the feelings of patriotism, which gave its early and astonishing victories to the Republic. I do not see that the Legion of Honour could have made the public spirit greater. Considered as a guarantee of the Revolution, the institution appears to me to run counter to its object, and as laying the foundation of an intermediate body between the throne and the people; to involve a principle inconsistent with the representative system, which can recognise no distinction but that which flows from the choice of the citizens. I fear that the desire of possessing these ribbons may weaken the feelings of duty and of honour, instead of strengthening them. I have the highest respect for the motives which have led to this proposition, but I have still great doubts, and it seems highly desirable that such an institution should not be established but after the decided approbation of the great bodies in the state.

"In the theory which is presented for our consideration on this subject, representative governments are confounded with monarchical. It is quite true, that distinctions of rank are indispensable in a monarchy, in order to counterbalance, by intermediate bodies, the weight of the throne; but in a republic they are never-failing sources of irritation, because they destroy that equality among the citizens which is the foundation of all such institutions. In a monarchy, the safeguard of the people is to be found in a multitude of obstacles which restrain the inclinations of the ruler; in representative states, sovereign power is divided; the people are subjected only to magistrates of their own selection, and know of none but those whom the constitution recognises. By placing in the state the proposed institution, you voluntarily admit a patriciate, of which the immediate and inevitable tendency will be, to run into a military and hereditary nobility.

"The Legion of Honour involves within itself all the elements which have elsewhere led to a hereditary nobility, — individual distinction, power, honours, titles, and

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1801.

22.
Alleged tendency of the institution to originate a patrician class.

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1801.

23.
And its tendency toward the re-establishment of a monarchy.

fixed revenues. Hardly any where has a hereditary noblesse commenced its career with such advantages. It is in vain to pretend that the progress of intelligence and the lights of the age are a sufficient guarantee against any such abuse. The human heart is ever the same ; a renewal of the same circumstances will reproduce the same errors and the same desires. From the institution of the Legion will spring up afresh all the ancient prejudices, and these prejudices will fortify the military spirit and the respect for nobility, and introduce a separate in the midst of the general interest. Under pretence of effacing the last traces of nobility, it will establish a new one, and strongly confirm the old. Considered as an intermediate body, the Legion is, to say the least of it, a mere superfluity. Such intermediate bodies are of some use in despotic countries ; but in a representative state, and among a nation fortunate enough to possess the right of free discussion on public affairs, the sole intermediate body which is required, or should be tolerated, is the representatives of the people. The institution proposed is alike contrary to the principles of the Revolution and the text of the constitution. The proposed order leads directly to a monarchy. Crosses and ribbons are the pillars of an hereditary throne : they were unknown to the Romans who conquered the world.”¹

¹ Dum. viii.
195.

24.
Napoleon's reply.

Napoleon replied :—“ We are always referred by the Opposition to the Romans. It is singular that, as an argument against distinctions, reference should so frequently be made to the nation among all that ever existed in which they were most firmly established. The Romans had patricians, the equestrian order, citizens, and knights ; for each class they had a separate costume, different habits. To reward achievements, they awarded all sorts of distinctions, surnames recalling great services, mural crowns, triumphs. Superstition was called in to lend her aid to the general impression. Take away the religion of Rome, and nothing remains. When that fine body of patricians was destroyed, Rome was torn in pieces ; there successively arose the fury of Marius, the proscriptions of Sylla, the tyranny of the emperors. Brutus is continually referred to as the enemy of tyrants ; and yet Brutus was the greatest of all aristocrats. He slew Cæsar only

because he wished to degrade the influence of the senate, and exalt that of the people. This is the use which the spirit of party makes of history.*

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"I defy you to show me a republic, ancient or modern, where distinctions have not prevailed. They call them baubles,—well, it is with baubles that you govern mankind. I would not say that at the Tribune; but in a Council of State nothing should be concealed. I have no idea that the passion for liberty and equality is to be lasting in France. The French have not been so far changed by ten years of revolution; they are still as gallant and volatile as their Gaulish ancestors. They have but one prevailing sentiment, and that is honour; every thing should be done, therefore, to foster and encourage that principle. Observe how forcibly the people have been struck by the decorations of the strangers amongst us; that revealed their secret predilections. Voltaire called soldiers, Alexanders at five sous a-day. He was right; they really are so. Do you believe that you would ever make a man fight by abstract principles? Never; such views are fit only for the scholar in his study. For the soldier, as for all men in active life, you must have glory and distinction; recompenses are the food which nourish military virtue. The armies of the Republic have done such great things, because they were composed of the sons of labourers and substantial farmers, and not the mere rabble; because the officers stepped into the situations of those of the old *régime*, and were animated by the same sentiments of honour. It is the same principle which led to all the triumphs of Louis XIV. You may call, if you please, the Legion of Honour an order: it matters not, names will not alter the nature of things.

25.
Existence of
honorary re-
wards in the
ancient re-
publics; and
necessity of
them to the
formation of
the soldier.

"For ten years you have been constantly speaking of institutions, and what, after all, have you done? Nothing. The moment had not yet arrived. The Republicans proposed to unite the people to the country, by assembling them in churches, where, dying of cold, they were made

26.
Necessity of
such institu-
tions to the
maintenance
of the Re-
public.

* These observations of Napoleon are very remarkable. They show how much more clearly his natural sagacity, even amidst all the tumult of camps, had apprehended the truth of ancient history, than the numerous declaimers who, through the whole of the Revolution, had descanted on its examples.

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to listen to the reading and exposition of the laws; it may easily be imagined what effect such an institution had in attaching them to their government. I am well aware, that, if you judge of this institution according to the prejudices produced by ten years of revolution, it must appear worse than useless; but if you consider that we are placed *after* a revolution, and called upon to reconstruct society, a very different opinion will be formed. Every thing has been destroyed; we must commence the work of creation. We have, indeed, a nation and a government; but they are united by a rope of sand. There exist at the same time amongst us several of the old privileged classes, organised from the unity of their principles and interests, and who will always pursue one definite object. But we are scattered, without union, system, or lasting bond of connexion. As long as I survive I will answer for the Republic; but we must consider what is likely to occur after my death. Do you suppose the Republic is definitely established? You never were more mistaken. We have the means of so establishing it, but we have not yet done it, and never will do it, till we have scattered over the surface of France some masses of granite. Do you suppose you can trust the people for the preservation of your institutions? Believe me, you are mistaken. They will exclaim in a short time, 'Vive le Roi!' or 'Vive la Ligue!' with as much alacrity as they now cry, 'Vive la République!' It is necessary therefore to give a lasting direction to the public impulse, and to prepare instruments for that purpose. In the war of La Vendée, I have seen forty men obtain the absolute direction of a department; that is the system that we must make use of." ¹

¹ Thib. 83.
25.

27.
Small majority by which it is adopted by the Legislature.

Notwithstanding the profound and unanswerable observations by which he supported it, it was by a very slender majority that the institution of the Legion of Honour passed the great bodies of the state.* So strongly

* The numbers were,—

	Ayes.	Noes.
In the Council of State,	14	10
——Tribunate,	56	38
——Corps Legislatif,	166	110
	236	158
Majority,		78 ²

² Thib. 92.

implanted were the principles of the Revolution, even in the highest functionaries of the realm, and so difficult was it to extinguish that hatred at distinctions or honours which formed so leading a feature in the passions by which it was at first distinguished. No measure during the Consulate encountered nearly so powerful an opposition. Napoleon was much struck with this circumstance, and confessed in private that he had precipitated matters, and that it would have been better to have waited longer before so obnoxious a change was introduced.¹ It was carried into execution, however, with all those circumstances of pomp and ceremony which he well knew are so powerful with the multitude. The inauguration of the dignitaries of the order took place, with extraordinary magnificence, in the church of the Hôtel des Invalides, in presence of the First Consul and of all the great functionaries of the Republic; and the decorations soon began to be eagerly coveted by a people whose passion for individual distinction had been the secret cause of the Revolution.²

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¹ Thib. 91.
² Bour. iv. 357, 358.

² D'Ab. vi. 21. Thib. 91.
Bour. iv. 357, 358.
o

The event, however, proved that Napoleon had rightly appreciated the true character of the revolutionary spirit. The leading object in the Revolution was the extinction of *castes*, not of *ranks*; equality of rights, and not of classes; the abolition of hereditary, not personal distinction. "Vanity," as Napoleon elsewhere observed, "is the ruling principle of the French, and was at the bottom of all the convulsions of the Revolution; it was the sight of the noblesse enjoying privileges and distinctions to which they could not aspire, which filled the Tiers Etat with inextinguishable and natural animosity." But an institution which conferred lustre on individuals and not on families, and led to no hereditary distinctions, was so far from running counter to this desire, that it afforded it the highest gratification, because it promised the objects of this passion to any, even the humblest of the citizens, who was worthy of receiving it. The Legion of Honour accordingly, which gradually extended so as to embrace two thousand persons of the greatest eminence in every department, both civil and military, in France, became an institution in the highest degree both useful and popular; and served as the forerunner to that new

²⁸.
It entirely
succeeded.

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¹ Jom. Vie
de Nap. i.
526, D'Ab.
vii. 169, 170.

29.

Napoleon is
created First
Consul for
ten years ad-
ditional ;
grounds set
forth in the
Senatus Con-
sultum on the
occasion.

nobility which Napoleon afterwards created as safeguards to his imperial throne.¹ The Revolution had been founded, not on hatred, but on excessive admiration of such distinctions ; but it was the admiration of a lover which created unbounded jealousy of all others enjoying them.

When so many institutions were successively arising which pointed to the establishment of a regular government, it was impossible that its head could remain in a precarious situation. Napoleon accordingly was created by the obsequious legislature First Consul for ten years, beyond the first ten fixed at his original appointment ; an appointment which, although far from coming up to his anticipations and wishes, was yet important as a step to the establishment of perpetual and hereditary succession in his family. The grounds of this change are thus ably set forth in the Senatus Consultum which introduced it :—"Considering that in the existing circumstances of the Republic, it is the first duty of the Conservative Senate to employ all the means in its power in order to give the government the stability which can alone augment the national resources, inspire confidence without, establish credit within, reassure our allies, discourage our secret enemies, remove the evils of war, bring to maturity the fruits of peace, and leave to the wisdom of administration the selection of the proper period for bringing forward all the designs which it may have in view for the happiness of a free people," &c. Napoleon replied in the following words, which subsequent events rendered prophetic :—"Fortune has hitherto smiled on the Republic, but she is inconstant ; and *how many are there whom she has overwhelmed with her favours have lived too long by a few years !* The interests of my glory and happiness seem to have marked as the termination of my public career the moment when a general peace was signed. But you deem a new sacrifice necessary on my part. I will not scruple to undertake it, if the wishes of the people prescribe what your suffrages authorise."²

² Dum. viii.
98, 99. Bour.
iv. 361.

30.

State of reli-
gion in
France at
this period.

But all these measures, important as they were, yielded to the great step which at the same time was adopted, of re-establishing the Catholic religion in France, and renewing those connexions with the Pope, which had been violently broken during the fury of the French

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Revolution. Although the institutions of religion had been abolished, its ministers scattered, and its property confiscated, by the different revolutionary assemblies who had governed the country, yet a remnant of the Christian faith still lingered in many parts of the rural districts. When the horrors of the reign of Robespierre ceased, and a government comparatively lenient and regular was established under the Directory, the priests obtained leave to open their churches, provided they undertook to maintain them at their own expense, and a considerable number returned from exile, and commenced in poverty and obscurity the restoration of religious observances. They were again exposed to persecution and danger after the 18th Fructidor, and, being destitute of any species of property, and entirely dependent upon the voluntary contributions of their flocks, they were totally unequal to the Herculean task of combating the irreligious spirit which had acquired such strength during a revolutionary interregnum of ten years. A remnant of the faithful, composed for the most part of old women, attended the churches on Sunday, and marked by their fidelity an institution which might otherwise have been totally forgotten; but they were hardly observed amidst the crowds who had discarded every species of devotion. A great proportion of the churches, both in the towns and the country, had been either pulled down, or converted to secular purposes during the Revolution. Of those which remained, a still greater number were in such a state of dilapidation, from the total absence of any funds for their support, as to threaten speedily to become unserviceable for any purpose whatever. In this general prostration of the Christian faith, the bewildered multitude had sought refuge in other and extravagant creeds; the sect of the Theophilanthropists had arisen, whose ravings amidst fruits and flowers were listened to by a few hundreds, perhaps thousands, of the credulous or enthusiastic of Paris; while the great majority of the people, educated without any religious impressions, quietly passed by on the other side, and lived altogether without God in the world.¹

¹ D'Abr. vi.
38, 41. Thib.
151, 152.
Jom. Vie de
Nap. i. 489.

Although neither a fanatic nor even an avowed believer in Christianity, Napoleon was too sagacious not to

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1801.

31.
Napoleon's
views on this
subject.

perceive that such a state of things was inconsistent with any thing like a regular government. He had, accordingly, early commenced a negotiation with the Pope; and the head of the Church, delighted at finding such a disposition in a revolutionary chief, had received his advances with the utmost cordiality. Cardinal Gonzalvi, who at this period with singular ability directed the conclave, had, in the name of the supreme Pontiff, written to General Murat, when advancing towards the Roman states, after the armistice of Treviso, to express "the lively admiration which he felt for the First Consul, to whose fortunes were attached the tranquillity of religion not less than the happiness of Europe." The views of Napoleon on that matter were strongly expressed to the councillors of state with whom he conversed on the subject. "Yesterday evening," said he, "when walking alone in the woods, amidst the solitude of nature, the distant bell of the church of Ruel struck my ear. Involuntarily I felt emotion; so powerful is the influence of early habits and associations. I said to myself, if I feel thus, what must be the influence of such impressions on simple and credulous men? Let your philosophers, your *ideologues* answer that if they can. It is absolutely indispensable to have a religion for the people; and that that religion should be directed by the government. At present, fifty bishops, in the pay of England, direct the French clergy; we must forthwith destroy their influence; we must declare the Catholic the established religion of France, as being that of the majority of its inhabitants; we must organise its constitution. The First Consul shall appoint the fifty bishops; the Pope will induct them. They shall appoint the parish priests; the people shall defray their salaries. They must all take the oath; the refractory must be transported. The Pope will, in return, confirm the sale of the national domains. He will consecrate the Revolution; the people will sing, God save the Gallican Church. They will say, I am a Papist; I am no such thing. I was a Mahometan in Egypt; I will become a Catholic here for the good of my people.¹ I am no believer in particular creeds; but as to the idea of a God, look to the heavens, and say who made that."

"To discuss the necessity of a religion," replied the

¹ Thib. 152.
153. Nap. ii.
88.

opponents of the establishment, "is to mistake the question. There can be no doubt on that subject; but the point is, cannot religion exist without an established church? There is to be found in the clergy one hierarchy, one spirit, one object. If this colossus had for its head the chief of the state, the evil would exist only in half; but if a foreign potentate, the Pope, is its leader, a schism is introduced into the community. Never will you attach the clergy sincerely to the new order of things. The Revolution has despoiled them both of their honours and their property; they will never pardon these injuries; eternal war is sworn between the rival powers. The clergy will be less dangerous when they are detached from each other than when organised in one body. It is not necessary either to persecute or transport a single individual; all that is required is to let them say mass as they choose, and allow every citizen to go either to church or to the Theophilanthropic temples, as suits his inclination. If the incompatibility between priests and the Republic becomes so evident as to disturb the public tranquillity, we must never hesitate to banish them; you must either proscribe them or the Revolution. The spirit of the age is wholly opposed to a return to Catholicism. We are nearer the truths of Christianity than the priests of Rome. You have but to say the word, the Papacy is ruined, and France takes its place as a Protestant state."

"You are deceived," said Napoleon; "the clergy exist, and ever will exist; they will exist as long as the people are imbued with a religious spirit, and that disposition is permanent in the human heart. We have seen republics and democracies; history has many examples of such governments to exhibit, but none of a state without an established worship, without religion and without priests. Is it not better to organise the public worship, and discipline the priests, than to leave both entirely emancipated from the control of the state? At present the clergy openly preach against the Republic, because they experience no benefit from it. Should we transport them? Unquestionably not! for what alone constitutes their authority in the wreck of their fortunes is the fidelity with which they adhere to the church of their fathers, and that will be increased rather than diminished

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XXXV.

1801.

32.

Arguments
in the Council
of State
against an
establish-
ment.

33.

Napoleon's
reply.

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1801.

by all the sufferings they undergo. You may send into exile the English or the Austrians; for they are bound by no ties to our country; but the French, who have families here, and are guilty of no offence but an adherence to their religious opinions, must be treated differently. You cannot extinguish their opinions; you must, therefore, attach them to the Republic. If the Protestant faith is proclaimed, one half of the country will adopt that creed and the other half remain Catholic; we shall have the Huguenot wars over again, and interminable divisions. We have nothing to take from the clergy, and as little to ask from them. The affair is entirely a political matter, and the line I have adopted appears the safest that could have been chosen.”¹

¹ Thib. 153,
157.

34.
Concordat,
July 15, 1801.
Passed into a
law, April 8,
1802.

Notwithstanding these decided opinions of the First Consul, the negotiations with the Court of Rome were attended with considerable difficulty, and proved very tedious. At length, however, they were brought to a conclusion, and, despite the opposition of a portion of the Council and of the Legislature, the concordat with the Pope passed into a law, and the Christian religion was re-established through the French territory.* By this memorable law the Catholic religion was declared that of the French people. Ten archbishops and fifty bishops were established, the former with a salary of fifteen thousand francs (£600) a-year, the latter with one of ten thousand, or £400. It was provided that there should be at least a parish priest in every district of a *juge de paix*, the lowest species of legal jurisdiction, with as many additional ministers as might be deemed necessary; the bishops and archbishops were to be appointed by the First Consul; the bishops nominated the parish priests and inferior clergy, subject to the approbation of the same authority. The salary of the priests in the larger parishes was fixed at fifteen hundred

* The numbers were:—

	For.	Against
Tribunate,	78	7
Legislative body,	236	21
	306	28

whereas the Legion of Honour was only carried by a majority of 236 to 158; a striking proof how much more strenuous the opposition was to any approach towards the re-establishment of a nobility, than even of the Christian religion, which was held forth as so much the object of obloquy.—THIBAUDEAU, 210.

francs, or £60 a-year; in the smaller, twelve hundred, or £48. The Departmental Councils were charged with the procuring of houses, or lodgings and gardens, for the bishops, priests, and curates. The churches which had survived the Revolution were placed at the disposal of the bishops, and provision made for the repair, at the expense of the department, of such as were ruinous.¹ Such was the establishment which in France emerged from the chaos of the Revolution, and such the provision for the ministers of religion made by the nation which, in the outset of the convulsions, had confiscated the vast possessions of the church, on the solemn assurance contained in the decree of the Constituent Assembly, that it "committed the due and honourable maintenance of religion and its ministers to the honour of the French people." *

Although the opposition in the Legislature was not nearly so formidable to the concordat as to the Legion of Honour, a much stronger feeling of discontent was excited by the change in the Revolutionary party and the army. "Buonaparte," said they, "is striving in vain to destroy the remains of the Revolution, and to close every avenue against the anti-revolutionary party, when by his concordat he opens to the latter an ample gateway, and with his own hands digs the mine which is to blow his edifice into the air." In truth, such was the extra-

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XXXV.
1802.

¹ See the Concordat and Articles Organiques, in Nap. Mélanges, i. 297, et seq. and Goldsmidt's *Récueil*, iii.

35.
General dissatisfaction which it occasioned.

* Some very important articles were included in the same treaty relative to the independence of the Gallican Church. It was provided, "1. That no bull, brief, rescript, decree, mandate, or provision, or other writing whatever, emanating from the Court of Rome, even concerning individuals, should be received, published, printed, or put in execution, without the authority of Government. 2. That no individual announcing himself as legate, vicar, or commissioner of the Holy See, should, without the same authority, exercise on the French territory or elsewhere, any function relative to the affairs of the Gallican Church. 3. That the decrees of foreign convocations, not excepting even those of general councils, should not be published in France, without a previous examination by the Government, to ascertain whether they were in harmony with the laws and institutions of the French Republic, or were in any way calculated to affect the public tranquillity. 4. That no national or metropolitan council, diocesan synod, or other deliberative assembly, should be held without the express authority of Government. 5. That an appeal should lie to the Council of State in every case of alleged abuse or misgovernment on the part of the superior ecclesiastical authorities; and that under this head should be included every infraction of the rules established in the Councils of the Church, every attempt calculated to injure the liberties of the Gallican Church, every infringement on the liberty of public worship, or of the rights which the laws secured to its ministers."² By these articles, the Church in France was practically rendered nearly as independent of the Papal authority as the Protestant establishment of Great Britain.

Its provisions in favour of the Gallican Church.

² Nap. Mélanges, i. 301.

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1802.

ordinary and unprecedented extent to which irreligion had spread under the Republican Government, that "two-thirds of the French people," according to the admission of their own historians, "were ignorant of the principles on which such a measure was founded, and regarded it as a strange and dangerous innovation." The opposition which it experienced was indeed almost inconceivable, and at once afforded the clearest evidence of the pernicious tendency of those measures of extermination which former governments had adopted against the possessions of the established church. It also demonstrated how rapidly the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, founded on the pretence of applying it to purposes of beneficence and public instruction, leads to the total destruction of every species of religious belief. Universally the opinion prevailed that the restoration of the altar was but a prelude to that of the throne, and that the concordat was to be regarded as a solemn pledge for the speedy re-establishment of the ancient *régime*, a manifesto against all the principles of the Revolution. These feelings were in an especial manner prevalent among the military and democratic parties. Moreau, Lannes, Oudinot, Victor, and many others, openly expressed their repugnance to the measure, and declined to join the ceremony which took place in Notre Dame on the occasion of its solemn proclamation. "Never," said the soldiers, "have the Republican arms been adorned by so many laurels as since they ceased to receive the benediction of the priests."¹

¹ Bign. ii.
198, 199.
Norv. ii. 166,
167. Journ.
xiv. 404.

36.
Ceremony on
the occasion
in Notre
Dame. April
11, 1802.

Napoleon, however, remained firm, notwithstanding all the opposition which took place, and the loud discontents of the capital; the re-establishment of public worship was announced by a proclamation of the consuls, and on the following day a grand religious ceremony took place in honour of the occasion, in Notre Dame. All the great bodies in the state, all the constituted authorities attended, and proceeded in extraordinary pomp to the cathedral. On this occasion, for the first time, the servants of the First Consul appeared in livery; the foreign ambassadors were invited to appear with all their attendants arrayed in the same manner, and a similar recommendation was addressed to such of the public functionaries as had car-

riages of their own. But so few of them were possessed of that luxury, that the equipages made a very indifferent appearance. The military, however, were obliged to attend in great numbers, and the brilliancy of their uniforms more than compensated the want of civil decoration. Such, however, was the repugnance of many of the generals to the ceremony, that it required all the authority of the First Consul to make Lannes and Augereau remain in the carriage when they perceived they were going to hear mass. It proceeded, nevertheless, with great *eclat*, in the cathedral of Notre Dame, which only eight years before had been polluted by the orgies of the Goddess of Reason. "What thought you of the ceremony?" said Napoleon to General Delmas, who stood near him when it was concluded. "It was a fine piece of mummerly," replied he. "Nothing was wanting but the million of men who have perished in order to destroy what you have now re-established." It was at first intended to have had the standards blessed by the archbishop, but the government was obliged to abandon the design, from being given to understand, that if this was done, the soldiers would trample them under their feet. So difficult is it to eradicate the passions which have been nursed up during the frenzy and convulsions of a revolution, and so obstinately do mankind, under the influence of prejudice, sometimes resist the establishment of those very institutions from which they are themselves destined to receive the most unalloyed advantages.^{1*}

Immediately after this great change, the observance of Sunday was to a certain degree resumed. It was provided in the concordat, that the government offices should be closed on Sunday, and this was immediately done. Shortly after, a decree of the consuls directed that all marriages should be proclaimed on that day, and the daily service of mass began in the Tuileries. Encouraged

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¹ Thib. 163.
164. Bour. iv.
279. Bign. ii.
199.

37.
Constrained
religious ob-
servances at
Paris.

* Rapp, one of Napoleon's aides-de-camp, who was a Protestant, positively refused to attend the ceremony, even when requested to do so by the First Consul himself. "Provided," said he, "you do not make these priests your aides-de-camp or your cooks, you may do with them what you please." The well-known devotion of Rapp to his general procured him impunity for these sort of speeches, which he very frequently made; but Delmas was not so fortunate. The First Consul was extremely irritated at his reply, which made a great noise at the time, and he was soon after sent into exile in consequence. — See THIBAUDEAU, 164.

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by so many symptoms of returning favour, the clergy made the utmost efforts to induce the First Consul to join publicly in the more solemn duties which the church prescribed; but to this he never could be brought to consent. "We are very well as we are," said he; "do not ask me to go further: you will never obtain what you wish: I will not become a hypocrite: be content with what you have already gained." Mass, however, was regularly performed at the Tuileries in the morning. The First Consul went to it on Sunday, and remained during the service, which seldom exceeded ten minutes, in an adjoining apartment, with the door open, looking over papers, or engaged in his usual occupations. He had considerable difficulty in preserving the balance so imperiously required in the head of the state, during the first return to religious observances after the revolutionary fever; yet by great firmness he succeeded, during his whole reign, in maintaining a just equilibrium between the impassioned characters on both sides.¹

¹Hour. iv.
281, 282.
Thib. 166.

38.
Prudence of
Napoleon in
restraining
the high
church party.

The wisdom with which Napoleon restrained the imprudent zeal of the church party appears in the proceedings which took place on the death of Mademoiselle Chameroi, a celebrated opera dancer. The priest of St. Roch refused to receive the body into his church, or celebrate over it the solemnities of interment, and this gave rise to a vehement dispute between the *artistes* who accompanied the body and the clergy. It came to be discussed in the Council of State. "It amounts to nothing," said the Senator Monge, "but a dispute of one set of comedians with another."—"What!" said the First Consul, with a severe air. "Yes, citizen consul," replied Monge, "we may say that when the grand crosses do not hear us." But Napoleon viewed the matter in a very different light; and on the following day an article appeared in the *Moniteur*, which bore internal marks of his composition. "The curate of St. Roch, in a moment of hallucination, has refused to pray for Mademoiselle Chameroi, or to admit her body into the church. One of his colleagues, a man of sense, received the procession into the church of the Filles Saint Thomas, where the service was performed with all the usual solemnities. The Archbishop of Paris has suspended the curate of St. Roch for

three months, to give him time to recollect that Jesus Christ commanded us to pray even for our enemies; and that, being recalled by meditation to a proper sense of his duties, he may learn that all these superstitious observances, the offspring of an age of credulity, or of crazed imaginations, tend only to the discredit of true religion, and have been proscribed by the recent concordat of the Gallican Church."¹

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¹ Thib. 166,
169.

The conclusion of the concordat was announced in these eloquent words in a proclamation issued by the First Consul: "An insane policy has sought during the Revolution to smother religious dissensions under the ruins of the altar, under the ashes of religion itself. At its voice all those pious solemnities ceased in which the citizens called each other by the endearing name of brothers, and acknowledged their common equality in the sight of heaven. The dying, left alone in his agonies, no longer heard that consoling voice which calls the Christian to a better world. God himself seemed exiled from the face of nature. Ministers of the religion of peace, let a complete oblivion veil your dissensions, your misfortunes, your faults: let the religion which unites you bind you by indissoluble cords to the interests of your country: let the young learn from your precepts that the God of peace is also the God of arms, and that he throws his shield over those who combat for the liberties of France. Citizens of the Protestant faith, the law has equally extended its solicitude to your interests; let the morality, so pure, so holy, so brotherly, which you profess, unite you all in love to your country, and respect for its laws; and, above all, never permit disputes on doctrinal points to weaken that universal charity which religion at once inculcates and commands."²

39.
His admirable proclamation on the subject of the concordat to the people of France. April 14, 1802.² Dum. viii.
95, 96.

But although the opposition which the restoration of religion met with in the corrupted population and revolutionary circles of Paris was very powerful, it was viewed in a very different light in the rural districts of France. The peasants beheld with undisguised delight the re-establishment of the priests, from whose labours and beneficence they had gained so much in former times; and the sound of the village bells again calling the faithful to the house of God, was hailed by

40.
Great joy at the change in the rural departments.

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millions, as the dove with the olive branch, which first announced peace to the "green undeluged earth." The restoration of Sunday, as a day of periodical rest, was felt as an unspeakable relief by the labouring population, who had never been able to establish the exemption from work on the tenth day, which the Convention had prescribed, and were borne down by years of continued and unbroken toil. But the pernicious effect of the total cessation of all religious instruction and observances for nine years could not so easily be eradicated. A generation had been educated, who were ignorant of the very elements of the Christian faith; the frenzy of the Revolution had snapped asunder a chain which had descended unbroken from the Apostolic ages. The consequences of this chasm have been to the last degree pernicious to the existing generation, and are, it is much to be feared, now irreparable. It is to this cause that we are to ascribe the spirit of irreligion which has since been so peculiarly the characteristic of the higher and urban classes of French society, and which has worked out its natural consequences throughout all the subsequent periods of the empire and the Restoration. A nation which, in its influential classes at least, has lost all respect for religion, is incapable of freedom, and can be governed only by force. "*Natura, tamen,*" says Tacitus, "*infirmittatis humanæ, tardiora sunt remedia quam mala, et ut corpora, lente augescunt, cito extinguuntur, sic ingenia studiaque opprresseris facilius quam revocaveris.*" *

41.
General satisfaction which the measure excited in foreign countries.

To foreign nations, however, who could not foresee the deplorable internal effects of this long interruption in religious instruction, the spectacle of France again voluntarily returning to the Christian faith was in the highest degree acceptable. Contrasting it with the monstrous profanations and wild extravagances of the irreligious fanaticism which had prevailed during the Revolution, they deemed it the harbinger of tranquillity to its distracted people, and peace to Europe. It contributed more than any circumstance to weaken the horror with which

* "It is the nature of human infirmity to render remedies more tardy than evils; and as bodies slowly enlarge, but are quickly destroyed, thus it is more easy to oppress and destroy studies and dispositions than to restore them."—TACITUS.

the Revolutionary Government had so long been regarded, and opened the way to the establishment of more kindly relations, not only with the governments, but with the people of foreign states. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia publicly expressed their satisfaction at the auspicious event; forgetting, in their joy at the restoration of so important a member to the Christian family, the jealousy with which a change so likely to consolidate the power of the First Consul might possibly have been regarded. The Emperor of Austria styled it, with great felicity of expression, "a service truly rendered to all Europe." And the thoughtful and religious every where justly considered the voluntary return of a great nation to the creed of its fathers, from the experienced impossibility of living without its precepts, as the most signal triumph to the Christian faith which had occurred since it ascended the imperial throne, under the banners of Constantine.¹

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¹ Bign. ii.
200, 201.

It was as the first step in a great political improvement, and as closing the door against the worst principles of the Revolution, that Napoleon, in spite of so much opposition from his own subjects, undertook and carried through the concordat with Rome. Many persons urged him to complete the system; separate the church of France from the Pope, and at once declare himself its head. They did not know, however, the real state of the country, and still less the character of the First Consul. So far from thinking that he could dispense with the court of Rome in settling this matter, he openly declared—"That if the Pope had not existed, it would have been well to have created him for that occasion, as the Roman consuls created a dictator in difficult circumstances." The concordat indeed recognised a foreign authority in religious matters, which might possibly disturb the republic on some future occasion; but it did not create it, and, on the contrary, brought it under restraints more favourable than could possibly have been expected, to the interests of the reigning power in France. By connecting the church with the state, Napoleon hoped to withdraw it from foreign or English influence, while by the conquest of Italy he expected to make the Pope the ready instrument of his will. He has himself told us

42.
Subsequent
opinions of
Napoleon on
the subject.

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¹ Nap. i. 115.
Mélanges.

43.
Napoleon's
views for the
restoration of
the property
of the emi-
grants.

Oct. 19.
1800.

that he never repented of this great step. — "The concordat of 1801," says he, "was necessary to religion, to the republic, to the government; the churches were closed, the priests persecuted, part of the bishops were in exile, and in the pay of England, part merely apostolic vicars, without any bond to unite them to the state. It put an end to these divisions, and made the Catholic apostolic church arise from its ruins. Napoleon restored the altars, caused the disorders to cease, directed the faithful to pray for the Republic, dissipated the scruples of the purchasers of national domains, and broke the last thread by which the exiled dynasty communicated with the country, by dismissing the bishops who resisted the reconciliation with the court of Rome, and holding them out as rebels to the holy see, who preferred their temporal interests to the eternal concerns of religion." ¹ *

Connected with the revival of religion was a great and generous design of the First Consul, which it would have been well for him if he could have carried completely into effect, viz. the restoration of all the inalienated national property to the original proprietors. His first project was to make the restitution to that extent complete, with the single exception of the buildings devoted to public establishments; and even to restore the two-thirds which had been cut off from the public creditors by the barbarous decree of 1797. He never contemplated, however, the restoration of the alienated landed property, being well aware of the inextricable difficulties in which that question was involved. But when the subject was brought forward in the Council of State, he found the opposition so great that he was compelled to modify the project so much, as amounted almost to its total abandonment. The severity of the laws against the emigrants had been gradually relaxed by successive edicts. An important change was first made by the *arrêt* of 28th of Vendémiaire (19th October, 1800,) which divided the

* Mr. Fox, after the peace of Amiens, ventured to blame Napoleon in conversation for not having permitted the marriage of priests in his dominions. "I then had," replied he, "and still have, need to pacify. It is with water, and not oil, that you must extinguish theological volcanoes. I would have had less difficulty in establishing the Confession of Augsburg in my empire." — *NAPOLÉON, Mélanges*, i. 121.

emigrants into two classes, from the first and most numerous of which the prohibition was removed.* They returned, in consequence, in crowds; and the gates were opened still more widely by the lenient policy of the Government, which directed the minister of police to grant passports of admission to almost all who applied for them, without regard to the formal distinctions established by the decree of the First Consul. In granting these indulgences, Napoleon was influenced by more than a feeling of pity for the exiled families; he already looked forward to them as the firmest support of his throne. But it was not without difficulty that these concessions were made to the aristocratic party; the Executive even was divided, and the Second Consul said to him, at the Council of State:¹—"The existence of the Government will be always precarious when it has not around itself several hundred revolutionary families, uniting in themselves the principal fortunes and offices of the state, to counterbalance the influence of the emigrant noblesse."

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¹ Thib. 96.
103. Bour. iv.
333, 334.

On the 29th April, 1802, a general amnesty was published by a *senatus consultum*, which reduced the exiled persons to about a thousand, and the melancholy list was, by the indulgence of the police, soon after reduced to a few hundreds. Above a hundred thousand emigrants, in consequence, returned to their native country, happy again to tread the soil and breathe the air of France, though deprived for the most part of all their possessions, and many of them in a deplorable state of destitution. The *senatus consultum* restored to every emigrant who was permitted to return, such part of his former property as had not been alienated by the state; but as it was soon found that they began in consequence to cut the

44.
Senatus Con-
sultum pro-
claiming a
general am-
nesty.
April 29,
1802.

* When this *arrêt* was under discussion in the Council of State, Napoleon observed, "There are above a hundred thousand names on these unhappy lists; it is enough to turn one's head. In the general calamity, the most elevated and dangerous characters can alone extricate themselves; they possess the means of purchasing testimony in their favour. Thus the practical result is, that a duke is struck off the list, while a poor labourer is kept on it. We must extricate the matter by classing the emigrants according to certain distinctions, which may admit equally persons of all descriptions. The lists must be reduced by three-fourths of its number to the names of such as are known to be hostile to the Government. Having effected such a diminution, we shall be the better enabled to distinguish the really dangerous characters; they will no longer escape notice in the troubled flood of misfortune."—THIBAUDEAU, 95.

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Aug. 4, 1802.

Sept. 5, 1802.

¹ Thib. 98,
105.

45.
Inadequacy
of these mea-
sures to heal
the evils of
revolutionary
confiscation.

forests to a great extent, in order to relieve their necessities, it became necessary to put a restriction upon this liberality, and a subsequent *arrêt* prohibited the removal of the sequestration on such of the woods belonging to emigrants, as amounted to three hundred arpents and upwards.* By a subsequent decree of the legislature, it was provided, through the urgent representations of the First Consul, that all successions to which the Republic had acquired right as coming in place of the emigrants prior to the 1st September, 1802, and which were inalienated, should be restored to the persons having right to them; that all claims of the Republic on the emigrants prior to the amnesty should be extinguished; and that the goods of emigrants which had devolved to the Republic, and were inalienated, should be declared liable to the claims of their creditors.¹

These measures, how humanely and wisely soever designed by Napoleon, proved almost totally inadequate to remedy the dreadful evils produced by the barbarous confiscation of property during the Revolution. He admits this himself. "My first design," says he, "was to have thrown the whole inalienated property of the emigrants into a mass, or syndicat, and divided it according to a certain proportional scale among the restored families. I met with so much resistance, however, that I was induced to abandon that design; but I soon found that, when I came to restore individually to each what belonged to him, I made some too rich and many too insolent. Those who had received the greatest fortunes proved the most ungrateful. It was a sense of this which induced me to pass the *arrêt*, which suspended the operation of the restitution contained in the act of amnesty as to all woods above a certain value. This was a deviation undoubtedly from the letter of the law; but

* On this occasion the First Consul said in the Council of State, "The emigrants who have been struck off the lists are cutting their woods, partly from necessity, partly to transport their money to foreign states. We cannot allow the greatest enemies of the Republic, the defenders of old prejudices, to recover their fortunes, and despoil France. I am quite willing to receive them; but the nation is interested in the preservation of the forests. The navy requires them; their destruction is contrary to every principle of good government. We must not, however, keep the woods without giving an indemnity to their proprietors; but we will pay them gradually, and as we acquire funds, and the delay of payment will prove a powerful means of rendering the claimants obedient to the Government."—THIRIAUDEAU, 98.

circumstances imperiously required it; our error consisted in not having foreseen it before the original law was framed. This reaction, however, on my part, destroyed all the good effect of the recall of the emigrants, and alienated from me all the great families. I would have avoided all these evils if I had followed out my original design of a syndicat; instead of one discontented great family, I would have made a hundred grateful provincial nobles, who, being all dependent on my government for their subsistence, could have been relied on to the last. It is evident that the emigrants had lost their all; that they had embarked their property on board the same vessel, and what was rescued from the waves should have been proportionally divided. It was a fault on my part not to have done so, which is the more unpardonable that I had entertained the idea; but I was alone, surrounded by thorns; every one was against me, time pressed, and still more important affairs imperiously required my attention." ¹*

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But in truth, even if the projects of Napoleon could have been carried into complete effect, they would have remedied but a small part of the evils consequent on the frightful confiscation of private property which took place during the Revolution. From a report made by M. Ramel on the finances of the Republic, it appears that before the year 1801 there had been sold national domains to the enormous amount of 2,555,000,000 francs, or above £100,000,000 sterling;† and that

¹ *Les Caus. ii.*
221, 222.

46.
Immense extent of this evil, and its irremediable effects.

* Considerable alarm was excited among the holders of national domains by these proceedings in favour of the emigrants. To allay them, the following article appeared in the *Moniteur*:—"The first duty of the French people, the first principle of the Republic, ever must be, to preserve untouched, and without any sort of distinction, the purchasers of national domains. In truth, to have trusted the fortunes of the Republic, when it was assailed by the united forces of Europe, to have united their private fortunes to those of the state in such a period of anxious alarm, must ever constitute a claim on the gratitude of the state and the people."—THIBAUDEAU, 176.

† The periods during which this prodigious confiscation of private property took place were as follows:—

From 17th May, 1790, to 18th Jan. 1795,		
the sales of national domains, chiefly church property, produced,		
	Francs.	
From Jan. 18, 1795, to Sept. 20, 1795, .	1,500,000,000 or	£80,000,000
From Sept. 20, 1795, to Nov. 25, 1797, .	611,438,000 or	24,500,000
From Nov. 25, 1797, to June 30, 1801, .	316,464,000 or	12,750,000
	127,231,000 or	5,800,000
	2,555,138,000 or	£103,050,000

—See *Compte Rendu de Ramel, Stat. de la France*, 545.

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¹ Comptes
Rendus, par
Ramel. Stat.
de la France,
545.

² Burke, v.
289, et seq.

47.
Napoleon's
important ob-
servations on
this point.

there remained to sell property to the amount of 700,000,000 francs, or £28,000,000 sterling.¹ When it is recollected that during the greater part of this period, the national domains, from the insecure tenure by which they were held, and the general confusion, were sold for a few years' purchase, it may be conceived what a prodigious mass of landed property must have been torn from the rightful proprietors in this way, and how fatal was the wound thus inflicted on the social system of France. Mr. Burke declared at the outset of the Revolution, that without complete restitution or indemnification to all the dispossessed proprietors, it would be impossible to construct a stable constitutional monarchy in France,² and the result has now completely established the justice of his opinion. The want of a landed aristocracy to coerce the people on the one hand, and restrain the executive on the other, has ever since been felt as the irreparable want in the monarchy; its absence was bitterly lamented by Napoleon.

"I am now convinced," said he, "that I was in the wrong in my arrangements with the Faubourg St. Germain. I did too much and too little; enough to excite jealousy in the opposite party, and not enough to attach to my interest the restored noblesse. There were but two lines to take; that of extirpation or fusion. The first could not for a moment be entertained; the second was by no means easy, but I do not think it was beyond my strength. I was fully aware of its importance. It was incumbent on us to complete the fusion; to cement the union at all hazards: with it we should have been invincible. The want of it has ruined us, and will for long prolong the misfortunes and agony of unhappy France. An aristocracy is the true support of the throne; its moderator, its lever, its fulcrum; the state without it is a vessel without a rudder; a balloon in the air. But the whole advantage of an aristocracy, its magic, consists in its antiquity; that was the precise thing, and the only thing, which I could not create; I did not possess the intermediate elements. A reasonable democracy will not seek more than equal capacity in all to rise to the highest dignities; the true course would have been to have employed the remains of

the aristocracy with the forms and spirit of democracy. Above all, it was desirable to have assembled together the ancient families, the names celebrated in our history; that was the only way to have conferred an air of grandeur on our modern institutions."¹

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¹ Las Cas. iii.
23.

How exactly have all men of a certain elevation of thought concurred, in all ages and countries, in the same opinions on this subject. "With the government of the multitude, and the destruction of the aristocracy," says Polybius, "commences every species of violence; the people run together in tumultuous assemblies, and are hurried into every excess, assassinations, banishments, and divisions of lands, till, being reduced at last to a state of savage anarchy, they once more find themselves under a master and a monarch, and submit to arbitrary sway."² All the attempts of subsequent governments to construct a constitutional throne, or establish public freedom on a durable basis, have failed from the absence of this element. Neither Napoleon nor the Bourbons were ever strong enough to attempt the restitution of the confiscated estates at the expense of the six millions of landed proprietors among whom they were now divided. "Melancholy," says Sir James Mackintosh, "as this conclusion is, it seems too probable that the present state of property and prejudice among the larger part of the people of France rather disposes towards a despotism, deriving its sole title from the Revolution, and interested in maintaining the system of society which it has established, and armed with that tyrannical power which may be necessary for its maintenance. Having no body of great proprietors to contend with, the monarch is delivered from all regular and constant restraint, and from every apprehension but that of an inconstant, and often servile populace." The conclusion to be drawn from this, however, is not that Mr. Burke's and Napoleon's opinion was erroneous, or that the fabric of liberty can be erected on the basis of robbery and spoliation; but that the national sins of France had been so great that reparation or restitution became impossible, and she has received the doom of perpetual servitude in consequence.

43.
Ruinous effects of this violence.

² Polyb. vi.
c. i.

When so many great ideas were passing through the mind of the First Consul, the important subject of public

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49.

Measures to
promote
public
instruction.

instruction, and the progress of science, could not long remain unnoticed. Insatiable in his desire for every species of glory, he aspired, like Charlemagne, not only to extend the frontiers, and enhance the renown of the Republic, but to construct a monument to science, which should perpetuate its fame to the latest generation. When he ascended the consular throne, the state of knowledge and public instruction was in the highest degree deplorable. The old establishments of education, which before the Revolution had been for the most part in the hands of the clergy, and endowed from ecclesiastical foundations, had shared the fate of all the feudal institutions, and perished alike with their blessings and their evils. During the long interregnum of ten years which intervened under the revolutionary government, public instruction had been generally neglected, and religious education, by far its most important department, entirely ceased, except in a small and persecuted class of society. Not that the Convention had overlooked this great subject of general instruction ; on the contrary, they were fully aware of its importance, and had done their utmost, during the distracted and stormy period when they held the reins of government, to fill up the chasm. They established several seminaries of medicine ; the Polytechnic school, which afterwards attained such deserved celebrity ; various schools of rural economy ; and a complete system for the instruction of the young men destined for the artillery, the engineers, the mines, and the naval service. Central schools were also introduced by their exertions in each department ; and to them is due the formation of the Institute, which so long kept alive the torch of science during the melancholy night of modern civilisation. But these efforts, how meritorious soever, were wholly inadequate to remedy the evils which the Revolution had produced. The distracted state of the country, after the subversion of all its institutions, caused no education to be of any value but such as tended at once to military advancement ; and the abolition of religious instruction rendered all that was, or could be, taught to the great body of the people, of little practical benefit.¹ Under democratic rule, France, amidst incessant declamations in favour of general illumination, and pompous

¹ Thib. 122,
125. Bign.
ii. 211.

eulogies on the lights of the times, was rapidly sinking into a state of darkness, deeper than the gloom of the middle ages.*

By directions from the First Consul, Chaptal presented to the Council of State a project for a general system of public instruction. It was founded on singular principles. Distrust of the general education of the people, especially in the rural districts, and an anxiety to train up a body of favoured young men in the interests of the government, were its leading features. Schools of primary instruction in the communes were every where permitted, but government contributed nothing to their support, and the teachers were left to such remuneration as they could obtain from their scholars. Secondary schools, the next in gradation, were placed on the same footing, with this difference, that they could not be established without the special authority of government. The favour of the executive was reserved for academies of the higher kind, which, under the name of lyceums and special schools, were established to the number of thirty in different parts of the Republic, and at which not only were the masters paid by the state, but the scholars, six thousand four hundred in number, were also maintained at the public expense. The teachers in these institutions were required to be married; a regulation intended to exclude the priests from any share in the higher branches of tuition; and no mention whatever was made of religion in any part of the decree. A striking proof of the continued influence of the infidel spirit which had grown up during the license and sins of the Revolution, and which rendered the whole establishment for education of little real service to the labouring classes of the community.¹

It was a fundamental rule of these establishments to admit no young man whose family was not attached to the principles of the Revolution. "We must never," said Napoleon, "admit into these schools any young man whose parents have combated against the

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50.

Napoleon's
measures in
favour of
education.

Decree,

May 1, 1802.

¹ Thib. 134,
135. Bign. ii.
1802.

51.

Principles on
which his
system was
founded, and
rewards to
sciences.

* These observations apply to France as a nation. The splendid discoveries and vast talent displayed in mathematics and the exact sciences by the Institute, throughout all the Revolution, can never be too highly eulogised, and will be fully enlarged upon in treating of the French literature during its progress.

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Republic. There could be no concord between officers of such principles and the soldiers of the army. I have never appointed even a sub-lieutenant, to my knowledge, unless he was either drawn from the ranks, or was the son of a man attached to the Revolution. The lion of the Revolution sleeps; but if these gentlemen were to waken him, they would soon be compelled to fly with their best speed." How much attached soever to his favourite system of fusing together the opposite parties in the Revolution, Napoleon had no notion of extending it to the armed force of the state. Following out the same plan of concentrating the rays of government favour upon the higher branches of knowledge, the sum of sixty thousand francs (£2400) was set aside to encourage the progress of French philosophy in electricity and galvanism; a galvanic society was instituted; a *senatus consultum* awarded the rights of French citizenship to every stranger who had resided a year in its territory, and had deserved well of the Republic by important discoveries in science or art; the Institute was divided into four classes, and each member received a pension of fifteen hundred francs, or £60 a-year; while a chamber of commerce was established in each considerable city of the Republic, and a council-general of commerce at Paris.¹

Oct. 4, 1802.

Oct. 18, 1802.

Dec. 24, 1802.

¹ Thib. 130,
134, 141.
Norv. ii. 189,
190.

52.

Trials of
public feeling
by the Royal-
ists.

Oct. 9, 1802.

² Thib. 147,
148. Bour.
v. 257.

The rapid succession of objects, tending to monarchical ideas, encouraged the Royalists in the capital to make a trial of their influence over the public mind. Duval composed a play, entitled "Edward in Scotland," which Napoleon resolved to see performed before he determined whether or not it should be allowed to be represented. He listened attentively to the first act, and appeared even to be interested in the misfortunes of the exiled prince; but the warm and enthusiastic applauses which ensued as the piece advanced, convinced him that it could not be permitted without risk. It was interdicted, and the author counselled to improve his health by travelling; he retired to Russia, and remained there for a year.²

A general system was now set on foot for the maintenance of the requisite forces by sea and land, and the instruction of the young officers in the rudiments of the military art. A levy of one hundred and twenty thousand men was ordered; one-half of whom were destined

to replace the discharged veterans, and the other to form an army of reserve.¹ At the same time, a project was discussed for the formation of a fixed body of seamen, divided into regiments, and allotted to each vessel in the navy. Truguet observed, "If you have only commerce you will never want sailors, and they will cost nothing; it is only when a nation has no trade that it is necessary to levy sailors; much longer time is required to form a sailor than a soldier; the latter may be trained to all his duties in six months." Napoleon replied, "There never was a greater mistake; nothing can be more dangerous than to propagate such opinions; if acted upon, they would speedily lead to the dissolution of our army. At Jemappe, there were fifty thousand French against nine thousand Austrians; during the first four years of the war all the hostile operations were conducted in the most ridiculous manner. It was neither the volunteers nor the recruits who saved the Republic; it was the one hundred and eighty thousand old troops of the monarchy, and the discharged veterans whom the Revolution impelled to the frontiers. Part of the recruits deserted, part died; a small proportion only remained, who, in process of time, formed good soldiers. Why have the Romans done such great things? Because six years' instruction were with them required to make a soldier. A legion composed of three thousand such men was worth thirty thousand ordinary troops. With fifteen thousand men such as the guards, I would any where beat forty thousand. You will not soon find me engaging in war with an army of recruits. In this great project we must not be startled by expense. No inland boatmen will ever voluntarily go to the sea-ports. We must make it a matter of necessity. The conscription for the marine should commence at ten or twelve years of age; the men should amount to twelve thousand, and serve all their lives. We are told there is no such naval conscription in England; but the example is not parallel. England has an immense extent of coast which furnishes her with abundance of seamen. We have a comparatively small coast, and but few seamen. Nature has been niggardly to us in this particular; we must supply its defects by artificial means." In pursuance of these principles an

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

53.

Measures for
recruiting the
army and
navy. De-
bates on the
subject in the
Council of
State.

¹ Thib. 107,
109.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

Oct. 4, 1802.

54.

Speech of Napoleon on the government of the colonies.

Nov. 9, 1802.

arrêt appeared upon the 4th October, which laid the foundation of the conscription for the naval service of France.*

About the same time a project was brought before the Council for the establishment of chambers of agriculture in the colonies. They were decreed ; but the war, which soon afterwards broke out, prevented the plan being carried into execution. The principles, however, advanced by Napoleon in support of the proposal, are admirable for their wisdom and sagacity. "Doubtless," said he, "you must govern the colonies by force ; but there can be no force without justice. Government must be informed as to the real situation of the colonies, and for this purpose, it must patiently hear the parties interested ; for it is not sufficient to acquire the character of justice, that the ruling power does what is right. It is also necessary that the most distant subjects of the empire should be convinced that this is the case, and this they will never be, unless they are sensible that they have been fully heard. Were the Council of State composed of angels or gods, who could perceive at a glance every thing that should be done, it would not be sufficient unless the colonists had the conviction that they had been fully and impartially heard. All power must be founded on opinion ; it is in order to form it that an institution similar to that proposed is indispensable. At present there is no constitutional channel of communication between France and the colonies ; the most absurd reports are in circulation there as to the intentions of the central government, and it is as little informed as to the real wants and necessities of its distant possessions. If Government had, on the other hand, a colonial representation to refer to, it would become acquainted with the truth, it would

Discussion on
the Ecole
Militaire.

* The establishment of the Ecole Militaire at the same time underwent a discussion at the Council of State. Napoleon observed—"This institution diminishes the severity of the conscription. It enables the young man to complete his education, which the conscription would otherwise prevent, at the same time that he is learning the rudiments of the military art. I know of no other school equally well constituted ; it will raise the organisation of our army to the very highest point. The army under the Republic was for long supported by the youths who in 1793 issued from this establishment. All the commanders of corps feel the want of skilled young men ; I can appoint them, but if they are ignorant of the duties of the private soldier, it is felt as an injustice by the common men. The Ecole Militaire furnishes scholars instructed in both departments, and thence its great excellence."

proclaim it, and transmit it in despatches to its colonial subjects.

"Commerce and the colonies have opposite interests; the interest of the former is that of purchasers and consumers, of the latter that of raisers and producers. No sooner is it proposed to impose duties on colonial produce, than I am besieged with memorials from all the chambers of commerce in France, but no one advances any thing in behalf of the colonies; the law, whatever it is, arrives there in unmitigated rigour, without the principles which led to it being explained, or their receiving any assurance that their interests have been balanced with those of the other side. But the colonists are Frenchmen, and our brothers; they bear a part of the public burdens, and the least that can be done for them in return is to give them such a shadow of a representation. Many persons here see only in the colonies the partisans of the English; that is held out merely as a pretext for subjecting them to every species of insult. Had I been at Martinique, I should have espoused the cause of the English; for the first of social duties is the preservation of life. Had any of your philanthropic liberals come out to Egypt to proclaim liberty to the blacks or the Arabs, I would have hung him from the mast-head. In the West Indies similar enthusiasts have delivered over the whites to the ferocity of the blacks, and yet they complain of the victims of such madness being discontented. How is it possible to give liberty to the Africans when they are destitute of any species of civilisation, and are ignorant even of what a colony or a mother country is. Do you suppose that had the majority of the Constituent Assembly been aware what they were doing, they would have given liberty to the blacks? Certainly not; but few persons at that time were sufficiently far-sighted to foresee the result, and feelings of humanity are ever powerful with excited imaginations. But now, after the experience we have had, the maintenance of the same principles is inconsistent with good faith. It can be the result only of overweening self-confidence or hypocrisy."¹

Words of true political wisdom, which demonstrate how admirably qualified Napoleon was to have held, with just

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

55.

Their right to representation in the parent state.

¹ Thib. 117, 121.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

56.

Superior justice of colonial administration in monarchical than in republican states.

and even hands, the reins of power in a vast and varied empire, and which have since become of still greater value from the contrast they afford to the measures subsequently pursued by another state, in regard to far greater colonial dependencies, and with the lamentable result of former rashness even more forcibly brought before its eyes. It is observed by Mr. Hume, that the remote provinces and colonial dependencies of a despotic empire, are always better administered than those of a popular government, and that the reason is, that an uncontrolled monarch being equally elevated above all his subjects, and not more dependent on one class than another, views them all, comparatively speaking, with equal eyes; whereas a free state is ruled by one body of citizens who have obtained the mastery of another, and govern exclusively the more distant settlements of the empire, and are consequently actuated by personal jealousy or patrimonial interests, in their endeavours to prevent them from obtaining the advantage of uniform and equal legislation. The admirable wisdom of the principles of colonial government thus developed by Napoleon, compared with the unjust and partial principles of administration which have of late years been adopted by Great Britain towards her West Indian settlements and East Indian empire, afford a striking illustration of the justice of this remark. England, if she does not alter her system of government, will ultimately lose her splendid colonial empire, from the same cause which proved fatal to that of Athens, Carthage, and Venice: viz. the selfish system of legislation exclusively adapted to the interest, or directed by the prejudices of the holders of political power in the centre of the state, and the general neglect of the wishes of the remote and unrepresented colonial dependencies.

57.
Finances of France.
General valuation, or cadastre.

France, both under the monarchy and during the course of the Revolution, like every other country which has fallen under despotic power, had become burdened with an enormous and oppressive land tax. The clear produce of the direct contributions in the year 1802 was two hundred and seventy three millions six hundred thousand francs, or £11,000,000 sterling, which, on the

net amount of agricultural labour in the Republic, was about twenty per cent.¹* This immense burden was levied according to a scale, or "cadastre," at which it was estimated the land was worth; and as the smiles of government favour were bestowed on the official persons employed in making the surveys, in a great degree in proportion to the amount to which they contrived to bring up the revenue of their districts, the oppression exercised in many parts of the country was extreme, and the less likely to be remedied, that it fell on a numerous body of detached small proprietors, incapable of any effective or simultaneous effort to obtain redress. The "cadastre," or scale of valuation, had been of very old standing in France, as it regulated the *taille* and *vingtième*, which constituted so large a portion of the revenue of the monarchy.† By a decree of the National Assembly of 16th September, 1791, sanctioned by the King on the 23d September in the same year, the method prescribed for fixing the valuation was as follows:— "When the levy of the land-tax in the territory of any community shall commence, the surveyor charged with the operations shall make out a scheme in a mass, which shall exhibit the general result of the valuation, and its division in sections. He shall then make out detailed plans, which shall constitute the parcelled valuations of the community."¹

CHAP.
XXXV.
1802.

Sept. 16,
1791.

¹ Duc de
Gaeta, ii.
260, 261.

These directions were justly and impartially con-

* MM. Lavoisier and Laplace estimate the total agricultural produce in France in 1805 at

	France.	
Net produce, deducting cost of production,	2,750,000,000 or	£110,000,000
Direct Taxes falling on land,	1,200,000,000 or	48,000,000
Indirect Taxes,	250,000,000 or	10,000,000
Drawn by the owners,	350,000,000 or	14,000,000
	600,000,000 or	24,000,000

So that of the net produce of the soil one-half was absorbed in taxation, and no less than 20 per cent. was taken from the proprietors in a *direct form*; a signal proof how little the French peasantry had gained, in alleviation of burdens at least, by the results of the revolution.—See PEUCHET, *Stat. de la France*, 286, 287.

The committee of the Constituent Assembly, who reported in 1790 on this subject, estimated the territorial revenue of France at 1500 millions, or £60,000,000. MM. Laplace and Lavoisier, after various laborious calculations, estimates it in 1816 at 1,300,000,000 francs, or £52,000,000; while the Duke de Gaeta, in 1817, fixed it at 1,323,000,000 francs, or £53,000,000.—See DUC DE GAETA, ii. 299.

† The Constituent Assembly in 1790 estimated the territorial revenue at 1,500,000,000 francs, or £60,000,000 annually, but took the cadastre or valuation at 1,200,000,000 francs, or £48,000,000, and fixed the land-tax at 300,000,000 francs, or £12,000,000, and, with the expenses of collection, 300,000,000 francs, or £12,000,000, being a fourth of the income of every landed proprietor."²

Statistical
details.

² Duc de
Gaeta, ii. 288.
Peuchet,
Stat. de la
France, 524.

CHAP.
XX XV.

1802.

58.
Immense
evils arising
from its in-
equality.1 Duc de
Gaeta, ii. 261.2 Duc de
Gaeta, ii. 257.59.
Napoleon's
arguments on
the necessity
of a cadastre.

ceived; but the difficulty of forming just and equal valuations in a country so immensely subdivided, and of such vast extent as France, was extreme; and, during the license and tyranny of the Revolution, the most flagrant inequality prevailed in the land-tax paid in different parts of the country. We have the authority of Napoleon's finance minister in 1802 for the assertion, that in every district of France, "there were some proprietors who were paying the fourth, *the third, and even the half*, of their clear revenue, while others were only rated at a tenth, a twentieth, a fiftieth, or a hundredth."¹ The gross injustice of such a system naturally produced the most vehement complaints, when the restoration of a regular government afforded any prospect of obtaining redress. The consular government, during the whole of 1802, was besieged with memorials from all quarters, setting forth the intolerable injustice which prevailed in the distribution of the land-tax, the utter inefficacy of all attempts which had been made in preceding years to obtain from the councils or prefects of the departments any thing like equality in the valuation, and the complete disregard which both the Convention and Directory had evinced towards the loud and well-founded complaints of the country.²

The matter at length became so pressing, that it was brought before the Council of State.—The magnitude of the evil did not escape the penetration of the First Consul. "Your system of land-tax," said he, in the Council of State, "is the worst in Europe. The result of it is, that there is no such thing as property or civil liberty in the country; for what is freedom without security of property? There can be no security in a country where the valuation on which the tax proceeds can be changed at the will of the surveyors every year. A man who has three thousand francs of rent a-year (£120) cannot calculate upon having enough next year to exist; every thing may be swept away by the direct tax. We see every day questions about five or a hundred francs gravely pleaded before the legal tribunals, and a mere surveyor can, by a simple stroke of the pen, surcharge you several thousand francs. Under such a system there cannot be said to be any property in the

country. When I purchase a domain, I know neither what I have got, nor what I should do in regard to it. In Lombardy and Piedmont there is a fixed valuation; all know what they have to pay; no extraordinary contributions are levied but on extraordinary occasions, and by the judgment of a solemn tribunal. If the contribution is augmented, every one, by applying it to his valuation, knows at once what his burden amounts to. In such a country, therefore, property may truly be said to exist. Why is it that we have never had any public spirit in France? Simply because every proprietor is obliged to pay his court to the tax-gatherers and surveyors of his district. If he incurs their displeasure he is ruined. It is in vain to talk of appealing; the judgments of the courts of review are arbitrary. It is for the same reason that there is no nation so servilely submissive to the government as France, because property depends entirely upon it. In Lombardy, on the other hand, a proprietor lives on his estate without feeling any disquietude as to who succeeds to the direction of affairs. Nothing has ever been done in France to give security to property. The man who shall devise an equal law on the subject of the cadastre will deserve a statue of gold."¹ What an instructive testimony as to the amount of security which the Revolution had conferred upon property in France, and the degree of practical freedom which had been enjoyed, and of public spirit developed, under its multifarious democratic administrations!

¹ Bign. i. 221.
Thib. 179.

The formation of a valuation was decreed, proceeding on a different principle. This was to adopt as the basis of the scale, a valuation, laid, not on parcels of ground, but on masses of the same kind of cultivation. This system, however, although in appearance the most equitable, was found by experience to be attended with so many difficulties, that its execution did not proceed over above a fifth of the territory of the Republic, and it was at length abandoned from the universal complaints of its injustice. The discussion of the cadastre was again brought forward, and made the subject of anxious consideration in 1817, but the inequality of the valuation still continued, and is the subject of loud and well-founded complaints at this hour. In truth, such are the obstacles

60.
His system to
remedy the
evils.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

thrown in the way of an equal valuation by individual interests, and such the difficulties with which the execution of such a task is attended, from the variation in the amount of the produce of the soil, and the prices which can be got for it at different times and seasons, that it is not going too far to pronounce it to be impossible to establish it universally without great local injustice. Inequality, severity, and oppression are the invariable and inevitable attendants of direct taxation wherever established, and even under the very best system of local administration. The only taxes which are, comparatively speaking, equal, just, and unfelt, are indirect burdens, which, being laid on consumption, are voluntarily incurred, disguised under the price of the article, and accurately proportioned to the amount of expenditure of each individual.¹

¹ Gaeta, ii.
258.

61.
Indignation
of Napoleon
at the lan-
guage used in
the Tribu-
nate.

But in the midst of these great designs of Napoleon for the reconstruction of society in France, he experienced the greatest annoyance from the independent, and sometimes cutting language used by the popular orators in discussing the projects sent from the Council of State to the Tribunate. Though friendly to a free and unreserved discussion of every subject in the first of these bodies, which sat with closed doors, and in which the intellect of able men only was addressed, the First Consul was irritated to the last degree by the opposition which his measures experienced in the only part of the legislature which retained a shadow even of popular constitution, and appealed, though in a very subdued tone, to popular passion, and openly expressed his resolution to get quit of an institution which reminded the people of the dangerous powers which they had exercised during the anarchy of the Revolution. He loved unfettered arguments in presence only of men competent to judge of the subject, but could not endure the public harangues of the tribune, intended to catch the ears, or excite the passions of an ignorant populace.² * On various occasions, during the course of 1802, his displeasure was strongly excited by

² Bour. v. 85.
Thib. 198.

* He often said to the leading orators of the Tribunate,—"Instead of declaiming from the tribune, why do you not come to discuss the points under deliberation with me in my cabinet? We should have family discussions as in my Council of State."—THIBAUDEAU, 198.

the ebullitions of republican spirit or spleen which occasionally took place in the Tribunal. An expression in the treaty with Russia roused the indignation of the veteran democrats of the Revolution. It was provided that "the two contracting parties should not permit their respective *subjects* to entertain any correspondence with foreign powers." When the treaty came to be discussed at the Tribunal, this expression gave rise to an angry discussion. Thibaut exclaimed, "The French are citizens, and not subjects." Chenier observed, "Our armies have combated ten years that we should remain citizens, and we have now become subjects. Thus are accomplished the wishes of the two coalitions." Napoleon was highly displeased with these symptoms of a refractory spirit. "What," said he, "would these declaimers be at? It was absolutely necessary that my government should treat on a footing of equality with that of Russia. I would have become contemptible in the eyes of all foreign nations if I had yielded to these absurd pretensions on the part of the Tribunal. These gentlemen annoy me to such a degree that I am strongly tempted to be done at once with them."¹

CHAP.
XXXV.
1802.

¹ Bour. i. 85.
87. Thib.
198, 207.

Another law was brought forward about the same time, which excited a still more vehement opposition on the part of the public orators. It related to certain changes in the constitution of the judges intrusted with the arrest of individuals and the municipal police. These powers were, by the existing law, invested in the hands of the *juges du paix*, who were judges of the lowest grade, and the only ones still appointed by the people; the proposed change took this branch of jurisdiction from these functionaries, and vested it in a small number of judges appointed for that special purpose by the government, who were to take cognisance of the crimes of robbery, housebreaking, and some others, without a jury. The importance of this change, which so nearly concerned the personal liberty of every individual, was at once seen, and the public indignation, in an especial manner, roused by a clause which subjected every citizen to arrest by the simple authority of the minister of police, and took away all personal responsibility on the part of the members of administration, on account of any acts infringing on the

62.
Important
change in
municipal
government
carried in
spite of that
body.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

Dec. 11. 1802.

1 Thib. 204.

63.
Debates on
the Tribunal
in the Council
of State.

liberty of the subject which they may have committed. The storm was so violent, and the complaints on this point especially, so well founded, that government was obliged to withdraw the most obnoxious article; but the necessity of the case, and the universal knowledge which prevailed of the total insecurity to life and property, from the height to which outrage and violence still existed in the interior, prevailed over the opposition, and the law, with that exception, passed after a strenuous resistance. Napoleon's displeasure was so great, that he could not conceal it, even in an audience to which the Senate was admitted on this subject. Speaking of the Tribunal, he said with the utmost energy, "There are assembled within its walls a dozen or fifteen metaphysicians; they are fit only to be thrown into the Seine. They are a kind of vermin, who have overrun my dress. But don't let them imagine I will suffer myself to be attacked like Louis XVI.; I will never allow matters to come to that."¹

His opinions on this subject were emphatically expressed, and the grounds of them powerfully urged in the Council of State, when the project for the renewal of the constitution was brought forward. "We must make a change," said he; "the example of England must not mislead us; the men who compose its Opposition are neither emigrants who regret the feudal *régime*, nor democrats who seek to revive the Reign of Terror. They feel the natural weight of talent, and are chiefly desirous to be bought at a sufficient price by the crown. With us the case is very different; our Opposition is composed of the remnant of the privileged classes, and of the outrageous Jacobins. They by no means limit their ambition to an accession to place or office; the one half would be satisfied with nothing but a return to the ancient *régime*; the other to the reign of democratic clubs. No two things are more opposite than the effects of free discussion among a people long habituated to its excitement, and in a country where freedom has only commenced. Once admitted into the Tribunal, the most honourable men aim only at success, without caring how violently they shake the fabric of society. What is government? Nothing if deprived of the weight of opinion. How is it possible to counterbalance the

influence of a Tribune always open for the most inflammatory speeches? When once the patrician classes are destroyed, the freedom of the tribune must of necessity be suppressed. The circumstances were widely different at Rome; yet, even there, the tribunes of the people did infinite mischief. The constituent assembly placed the king in a secondary position; they were right, for he was the representative of the feudal *régime*, and was supported by all the weight of the nobles and the clergy. At present the government is the representative of the people. These observations may appear foreign to the subject in hand, but in reality they are not so; they contain the principles on which, I am persuaded, government must now be conducted, and I willingly throw them out in order that they may be more largely disseminated by the intelligent circle which I see around me."

In conformity with these principles, the First Consul brought forward his plan, which was to divide the Tribune into five sections, corresponding to the divisions of the Council of State; that the proposed laws should be *secretly* transmitted from the section of the Council of State to the corresponding section of the Tribune; that they should be *secretly* discussed in the Tribune, and between the Tribune and the Council of State by three orators appointed on both sides; and that no public discussion should take place except by three orators, mutually in like manner chosen, between the Tribune and the Government pleaders before the legislature. It was strongly objected to this change, that it tended to destroy the publicity of proceedings in the only quarter where it still existed, and eradicated the last remnants of a free constitution. Napoleon replied: "I cannot see that. Even if it were so, a constitution must be moulded by circumstances, modified according to the results of experience, and ultimately constructed in such a way as not to impede the necessary action of government. My project secures a calm and rational discussion of the laws, and upholds the consideration of the Tribune. What does the Tribune mean? nothing but the tribune, that is, the power of rational discussion. The government has need of such an addition to its means of information: but what is the use of a hundred men to discuss the laws

CHAP.
XXXV.

1803.

64.
Napoleon's
plan for mo-
difying it.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

Dec. 21, 1802.

¹ Thib. 229,
232.

65.
He resolves
to make him-
self Consul
for life. His
efforts to
spread mon-
archical
ideas.

introduced by thirty? They declaim; but do nothing of real utility. We must at length organise the constitution in such a manner as to allow the government to advance. No one seems yet sufficiently impressed with the necessity of giving unity to the executive; until that is effected, nothing can be done. An universal disquietude prevails; speculation, exertion of every kind is arrested. In a great nation the immense majority of mankind are ever incapable of forming a rational opinion on public affairs. Every one must contemplate, at some period or another, the death of the First Consul; in that case, without a cordial union of the constituted authorities, all would be lost." The Opposition, however, was very powerful against these great alterations; and Napoleon, whose prudence in carrying through political changes was equal to his sagacity in conceiving them, contented himself, at the annual renewal of the constitution, with an *arrêt* of the Senate, that thenceforward the duties of the Tribunate and the Legislative body should be exercised only by the citizens who were inscribed on the two lists as the first elected to continue the exercise of the national functions. The great change of the constitution involved in the mutilation of the Tribunate, was reserved for the period when Napoleon was to be elected First Consul for life; an event which soon afterwards took place.¹

Influenced not merely by ambition, but by a profound and philosophic view of the existing state of France, Napoleon had firmly resolved to convert the republic into a monarchy, and not only seat himself on the throne, but render the dynasty hereditary in his family, or those whom he might designate as his successors. Nothing could be more apparent to an impartial spectator of the state of France, and the adjoining nations, than that it was utterly impossible that republican institutions could exist in a country so situated. Destitute of any of the elevated or ennobled classes which alone in a great and powerful community can give stability to such institutions; exposed to all the sources of discord and corruption arising from a powerful military force, selfish and highly civilised manners, and the influence of a vast revenue; placed in the midst of the great military monarchies of

Europe, who were necessarily hostile to such institutions, from the experience they had had of the evils with which they were attended to all the adjoining states, France could not by possibility avoid falling under the government of a single individual. Napoleon had no alternative but to restore the Bourbons, or seat himself on the throne. During the whole of 1802, the efforts of Government were incessant to extend monarchical ideas by means of the press, and the private influence of all persons in official situations. Lucien Buonaparte has been already noticed as one of the earliest and most zealous propagators of these new opinions a year before; though as they came forth at too early a period, and somewhat startled the public, he was rewarded for his services by an honourable exile as ambassador at Madrid. But in the succeeding season, the change of the public mind had become so evident, that it was no longer necessary to veil the real designs of Government; and the appointment of Napoleon to the consulship for life was accordingly zealously advocated by all persons in prominent situations. Rœderer supported it with all the weight of his acute metaphysics; Talleyrand gained for it the suffrages of the whole diplomatic body. Arbitrary power advanced with rapid steps in the midst of general declamations in favour of order and stability. Whoever spoke of liberty or equality was forthwith set down as a Jacobin, a Terrorist, and looked on with suspicious eyes by all the servants of Government. The partisans of revolution, finding themselves reduced to a miserable minority, retired into the obscurity of private life, or consoled themselves for the ruin of their republican chimeras, by the personal advantages which they derived from situations round the Consular throne.¹

¹ Bign. ii. 231,
232. Thib.
236.

It is remarkable that, while all around the First Consul beheld with undisguised satisfaction his approaching elevation to the throne, the individual in existence who, next to himself, was to gain most by the change, was devoured with anxiety on the subject. All the splendour of the throne could not dazzle the good sense of Josephine, or prevent her from anticipating in the establishment of the Napoleon dynasty, evident risk to her husband, and certain downfall to herself. "The real enemies of Buona-

66.
Strong opposition of Josephine to these attempts.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

parte," said she to Rœderer, who was advocating the change, "are those who put into his head ideas of hereditary succession, dynasty, divorce, and marriage." She employed all the personal influence which she possessed with the First Consul and his most intimate counsellors to divert him from these ideas, but in vain. "I do not approve the projects of Napoleon," said she; "I have often told him so; he hears me with attention, but I can plainly see that I make no impression. The flatterers who surround him soon obliterate all I have said. The new honours which he will acquire will augment the number of his enemies; the generals will exclaim that they have not fought so long to substitute the family of the Buonapartes for that of the Bourbons. I no longer regret the want of children; I should tremble for their fate. I shall remain attached to the destiny of Buonaparte, how dangerous soever it may be, as long as he continues to me the regard which he has hitherto manifested; but the moment that he changes I will retire from the Tuileries. I know well how much he is urged to separate from me."¹

¹ Bour. v. 44,
47. Thib. 237,
242.

67.
The attempt
at first fails
in the Senate.

The project for appointing Napoleon consul for life had failed a few months before, when the extension of that appointment for ten years took place. Napoleon affected at that period to decline such an elevation; the two other Consuls, acquainted with his real desires, insisted that it should be forced upon him; and it was so carried in the Council of State by a majority of ten to seven. Lanfrede, who brought up the report of the committee of the Senate on the subject, and was not in the secret, proposed only a temporary extension; Despinasse moved that it should be for life. But Tronchet, who was president, and whose intrepidity nothing could overcome, held firm for the first proposal, and it was carried by a majority of sixty to one, Lanjuinais alone voting in the minority. Tronchet was neither a republican nor a courtier; he preferred a monarchy; but notwithstanding his admiration for Napoleon, he feared his ambition. He said of Napoleon, in a company where several senators were assembled:—"He is a young man; he has begun like Cæsar, and will end like him; I hear him say too frequently, that he will mount on horse-

back and draw his sword."¹ What a glorious distinction for the same individual to have with equal courage pleaded the cause of Louis XVI. in the Temple, and restrained the career of Napoleon on the throne; and how noble a contrast to the baseness of so many of the popular faction, "who had shown as great vehemence in the persecution of a falling, as they now displayed servility in the adulation of a rising monarch!"*

The design of making Napoleon consul for life having thus failed in the Senate, probably from misapprehension of what he really desired, the method of attaining the object was changed. He began, as he usually did in such cases, to blame severely those who had been most prominent in urging forward the plan, and in an especial manner animadverted on Rœderer, whose efforts to procure his elevation had been peculiarly conspicuous. But in the midst of his seeming displeasure at the proposal which had been made, the most efficacious means were taken to secure its adoption. In reply to the address of the Senate, which extended his power for ten years beyond the term originally assigned, he observed—"The suffrages of the people have invested me with the supreme authority; I should not deem myself sufficiently secured in the new proof which you have given me of your esteem, if it were not sanctioned by the same authority." Under cover of this regard for popular sovereignty, the partisans of Napoleon veiled a design of conferring on him hereditary power.

It was proposed in the Council of State, that the people should be consulted on the question whether the consulship for *life* should be conferred upon him. Rœderer said—"An extension of the consulship for ten years gives no stability to Government. The interests of credit and of commerce loudly demand a stronger measure.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

¹ Thib. 245.
Bour. v. 17,
18.

68.

Means adopted to ensure its success.

69.

Reference of the question to the votes of the people.

* So far did the spirit of servility proceed among the courtiers of the Tuilleries, that they seriously proposed to Napoleon to restore the ancient titles of honour, as being more in harmony than republican forms with the power with which he was now invested. But Napoleon had too much sense to disclose at once the whole of his designs. "The pear," said he to Bourrienne, "is not yet ripe. All that will come in good time; but it is essentially requisite that I myself, in the first instance, assume a title, from which those which I bestow on others may naturally flow. The most difficult part is now over; no one can be deceived; every body sees there is but a step which separates the consulship from the throne. Some precautions are still requisite; there are many fools in the Tribunal; but let me alone, I will overcome them."—BOURRIENNE, v. 17.

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XXXV.

1802.

The Senate has limited its appointment to ten years, because it conceived it did not possess power to confer authority for a longer period; but we should submit to the people the question, whether the First Consul should be nominated for life, and invested with the right to appoint his successor." So clearly was the design seen through, that the proposal was carried without a division, though some of the popular members abstained from voting. In conformity with this resolution of the Council of State, and without any authority from the other branches of the Legislature, the question was forthwith submitted to the people,—“Shall Napoleon Buonaparte be Consul for life?” Registers were directed to be opened in every commune, to receive the votes of the citizens. Napoleon declined the addition of the question, whether he should be invested with the right to nominate his successor, deeming the inconsistency too glaring between a refusal to accept a prorogation for ten years from the Senate, if not confirmed by the people, and the demand of a right to nominate a successor to the throne of France.¹

¹ Thib. 250.
253, 265.
Bour. v. 17.
Bign. ii. 239.

69.

Result of the
appeal, and
great satisfaction
which it
gave.

Aug. 2, 1802.

The result of this appeal was announced by the *Senatus Consultum* of August 2. It appeared that three million five hundred and fifty-seven thousand eight hundred and eighty-five citizens had voted, of whom three million three hundred and sixty-eight thousand two hundred and fifty-nine were for the affirmative. This is one of the most remarkable events recorded in the history of the Revolution, and singularly descriptive of that longing after repose, that invincible desire for tranquillity, which uniformly succeeds to revolutionary convulsions, and so generally renders them the prelude to despotic power. The rapid rise of the public funds demonstrated that this feeling was general among the holders of property in France. They advanced with every addition made to the authority of the successful general; as low as eight before the 18th Brumaire, they rose at once to sixteen when he seized the helm, and after the consulship for life was proclaimed, reached fifty-two. Contrast this with the rise of the public securities, thirty *per cent.*, on the day on which Necker was restored to the ministry on the shoulders of the people;² to carry through the

² Bour. v. 55.
Norv. ii. 129.
Thib. ii. 81.

convocation of the States-General, and observe the difference between the anticipation and the experience of a revolution.

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XXV.
1802.

In the midst of the general unanimity, M. Lafayette had the courage to vote against the appointment of the First Consul for life. He added to his vote these words: "I cannot vote for such a magistracy, until public freedom is sufficiently guaranteed; when that is done, I give my voice to Napoleon Buonaparte." In a letter, addressed to the First Consul, he fully expressed the grounds of his jealousy:—"When a man," said he, "penetrated with the gratitude which he owes you, and too much enamoured of glory, not to admire that which encircles your name, has given only a conditional vote, it is the less suspected that no one will rejoice more than himself to see you the first magistrate for life, in a free republic. It is impossible that you, General, the first in that class of men who occasionally arise at the interval of ages, should wish that such a revolution, illustrated by so many victories, stained by so many crimes, should terminate only in the establishment of arbitrary power. Patriotic and personal motives would lead me to desire for you that compliment to your glory which the consulship for life would afford; but the principles, the engagements, the actions of my life forbid me to wish for any such appointment if not founded on a basis worthy of you." In a private conversation with the First Consul, he added:—"A free government, and you at its head; that comprehends all my desires."

70.
Letter of Lafayette declining to vote for it.

The veteran republican did not perceive, what indeed none of the enthusiasts of his age were aware of, that the establishment of the freedom to which he was so warmly attached had been rendered impossible by the crimes of the Revolution in which he himself had borne so conspicuous a part. He was taught the same truth in a still more striking manner thirty years afterwards by the result of the Revolution which overturned the Restoration; but it is seldom that political fanatics, how sincere or respectable soever, are enlightened even by the most important lessons of contemporaneous history. Napoleon said on this occasion:—"In theory Lafayette is perhaps right; but what is theory? a mere dream when applied

71.
Napoleon's observations on Lafayette's vote.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

¹ Bour. v. 61.
62. Hign. ii.
235, 236.

72.
Answer of the
First Consul
to the address
of the Senate
on the occasion.

to the masses of mankind. He thinks he is still in the United States, as if the French were Americans. He has no conception of what is required for this country. The Catholic religion has still its root here; I have need of the Pope. He will do all I desire." From that period all communication between the General and the First Consul ceased. Napoleon tried repeatedly afterwards to regain him to his government, but in vain.^{1*}

The answer of the First Consul to the address of the Senate on this important occasion is valuable, as illustrating the great views which he already entertained of his mission, to extinguish the discord which had preceded him, and restore the reign of order upon earth. "The life of a citizen," said he, "belongs to his country; the French people have expressed their wish that mine should be solely devoted to it: I obey their will. In bestowing upon me a new, a permanent pledge of their confidence, the nation has imposed upon me the duty of moulding the system of its laws, so as to bring it into harmony with durable institutions. By my exertions, aided by your co-operation, citizen senators, by the concurrent voice of all the authorities, by the trust and the will of the whole people, the liberty, the prosperity, the equality of France will be established beyond the reach of chance. The most distinguished of people will be the most fortunate, and their prosperity will secure that of all Europe. Content to have been called by the will of Him from whom every thing emanates, to bring back the reign of justice, order, and equality upon the earth, I will hear the voice which summons me hence without regret, and without disquietude on the opinion of future generations."²

² Thib. 287.
Norv. ii. 193.

73.
Napoleon's
ideas on the
lists of eligibility.

Important changes in the constitution followed this alteration in the character of the executive authority; they were preceded by memorable discussions on the principles of government in the Council of State. "All the powers of the state," said Napoleon, "are in the air; they have nothing to rest upon. We must establish

* Napoleon did not attempt to disguise his contempt for the venal revolutionists who now fawned on the sceptre of the Consulate. "How contemptible are these men," said he; "all your virtuous Republicans are at my service, if I will condescend to put gilt lace on their coats."—BOURRIENNE, v. 10, 11.

relations between them and the people, a particular in which the constitution was essentially defective. The lists of those eligible to particular offices have by no means answered the desired end. If they were for life, they would establish the most fearful aristocracy that ever existed; if temporary, they would keep the nation in continual excitement for an imaginary advantage. What flatters and captivates the people in democratic institutions is the real and practical exercise of their powers; but under the existing system, the people who perceive only five thousand persons eligible to the higher offices of state, cannot flatter themselves that they possess such a share in the elections as to have any influence on the administration. To ensure the stability of government, the people must have a larger share in the election and feel themselves really represented. The electoral colleges attach the people to the government, and *vice versa*. They are a link, and a most important one, between the authorities and the nation. In that link it is indispensable to combine the class of proprietors with the most distinguished of those who have not that advantage; the former, because property must be the basis of every rational system of representation; the latter, because the career of ambition must not be closed to obscure or indigent genius.

"We are told to look at the English constitution for a model: I am of opinion that it is inapplicable to this country, situated as it now is; and my reasons for that opinion are these:—England embraces in the bosom of its society a body of nobles who hold the greatest part of the property of the nation, and are made illustrious by ancient descent. In France that body is totally wanting. It cannot be created; if you compose it of the men of the Revolution, it could only be brought about by a concentration in their hands of the whole property of the nation, which is impossible; if of the ancient noblesse, a counter-revolution would immediately ensue. Besides this, the character of the two people is different; the Englishman is rude, the Frenchman is vain, polite, inconsiderate. Look at the elections; you will see the English swilling for forty days at the expense of the nobles; never would the French peasantry disgrace

CHAP.
XXXV.
1802.

74.
The usages of
the English
representa-
tive system
inapplicable
to France.

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XXXV.

1802.

themselves by similar excesses. Their passion is for equality. For these reasons I am clearly of opinion that the English constitution is inapplicable to France. The constitution may be aptly compared to a vessel; if you abandon it to the winds, with all its sails set, no one can tell where it may be drifted. Where are now the men of the Revolution? the moment they were expelled from office they sank into oblivion. This will happen in all cases, if precautions are not taken to prevent it; it was with that design that I instituted the Legion of Honour; among all people, in every republic that ever existed, classes are to be found. At present, nothing has a lasting reputation but military achievement; civil services are less striking, more open to differences of opinion. Hereditary succession to the First Consul is absurd; not in itself, for it is the best guarantee for the stability of the state, but because it is incompatible with the present state of France. It long existed in the ancient monarchy; but with institutions which rendered it feasible, which exist no longer, and cannot be restored. Hereditary succession is founded on the idea of civil right; it presupposes property; it is intended to ensure its transmission from the dead to the living. But how is it possible to reconcile hereditary succession in the chief magistrate with the principle of the sovereignty of the people? When the crown was hereditary, the chief situations in the kingdom were hereditary also; the fiction on which the former was founded was but a branch of the general law. At present there is no longer any thing of that kind."¹

¹ Thib. 295,
299.

75.

Great
changes in the
constitution.
Aug. 4, 1802.

On the views taken by Napoleon the new constitution was framed, which was proclaimed on the 4th August. The chief changes were, that the Tribunate was reduced from one hundred to fifty members; a diminution of importance, which was regarded at the time, as it really was, as merely a prelude to its total extinction, and which so completely deprived that remnant of free institutions of consideration, as to render it, from thenceforward, no obstacle whatever to the despotic tendency of the government. The Legislative Body was reduced to two hundred and fifty-eight members, and divided into five divisions, each of which was annually renewed; the electors also

retained their functions for life. The Senate was invested with the power to dissolve the Legislative Body and the Tribunate, declare particular departments *hors de la constitution*, and modify the fundamental institutions of the Republic. The First Consul received the right to nominate his successor and to pardon offences. In return for so many concessions to the executive, a shadow of privilege was conferred on the electors; the electoral colleges were allowed each to present two citizens for the functions of the municipality department and nation. In all but name, the consulship was already a despotic monarchy. So evident did this soon become, that even the panegyrists of Napoleon have not scrupled to assert that the consular and imperial institutions were "fraudulent constitutions, systematically framed by servile hands to introduce despotic power." Subsequent experience has warranted the belief that, how arbitrary soever, they were the only institutions under which France could enjoy any degree of tranquillity, and that, if they were calculated to extinguish freedom, it was because the sins of the Revolution had rendered her people neither worthy of receiving, nor capable of enjoying that first of blessings.¹

A few days after the constitution was published, the First Consul presided at the Senate, and received the congratulations of the constituted authorities, the public bodies, and the foreign ambassadors, on his appointment for life. This was remarkable as the first occasion on which he openly displayed the pomp and magnificence of regal power. The soldiers formed a double line from the Tuileries to the Luxembourg; the First Consul was seated in a magnificent chariot, drawn by eight horses; the two other consuls followed in carriages drawn by six. A splendid *cortège* of generals, ambassadors, and public functionaries followed, whose gorgeous appearance captivated the Parisian multitude, more passionately devoted than any other in Europe to spectacles of that description. Enthusiastic applause from the inconstant populace rent the heavens; they did not manifest greater rapture when the Constituent Assembly began the work of demolishing the monarchy, than they now did when the First Consul restored it.²

CHAP.
XXXV.
1802.

¹ Norv. ii.
193. Bour. v.
56. Bign. ii.
242, 246.
Thib. 289,
297.

76.
Acceptance
of the new
constitution
by the Senate,
Aug. 8, 1802.

² Thib. 305,
306

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

77.

Aspect of
Paris and its
society at this
period.

The aspect of Paris at this period was sufficient to have captivated a nation gifted with a less volatile imagination than the French, the more especially coming as it did after the sad and melancholy scenes of the Revolution. The taste for luxury and pleasure had spread rapidly in a capital where they had all the charms of novelty; while the people, delighted at the return of enjoyments, to which they had long been strangers, drank deep and thankfully of the intoxicating draught. The vast influx of strangers, especially English and Russians, filled the streets with brilliant equipages; while the gay and party-coloured liveries dazzled the inhabitants, from the contrast they afforded to the sombre appearance of the Jacobin costume. The whole population of Paris flocked to the Place Carrousel, where their eyes were daily dazzled by splendid views, attended by a concourse of strangers which recalled the prosperous days of Louis XIV.; while the higher classes of citizens were not less captivated by the numerous and brilliant levees and drawing-rooms, in which the Court of the First Consul already rivalled the most sumptuous displays of European royalty.* M. de Markoff, who had succeeded Kalitscheff as ambassador from Russia, Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador, and the Marquis Luchesini, the representative of Prussia, were in an especial manner distinguished by the magnificence of their retinues, and the eminent persons whom they presented to the First Consul. Among the illustrious Englishmen who hastened to Paris to satiate their curiosity by the sight of the remains, and the men, of the Revolution, was Mr. Fox, whom Napoleon received in the most distinguished manner, and for whom he ever after professed the highest regard. But the praises of an enemy are always suspicious, and the memory of that able man would have been more honoured if the determined foe of England had bestowed on him some portion of that envenomed hatred¹ which he so often expressed

¹ Bour. v. 55.
D'Abr. vi.
136, 140.

* The court of Napoleon at this period was happily characterised by the Princess Dolgorucki, who then resided in Paris: "The Tuileries," said she, "is not, properly speaking, a court; and yet it is as little a camp: The consulship is a new institution. The First Consul has neither a *chapeau bras* under his arm, nor do you hear the clank of a sabre at his side."—LAS CASES, iii. 241.

towards Pitt or Wellington, and all the British leaders who had advanced the real interests and glory of their country.*

Nor was the French metropolis less illustrated by the spoils which were collected there from the vanquished states in every part of Europe. Already the Venus de Medicis, torn from her sanctuary in the tribune of Florence, diffused over the marble halls of the Louvre her air of matchless grace; the Pallas of Velletri attested the successful researches of the French engineers in the Roman states; while the St. Jerome of Parma, the Transfiguration of Rome, and the Last Communion of the Vatican, exhibited to wondering crowds the softness of Correggio's colouring, the grandeur of Raphael's design, and the magic of Domenichino's finishing. Dazzled by the brilliant spectacle, the Parisians came to regard these matchless productions, not as the patrimony of the human race, but as their own peculiar and inalienable property, and thus prepared for themselves that bitter mortification which afterwards ensued on the restoration of these precious remains to their rightful owners.¹

In foreign states the re-establishment of a regular government in France, and its settlement under the firm and able guidance of Napoleon, diffused as great contentment as among its own inhabitants. In London, Vienna, and Berlin, the institution of the consulship for life gave unalloyed satisfaction. All enlightened persons in these capitals perceived that the restoration of the feudal régime and the property of the emigrants had already become impossible, and that the fury of the Revolution, under which they had already suffered so severely, was never so likely to be stilled as under the resolute and fortunate soldier who had already done so much to restrain its excesses. The

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

78.

Formation of
the lower
gallery in the
Louvre.

¹ Bour. v. 55.
D'Abr. vi.
259.

79.

Great satisfaction which
these changes
gave in foreign
courts.

* To the honour of Mr. Fox it must be mentioned, that during his intercourse with the First Consul he never failed to impress upon him the absurdity and falsehood of those ideas in regard to the privy of Mr. Pitt to any designs against his life, or any desire for his destruction, which were then so prevalent in the Tuileries. Alone and unaided, in the midst of the officers and generals of Napoleon, Mr. Fox undertook the defence of his illustrious opponent, and pleaded his cause with a warmth and generosity which excited the admiration even of the most envenomed enemies of the English administration."—See DUCHESSE D'ARRANTES, vi. 136, 143.

He said frequently, in his bad French, "Premier Consul, otez cela de votre tête."—See LAS CASES, iv. 172.

Generous
conduct of
Mr. Fox in
defending
Mr. Pitt to
the First
Consul.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

Queen of Naples, a woman endowed with masculine spirit and great penetration, expressed the general feeling at Vienna, where she then was, in these words: "If I had possessed a vote in France, I would have given it to Napoleon; and written after my signature, I name him consul for life, as being the man most fitted to govern the country. He is worthy of the throne, since he knows how to fill it." Public opinion, after this change, ran so strongly in favour of the centralisation of influence and hereditary succession, that if the First Consul had not repressed the general transports, he would have received at once the unlimited gift of absolute power. The agents of Government pursued with unrelenting severity the last remains of democratic fervour. It was generally suggested that all authority should be concentrated in the same hands, from the consulship for life to the appointment of mayor to the lowest village in France and that the citizens should as rapidly as possible be estranged from any exercise of powers which they were evidently incapable of using to advantage. Innumerable projects were set on foot for reducing the number of the communes, the prefectures, and the tribunals; the old parliaments were held up as models of the administration of justice, the old intendants of provinces as a perfect system of local administration. So powerful was the reaction against the ideas and the changes of the Revolution!¹

¹ Thib. 311,
312. Bign.
ii. 250.

80.
Infamous
proposals of
Lucien re-
jected by
Josephine.

So strong was the desire generally felt at this time for perpetuating the dynasty in the descendants of Napoleon, that the persons around his throne went the length of proposing to Josephine that she should palm off a stranger or bastard child upon the nation. "You must have a son, if not of him; of some one else. You are going to the waters of Plombieris; you know what they are celebrated for," said Lucien to her. And when she expressed her indignation at the proposal,—"Well," says he, "if you will not or cannot comply, Buonaparte must have a child by some other woman, and you must adopt it; for a family is indispensable to him, and it is for your interest that he should have one; you can be at no loss to understand why." "Lucien," replied she, "you are mad. Do you suppose France would ever submit to be governed by a bastard?" Shortly after she recounted this extra-

ordinary scene to one of the councillors of state. "You may depend upon it," said she, "they have not abandoned their idea of hereditary succession, and that it will be brought about some day, one way or other. They wish that Buonaparte should have a child of some other woman, and that I should adopt it; but I told them I would never lend myself to such an infamous proposal. They are so blinded as to believe that the nation would permit a bastard to succeed. They are already beginning to hint at a divorce and a large pension to me. Buonaparte even is carried away by their ideas. The other day, when I expressed my fears in regard to the Princess Hortense, on account of the infamous reports which are in circulation about her infant being his son, he answered, 'These reports are only accredited by the public, from the anxiety of the nation that I should have a child.' He is more weak and changeable than is generally imagined. It is owing to that circumstance that Lucien has got such an extraordinary dominion over him." Napoleon at St. Helena alluded to this proposal, though, with his usual disregard of truth, he made it come from Josephine herself; an assertion which his secretary most properly denies, and which is completely disproved by the event. If Josephine had been willing to adopt an illegitimate son of Napoleon, and pass it off as her own offspring, she would have lived and died Empress of France.¹

CHAP.
XXXV.
1802.

¹ Bour. v. 21,
49. Thib.
309, 310.

Shortly after Napoleon was appointed to the consulship for life, several changes in the administration took place. The most important of these was the suppression of the ministry of police, and the transference of Fouché to a comparatively insignificant situation in the Conservative Senate. This selfish and cruel, but astute and able statesman, notwithstanding his share in the atrocious massacres of the Loire and the fusilades of Lyons, had now become one of the most important supporters of the consular throne. His great value consisted in his perfect knowledge of the revolutionary characters, and the clear guidance which he afforded to the First Consul on all the delicate points where it was necessary to consult the inclinations, or yield to the prejudices of the immense body of men who had risen to importance on the ruins of the ancient proprietors. He formed the same link

81
Suppression
of the minis-
try of police.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

between the Government and the Revolutionary interests which Talleyrand did between them and the ancient *régime*. The honours and fortune to which he had risen, had in no respect changed the simplicity of his former habits; but with the possession of power he had acquired a taste for its sweets, and became little scrupulous as to the means by which it was to be exercised. Ambition had become his ruling passion; he loved office and the wealth which it brought with it, not for the enjoyments which it might purchase, but for the importance which it conferred. Such was his dissimulation, that he never suffered his real views to escape either from his lips or his countenance; and by the extraordinary hypocrisy of which he was master, inspired parties the most at variance with a sense of his importance, and a desire to propitiate his goodwill.* The Republicans beheld in the ancient Jacobin who had voted for the death of Louis, and presided over the executions of Nantes and Lyons, the representative of their party in the state; the ancient noblesse lavished on him their praises, and acknowledged with gratitude the favours he had conferred on many of the most illustrious of their body. Josephine made him her confidant in all her complaints against the brothers of her husband, and received large sums of money from his coffers to reveal the secrets she had elicited from the First Consul; while he himself yielded to a fascination which seemed to extend alike over the greatest men and most powerful bodies in the state.¹

¹ Bourr. v. 32,
33. Thib.
325, 326.

82.
And disgrace
of Fouché.

Napoleon, however, at length perceived, that the immense influence which Fouché enjoyed as head of the police, might one day become formidable even to the Government. He had the highest opinion of the importance of that branch of the administration; but he began to conceive inquietudes as to its concentration in the hands of so able an individual. It was impossible to disguise the fact that its members had conspired in favour of the Consulate against the Directory, and the powerful machinery which was then put in motion to support Napoleon, might with equal

* His ruling maxim, in common with Talleyrand, was, that the chief use of words was to conceal the thoughts.

facility be directed to his overthrow. Influenced by these considerations, the First Consul lent a willing ear to the party at the Tuileries who were adverse to Fouché, at the head of which was Talleyrand, who openly opposed and cordially hated his powerful rival. Yet such was the ascendancy of the minister of police, even over the powerful mind of Napoleon, that he long hesitated before he took the decisive step ; and, after it had been resolved on, felt the necessity of veiling it under a professed measure to increase the popularity of Government. He represented to Fouché, therefore, that the office of minister of police was one which might now be dispensed with, and that the Government would derive additional popularity from the suppression of so obnoxious a branch of the administration. Fouché saw through the device ; but, according to his usual policy, yielded to a power which he could not brave, and expressed no dissent to the First Consul, though he was far from supposing the storm was so soon to break on his head. The *arrêt* for his dismissal was signed when he was on a visit to Joseph Buonaparte, at Morfontaine. Fouché was named a senator, and loaded with praises by the Government, which deemed him too powerful to be retained in his former situation ; and, at the same time, the ministry of police was suppressed, and united to that of justice, in the person of Regnier.¹*

Soon after, an important change took place in the constitution of the Senate. It had been originally provided that those elevated functionaries should, after their appointment, be incapable of holding any other situation ; but it was subsequently enacted that the senators might hold the offices of consuls, ministers, inspectors of public instruction, be employed in all extraordinary missions,

CHAP.
XXXV
1802.

Sept. 12.

¹ Bour. v. 36,
37. Thib.
325, 329.
Fouché,
Mem. i.

83.
Changes in
the constitu-
tion of the
Senate.
Aug. 15.
1802.

* The letter of the First Consul to the Senate, announcing the suppression of the ministry of police, was couched in these terms : — “ Appointed minister of police in the most difficult times, the Senator Fouché has fully answered by his talents, his activity, and his attachment to the Government, all that the circumstances demanded of him. Placed now in the bosom of the Senate, he is called to equally important duties ; and if ever a recurrence of the same circumstances should require a restoration of the office of minister of police, it is on him that the eyes of Government would first be fixed to discharge its functions.” These consolatory words opened to Fouché a ray of hope in the midst of his disgrace ; all his efforts were from that moment directed to bring about his restoration to office ; and at length, as will appear in the sequel, he attained his object. — See Bour. v. 37 ; and Thib. 328.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1802.

Jan. 14,
1803.

1 Thib. 335.

84. .
Renewed cor-
respondence
between
Louis
XVIII. and
Napoleon.

Feb. 1803.

and receive the decoration of the Legion of Honour. Subsequently a munificent provision was made for the Senate, and every member on his nomination received an appointment for life. Pensioned by the executive, nominated by the First Consul, surrounded by every species of seduction, this branch of the Government in reality served thereafter no other purpose but to throw a thin veil over the omnipotence of the executive. Napoleon was careful, however, to keep up its name, and bring forward all his despotic measures under the sanction of its authority, as the Roman emperors retained the venerable letters S. P. Q. R. on their ensigns, and the preamble "ex auctoritate Senatus," to the most arbitrary acts of their administration.¹*

An event occurred at this period, which tended in a remarkable manner to illustrate the dignity with which the exiled family of the Bourbons bore the continued rigours of fortune. When Napoleon was pursuing his projects for the establishment of a hereditary dynasty in his family in France, he caused a communication to be made to the Count de Lille, afterwards Louis XVIII., then residing, under the protection of the Prussian king, at Königsberg, offering, in the event of his renouncing in his favour his right to the throne of France, to provide for him a principality, with an ample revenue, in Italy. But Louis answered in these dignified terms, worthy of the family from which he sprung:—"I do not confound M. Buonaparte with those who have preceded him. I esteem his valour, his military talents; I am gratified by many acts of his administration, for the happiness of my people must ever be dear to my heart. But he deceives himself, if he imagines that he will prevail upon me to surrender my rights. So far from it, he would establish them himself, if they could admit of doubt, by the step which he has taken at this moment. I know not the

* Another *arrêt* at the same period regulated the costume of the persons employed in the legal profession. The robes of the judges were ordered to be red, and those of the bar black. During the Revolution, all the distinguishing marks had been abolished. The black robe which Molière had so exquisitely ridiculed, had given way to the costume of the sans-culottes. At the same time, the old habillements at the *Messe Rouge* were re-established; and the service was celebrated by the Archbishop of Paris. Every thing breathed a return to the ancient régime. Cambacérés was the great promoter of these changes; well aware of the importance of whatever strikes the eye on the inconsiderate multitude.—THIBAUDEAU, 333.

intentions of God to my family or myself, but I know the obligations which he has imposed upon me. As a Christian, I will discharge the duties which religion prescribes to my last breath ; son of St. Louis, I will make myself be respected even in fetters ; successor of Francis I., I wish ever to be able to say with him, ‘ All is lost except our honour.’ ” ¹

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1802.

¹ Hour. v.
147. Bign.
iii. 283, 287.

It was at the same period that Napoleon commenced the great undertaking which has so deservedly covered his memory with glory, and survived all the other achievements of his genius,—the formation of a CIVIL CODE, and the concentration of the heterogeneous laws of the monarchy and republic into one consistent whole. In contemplating this great work, it is difficult whether to admire most the wisdom with which he called to his assistance the ablest and most experienced lawyers of the old *régime*, the readiness with which he apprehended the difficult and intricate questions which were brought under discussion, or the prudence with which he steered between the vehement passions and contending interests that arose in legislating for an empire composed of the remains of monarchical and republican institutions. It is no longer the conqueror of Jena or Austerlitz, striking down nations in a single field, whom we recognise ; it is Solon legislating for a distracted people ; it is Justinian digesting the treasures of ancient jurisprudence, that arises to our view ; and the transient glories even of the imperial reign fade before the durable monument which his varied genius has erected in the permanent code of half of Europe.

85.
Formation of
the Code Na-
poleon.

It is observed by Lord Bacon, that when “ laws have been heaped upon laws, in such a state of confusion as to render it necessary to revise them, and collect their spirit into a new and intelligible system, those who accomplish such an heroic task, have a good right to be named among the benefactors of mankind.” Never was the justice of this observation more completely demonstrated than by the result of the labours of the First Consul in the formation of the Code Napoleon. The complication of the old laws of France, the conflicting authority of the civil law, the parliaments of the provinces, and the local customs, had given rise to a chaos of confusion which had

86.
Reflections
on the diffi-
culty of this
subject.

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XXV.
1802.

suggested to many statesmen before the Revolution the necessity of some attempt to reduce them to a uniform system. By an astonishing effort of mental vigour, Pothier had contrived to extract out of this heterogeneous mass the elements of general jurisprudence, and followed out the principles of the Roman law, with a power of generalisation and clearness of expression, to which there is nothing comparable in the whole annals of legal achievement. But his lucid works had not the weight of general law; they could not be referred to as paramount on every question; they contained principles to be followed from their equity, not rules to be obeyed from their authority. The difficulty of the task was immensely increased by the Revolution; by the total change in the most important branches of jurisprudence, personal liberty, the rights of marriage, the descent of property, and the privileges of citizenship, which it occasioned; and the large inroads which revolutionary legislation had made on the broken and disjointed statutes of the monarchy.

87.
Extreme difficulty of
legal reformation.

To reform a system of law without destroying it is one of the most difficult tasks in political improvement, and one requiring, perhaps, more than any other change, a combination of practical knowledge with the desire of social amelioration. To retain statutes as they are, without ever modifying them according to the progress of society, is to make them fall behind the great innovator, Time, and often become pernicious in their operation. To new-model them, in conformity with the wishes of a heated generation, is almost certain to incur unforeseen and irremediable evils. Nothing is more easy than to point out defects in established laws, because their inconvenience is felt, and the people generally lend a ready ear to those who vituperate existing institutions; nothing is more difficult than to propose safe or expedient remedies, because hardly any foresight is adequate to estimate the ultimate effects which any considerable legal changes produce. They are in general calculated to remedy some known and experienced evil, and, in so far as they effect that object, they are salutary in their operation; but they too often go beyond that limit, and in the pursuit of speculative good, induce unforeseen inconveniences.

much greater than those they remove. The last state of a nation, which has gone through the ordeal of extensive legal innovation, is in general worse than the first. The only way in which it is possible to avoid these dangers, is to remedy experienced evils, and extend experienced benefits only, without advancing into the tempting but dangerous regions of speculative improvement. It is the clearest proof that the Code of Napoleon was formed on these wise principles, that it has not only survived the empire which gave it birth, but continues, under new dynasties and different forms of government, to regulate the decisions of many nations who were leagued to bring about the overthrow of its author. Napoleon has said, "that his fame in the eyes of posterity would rest even more on the code which bore his name than all the victories which he won;" and its permanent establishment, as the basis of the jurisprudence of half of Europe, has already proved the truth of the prophecy.

Deviating altogether from the rash and presumptuous innovations of the Constituent Assembly, which took counsel of its own enthusiasm only, Napoleon commenced his legislative reforms, by calling to his councils the most distinguished lawyers of the monarchy. Tronchet, Rœderer, Portalis, Thibaudeau, Cambacérès, Lebrun, were his chief coadjutors in this Herculean task;* but although he required of these eminent legal characters the benefit of their extensive experience, he joined in the discussions himself, and struck out new and important views, on the most abstract questions of civil right, with a facility which astonished the councillors, who had been accustomed to consider only his military exploits. To the judgment of none did the First Consul so readily defer as of Tronchet; notwithstanding his advanced age, and monarchical prepossessions, he deemed no one so worthy as the illustrious defender of Louis XVI. to take the lead in framing the code for the empire. "Tronchet,"

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1802.

88.
Discussions
on the sub-
ject of the
Code in the
Council of
State.

* Their respective merits were thus stated by Napoleon: "Tronchet is a man of the most enlightened views, and possessing a singularly clear head for his advanced years. Portalis would be the most eloquent orator, if he knew when to stop. Thibaudeau is not adapted for that sort of discussion; he is too cold. He requires, like Lucien, the animation and fire of the Tribune. Cambacérès is the Advocate-General; he pleads sometimes on one side, sometimes on another. The most difficult part of the duty is the reduction of their ideas into the process-verbal; but we have the best of *redacteurs* in Lebrun."—THIBAudeau, 415.

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1802.

said he, "was the soul of the commission, Napoleon its mouthpiece. The former was gifted with a mind singularly profound and just ; but he soared above those around him, spoke indifferently, and was seldom able to defend his opinions." The whole council, in consequence, was in general adverse to his propositions when they were first brought forward ; but Napoleon, with the readiness and sagacity which he possessed in so remarkable a degree, saw at a glance where the point lay, and with no other materials than those which Tronchet had furnished, and hardly any previous acquaintance with the subject, brought forward such clear and lucid arguments as seldom failed to convince the whole assembly.¹

¹ Thib. 412.
Houss. v. 122,
123. Las
Cases, iii.
241, 242.

89.
Great ability
of Napoleon
in these dis-
cussions.

He presided at almost all the meetings of the commission for the formation of the civil code, and took such a vivid interest in the debates, that he frequently remained at them six or eight hours a-day. Free discussion in that assembly gave him the highest gratification ; he provoked it, sustained it, and shared in it. He spoke without preparation, without embarrassment, without pretensions ; in the style rather of free and animated conversation than of premeditated or laboured harangue. He never appeared inferior to any members of the council, often equal to the ablest of them, in the readiness with which he caught the point at issue, and the logical force with which he supported his opinions, and not unfrequently superior to any in the originality and vigour of his expressions. The varied powers and prodigious capacity of Napoleon's mind nowhere appeared in such brilliant colours as on those occasions ; and would hardly appear credible, if authentic evidence on the subject did not exist in the *procès-verbaux* of those memorable discussions. Bertrand de Molleville, formerly minister of marine to Louis XVI., and a man of no ordinary capacity, said, in reference to those discussions, "Napoleon was certainly an extraordinary man ; we were very far indeed from appreciating him on the other side of the water. From the moment that I looked into the discussions on the civil code, I conceived the most profound admiration for his capacity. It is utterly inconceivable where he acquired so much information on these subjects."² The limits, however, of a work of general history, render

² Bert. de
Molleville,
viii. 312.

it impossible to enter into a survey of the many important subjects brought under review in the formation of the Code Napoleon. Two only can be noticed, as those on which the interests of society chiefly depend,—the laws of succession, and those regarding the dissolution of marriage.

How clearly soever Napoleon saw and expressed the dangers of the minute subdivision of landed estates, and consequent destruction of a territorial noblesse, arising from the establishment of an equal division of property, whether in land or money, among the heirs of a deceased person, he found this system too firmly established to venture to attack it. It was identified in the eyes of all the active and energetic part of the nation with the first triumphs of the Revolution; it had been carried by Mirabeau in the Constituent Assembly, with the general concurrence of the people, and had since become the foundation of so many private interests and individual prospects, that it was universally regarded as the great charter of the public liberties, and any infringement on it as the first step towards a restoration of feudal oppression. Great as was the power, apparently unbounded the influence, of Napoleon, it would have been instantly shattered by any attempt to break in upon this fundamental institution. Wisely abstaining, therefore, from change, where he could not introduce improvement, he contented himself with consolidating the existing laws on the subject, and establishing in the Code Napoleon a general system of succession, fundamentally at variance with that of all the other states of Europe, and of which the ultimate consequences are destined to be more important than any of the other changes brought about by the Revolution.

By this statute, which may be termed the revolutionary law of succession, the right of primogeniture, and the distinction between landed and movable property, were taken away, and inheritance of every sort was divided in equal portions among those in an equal degree of consanguinity to a deceased person.* This indefeasible right of children to their parents' succession was declared to be

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1802.

90.
Law of suc-
cession, as
finally fixed
by Napoleon.

91.
Sketch of the
French revo-
lutionary
system of suc-
cession.

* By the decree April 19, 1803, the law of succession was established in the following manner:—

1.—1. The law pays no regard either to the nature of property, or the quarter from which it comes, in regulating succession.

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1802.

a half, if one child was left ; two-thirds, if two ; three-fourths, if three or more. All entails or limitations of any sort were abolished. The effects of such a system, co-operating with the immense subdivision of landed estates

2. Every succession which devolves to ascendants or collaterals, is divided into two equal parts ; the one for the relations by the father's side, the other for those by the mother's.

3. The proximity of relations is determined by the number of generations by which they are separated from the deceased ; in the line direct, by the number of descents ; in the collateral, by the number which separates each from the common ancestor, up and down again. Thus, two brothers are related in the second degree ; the uncle and nephew in the third ; cousins-germain in the fourth.

4. In all cases where representation is admitted, the representatives enter as a body into the place, and enjoy the rights of the person represented. This right obtains *ad infinitum* in the direct line of descendants, but not in that of ascendants. In the collateral line, it is admitted in favour of the children of a brother or sister deceased, whether they are called to the succession concurrently with their uncles or aunts, or not. In all cases where representation is admitted, the succession is divided *per stirpes* ; and if the same branch has left several descendants, the subdivision in the same manner takes place *per stirpes*, and the members of each subdivision divide what devolves to them *per capita*.— *Code Civil*, § 731-745.

II. Children or their descendants succeed to their father or mother, grandfather, grandmother, or other ascendants, without distinction of sex or primogeniture, and whether of the same or of different marriages. They succeed *per capita*, when they are all related in the first degree ; *per stirpes*, when they are called in whole or in part by representation. If the defunct leaves no issue or descendants, his succession divides according to the following rules :—

III.—1. In default of descendants, the brothers and sisters are called to the succession, to the exclusion of collaterals or their descendants. They succeed either *per capita* or *stirpes*, in the same way as descendants.

2. If the father and mother of a deceased person survive him, his brothers and sisters, or their descendants, are only called to half of the succession ; if the one or the other, only to three-fourths.

3. The division of this half, or three-fourths, is made on the same principles as that of descendants, if the collaterals are of the same marriage ; if of different, the succession is divided equally between the paternal and maternal lines.— *Code Civil*, § 750-755.

IV. In default of collaterals, or their issue, ascendants succeed according to the following rules :—

1. The succession divides into two equal parts ; of which the one half ascends to the father's side, the other to the mother's.

2. The ascendant, the nearest in degree, receives the half belonging to his line, to the exclusion of the more remote.

3. Ascendants in the same degree, take *per capita*, there being no representation in the ascending line.

4. If the father and mother of a deceased person, who dies without issue, survive him, and he leaves brothers and sisters, or their descendants, the succession is divided into two parts ; one to the ascendants, one to the collaterals. But if the father and mother have predeceased him, their share accretes to that of the collaterals.— *Code Civil*, § 746-749.

V.—1. Voluntary gifts, whether by deeds *inter vivos*, or by testament, cannot exceed the half of the deceased's effects, if he leaves one child ; the third, if two ; the fourth, if three or more.

2. Under the description of children in this article, are included descendants in whatever degree ; estimating these, however, *per stirpes*, not *per capita*.

3. Voluntary gifts, either by deeds *inter vivos*, or testamentary deeds, cannot exceed the half of the effects of the deceased if he leaves no descendants, but ascendants in both the paternal and maternal line, or three-fourths, if one of these only.— *Code Civil*, § 913-915.

VI. Natural children have a right of succession to their parents alone, if they have been legally recognised, but not otherwise.

1. If the father or mother have left legitimate issue, the natural child has a right to a third of what he would have had right to if he had been legitimate.

which took place from the sale of the forfeited properties during the Revolution, have been incalculable. It was estimated by the Duke de Gaeta, long minister of finance to Napoleon, that, in 1815, there were 13,059,000 individuals in France belonging to the families of agricultural proprietors, and 710,500 belonging to the families of proprietors not engaged in agriculture, all living on the revenue of profit derived from their properties.¹

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XXXV.

1802.

¹ Gaeta, ii.
335.

As may be supposed, where so extreme a subdivision of property has taken place, the situation of the greater part of these little proprietors is indigent in the extreme. It appears from the authority of the same author, that there were in 1815 no less than 10,400,000 of properties taxed in France; and that of this immense number only 17,000 paid direct taxes to the amount of 1000 francs, or £40 a-year each; * while no less than 8,000,000 were taxed at a sum below twenty-one francs, or sixteen shillings. Direct taxes to the amount of sixteen shillings correspond to an income of five times the amount, or £4 a-year; to the amount of £40 a-year, to one at the same rate of £200. Thus the incomes of only 17,000 properties in France exceeded £200 a-year, while there were nearly 8,000,000 which were worth only £4 per annum.² † The separate *proprietors*, as many held more than one property, were estimated at 4,833,000 by the minister of finance in 1813.

² 92.
Prodigious effects of this law in subdividing land in France.

² Due de Gaeta, ii. 327, 328. Peuchet, 246, 247.

2. It extends to a half, if the deceased left no descendants, but ascendants or brothers or sisters.

3. It extends to three-fourths, when he leaves neither descendants nor ascendants, nor brothers nor sisters; to the whole when he leaves neither. — *Code Civil*, § 756-758.

* Taxed at		Number of persons taxed.	Produce of Tax.	
			Francs.	
1000 francs, or	£40	17,745	31,649,468	or £1,300,000
500 to 1000, or from	20 to £40,	40,773	27,653,016	or 1,140,000
101 to 500, or from	4 to 20,	459,937	90,411,706	or 3,500,000
51 to 100, or from	2 to 4,	594,648	41,181,488	or 1,650,000
31 to 50, or from	25s. to 2,	699,637	27,229,518	or 1,200,000
21 to 30, or from	16s. to 25s.	704,871	17,632,083	or 750,000
Below 21 fcs. or below	16s. 10d.	7,897,110	47,178,649	or 1,900,000

³ 10,414,721 282,935,928 £11,440,000 ³ Gaeta, ii. 327.

When it is recollected that the contribution *foncière* in France is fully 20 per cent⁴ upon all estates without exception, this table gives the clearest proof of the changes in property brought about by the Revolution. It results from it, that in 1815 there were only 17,000 proprietors in the whole country who were worth £200 a-year and upwards; a fact incredible, if not stated on such indisputable authority, and speaking volumes as to the disastrous effects of that convulsion.

† From the report to the minister of the finances, published in 1817, by the commissioners on the cadastre, it appears that at that period there were

⁴ Peuchet, 286, 287.

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XXXV.

1802.

93.

Singular
attachment
of the modern
French to this
law.

It is a singular fact, pointing apparently to an important law in the moral world, that when men yield to the seductions of passion, and engage in the career of iniquity, they are led by an almost irresistible impulse to covet the very changes which are to lead to their own destruction, and cling with invincible tenacity to the institutions which are calculated to defeat the very objects on account of which all these crimes have been committed. The confiscation of property in France was the great and crying sin of the Revolution, because it extended the consequences of present violence to future ages, and injured the latest generations on account of the political differences of the present time; and it is precisely that circumstance which has rendered hopeless all the efforts for freedom made by the French people. By interesting so great a number of persons in the work of spoliation, and extending so far the jealousy at the nobles, by whom the confiscated properties might be resumed, it has led to the permanent settlement of the law of succession, on the footing of equal division and perfect equality. Opinion there as elsewhere, founded on interest, has followed in the same direction:

94.

Which is
fatal to all
real freedom.

No doctrine is so generally prevalent in France, as that this vast change is the leading benefit conferred upon the country by the Revolution; and yet nothing can be so evident to an impartial spectator, as that it is its greatest curse. It is precisely the circumstance which has ever since rendered nugatory all attempts to establish public freedom there, because it has totally destroyed the features and the elements of European civilisation, and left only

10,083,000 separate properties assessed to the land-tax in France. This number has since that time been constantly increasing, as might be expected under the revolutionary order of succession. The numbers were,—

1816,	10,083,750
1826,	10,296,693
1833,	10,814,799

Allowing that there are several separate properties often accumulated in the same individuals, this implies, in the estimation of the French writers, at least 5,500,000 separate proprietors. The total clear produce of the agriculture of France is estimated by DUPIN at 4,500,000,000 francs, or £180,000,000 sterling. Supposing that the half of that sum, or £90,000,000 sterling, is the annual clear profit of cultivation, after defraying its charges, it follows that the average income of the five millions and a half of French proprietors, including all the great estates, is about £16, 10s. a-year! No less than 2,000,000 proprietors are rated at or below £2 a-year! Nothing more is requisite to explain the experienced impossibility of constructing a durable free government in that country. It exhibits Asiatic, not European civilisation.—See SARRAN'S *Contre Révolution de 1830*, ii. 273, 274.—*Deux Ans Règne de Louis Philippe*, 271; and DUPIN, *Force Commerciale de France*, i. 7.

Indian ryots engaged in a hopeless contest with a metropolis wielding the influence of a central government, and the terrors of military power. The universality of the illusion under which the French labour on this subject, is owing to the wide extent of the instinct which leads the revolutionary party to shun every thing that seems to favour even an approach to the restoration of the dispossessed proprietors. In their terror of this remote and chimerical evil they have adopted measures which, by preventing the growth of any hereditary class between the throne and the peasant, have rendered the establishment of constitutional freedom utterly impracticable, and doomed the first of European monarchies to the slavery of Oriental despotism. By such mysterious means does human iniquity, even in this world, work out its merited punishment; and so indissoluble is the chain which unites guilty excess with ultimate retribution.

The principle of admitting divorce in many cases was too firmly established in the customs and habits of France to admit of its being shaken. Important deliberations, however, took place on the subject of the cases in which it should be admissible. The First Consul, who entertained very singular ideas on the subject of marriage and the proper destiny of women,* warmly supported the looser side; and it was at length agreed, 1. That the husband might in every case sue out a divorce on the account of the adultery of his wife. 2. That she might divorce her husband for adultery in those cases only where he brought his concubine into their common habitation.

CHAP.
XXXV.
1803.

95.
Law regard-
ing divorce.

March 21,
1803.

* When the article in the Code, "The husband owes protection to his wife, she obedience to him," was read out, Napoleon observed, "The angel said so to Adam and Eve,—the word *obedience* is in an especial manner of value in Paris, where women consider themselves at liberty to do whatever they please; I do not say it will produce a beneficial effect on all, but on some it may. Women in general are occupied only with amusement and the toilet. If I could be secure of never growing old, I would never wish a wife. Should we not add, that a woman should not be permitted to see any one who is displeasing to her husband? Women have constantly the words in their mouths,—'What, would you pretend to hinder me from seeing any one whom I choose?'"—THIBAUDEAU, 436.

In these expressions it is easy to discern that Napoleon's thoughts were running on Josephine, whose extravagance in dress and passion for amusement knew no bounds. But, independent of this, he had little romance or gallantry in his disposition, and repeatedly expressed his opinion, that the Oriental system of shutting up women was preferable to the European, which permitted them to mingle in society.

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XXXV.
1803.

3. Divorce was permitted for severe and grave injuries inflicted by the one spouse on the other; and for the condemnation of either to an infamous punishment. 4. The mutual consent of the spouses steadily adhered to, and expressed in a way prescribed by law, was also admitted as a sufficient cause of divorce.¹ The only limitations in the last case were, that it could not take place until two nor after twenty years of married life had elapsed, or after the wife had attained the age of forty-five; that the parents or other ascendants of the spouses should concur, and that the husband should be above twenty-five, and the wife above twenty-one years of age.² It may easily be conceived what a wide door such a facility in dissolving marriage opened for the introduction of dissolute manners and irregular connexions; and in its ultimate effects upon society this change is destined to be not less important, or subversive of public freedom, than the destruction of the landed aristocracy by the revolutionary law of succession.* In such a state of society, the facility of divorce and dissolution of manners act and react upon each other. Napoleon admitted this himself. "The foundlings," says he, "have multiplied tenfold since the Revolution."³ But it is not in so corrupted a source that we are to look for the fountains either of public freedom or durable prosperity.

¹ Code Civil,
§ 229, 233.

² Ibid. § 275,
278.

³ *Les Cas.* v.
41.

96.
Great effects
of these salu-
tary changes
of Napoleon.

The effects of these great measures, carried into execution by Napoleon, are thus justly and emphatically summed up in his own words:—"In the course of the four years of the consulship, the First Consul had succeeded in uniting all the parties who divided France; the list of emigrants was infinitely reduced; all who chose to return had received their pardon; all their unalienated property had been restored, excepting the woods, of which, nevertheless, they were permitted to enjoy the liferent; none remained exiled but a few persons attached to the Bourbon princes, or such as were so deeply implicated in resistance to the Revolution as to be unwilling to avail themselves of the amnesty. Thousands of emigrants had returned under no other condition but that of taking the

* From the returns lately made, it appears that, in the year 1824, out of 28,812 births, only 18,591 were legitimate; 2378 being of children born in concubinage, and 7843 children brought to the foundling hospitals.—*DUPIN, Force Com. de France*, 99, 100.

oath of fidelity to the constitution. The First Consul had thus the most delightful consolation which a man can have, that of having reorganised above thirty thousand families, and restored to their country the descendants of the men who had made France illustrious during so many ages. The altars were raised from the dust; the exiled or transported priests were restored to their dioceses and parishes, and paid by the Republic. The concordat had rallied the clergy round the consular throne; the spirit of the western provinces was essentially changed; immense public works gave bread to all the persons thrown out of employment during the preceding convulsions; canals were every where formed to improve the internal navigation; a new city had arisen in the centre of La Vendée; eight great roads traversed that secluded province, and large sums had been distributed to the Vendéans, to restore their houses and churches, destroyed by orders of the Committee of Public Salvation."¹

The difficulty with which the restoration of order in a country recently emerging from the fury of a revolution was attended, cannot be better stated than by the same masterly hand. "We are told that all the First Consul had to look to was to do justice: but to whom? To the proprietors whom the Revolution had violently despoiled of their properties, for this only, that they had been faithful to their legitimate sovereign and the principle of honour which they had inherited from their ancestors? Or to the new proprietors, who had adventured their money on the faith of laws flowing from an illegitimate authority? Justice! but to whom? To the soldiers mutilated in the fields of Germany, La Vendée, and Quiberon, who were arrayed under the white standard or the English leopards, in the firm belief that they were serving the cause of their king against a usurping tyranny; or to the million of citizens, who, forming round the frontiers a wall of brass, had so often saved their country from the inveterate hostility of its enemies, and bore to so transcendent a height the glory of the French eagle? Justice! but to whom? To that clergy, the model and the example of every Christian virtue, stripped of its birthright, the reward of fifteen hundred years of beneficence;² or to the recent acquirers,

CHAP.
XXXV.
1803.

¹ Nap. in
Month. ii.
225.

97.
Extreme difficulty of the task he had undertaken.

² Nap. in
Month. ii.
225.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1803.

98.

Great public
works set on
foot in
France.

who had converted the convents into workshops, the churches into warehouses, and turned to profane uses all that had been deemed most holy for ages ?”

Amidst these great undertakings, the internal prosperity of France was daily increasing. The budget for the year 1803 presented a considerable increase of revenue over that of 1802.* Various public works, calculated to encourage industry, were every where set on foot during that year ; chambers of commerce established in all the principal cities of the Republic ; a grand exhibition of all the different branches of industry was formed at the Louvre, which has ever since continued with signal success ; the Hôtel des Invalides received a new and more extended organisation, adapted to the immense demands upon its beneficence, which the wounds and casualties of the war had occasioned :¹ a portion of the veterans were settled in national domains as a reward for their services during the war ;² a new establishment was formed at Fontainebleau for the education of youths of the higher class for the military profession ;³ and the great school of St. Cyr, near Paris, opened gratuitously to the children of those who had died in the service of their country ;⁴ an academy was set on foot at Compeigne for five hundred youths, where they were instructed in all the branches of manufactures and the mechanical arts ;⁵ the Institute received a new organisation, in which the class of moral and political science was totally suppressed—a change highly symptomatic of the resolution of the First Consul to put an end to those visionary speculations from which so many calamities had ensued to France ;⁶ while the General Councils of the Departments were authorised, in cases where it seemed expedient, to increase the slender incomes of the bishops and archbishops, a power which received a liberal interpretation under the empire, and rapidly induced the cordial

¹ July 8,
1803.² June 15,
1803.³ Jan. 28,
1803.⁴ Oct. 8,
1803.⁵ April 1803.

Jan. 1803.

* The budget for that year stood thus, being an increase of 17,000,000 francs, or £700,000 over the preceding year :—

Direct taxes, ...	305,105,000 francs, or	£12,300,000
Registers,	200,106,000 — or	8,100,000
Customs,	36,924,000 — or	1,400,000
Post-office,	11,205,000 — or	450,000
Lottery,	15,326,000 — or	620,000
Salt tax,	2,300,000 — or	92,000

570,966,000

£22,942,000

—See BIGNON, iii. 246 ; and GAETA, i. 303.

support of the clergy throughout all France to the consular government.¹

Nor was it only in measures of legislation that the indefatigable activity and beneficent intentions of the First Consul were manifested. Then were projected or commenced those great public improvements which deservedly rendered the name of Napoleon so dear to the French, and still excite the admiration even of the passing traveller in every part of the kingdom. That extensive inland navigation was set on foot, which, under the name of the canal of St. Quentin, was destined to unite the Scheldt and the Oise; other canals were begun, intended to unite the waters of the Saone to the Yonne, the Saone to the Rhine, the Meuse to the Rhine and the Scheldt, the Rance to the Villaine, and thereby furnish an internal communication between the Channel and the ocean; the canals of Arles and Aigues Mortes were opened, and an inexhaustible supply of fresh water was procured for the capital by the canal of Ourcq. This great step led to further improvements. Paris had long suffered under the want of that necessary element, and the means of cleaning or irrigating the streets were miserably deficient; but, under the auspices of Napoleon, this great want was soon supplied. Numerous fountains arose in every part of the city, alike refreshing to the eye, and salutary to the health of the inhabitants; the beautiful cascade of the Chateau d'Eau cooled the atmosphere on the Boulevards du Temple, while the water-works and lofty *jets d'eau* in the gardens of the Tuileries, attracted additional crowds to the shady alleys and marbled parterres of that splendid spot. Immense works, undertaken to improve and enlarge the harbours of Boulogne, Havre, Cherbourg, Rochelle, Marseilles, Antwerp, and Ostend, sufficiently demonstrated that Napoleon had not abandoned the hope of wresting the sceptre of the seas from Great Britain; while the order to erect in the centre of the Place Vendome, a pillar, in imitation of the column of Trajan, to be surmounted by the statue of Charlemagne, already revealed the secret design of his successor to reconstruct the Empire of the West.²

CHAP.
XXXV.

1803.

¹ Bign. ii.
252, 253.

99.

Vast im-
provements
of Paris.
April 8, 1803.

² Bign. ii.
252, 264.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

PEACE OF AMIENS—FROM THE CONCLUSION OF HOSTILITIES
TO THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR—OCTOBER 1801—MAY 1803.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1801.

1.

Universal joy
in Europe at
the termina-
tion of the
war.

UNBOUNDED was the joy, unlimited the hopes, conceived in Europe upon the conclusion of the peace of Amiens. Ten years of ceaseless effusion of blood had tamed the fiercest spirits, and hushed the strongest passions; the finances of all the parties in the strife had become grievously embarrassed; and the people of every country, yielding to the joyful illusion, fondly imagined that the period of discord had terminated, and a long season of peace and prosperity was to obliterate the traces of human suffering. They did not reflect on the unstable basis on which this temporary respite was rested; they did not consider that it was not from the causes of hostility having ceased, but from the means of carrying it on having been exhausted, that a truce had been obtained; that the elements of a yet greater conflagration lay smouldering in the ashes of that which was past; that discordant passions had been silenced, not extinguished; irreconcilable interests severed, not adjusted. Little anticipating the dreadful calamities which yet awaited them, the population of Paris forgot, in the glitter of reviews, and the splendour of military pageantry, all the calamities of the Revolution; the inhabitants of Vienna enjoyed with unwonted zest the respite from anxiety and exertion which the suspension of hostilities afforded them; and the youth of Britain hastened in crowds to the French metropolis, to gratify their curiosity by the sight of the scenes which had so long been the theatre of such tragic events, and of the heroes who had gained immortality by such glorious achievements.

But not one instant's respite did the First Consul allow to his own active and indefatigable mind. Deeming, like Cæsar, nothing done while aught remained to do, he had no sooner arrived at the highest point of military glory than he turned his attention to the restoration of naval power, and eagerly availed himself of the opportunity which the suspension of maritime hostilities afforded, to revive that decayed, but indispensable part of public strength. Wisely deeming the recovery of the French colonies the only means that could be relied on for the permanent support of his marine forces, he projected, on a scale of unparalleled magnitude, an expedition for the recovery of ST. DOMINGO, the once great and splendid possession of France in the Gulf of Mexico, long nursed by the care and attention of the monarchy, at once lost by the reckless innovations of the Constituent Assembly. It would seem as if the laws of Providence, in nations not less than individuals, have provided for the certain ultimate punishment of inordinate passions, in the consequences flowing from their own indulgence. Long before the war commenced, or the fleets of France had felt the weight of British strength; before one shot had been fired on the ocean, or one harbour blockaded by a hostile squadron, the basis on which the French maritime power rested had been destroyed. Not the conquest of the Nile, or the conflagration of Toulon; not the catastrophe of Camperdown, or the thunderbolt of Trafalgar, ruined the navy of France. Severe as these blows were, they were not irremediable; while her colonies remained, the means of repairing them existed. It was the rashness of ignorant legislation which inflicted the fatal wound, the fumes of revolutionary enthusiasm which produced consequences that could never be repaired.

St. Domingo, the largest, with the exception of Cuba, and beyond all question, before the Revolution, the most flourishing of the West India islands, is about a hundred marine leagues, or three hundred English miles in length, and its mean breadth is about thirty leagues, or ninety miles. It contains three thousand square leagues, of which two-thirds were, in 1789, in the hands of the Spaniards, and one-third in those of the French. Although the French portion was the smallest, yet it was

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1801.

2.

Napoleon meditates an expedition to St. Domingo. Disastrous effects of the St. Domingo revolt to the French navy.

3.
Description of St. Domingo.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1801.

incomparably the most productive, both from the nature of the soil, and the cultivation bestowed on the surface. The Spanish consisted for the most part of sterile mountains, clothed with forests, or rising into naked cliffs, in the centre of the island; whereas the French lay in the plains and valleys at their feet, and had the advantage both of the numerous streams, which, in that humid climate, descended from their wooded sides, and the frequent bays and gulfs which the ocean had formed in its deeply indented shore. The French possession of their portion of the island commenced in 1664, and, notwithstanding the frequent interruption of their colonial trade during the wars with England, its prosperity had increased in a most extraordinary degree, and in a ratio far beyond that of any other of the West India islands. As usual in all the colonies of that part of the world, the inhabitants consisted of whites, mulattoes, and negro slaves; the first were about forty thousand, the next sixty thousand; while the slave population exceeded five hundred thousand. Such a disproportion was in itself a most perilous element in social prosperity; but it was much increased by the habits and prejudices of the European race, who were exposed to so many dangers. A large portion of the property of the island was in the hands of an inconsiderable number of great and old families, whose fortunes were immense, prejudices strong, and luxury extreme; while a far more numerous but less opulent body, under the name of *Petits Blancs*, were gradually rising into importance, and, like the Tiers Etat in the mother country, felt far more jealous of the established aristocracy than apprehensive of the consequences of political innovation. Not a few also of the great proprietors were overwhelmed with debt, the natural consequence of long-continued extravagance; and experience soon proved, that not less in the new than the old world, it was in that class that the most ardent and dangerous partisans of revolutionary change were to be found.¹

¹ Dum. viii.
457, 458, 460,
464.

4.
It's statistical
details.

The produce of the island, and the commerce which it maintained with the mother country before the commencement of the troubles, were immense. The French part alone raised a greater quantity of colonial produce

than the whole British West India islands taken together. Its exports in 1788 amounted to the enormous value of one hundred and eighty-nine million francs, or £7,487,375, and the gross produce, including the Spanish portion, reached four hundred and sixty million francs, or £18,400,000; while its imports, in manufactures of the parent state, were no less than two hundred and fifty million francs, or £10,000,000 sterling. More than half of this immense produce was re-exported from France to other states, and the commerce thence arising was the chief support of its maritime power. Sixteen hundred vessels, and twenty-seven thousand sailors, were employed in conducting all the branches of this vast colonial traffic. With so magnificent a possession, France had no occasion to envy the dependencies of all other states put together.* It was this splendid and unequalled colonial possession which the French nation threw away and destroyed at the commencement of the Revolution, with a recklessness and improvidence of which the previous history of the world had afforded no example.¹

¹ Dum. viii.
112, 113.
Jom. xiv. 445.
Bign. ii. 407.
Malte Brun.
c. 93, v. 583.

Hardly had the cry of liberty and equality been raised in France, when it was responded warmly and vehemently from the shores of St. Domingo. Independent of the natural passion for liberty which must ever exist among those who are subjected to the restraints of servitude, the slave population of this colony was very soon assailed by revolutionary agents and emissaries, and the workshops and fields of the planters overrun by heated missionaries, who poured into an ignorant and ardent multitude the new-born ideas of European freedom. The planters were far from appreciating the danger with which they were menaced. On the contrary, a large proportion of the smaller class took part, as usual in revolutionary convulsions, with the popular party, and aided in the propagation of principles destined soon to issue for themselves in conflagration and massacre. All united in regarding

Origin of the
Revolution in
that island.
Rash mea-
sures of the
French Con-
stituent As-
sembly.

* The produce of the whole British West India islands exported was, anterior to the emancipation of the negroes, £8,448,839; the British manufactures they consumed was £3,988,286; the shipping employed in their trade 249,079 tons; the seamen, 13,691 in the outward, 14,900 in the homeward voyages. The total gross agricultural produce of the islands was about £22,000,000. — See *Parl. Return*, 4th June, 1833; and *Porter's Parl. Tables*, i. 64. Since the disastrous measure of emancipation, the exports of the sugar islands have fallen off above a third; the tonnage they require is now only 160,000.

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1801.

March 8,
1790.

the crisis in the mother country as a favourable opportunity for asserting their independence, and emancipating themselves from those restraints which the jealousy of her policy had imposed on their commerce. By a decree on March 8, 1790, the Constituent Assembly had empowered each colony belonging to the Republic to make known its wishes on the subject of a constitution, these wishes to be expressed by colonial assemblies, freely elected and recognised by their citizens. This privilege excited the most ruinous divisions among the inhabitants of European descent, already sufficiently menaced by the ideas fermenting in the negro population. The whites claimed the exclusive right of voting for the election of the members of this important assembly; while the mulattoes strenuously asserted their title to an equal share in the representation; and the blacks, intoxicated with the novel doctrines so keenly discussed by all classes of society, secretly formed the project of ridding themselves of both. This decree of the National Assembly was brought out to the island by Lieutenant-Colonel Ogé, a mulatto officer in the service of France, who openly proclaimed the opinion of the parent legislature, that the half-caste and free negroes were entitled to their full share in the election of the representatives. The jealousy of the planters was immediately excited. They refused to acknowledge the decree of the Assembly, constituted themselves into a separate legislature,¹ and, having seized Ogé in the Spanish territory, put him to death by the torture of the wheel, under circumstances of atrocious cruelty.

¹ Dum. viii.
112, 119, 123.

6.
Freedom is
conferred on
all persons of
colour.

This unpardonable proceeding, as is usually the case with such acts of barbarity, aggravated instead of stifling the prevailing discontents; and the excitement in the colony soon became so vehement, that the Constituent Assembly felt the necessity of taking some steps to allay it. The moderate and violent parties in that body took different sides, and all Europe looked with anxiety upon a debate so novel in its kind, and fraught with such momentous consequences to a large portion of the human race. Barnave, Malouet, Alexander Lameth, Bertrand de Molleville, and Clermont Tonnerre, strongly argued, that men long accustomed to servitude could not

receive the perilous gift of liberty with safety either to themselves or to others, except by slow degrees, and that the effect of suddenly admitting that bright light upon a benighted population, would be to throw them into inevitable and fatal convulsions. But Mirabeau, the master-spirit of the Assembly, and the only one of its leaders who combined popular principles with a just appreciation of the danger of pushing them to excess, was no more, and the declamations of Brissot and the Girondists prevailed over these statesman-like ideas. By a decree passed on 15th May 1791, the privileges of equality were conferred indiscriminately on all persons of colour born of a free father and mother.¹

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1801.

May 17th
1791.
¹ Dum. viii.
123, 125.
Bertrand de
Moll. Mem.
i. 183, 195.

Far from appreciating the hourly increasing dangers of their situation, and endeavouring to form with the new citizens an organised body to check the further progress of levelling principles, the planters openly endeavoured to resist this rash decree. Civil war was preparing in this once peaceful and beautiful colony; arms were collecting; the soldiers, caressed and seduced by both parties, were wavering between their old feelings of regal allegiance and the modern influence of intoxicating principles, when a new and terrible enemy arose, who speedily extinguished in blood the discord of his oppressors. On the night of the 22d August the negro revolt, long and secretly organised, at once broke forth, and wrapt the whole northern part of the colony in flames. Jean François, a slave of vast penetration, firm character, and violent passions, not unmingled with generosity, was the leader of the conspiracy; his lieutenants were Biasson and TOUSSAINT. The former, of gigantic stature, Herculean strength, and indomitable ferocity, was well fitted to assert that superiority which such qualities seldom fail to command in savage times; the latter, gifted with rare intelligence, profound dissimulation, boundless ambition, and heroic firmness, was fitted to become at once the Numa and the Romulus of the sable republic in the southern hemisphere.²

7.
The insurrec-
tion breaks
out.

August 22,
1791.

² Dum. viii.
125, 127.
Bign. ii. 395.

This vast conspiracy, productive in the end of calamities unparalleled even in the long catalogue of European atrocity, had for its objects the total extirpation of the whites, and the establishment of an independent black

8.
Its progress
and horrors.

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XXXVI.
1801.

government over the whole island. So inviolable was the secrecy, so general the dissimulation of the slaves, that this awful catastrophe was noways apprehended by the European proprietors; and a conspiracy which embraced nearly the whole negro population of the island, was revealed only by the obscure hints of a few faithful domestics, who, without betraying their comrades, warned their masters of the approach of an unknown and terrible danger. The explosion was sudden and dreadful, beyond any thing ever before seen among mankind: In a moment the beautiful plains in the north of the island were covered with fires; the labour of a century was devoured in a night; while the negroes, like unchained tigers, precipitated themselves on their masters, seized their arms, massacred them without pity, or threw them into the flames. From all quarters the terrified planters fled to Cape Town, already menaced by ten thousand discontented slaves in its own bosom; while fifteen thousand insurgents surrounded the city, threatening instant destruction to the trembling fugitives within its walls. The cruelties exercised on the unhappy captives on both sides, in this disastrous contest, exceeded any thing recorded in history. The negroes marched with spiked infants on their spears instead of colours; they sawed asunder the male prisoners, and violated the females on the dead bodies of their husbands. Nor were the whites slow in taking vengeance for these atrocities. In several sallies from Cape Town, the discipline and courage of the Europeans prevailed. Numerous prisoners were made, who were instantly put to death, and the indiscriminate rage of the victors extended to the old men, women, and children of the insurgent race, who had taken no part in the revolt.¹

¹ Dum. viii.
127, 130.
Rap. à l'As-
semblée
Const. 23, 27.

9.
Furious civil
war in the
south of the
island

While these disasters were overwhelming the northern part of the island, the southern was a prey to the fierce and increasing discord of the planters and people of colour. At length the opposite parties came into open collision. The mulattoes, aided by a body of negroes, blockaded Port-au-Prince; while the whites of that town and its vicinity, supported by the national guard and troops of the line, assembled their forces to raise the siege. The black army was commanded by a chief named

Hyacinthe, who displayed in the action an uncommon degree of skill and intrepidity. The shock was terrible ; but at length the planters were overthrown, and their broken remains forced back to the town. In other quarters similar actions took place, with various success, but the same general result ; the whites were finally forced into the cities, and the plains irrevocably overrun by the insurgent forces.¹

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XXXVI.
1801.

¹ Dum. viii.
130, 138.

Overwhelmed with consternation at these disastrous events, the Constituent Assembly endeavoured, when it was too late, to retrace their steps. Barnave, who had so ably resisted the precipitate emancipation of the coloured races, and clearly predicted the consequences to which it would lead, prevailed upon them, in those brief days of returning moderation which signalled the close of their career, to pass a decree, which declared in substance that the external relations and commerce of the colonies should alone be subject to the direct legislation of the National Assembly in the parent state, and that the Colonial Assemblies should have the exclusive right of legislating, with the approbation of the king, for the internal condition and rights of the different classes of inhabitants. But it was too late. This wise principle, which, if embraced earlier in the discussion, might have averted all the disasters, only added fuel to the flames which were consuming the unhappy colony. The planters, irritated by injury and hardened by misfortune, positively refused to make any dispositions for the gradual extinction of slavery, and insisted upon the immediate and unqualified submission of the whole insurgents, mulatto and negro ; while the slaves, emboldened by unlooked-for success, openly asserted their determination to come to no accommodation but on condition of their absolute freedom.²

10.
The Constituent Assembly in vain try to retrace their steps.
Sept. 24, 1791.

² Ibid. viii.
138, 142.

Three delegates of the Convention, with a reinforcement of three thousand men, were despatched, in November 1791, to endeavour to re-establish the affairs of the colony, and reconcile its discordant inhabitants ; but they soon found that the passions excited on both sides were so vehement as to be incapable of reconciliation. They arrived at Cape Town, where they found the remnant of the white population blockaded by the negro forces.

11.
French delegates in vain endeavour to settle differences.

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XXXVI.
1801.

They were received by the members of the Colonial Legislature covered with black, and those of the municipality arrayed in red crape; while instruments of punishment, gibbets and scaffolds erected in the market-place, too surely told the bloody scenes which the island had recently witnessed. Their first step was to proclaim a general amnesty, which was received with apparent thankfulness in the insurgent camps, and cold distrust by the Colonial Legislature. Toussaint repaired to the town, where he professed the desire of the negroes to return to their duty, if their rights, as proclaimed by the mother country, were recognised; but his language was not that of rebels negotiating an amnesty for their offences, but of an independent power, actuated by a desire to stop the effusion of blood. As such, it excited the indignation of the planters, who insisted on the unqualified submission of the slaves, and the punishment of the authors of the revolt; demands which so enraged the negroes, that it was with difficulty Toussaint could prevent them from giving their indignation vent by the indiscriminate massacre of all the prisoners in their hands.¹

¹ Dum. viii.
143, 145.

12. i.
The insurrec-
tion becomes
universal.

The Constituent Assembly had flattered itself that its last decree, which put the fate of the mulatto and negro population into the hands of the Colonial Legislature, would have had the effect of inducing the latter to concede emancipation to the half-caste race, and of conciliating the former, through gratitude for so great a benefit conferred on them by their former masters. But in forming that hope, they proved their ignorance of the effect of concessions dictated by alarm, of which their own institutions were soon to afford so memorable an example. The Colonial Legislature, aware, from dear-bought experience, that the prospect of such acquisitions in that moment of excitement would only inflame with tenfold fury all who had a drop of negro blood in their veins, resolutely refused to make any concessions even to the mulatto population. The commissioners of the National Assembly openly took part with that unhappy body of men, thus deprived of the benefit conferred on them by the mother country, in consequence of which the war, which had subsided during the progress of the negotiation, broke out again with redoubled fury, and

the mulattoes every where joined their skill and intelligence to the numbers and ferocity of the negroes. A large body of whites was massacred in the church of Ouanaminthe by the Africans, whom the mulattoes had the cruelty to introduce; and Cape Town itself was nearly surprised by Biasson and Toussaint at the head of a chosen body of their followers. The contest had no longer a semblance of equality. The insurrection broke out on every side, extended into every quarter; fire and sword devoured the remains of this once splendid colony; the wretched planters all took shelter in Cape Town; and the slaves, deprived of the means of subsistence by their own excesses, dispersed through the woods, reverting to the chase or plunder for a precarious existence.¹

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XXXVI.
1801.

Meanwhile the Legislative Assembly, which had succeeded the Constituent, a step farther advanced in revolutionary violence, was preparing ulterior measures of the most frantic character. Irritated at the Colonial Legislature for not having followed up their intentions, and instigated by the populace, whom the efforts of Brissot and the Society *des Amis des Noirs* at Paris had roused to a perfect frenzy on the subject, they revoked the decree of the 24th September preceding, which had conferred such ample powers on the Colonial Legislatures, dissolved the Assembly at Cape Town, and despatched three new commissioners, Arthaux, Santhonax, and Polverel, with unlimited powers to settle the affairs of the colony. In vain Barnave and the remnant of the constitutional party in the Assembly strove to moderate these extravagant proceedings: the violence of the Jacobins bore down all opposition. "Don't talk to us of danger," said Brissot; "let the colonies perish rather than one principle be abandoned."²

¹ Dum. viii.
145, 151.

13.
The Girondists resolve upon unlimited concession.

² Ibid. viii.
151, 152.
Toul. iv. 172.

The proceedings of the new commissioners speedily brought matters to a crisis. They arrived first at Port-au-Prince, and, in conformity with the secret instructions of the Government, which were to dislodge the whites from that stronghold, they sent off to France the soldiers of the regiment of Artois, established a Jacobin club, transported to France or America thirty of the leading planters, and issued a proclamation, in which they exhorted the colonists "to lay aside at last the preju-

14.
The arrival of the Commissioners augments the discord, May 1789.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1801.

June 10th,
1793.June 20th,
1793.

•
 1 Dum. viii.
 152, 159.

15.
 Storming and
 massacre of
 Cape Town.

dices of colour." Having thus laid the revolutionary train at Port-au-Prince, they embarked for Cape Town, where they arrived in the middle of June. Matters had by this time reached such a height there as indicated the immediate approach of a crisis. The intelligence of the execution of the king, and proclamation of a Republic, had roused to the very highest pitch the democratic passions of all the inferior classes. The planters, with too good reason, apprehended that the Convention which had succeeded the Legislative Assembly would soon outstrip them in violence, and put the finishing stroke to their manifold calamities, by at once proclaiming the liberty of the slaves, and so destroying the remnant of property which they still possessed. But their destruction was nearer at hand than they supposed. On the 20th of June, a quarrel accidentally arose between a French naval captain and a mulatto officer in the service of the Colonial Government; the commissioners ordered them both into their presence without regard to the distinction of colour, and this excited the highest indignation in the officers of the marine, who landed with their crews to take vengeance for the indignity done to one of their members. The colonists loudly applauded their conduct, and invoked their aid as the saviours of St. Domingo: the exiles brought from Port-au-Prince fomented the discord as the only means of effecting their liberation; a civil war speedily ensued in the blockaded capital, and for two days blood flowed in torrents in these insane contests between the sailors of the fleet and the mulatto population.¹

The negro chiefs, secretly informed of all these disorders, resolved to profit by the opportunity thus afforded to them of finally destroying the whites. Three thousand insurgents penetrated through the works, stript of their defenders during the general tumult, and, making straight for the prisons, delivered a large body of slaves who were there in chains. Instantly the liberated captives spread themselves over the town, set it on fire in every quarter, and massacred the unhappy whites when seeking to escape from the conflagration. A scene of matchless horror ensued: twenty thousand negroes broke into the city, and, with the torch in one hand and the

sword in the other, spread slaughter and devastation around. Hardly had the strife of the Europeans with each other subsided, when they found themselves overwhelmed by the vengeance which had been accumulating for centuries in the African breast. Neither age nor sex was spared ; the young were cut down in striving to defend their houses, the aged in the churches where they had fled to implore protection ; virgins were immolated on the altar ; weeping infants hurled into the fires. Amidst the shrieks of the sufferers and the shouts of the victors, the finest city in the West Indies was reduced to ashes. Its splendid churches, its stately palaces, were wrapt in flames ; thirty thousand human beings perished in the massacre, and the wretched fugitives who had escaped from this scene of horror on board the ships, were guided in their passage over the deep by the prodigious light which arose from their burning habitations. They almost all took refuge in the United States, where they were received with the most generous hospitality ; but the frigate *La Fine* foundered on the passage, and five hundred of the survivors from the flames perished in the waves.¹

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1801.

¹ Toul. iv.
257, 260.
Dum. viii
157, 160.

Thus fell the queen of the Antilles, the most stately monument of European opulence that had yet arisen in the New World. Nothing deterred, however, by this unparalleled calamity, the Commissioners of the Republic pursued their frantic career ; and, amidst the smoking ruins of the capital, published a decree which proclaimed the freedom of all the blacks who should enrol themselves under the standards of the Republic ; a measure which was equivalent to the instant abolition of slavery over the whole island. Further resistance was now hopeless. The Republican authorities became the most ardent persecutors of the planters ; pursued alike by Jacobin frenzy and African vengeance, they fled in despair. Polverel proclaimed the liberty of the blacks in the west, and Montbrun gave free vent to his hatred of the colonists, by compelling them to leave Port-au-Prince, which had not yet fallen into the hands of the negroes. Every where the triumph of the slaves was complete, and the authority of the planters for ever destroyed. But although the liberation of the negroes was effected, the

16.
The universal
freedom of
the blacks is
proclaimed,
June 3, 1793.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1801.

1 Dum. viii.
160, 166.17.
The English
obtain a foot-
ing on the
island, but
are soon ex-
pelled.

June 5, 1794.

2 Dum. viii.
167, 171.
Bign. ii. 396,
397.18.
Furious civil
wars between
the negroes
and mulat-
toes.

independence of the island was not yet established. The English regarded with the utmost jealousy this violent explosion in their vicinity ; and the leaders of the insurgents soon perceived that they could maintain their freedom only by an alliance with the French Government. Toussaint, influenced by these views, passed into the service of France with the rank of colonel, and the blacks began to be organised into regiments under the standards of the Republic.¹

The English before long appeared as actors on this theatre of devastation. They were naturally apprehensive of the utmost danger to their West Indian possessions, from the establishment of so great a revolutionary outpost in the centre of the Gulf of Mexico ; and entertained a hope that, by allying themselves with the remnant of the planters, they might not only extinguish that frightful volcano, but possibly wrest the island with all its commerce from the French Republic. A British squadron appeared off Port-au-Prince early in 1794, and took possession of that town in the June following. They afterwards secured the mole of St. Nicholas, the principal harbour of the island ; and the negro chief Hyacinthe passed into their service with twelve thousand blacks. Encouraged by this great reinforcement, they commenced a systematic warfare for the reduction of the island. But Toussaint, at the head of the French forces and the great majority of the negroes, still maintained the standard of independence : the blacks soon deserted the British standard ; the deadly climate mowed down the European troops ; they were gradually pressed backward to the sea-coast ; and at length the mole of St. Nicholas, their principal stronghold, capitulated to the victorious negro chief.²

No sooner were they delivered from external enemies, than the parties in the island broke out into furious hostility with each other. The mulattoes beheld with undisguised apprehension the preponderance which the negroes had acquired in the late contests, and arrayed themselves under General Rigaud, and Hédouville, the Commissioner of the French Government, to resist Toussaint, who was at the head of the African population. A frightful civil war ensued, which was long carried on

with various success ; but at length the mulattoes were overcome, and Rigaud forced to take refuge in the walls of Cayes, the sole fortress on the island which still acknowledged his authority. Toussaint, who still professed himself a lieutenant of the French Republic, now undisputed master of the field, immediately turned his forces against the Spanish part of the colony, which had been ceded to France by the treaty of Bale. He marched at the same time against Port-au-Prince and Cape Town ; his progress was one continued triumph ; the Spanish territory received him without resistance, and in December 1800, his authority was obeyed from one end of the territory to the other.¹

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1801.

¹ Jom. xiv.
430, 434.

Matters were in this situation when Napoleon, who had now succeeded to the helm of government, began to turn his attention to the affairs of this long neglected and now ruined colony. Entirely directed by military ideas, he immediately conceived the design of regaining the French dominion over the island by means of Toussaint, who had now concentrated in his own hands all its forces, and for this purpose lent a willing ear to the representations of Colonel Vincent, whom the negro chief had sent to Paris to lay the state of its affairs before the First Consul. Influenced by these views, he sent back that officer with a decree, confirming Toussaint in his command as general-in-chief, establishing the constitution there, which in France followed the 18th Brumaire, and issued a proclamation, in which he called on the "brave blacks to remember that France alone had recognised their freedom." This proclamation cut off all hopes from Rigaud and the remnant of the mulatto population, who immediately, in despair, embarked from Cayes, and dispersed themselves over the West India Islands, abandoning for ever their country to the insurgent population for whom they had made so many sacrifices ; the usual fate of those in the middle ranks who stir up the passions of the lowest.²

19.
Napoleon
confirms
Toussaint
in his command.

² Jom. xiv.
435, 440.
Hign. ii. 398,
399.

Toussaint, now undisputed governor of the whole island, adopted the most vigorous measures to put an end to the public discord. While he himself published a general amnesty, and paraded in triumph through the island, attended by all the pomp of European splendour,

20.
Vigorous
measures
of the negro
chief in the
administra-
tion.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1801.

he committed to his ferocious lieutenant, Dessalines; the task of extinguishing the remains of the hostile party. That chief executed the duty with scrupulous exactness and fatal effect. The method of destroying provinces by means of noyades, imported from France by the revolutionary agents, was practised with cruel success, and African vengeance availed itself of the means of destruction which revolutionary wickedness had invented. While Toussaint was received with discharges of cannon and every demonstration of public joy in the principal cities of the island, ten thousand unhappy captives were put to death by the orders of his bloodthirsty lieutenant; and the remains of the ardent race of mulattoes, whose ambition had first disturbed the peace of the island, perished by the hands of the servile crowd whom they had themselves elevated into irresistible power.¹

¹ Bign. ii. 399, 400.

21.

His agricultural policy; and is appointed President for life of the island.

Delivered by this bloody execution from almost all his enemies, Toussaint applied himself, with his wonted vigour, to restore the cultivation of the island, which, amidst the public calamities, had been almost totally abandoned. Imitating the feudal policy, he distributed the unoccupied buildings and lands among his military followers; and their authority having compelled the common men to work, the level parts of the country soon assumed a comparatively flourishing appearance.

1st July 1801.

At the same time an assembly of the leading chiefs of the country was convoked at Cape Town, who drew up a constitution for the inhabitants, and conferred on Toussaint unlimited authority, under the title of President and Governor for life, with the right of nominating his successor. Colonel Vincent was immediately despatched to Paris with the new constitution, and a letter from Toussaint to the First Consul, beginning with the words, "The first of blacks to the first of whites."²

² Jom. xiv. 444, 445.
Bign. ii. 401, 402. Dum. viii. 176, 177.

22.

Napoleon instantly resolves to subdue the island.

This unexpected intelligence was a severe blow to the First Consul. He at once perceived that Toussaint had no intention of remaining his lieutenant; that the feeling of independence had taken root; and that, unless a blow was immediately struck, the colony was for ever lost to the French empire. Colonel Vincent arrived with this despatch on the 14th October 1801, just thirteen days after the signature of the preliminaries of peace with

England, and when the now pacified ocean afforded him the means of at once reasserting the French dominion over the island. He immediately resolved to subdue the colony by force of arms, and restore to France those inestimable maritime advantages which its possession had so long secured to the monarchy. The idea of regaining a commerce which, with the addition of the Spanish part of the island, might be expected to amount to sixteen millions sterling, employ two thousand ships, and thirty thousand seamen, was irresistible to a newly installed sovereign, who felt his deficiency in these particulars to be the only impediment to universal dominion.¹

CHAP.
XXXVL.

1801.

¹ Bign. ii.
402. Jom.
xiv. 445.

Meanwhile, under the stern and severe government of the African chief, the fields of St. Domingo began to regain in part their once smiling aspect. The military discipline which, during the long previous wars, he had been enabled to diffuse among his followers, afforded him the means of establishing that forced cultivation, without which experience has ever found the negro race incapable of pursuing the labour of civilised life. The mulattoes, compelled to engage in the most degrading occupations, bitterly lamented the insupportable black yoke they had imposed upon themselves; the negroes, forced to re-enter their fields and workshops, found that their dreams of liberty had vanished into air, and that they had only made, for the worse, an exchange of masters. Their comfortable dwellings, their neat gardens, their substantial fare, had disappeared, and there remained only the bitterness of servitude without its protection, the license of freedom without its industry. But, amidst the most acute individual suffering, the rigid government of Toussaint succeeded ere long, by the application of force, in restoring, in part, the cultivation of the colony. The negroes were detained, by the terrors of military execution, in the most complete subordination. The chiefs to whom the lands were allotted submitted to the rule of a master whom they at once feared and admired. Commerce with the adjoining islands and the United States began to revive from its ashes; and out of the surplus produce and customs of the island, the Government obtained the means of maintaining a respectable military establishment. Eighteen thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and fifteen

23.
Increasing
prosperity of
the island
under Toussaint's administration.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1801

hundred mounted *gens d'armes*, preserved order in the colony, and gave it the appearance of a military establishment. Toussaint, amidst other great projects, had conceived the design of purchasing slaves from the adjoining states, for experience had already proved that the African race, when free, is incapable of continued or personal labour. His authority was absolute and universal; and the convulsions of St. Domingo added another to the numerous proofs furnished by history, that revolutionary movements, under whatever circumstances commenced, invariably terminate in establishing the unlimited despotism of a single individual.¹*

¹ Dum. viii.
177, 178.

24.
Preparations
of Napoleon
for its subju-
gation.

But it was no part of the designs of the First Consul to allow this magnificent colony to slip out of the grasp of France, or to leave its reviving commerce to nourish only the navy of Britain. Hardly was the ink of his signature to the preliminaries of a maritime peace dry, when he turned his attention to the conquest of the island. Independently of the maritime and political advantages to be derived from such a measure, he entertained the most sanguine hopes of the accession of influence which he would obtain from the disposal of the immense possessions, belonging chiefly to the emigrant noblesse, which would be recovered in the southern hemisphere. Having taken his resolution, he proceeded, with his wonted vigour and ability, in preparing the means of its execution. An extraordinary degree of activity was immediately manifested in the dockyards of Brest, L'Orient, Rochefort, Toulon, Havre, Flushing, and Cadiz. Land forces began to diverge towards these different points of embarkation, and the destination of the armament was announced in the following proclamation issued by Government:—"At St. Domingo, systematic acts have disturbed the political horizon. Under *equivocal appearances*, the Government has permitted itself to see only the ignorance which confounds names and things, which usurps when it seeks to obey; but a fleet and an army, which are preparing in the harbours of Europe, will soon

22d Nov.
1801.

* The American war of independence is no exception. It was not so much a revolutionary movement as a national war between one distant power and another; and, but for the boundless extent of the back settlements, it is more than doubtful whether even there the same results would not have taken place before this time.

dissipate these clouds, and St. Domingo will be reduced, in whole, to the government of the Republic." In the proclamation addressed to the blacks, it was announced by the same authority:—"Whatever may be your origin or your colour, you are Frenchmen, and all alike free and equal before God and the Republic. At St. Domingo and Guadaloupe slavery no longer exists—all are free—all shall remain free. At Martinique different principles must be observed."¹

The forces collected in the different harbours of the Republic for this purpose were the greatest that Europe had ever yet sent forth to the New World. Thirty-five ships of the line, twenty-one frigates, and above eighty smaller vessels, having on board twenty-one thousand land troops, were soon assembled. They resembled rather the preparations for the subjugation of a rival power, than the forces destined for the reduction of a distant colonial settlement. The fleet was commanded by Villaret Joyeuse; the army by Le Clerc, the brother-in-law of Napoleon and husband of the Princess Pauline, whose exquisite figure has since been immortalised by the chisel of Canova. The land forces were almost all composed of the conquerors of Hohenlinden; the First Consul gladly availed himself of this opportunity to rid himself of a large portion of the veterans most adverse to his authority. The most distinguished generals of Moreau's army, Richepanse, Rochambeau, Lapoype, and their redoubtable comrades, were employed in the same destination. In the selection of the general-in-chief, the First Consul was not less influenced by private considerations. He was desirous of giving the means of enriching themselves to two relations, whose passion for dress and extravagant habits had already occasioned repeated and disagreeable pecuniary demands on the public treasury.²

The British Government naturally conceived no small disquietude at the preparation of so great an armament, at the very time when the signature of the preliminaries rendered it difficult to imagine what could be its destination. They demanded, accordingly, explanations on the subject, and the Cabinet of the Tuileries at once unfolded the object of the expedition. Not deeming themselves

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1801.

¹ Dum. viii.
193, 194.
Bign. II. 408,
409.

25.
Immense
naval and
military
forces assem-
bled.

² Duchess
d'Abr. vi. 93,
99. Norv. II.
194. Bign. II.
411.

26.
British Go-
vernment
makes no op-
position.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1801.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 335.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 99.
Dum. viii.
202, 203.

entitled to interfere between France and her colonies, and perhaps not secretly disinclined to the subjugation of so formidable a neighbour as an independent negro state in the close vicinity of her slave colonies, Great Britain abstained from any further opposition, and merely took the precautionary measures of assembling a powerful fleet of observation in Bantry Bay, and greatly strengthening the naval force in the West Indies.¹

27.
Expedition
sails, and ar-
rives off St.
Domingo.

The fleets from Brest, L'Orient, and Rochefort, all set sail on the 14th December, 1801. The land forces they had on board, under the immediate command of Le Clerc, amounted at first only to ten thousand men, but they were followed by reinforcements from Cadiz, Brest, Havre, and Holland, which swelled the troops ultimately to thirty-five thousand men. The first division of this formidable force appeared off the island in the beginning of February. So completely was the government of St. Domingo at fault as to the object of the expedition, that, had it not been for fifteen days which were lost in the Bay of Biscay in assembling the different divisions of the fleet, Toussaint would have been surprised ere he had begun to make any preparations whatever for his defence. No sooner, however, did he receive intelligence from an American vessel of the appearance of the fleet in the southern latitudes, than he instantly took his line, despatched messengers in all directions to assemble his forces, and announced his heroic resolution in these memorable words:—"A dutiful son, without doubt, owes submission and obedience to his mother; but if that parent should become so unnatural as to aim at the destruction of its own offspring, nothing remains but to intrust vengeance to the hands of God. If I must die, I will die as a brave soldier and a man of honour. I fear no one."²

² Journ. xv.
41, 42. Dum.
viii. 205, 206.
Le Clerc, i.
117, 132.

28.
First irreso-
lution, but
final firmness
of Toussaint.

But events quickly succeeded each other, which warned the negro chief of the desperate nature of the contest to which he was committed. He had recently before concluded a convention for mutual assistance with General Nugent, the governor of Jamaica, and with reason placed great reliance on the efficacious support of the English naval power to protect his dominions from the threatened invasion; when the intelligence of the peace of Amiens, followed by accounts of the arrival of the French fleet in

the neighbourhood of the island, at once dissipated these expectations. He hastened to Cape Samana to obtain, with his own eyes, a view of the formidable armament of which report had so magnified the terrors; and was struck with astonishment at the sight of it, covering, as it did, the ocean with its sails, and so much beyond any thing yet seen in these latitudes. For a moment he hesitated on the part he should adopt. "We must die," said he; "France in a body has come to St. Domingo. We have been deceived; they are determined to take vengeance and enslave the blacks." Recovering, however, soon after, his wonted resolution, he mournfully cast his eyes over the interminable fleet, whose sails, as far as the eye could reach, covered the ocean, and despatched couriers in all directions to rouse the most determined resistance. His forces, however, even with all the advantages of climate and local knowledge, were scarcely correspondent to the magnanimous resolution. They hardly exceeded twenty thousand men, dispersed over the whole island; and whatever their courage may have been, they could not be expected to stand the shock of the troops with whom the Austrian veterans had contended in vain.¹

¹ Dum. viii.
206, 207.
Jom. xv. 42,
43, 48. Le
Clerc, i. 19,
35.

Le Clerc gave orders to commence the disembarkation at Cape Town, on the 1st February, where Christophe commanded; but difficulties arose in consequence of the impossibility of finding a pilot to guide the vessels into the harbour. At length the admiral seized upon the harbour-admiral, a mulatto, named Sangos, put a rope about his neck, and threatened him with instant death if he did not show the way, and a bribe of fifty thousand francs (£2000) if he would; but nothing could induce him to betray his country. The precious time thus gained was turned to a good account by Christophe. He rapidly organised every thing for burning what yet remained of the town, which had been in part rebuilt since the sack ten years before; removed all the inhabitants capable of bearing arms, and all the stores which could be of service to the enemy, and only waited the signal of disembarkation to apply the torch in every direction. On the 4th, the division of Hardy effected a landing on the one side of the capital, and Rochambeau on the other, under cover of a brisk cannonade from the

29.
The French
land, and
Cape Town is
burnt by the
blacks.

4th Feb.
1802.

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1802.

fleet; on the same night the town was set on fire, and burned with the utmost fury; out of eight hundred houses scarcely sixty were standing on the following morning, and the first struggles of African independence were signalled by an act of devotion, of which European patriotism has exhibited few examples. The generous sacrifice was not made in vain; both stores and provisions, which might have furnished invaluable supplies to the army, were destroyed, and out of the ruins of the city arose those pestilential vapours which afterwards proved more fatal to the troops than all the forces that Toussaint could assemble for their destruction.¹*

¹ Dum. viii.
208, 213.
Jom. xv. 46,
47, 48. Norv.
ii. 207.

30.
But the
French gene-
rally prevail
in the field.

This sinister commencement, so ominous of the desperate nature of the resistance which they might expect, was not, however, immediately followed by the disasters which were apprehended. European skill and discipline soon asserted their wonted superiority over the military efforts of the other quarters of the globe; and how could the blacks, but recently emancipated from the lash of slavery, be expected to withstand, in regular combat, the conquerors of Hohenlinden? General Kerveseau without difficulty made himself master of the Spanish part of the island, which had unwillingly submitted to the negro Government. Boudet and Latouche landed at Port-au-Prince in the harbour, in the face of the enemy, and pursued them so rapidly into the town, as to save it from the conflagration with which it was menaced by the savage Dessalines; while the whole southern part of the island submitted at once to the authority of the invaders, and was thus saved from impending destruction. The important harbour of the mole of St. Nicholas was occupied without opposition;

* The parallel conflagrations of Numantium, Cape Town, and Moscow, prove, that whatever may be their deficiency in industry, or the habits of persevering exertion, the negro race is as capable as the European of the sacrifices required by patriotic spirit. When we recollect that it was in a comparatively rude state of society that all these heroic deeds were done, and that the history of civilisation in its later stages has afforded no similar examples, we are led to the conclusion, that the progress of refinement, by extending the influence of artificial wants, and strengthening the bonds by which men are bound to their individual possessions, gradually weakens the cords of public feelings, and that a foundation is thus laid by the wisdom of Nature for the decay of empires in the very consequences of their extension and greatness.

but Dessalines, who had failed in accomplishing that object at Port-au-Prince, did not abandon Saint Marc till he had reduced it to ashes. On all sides the plains and sea-coast fell into the hands of the Europeans, and the negro forces were driven back into the impracticable and wooded mountain ridges in the central parts of the island.¹

But this apparent triumph was the result chiefly of the profound and resolute system of defence adopted by the negro Government, which consisted in destroying the cities on the coast, ruining the cultivated plains which might afford supplies to the enemy, and retiring into the woody fastnesses in the interior, called in the emphatic language of the country, "the Grand Chaos," where the system of bush-fighting might render unavailing the discipline and experience of the European soldiers. There is nothing in the temperate zone comparable to the difficulty and intricacy of these primeval forests, where enormous trees shoot up to the height of two hundred feet from the ground, and their stems are enveloped in an impenetrable thicket of creepers and underwood, which flourish under the heat of a vertical sun. No roads, few paths, traverse this savage district; almost the only mode of penetrating through it is by following the beds of the torrents, which in that humid climate frequently furrow the sides of the mountains, where a column of regular soldiers is exposed to a murderous fire from the unseen bands stationed in the overhanging woods. It was Toussaint's design to maintain himself in these impenetrable fastnesses, sending forth merely light parties to harass the flanks and rear of the enemy, until the pestilential season of autumn arrived, and the heavy rains had generated those noxious vapours, which in that deadly climate so rapidly prove fatal to European constitutions. He had only twelve thousand regular troops remaining, but they were aided by the desultory efforts of the negroes in the plains, who were ever ready, like the peasants of La Vendée, to answer his summons, though apparently engaged only in agricultural pursuits; and with such auxiliaries, and the prospect of approaching pestilence, his resources were by no means to be despised, even by the best appointed European army.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1802.

¹ Jom. xv.
50, 53. Norv.
ii. 207, 209.
Bign. ii. 415,
416. Dum.
viii. 220, 230.

31.
Description
of the moun-
tainous inter-
ior to which
the negroes
retire.

**CHAP.
XXXVI.**

1802.

¹ Norv. ii.
207. Jom. xv.
53, 55. Dum.
viii. 230, 232.
Le Clerc, i.
171, 180.

^{32.}
Fruitless at-
tempt to in-
duce Touss-
saint to sub-
mit.

Feb. 12,
1802.

² Dum. viii.
232, 235.
Jom. xv. 55.
59. Norv. ii.
209, 210.
Franklin's
Hayti, 143.

^{33.}
General and
successful at-
tack on his
position.

All the blacks were animated with the most enthusiastic spirit; for the intentions of the invader were no longer doubtful, and the tenor of the last instructions to Le Clerc had transpired, which were to re-establish slavery throughout the whole island.¹

Penetrated with the difficulty of the novel species of warfare on which he was about to enter, Le Clerc tried to prevail on the negro chief, by conciliatory measures and the force of his paternal affections, to lay down his arms. For this purpose, he sent to him his two sons, whom he had brought with him from Paris, along with their crafty preceptor, M. Coisnon, and a letter from the First Consul, in which he acknowledged his great services to France, and offered him the command of the colony if he would submit to the laws of the Republic. With no small difficulty the children made their way to the habitation of their father at Ennery, thirty leagues from Cape Town, in the mountains. The mother wept for joy on beholding her long-lost offspring; and the chief himself, who was absent on their arrival, fell on their necks on his return, and for a moment was shaken in his resolution to maintain the independence of his country by the might of parental affection. He soon, however, recovered the wonted firmness of his character. In vain his sons embraced his knees, and implored him to accede to the proposition of the First Consul; in vain his wife and family added their tears. He saw through the artifice of his enemies, and clearly perceived that his submission would be the signal for the re-establishment of slavery throughout the colony. In the generous contention patriotic duty prevailed over parental love. He sent back his sons to Le Clerc, with an evasive letter proposing an armistice; the French General granted him four days to determine, and again restored them to their father. Toussaint, upon this, retained his sons, and returned no answer to Le Clerc, who forthwith declared him a rebel, and prepared to carry on the war to the last extremity.²

A few days afterwards the Toulon squadron arrived, bringing a reinforcement of six thousand men; and the French general, finding himself at the head of fifteen thousand effective men, prepared for a concentric attack

from all quarters on the wooded fastnesses still in the hands of the negro chief. It took place on the 17th, with the greatest success. Toussaint himself, intrenched with two thousand five hundred of his best troops, supported by two thousand armed negroes, in a strong position at the ravine of Coulevre, at the entrance of the thickets, was attacked and defeated by Rochambeau, with the loss of seven hundred men. His lieutenant, Maurepas, who had gained an important success at Gros Morne, was by this advantage placed between two fires, and forced to surrender; and soon after entered, with all his followers, into the service of the Republic. Dessalines, defeated by Boudet in the neighbourhood of St. Marc, with his own hands set fire to his dwelling. All his officers followed his example, and the retreat of the blacks towards the mountains in the south was preceded by the massacre of twelve hundred whites, and clouds of smoke which announced the destruction of all the plantations in that part of the island.¹

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1802.

Feb. 17.

Feb. 28.

¹ Jom. xv. 60,
62. Dum. viii.
236, 245.
Norv. ii. 211,
212.

Nothing daunted by these calamities, Dessalines had no sooner reached a place of security in the hills than he meditated an expedition against Port-au-Prince, from which the French troops had been in a great measure withdrawn; but it was defeated by the skill and valour of Latouche Trioille, and he was compelled to fall back to the mountains. The beaten remains of the blacks now assembled at the fort of Crête à Pierrot, an inconsiderable stronghold erected by the English at the confluence of two streams, in a position deemed inaccessible. Here, however, they were assaulted by two brigades of the French army under Debelle; but such was the vigour of the fire kept up by the blacks with grape and musketry, that the attempt to carry it by a *coup de main* failed, and the assailants were repulsed with the loss of seven hundred of their bravest troops. Le Clerc, upon this, concentrated all his disposable forces for the attack of this important point. The divisions both of Hardy and Rochambeau were brought up to support that of Debelle, and an escalade was again tried with the victorious troops of Rochambeau, who were a second time repulsed with severe loss. Le Clerc now despaired of reducing the fort but by regular approaches; and heavy artillery having,

34.
Desperate defence of a fort in the mountains.

March 3.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1802.

March 23.

¹ Dum. viii.
244, 249.
Jom. xv. 64,
70. Norv. ii.
212.

35.
The war as-
sumes a guer-
rilla character.

² Dum. viii.
249, 255.
Jom. xv. 70,
72. Norv. ii.
214.

36.
Negotiations
for the ter-
mination of
hostilities.
Dignified
conduct of
Toussaint.

with infinite difficulty, been at length planted against it, the defences were battered in breach, and every thing disposed for an assault. Conceiving themselves unable to resist the attack of so considerable a body, the negroes, during the night, fell furiously upon the blockading forces, cut their way through, and got clear off, highly elated at having arrested the whole French army above three weeks, and inflicted on them a loss of fifteen hundred men, in the attack of a fort so inconsiderable, that fifteen pieces of cannon only were found mounted on the ramparts.¹

Meanwhile Toussaint was again ~~forming~~ his broken divisions in the rear of the besieging force, and had spread terror in every direction through the conquered territory. His lieutenant, Christophe, carried his nocturnal incursions as far as Cape Town, and kept in constant alarm the feeble garrison which was left amidst its ruins. The division of Hardy in consequence fell back to their assistance, and, reinforced by two thousand five hundred fresh troops, which had just disembarked from the Dutch fleet, its brave commander issued forth, and took the field against Christophe. But the blacks, taught by experience, nowhere appeared in large bodies, and kept up such a murderous guerilla warfare upon the invaders, that, without making any sensible progress, they sustained a very serious diminution. Christophe at length retired to his old and formidable positions of Dondon and La Grande Rivière, at the entrance of the woody defiles. He was there attacked by Hardy, but the French were defeated with heavy loss.²

Both parties were now exhausted with this deadly strife. The negroes, driven from the rich and cultivated part of the island into the sterile and intricate woody fastnesses, had no resources for successfully prolonging the contest. Their means of subsistence must soon be expected to fail in these savage thickets; they had beheld with astonishment the agility and courage with which the French soldiers pursued them into their most inaccessible retreats, and began to despair of successfully maintaining the contest with an enemy who was continually receiving reinforcements from apparently interminable squadrons. On the other hand, Le Clerc was

not less desirous to come to an accommodation. Although, in a campaign of six weeks, he had, by great exertions, surmounted incredible difficulties, yet it could not be dissembled that these advantages had been gained by enormous sacrifices. The reinforcements received from France were far from compensating the losses which had been sustained; the soldiers, worn out with fatigue, and disgusted with an inglorious warfare, passionately longed for repose; their republican principles revolted at shedding their blood so profusely for the re-establishment of slavery; the military chest was exhausted, and the unhealthy season fast approaching, which would mow down the troops yet faster than the deadly aim of the negroes. These feelings at length led to an accommodation. The French General secretly entered into a separate negotiation with the leaders of the enemy; Christophe and Dessalines followed the example of Maurepas, and went over with their forces to the French service, where they received their former rank and appointments; and the heroic Toussaint was left, with a few thousand devoted followers, to make head not only against the European invaders, but the faithless Africans who had ranged themselves on their side. Borne down by necessity, the negro chief was at length forced to submit; but, in doing so, he maintained the dignity of his character, and, instead of accepting the rank and emoluments which had seduced the fidelity of his followers,¹ returned to his mountain farm of Ennery, and resumed, like Gincinnatus, the occupations of rural life.

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1802.

May 5, 1802.

¹ Bign. ii.
423, 424.
Dum. viii.
254, 257.
Jom. xv. 72,
75.

This pacification was complete; and every thing promised a successful issue to this hazardous expedition. The negro chiefs rivalled each other in deeds testifying the reality of their submission. Christophe, Dessalines, Maurepas, zealously performed all the duties imposed upon them by the French general. Thirty thousand muskets were surrendered in the department of the north alone, and stored in the magazines of Cape Town. The French even found themselves compelled to restrain the ferocious zeal of their new allies, who put to death, without mercy, the negroes who evaded the general disarming. Even those the blacks returned to their usual occupations. In the workshops, the fields, were filled

37.
General paci-
fication.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1802.

¹ Norv. ii.
218. Dum.
viii. 257, 261.
Jom. xv. 73,
75.

38.
Traacherous
views of Na-
poleon.

² Nap. in
Month. ii.
129. Dum.
viii. 262, 263.
Norv. ii. 219.
Jom. xv. 75,
76.

with labourers; foreign ships began to frequent the harbours, and commerce to give an air of returning prosperity to the scene of desolation. The regulations chalked out by Toussaint were for the most part adopted; the officers he had selected confirmed in their respective commands; and the foundations of a judicious system of colonial administration laid, by an assembly convoked at Cape Town. As the public treasury was exhausted, General Le Clerc pledged his private credit for these beneficent undertakings: a generous confidence, which was returned by the French Government by a base disavowal, which involved his family in total ruin.¹

The secret instructions of the First Consul directed the Commander-in-chief to engage all the negro chiefs to accept situations in the French service, and to send them over to receive employment according to their rank, in the French continental armies. It was not very likely that the soldiers of Marengo and Hohenlinden would have submitted to be commanded by negro officers, or that the place of Rochambeau, Hardy, and Richepanse could have been supplied by the able generals of division from Toussaint's army. Napoleon's real design was to deprive the blacks of their efficient leaders, and so pave the way for the re-establishment of slavery and the ancient proprietors. This was soon made manifest by what occurred at Guadaloupe. The proclamation of the First Consul had announced to the blacks the same treatment in St. Domingo and Guadaloupe, and the re-establishment of servitude in the latter island revealed to the African race the fate which awaited them under the French Government.²

During the two months which followed the pacification, Toussaint lived in profound retirement in his country residence at Ennery. Meanwhile, however, the yellow

* The regulations of Toussaint had converted rural into rural servitude. The negroes were compelled to work in command of the overseers and officers, and received in return a fourth of the produce. The earth was divided among them, according to the skill and strength of each individual. The inspectors exercised a summary jurisdiction over the blacks. All delinquencies were brought before them by the proprietors, and they were with investigated and punished the offence with rigid severity. The names of the delinquents were unknown, and continues so, generally speaking, to this day. The reality of slavery without its name. These regulations were so judicious, and so adapted to a people invincibly averse to voluntary exertion, that they were immediately adopted by the French General.—See DUMAS, viii. 263, 269.

fever broke out at Cape Town, and the hospitals were speedily crowded with French soldiers, several hundreds of whom died every day. The sight of this catastrophe excited the hopes of the negroes, and some insurrectionary movements manifested themselves among them in the mountains, not far from Toussaint's dwelling. Le Clerc immediately called upon Toussaint to disperse these assemblages, and he formed a detachment for that purpose; but the French, being suspicious of its destination, surrounded and disarmed it; and soon after, the General-in-chief, conceiving apprehensions of the fidelity of the negro leader, had him arrested and brought to Cape Town. The grounds on which this perfidious act was justified were so flimsy as to be incapable of deceiving any one; but it can hardly be made a subject of reproach against Le Clerc, for his instructions were positive, in one way or another, to transport to France all the leaders of the blacks. Its infamy rests on the government of Napoleon, on whom the subsequent fate of this great man has affixed a lasting stain, while the consequent destruction of the expedition has inadequately expiated it.

* The ground set forth by the French Government was, that in one of his letters which they intercepted, addressed to one of his old aides-de-camp, he had congratulated him "that at length Providence had come to their succour." La Providence was the name of the great hospital at Cape Town; and from this ambiguous expression the French authorities concluded that he viewed with satisfaction the progress of the malady which was consuming them—a supposition probably not far from the truth, but which could never justify the arrest of the sable hero, while living quietly on his estate on the faith of a treaty solemnly concluded with the French Government. The mode of Toussaint's arrest added to the atrocity of the deed. Instead of sending a detachment to Ennery to seize him, he was invited to Gonaives by General Brunck. The unsuspecting hero fell into the snare, trusted to French honour, and was betrayed. He was forthwith sent to France and confined in the castle of Joux, in the Jura, where he died, whether by natural or violent means is unknown. This castle is situated on a rocky eminence, in a chain of those romantic mountains on the

CHAP.
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1802.

39.

Perfidious
arrest of
Toussaint by
the French
authorities.

July 5, 1802

1 Dum. viii.
270, 271.
Jom. xv. 77,
78.

40.

Subsequent
treatment
and murder of
Toussaint by
Napoleon.

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XXXVI.
1802.

¹ Norv. II. 21.
Dum. viii.
271, 272.
Jom. xv. 77.

road from Besançon to Lausanne. Among the numerous spots illustrated by these memorable wars, not the least interesting is the scene of the imprisonment and death of the greatest, after Hannibal, of African heroes; and it were well for the memory of Napoleon, if it could be cleared of the obloquy arising from the sudden death, about the same time, of so many eminent men in the state prisons of France.¹

41.
Dreadful
atrocities on
both sides in
Guadaloupe.

May 5, 1802.

While these events were in progress in St. Domingo, changes which ultimately were productive of the most important consequences took place in Guadaloupe. That island had revolted, and fallen under the dominion of the blacks by a process extremely analogous to, though less bloody than, that which had obtained in its larger neighbour. The mulattoes, under a renowned leader named Pélage, had arisen in insurrection in October 1801, against the European governor, and speedily made themselves masters of the island; but hardly had they got possession of the reins of power, when they found themselves threatened by a formidable conspiracy of the slaves, and narrowly escaped being butchered a few days after in the seat of their newly acquired power. The island was in a state of anarchy, divided between rival authorities, when Admiral Bouvet arrived with the renowned division of Richépanse, three thousand five hundred strong, which had mainly contributed to the great victory of Hohenlinden. Pélage, whose terrors were fully awakened by the fervour of the insurgent slave population, immediately ranged himself under his command, and manifested, in the short campaign which followed, the most distinguished bravery: but the slaves resisted, and Basse-terre, the capital, was only taken after a bloody conflict. Though driven to the mountains, however, the negroes maintained a desperate conflict; an insubstantial fort in the woods held out long, and was only reduced by a regular siege: Ignatius, a determined chief, was at length destroyed at Petit Bourg, after a brutal slaughter; and another leader, named Delgrès, threw himself up, with three hundred of his followers, to a steep rock, and surrendered to the enemy. These bloody catastrophes, however, extinguished the revolt in the island; but they were followed by measures of unpardonable and sanguinary severity.

Twelve hundred prisoners were drowned in cold blood by Lacrosse, who took the command of the island; and soon after, by a proclamation issued in the name of the First Consul, slavery and the whole ancient régime was solemnly re-established. A few days afterwards, Richépense was cut off by the yellow fever: a lamentable fate for so distinguished a European officer, to perish by an inglorious death in the midst of colonial atrocity.¹

The intelligence of these alarming events produced the utmost agitation in St. Domingo. The re-establishment of slavery in Guadeloupe, to which liberty had been promised equally as to St. Domingo in the proclamation of the First Consul,* naturally excited the utmost apprehensions in the blacks as to the fate which was reserved for themselves, in the event of the French authority being firmly re-established in the larger island. A stifled insurrection soon broke out, which speedily spread over the whole colony; although Christophe, Maurepas, and Dessalines, vied with each other in acts of severity against the insurgents. Dessalines even went so far as to arrest Charles Belais, Toussaint's nephew, who was conducted to the Cape, and sentenced to death by a military commission composed of mulatto officers. But the enthusiasm soon became universal, as the mask of profound dissimulation which they had so long worn was laid aside by the negro chiefs. On the night of the 14th October, Clervaux, Christophe, and Paul Louverture, joined the insurgents in the north, and their example was shortly afterwards followed by Dessalines with all the forces in the west. The situation of the French army was now critical in the extreme. By the losses of the campaign their troops had been reduced to thirteen thousand men, and of these five thousand were in the hospitals; so that there remained only eight thousand capable of bearing arms—a force totally inadequate to maintain the whole country against an exasperated black population of several hundred thousand souls. Le Clerc therefore directed a concentration of all the disposable troops at Cape Town and Port-au-Prince; but in doing this they were severely

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1802.

August 5,

1802.

1 Dum. viii.

288, 301.

Jom. xv. 80,

85.

42.

Perfidious conduct of the French towards that island, and general revolt in St. Domingo. Death of Le Clerc.

* "At St. Domingo and Guadeloupe, slavery no longer exists: all are free, and shall remain so. At Martinique different principles must prevail: slavery continues there, and must continue."—*Proclam. Nov. 1801*; DUMAS, viii. 283.

CHAP.
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1802.

Nov. 2.

¹ Dum. viii.
273, 277, 279.
Jom. xv. 85,
87, 92. Norv.
ii. 223, 224.

43.
Continued
successes of
the negroes.

Feb. 17, 1803

pressed by the insurgents, who increased immensely when the retreat of the French had become manifest ; and in the midst of this hazardous operation Le Clerc himself was seized with the yellow fever, which had already proved fatal to Hardy, Debelle, and his best officers. The violence of the malady, and the anxiety consequent on so responsible a situation, triumphed over the natural strength of his constitution, and he died on the 2d of November, leaving the remains of the army in the deepest state of dejection.¹

Rochambeau succeeded to the command ; but, though by no means destitute of military talents, he hastened the approaching dissolution of the French authority in the island, by the violence and injustice of his civil administration. Instead of cultivating the affections of the mulatto population, who had rendered such important services to his predecessor, he for ever alienated the affections of that numerous body, by the arrest and execution of Bardet, one of the half-caste chiefs who had rendered the most efficient aid to the French. Such was the exasperation occasioned by this atrocious proceeding, that it instantly threw the mulattoes into the arms of the negroes, and the flames of insurrection shortly spread through the southern and eastern parts of the island, where that mixed race chiefly prevailed. Encouraged by these successes, Christophe and Dessalines made a nocturnal attack on Cape Town in the middle of February ; they surprised Fort Belair, and put the garrison to the sword ; and their assault on the body of the place was only defeated by an uncommon exertion of vigour and courage on the part of the French general. Exasperated at these disasters, Rochambeau renewed his severities on the mulatto race ; two of their chiefs, Prosper and Brachas, were seized and drowned ; and this so enraged their countrymen, that they all left the colours of France, to which they had hitherto rendered essential service, and joined the negro standards. Informed of this defection, Rochambeau embarked in person for Port-au-Prince, with twelve hundred fresh troops recently arrived from France : but no sooner had he advanced into the open country round that town, than his troops fell into an ambuscade, and were driven back with great loss into its walls.²

Matters were in this disastrous state when the finishing

² Dum. 303,
315. Jom. xv.
92, 95. Bign.
ii. 433, 435.

blow was put to the affairs of the colony, by the rupture of the peace of Amiens and renewal of hostilities between France and Great Britain. The insurgents, then supplied with arms and ammunition by the English cruisers, speedily became irresistible: all the fortified posts in the south and west fell into their hands. Lavalette, at Port-au-Prince, capitulated to Dessalines, and was fortunate enough to reach the Havanna with the greater part of his troops. Rochambeau, blockaded in Cape Town by the blacks on the land side, and the English at sea, was obliged, after a gallant resistance, to surrender at discretion, and was conducted to Jamaica; while the Viscount de Noailles, who last maintained the French standard on the land, escaped under false colours, dexterously eluded the vigilance of the English cruisers, and surprised one of their corvettes, but was wrecked on the coast of Cuba, as if it had been ordained that no part of that ill-fated expedition should escape destruction.¹

Thus terminated this melancholy expedition, in which one of the finest armies that France ever sent forth perished, the victims of fatigue, disease, and the perfidy of its Government. The loss sustained was immense. Out of thirty-five thousand land troops embarked, scarcely seven thousand ever regained the shores of France. The history of Europe can hardly afford a parallel instance of so complete a destruction of so vast an armament. Nevertheless the First Consul is not chargeable with any want of skill or foresight in the conduct of the expedition, or any Machiavelian design to get quit of the soldiers of a rival chief in its original conception, though the choice of the troops employed in the expedition betrays that object when the design was once formed. The object of regaining possession of so great a colony was well worth the incurring even of considerable risk; the forces employed were apparently adequate to the end; the period of the year selected was the best adapted for the conduct of warlike operations. In ability of design and wisdom of execution, Napoleon never was deficient. It was the insensibility to any moral government of mankind, springing out of the irreligious habits of a revolution, that occasioned all his misfortunes. St. Domingo, in fact, was conquered when it was lost by his deceit and perfidy; by the iniquitous

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1802.

44.

The rupture of the peace of Amiens causes the total destruction of the French.

Oct 5, 1803.

¹ Jom. xv.

98, 99.

Norv. ii. 290,

231. Dum.

viii. 336, 339.

45.

Reflections on the expedition.

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XXXVI.

1802.

seizure of Toussaint when relying on the faith of a solemn treaty, and the re-establishment of slavery in Guadaloupe in violation of the promises of the French Government, contained in a proclamation signed by the First Consul. Napoleon admitted subsequently that he was wrong in his conduct to St. Domingo. "I have to reproach myself," said he, "for that expedition in the time of the Consulate. It was a great fault to try to subject it by force. I should have been contented with the intermediate government of Toussaint. Peace was not then sufficiently established with England: the territorial wealth to which I looked in trying to subject it, would have only enriched our enemies. It was undertaken against my opinion, in conformity to the wishes of the Council of State, who were carried away by the cries of the colonists."¹

¹ Las Cas. ii. 179. Bign. ii. 445.

46.
Degraded
state of St.
Domingo
ever since
that time.

Since the expulsion of the French from the island, St. Domingo has been nominally independent; but slavery has been far indeed from being abolished, and the condition of the people any thing but ameliorated by the change. Nominally free, the blacks have remained really enslaved. Compelled to labour, by the terrors of military discipline, for a small part of the produce of the soil, they have retained the severity, without the advantages of servitude. The industrious habits, the flourishing aspect of the island, have disappeared; the surplus wealth, the agricultural opulence of the fields, have ceased; from being the greatest exporting island in the West Indies, it has ceased to raise any sugar; and the inhabitants, reduced to half their former amount, and bitterly galled by their republican taskmasters, have relapsed into the indolence and inactivity of savage life.² The revolution of St. Domingo has demonstrated that the negroes can occasionally exert all the vigour and heroism which distinguish the European character; but there is as yet no reason to suppose that they are capable of the continued efforts, the sustained and persevering toil, requisite to erect the fabric of civilised freedom. An observation of Gibbon seems decisive on this subject. "The inaction of the negroes does not seem to be the effect either of their virtue or of their pusillanimity. They indulge, like the rest of mankind, their passions and appetites, and the adjacent tribes are engaged in frequent acts of hostility. But their rude ignorance has

² Mackenzie's St. Domingo, i. 260, 321. Franklin's Hayti, ii. 172, 176.

never invented any effectual weapons of defence or destruction; they appear incapable of forming any extensive plans of government or conquest, and the obvious inferiority of their mental faculties has been discovered and abused by the nations of the temperate zone. Sixty thousand blacks are annually embarked from the coast of Guinea, but they embark in chains, never to return to their native country; and this constant emigration, which, in the space of two centuries, might have furnished armies to overrun the globe, accuses the guilt of Europe and the weakness of Africa." ¹

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XXXVI.
1802.

¹ Gibbon, c.
25, vol. iii.
326.

- If the negroes are not inferior, either in vigour, courage, or intelligence, to the Europeans, how has it happened that, for four thousand years, they have remained in the savage state? What has prevented mighty empires arising on the banks of the Niger, the Quorra, or the Congo, in the same way as on those of the Euphrates, the Ganges, and the Nile? Why have they not made slaves of the Europeans, instead of the Europeans of them? Heat of climate, intricacy of forests, extent of desert, will not solve the difficulty, for they exist to as great an extent in the plains of Mesopotamia or Hindostan as in Central Africa. It is in vain to say the Europeans have retained the Africans in that degraded condition, by their violence, injustice, and the slave trade. How has it happened that the inhabitants of that vast and fruitful region have not risen to the government of the globe, and inflicted on the savages of Europe the evils now set forth as the cause of their depression? Did not all nations start alike in the career of infant improvement? and was not Egypt, the cradle of civilisation, nearer to Central Africa than the shores of Britain? In the earliest representations of nations in existence, the paintings on the walls of the tombs of the kings of Egypt, the distinct races of the Asiatics, the Jews, the Hottentots, and the Europeans, are clearly marked; but the blue-eyed and white-haired sons of Japhet are represented in cow-skins, with the hair turned outwards, in the pristine state of pastoral life, while the Hottentots are already clothed in the garb of civilised existence. What since has given so mighty an impulse to European civilisation,

47.
And of the
measure
which it af-
fords of the
capacity of
the negroes.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1802.

¹ Macken-
zie's St. Do-
mingo, ii.
260, 321.

48.
Ambitious
designs of
Napoleon in
Europe.

and retained in a stationary or declining state the immediate neighbours of Egyptian and Carthaginian greatness? It is impossible to arrive at any other conclusion, but that, in the qualities requisite to create and perpetuate civilisation, the African is decidedly inferior to the European race; and if any doubt could exist on this subject, it would be removed by the subsequent history and present state of the Haytian republic, and the lamentable failure of the emancipation of the negroes in the British colonies.^{1*}

But it was not only in the southern hemisphere that the vast designs of the First Consul were manifested. Europe also was the theatre of his ambition; and the preliminaries of Amiens were hardly signed, when his conduct gave unequivocal proof that he was resolved to be fettered by no treaties, and that to those who did not choose to submit to his authority, no alternative remained but the sword. By the eleventh article of the treaty of Luneville, it had been provided, that "the contracting parties shall mutually guarantee the independence of the Batavian, Helvetian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics, and the right to the people who inhabit them to adopt whatever form of government they think fit." The allies, of course, understood by this clause real independence—in other words, a liberation of these republics from the influence of France. But it soon appeared that Napoleon affixed a very different meaning to it, and that what he intended was the establishment of constitutions in them all, affiliated with the great parent republic, which should absolutely subject them to his power.

Holland was the first of the affiliated republics which

* The following table contains the comparative wealth, produce, and trade of St. Domingo, before 1789, and in 1832, after forty years of nominal freedom.

	1789.	1832.
Population, . . .	600,000 . . .	280,000
Sugar exported . . .	672,000,000 lbs. . .	None.
Coffee, . . .	86,789,000 lbs. . .	32,000,000 lbs.
Ships employed in trade, . . .	1680 . . .	1
Sailors, . . .	27,000 . . .	167
Exports to France, . . .	£6,730,000 . . .	None.
Imports from ditto, . . .	9,890,000 . . .	None.

—M'KENZIE'S St. Domingo, i. 321; and DUMAS, viii. 112.

underwent the change consequent on the establishment of the consular power in France. For this purpose, the French ambassador, Schimmelpennick, repaired to the Hague, to prepare a revolution which should assimilate the government of the Batavian to that of the French Republic. So devoted was the Directory at the Hague to Napoleon's will, that they voluntarily became the instrument of their own destruction. On the 17th September the French ambassador sent the constitution, ready made, to the legislative body, with the intimation that they had nothing to do but affix to it the seal of their approbation, as it had already received the sanction of the people. In fact, on the same day, it was published to the nation, before the opinion of the legislature on it was known: the Directory took for granted that it would be approved. The Dutch legislature, however, were not prepared for this degradation; and the last act of their existence did honour to their memory: they decreed the suppression of the illegal acts of the Directory. Forthwith a *coup d'état* was put in force. The Directory, by a violent act, dissolved the Chambers; their doors were closed by French bayonets, the guards absolved from their oaths, and all the persons in the employment of the Government dismissed. Shortly after, the new constitution was published by the Directory, alike without the knowledge or concurrence of the people; but it was a nearer approximation to the habits and wishes of the respectable classes than the democratic institutions which had preceded it: a legislative body, composed of five-and-thirty members, in a slight degree recalled the recollection of the old States-General. The division of provinces was the same as in the United States; but the Council of State, of twelve members, with a president changing every three months, was possessed of much more absolute power than ever belonged to the Stadtholder, while the frequent change of the president prevented any one from acquiring such a preponderance as might render him formidable to the authority of the First Consul. The form of submitting the constitution to the people was gone through. Out of 416,419 citizens having a right to vote, 52,219 rejected it. The immense majority who declined to vote was assumed to be favourable to the change, and the new

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1802.

49.

Holland is again revolutionised.

Sept. 18, 1801.

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XXXVI

1802.

government was solemnly proclaimed. The conduct of the Dutch on this occasion affords a striking proof of the impossibility of eradicating, by external violence, the institutions which have grown with the growth and strengthened with the strength of a free people. In vain they were subdued by the armies of France, and democratic institutions forced upon them, with the loud applause of the indigent rabble in power. The great mass of the inhabitants, and almost the whole proprietors, withdrew altogether from public situations, and took no share whatever in the changes which were imposed upon their country. In the seclusion of private life, they retained the habits, the affections, and the religious observances of their forefathers; their children were nursed in these patriotic feelings, untainted by the revolutionary passions which agitated the surrounding states; and when the power of Napoleon was overthrown, the ancient government was re-established, with as much facility and as universal satisfaction, as the English constitution on the restoration of Charles II.¹

¹ Dum. viii.
39, 42. Norv.
ii. 174, 175.

50.
And the Cis-
alpine Repub-
lic again re-
modelled.

Nov. 14,
1801.

Having thus established a government in Holland, entirely subservient to his will, and in harmony with the recent institutions in France, the next care of the First Consul was to remodel the Cisalpine Republic in such a way as to render it, too, analogous to the parent state, and equally submissive to his authority. For this purpose, early in November 1801, the French authorities began to prepare the inhabitants of the infant Republic for the speedy fixing of their destinies, and the formation of a new constitution better adapted to their more matured state of existence; and, on the 14th of the same month, a proclamation of the Extraordinary Commission of Government announced the formation of an Assembly of four hundred and fifty deputies at Lyons in the end of December, to deliberate on the approaching constitution. The place assigned for their meeting sufficiently indicated the influence intended to be exercised over their deliberations; and it was openly avowed in the proclamation, which "invited the First Consul to suspend the immense labours of his magistracy, to share with the members of the Assembly the important duties which awaited them." To render the members more docile to him, and

prepare the scenes in the drama which was to be performed before the audience of Europe, two of the ablest statesmen in France, M. Talleyrand and M. Chaptal, preceded the First Consul at Lyons, and arranged every thing before his arrival in a way perfectly conformable to his will.¹

The Convocation was opened on the 31st December, at Lyons, with extraordinary pomp. The unwonted concourse of strangers, both from France and Italy; the immense number of the most illustrious characters of both countries who were assembled, gave that city the air of the capital of southern Europe; the splendour of the processions with which the proceedings were opened, excited the utmost enthusiasm among the inhabitants. On the 11th January the First Consul made his triumphal entry into the city, escorted by a brilliant troop of one hundred and fifty young men of the first consideration, and was every where received with the most enthusiastic acclamations. Fêtes, spectacles, and theatrical representations succeeded each other without interruption, and universal transports attended the opening of a council fraught with the fate of the Italian peninsula. The few deputies attached to republican principles soon perceived that their visions of democracy were vanishing into air; but, unable to stem the torrent, they were constrained to devour their vexation in secret, and join in the external acts of homage to the First Consul. But, amidst the fumes of incense and the voice of adulation, Napoleon never for one instant lost sight of the important object of establishing his authority in Italy; and the report of the committee to whom the formation of a constitution had been referred, soon unfolded the extent of his views. They reported, that reasons of policy and state necessity forbade the evacuation of the Cisalpine territory by the French troops; that the infant Republic "had need of a support which should cause it to be respected by the powers who have not yet recognised its existence; that it absolutely required a man who, by the ascendant of his name and power, might give it the rank and consideration which it could not otherwise attain; and therefore that General Buonaparte should be invited to honour the Cisalpine Republic, by continuing to govern it, and by

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XXIV.

1802.

¹ Bot. III.
416. Bign. II.
152, 153.
Norv. II. 175,
176.

51.

Entry of Na-
poleon into
Lyons. Sena-
tus Consul-
tum there
settling the
Cisalpine go-
vernment.
Dec. 31, 1801.

Jan. 25, 1802.

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XXXVI.

1802.

blending with the direction of the Government in France the charge of its affairs, as long as he might deem this necessary for uniting all the parts of its territory under the same political institutions, and causing it to be recognised by all the powers of Europe." Napoleon accepted without hesitation the duty thus imposed upon him. He replied — "The choice which I have hitherto made of persons to fill your principal offices has been independent of every feeling of party or local interests; but as to the office of President of the Republic, I can discover no one among you who has sufficient claims on the public gratitude, or is sufficiently emancipated from party feelings, to deserve that trust. I yield, therefore, to your wishes, and I shall continue to take, as long as circumstances shall require it, the lead in your affairs." Loud applause followed every part of this well-conceived pageant; and, at the conclusion of the address, the whole Assembly rose and demanded that the name of "Cisalpine" should be changed into that of "Italian Republic," an important alteration, which revealed the secret designs, already formed by the ruler of France, of converting the whole peninsula into one state in close alliance with the great nation.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1802, 78.
Bot. iii. 416,
417. Norv. ii.
176, 177.
Biq. ii. 154,
157.

52.
Nature of the
new constitu-
tion.

The new constitution of the Italian Republic, "prepared in the cabinet of the First Consul, and to which the representatives of that state were not permitted to offer any opposition," was founded upon different principles from any yet promulgated in Europe. Three electoral colleges were formed; one composed of proprietors, one of persons of the learned professions, one of the commercial interests, whose numbers were invariably to remain the same. The legislative body consisted of seventy-five persons, elected by these colleges; while the vice-president, secretary of state, and all the members of the executive, were appointed by the First Consul. This constitution, so different from the democratic institutions which had preceded it, in some respects merits the eulogy of the Italian historian, as being "the best which Napoleon had ever conceived;"² and unquestionably, in the restriction of the elective franchise to the most respectable members of these different classes, an important step was made towards that establishment of political power on

² Bot. iii.
416.

the basis of property and intelligence, which is the only foundation on which that admirable part of a limited government can be securely rested. Melzi, a great proprietor in Lombardy, was appointed vice-president of the republic, with every demonstration of regard from the First Consul; a judicious choice, well deserved by the character and patriotism of that illustrious nobleman; and in that appointment, not less than the general character of the constitution, the democratic party perceived a deathblow given to all the hopes they had formed.¹

The success of this measure for the thorough subjection of the Italian Republic to his will, led shortly after to another still more audacious, and which, at any other period, would have instantly lighted in Europe the flames of a general war. On the 11th September, Piedmont was, by a formal decree, annexed to the French Republic, the First Consul alleging that the absence of any stipulation in its favour, in the treaties of Luneville and Amiens, was equivalent to a permission for him to absorb it in the growing dominion of France. The principle was thus openly acted upon, that the Republic was at liberty to incorporate with its dominions any lesser state, whose integrity was not expressly guaranteed by the greater powers. By this bold measure, all the north of Italy, from the summit of the Maritime Alps to the shores of the Mincio, was directly subjected to French influence; and Austria beheld at Milan a second French capital, almost within sight of the frontier of its Italian possessions. Thus Sardinia, which was the first of the European states that had submitted to the power of Napoleon, which, after a fortnight's struggle, opened its gates to the youthful conqueror, and had since, through every change of fortune,² remained faithful to his cause, was rewarded for its early submission and long fidelity by being the first to be destroyed; and the keys of Italy were placed, without opposition, in the hands of the French Republic.

Formidable as these acquisitions to France were, they were rendered doubly so from the measures taken at the same time by the enterprising spirit and vast conceptions of the First Consul to secure these important Transalpine

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1802.

¹ Dum. viii.
56, 57. Bign.
ii. 157, 158.
Norv. ii. 177,
178.

53.
Annexation
of Piedmont
to France.

Sept. 11,
1802.

² Dum. ix.
80, 81. Jom.
xv.

54.
Construction
of the roads
over Mont
Cenis and
the Simplon.

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XXXVI.
1802.

July 2, 1802.

¹ Dum. ix.
81.
Ann. Reg.
1802, 90.

55.
Parma and
Placentia are
occupied,
with Elba.

acquisitions to his dominions. Louis XIV. had said, after the family compact was concluded, "There are no longer any Pyrennees;" but with greater reason Napoleon might say, after the roads over the Simplon and Mont Cenis were formed, "There are no longer any Alps." The Valais, an integral part of Switzerland, but of great importance in a military point of view, as commanding the direct route from France to Italy, both by the Great St. Bernard and the Simplon, was erected into a separate Republic, entirely under French influence, under the denomination of the "Republic of the Valais." The object of detaching this inconsiderable state from the Helvetic confederacy was soon apparent. French engineers began to work on the northern side of the Simplon; Italian, to surmount the difficulties of the long ravine on the south; and soon that magnificent road was formed which leads from the rugged banks of the Rhone to the smiling shores of the Lago Maggiore, and has revealed to the eyes of an admiring world the stupendous grandeur of the defile of Gondo. Similar works were undertaken at the same time up the valley of the Isère and over Mont Cenis, as well as from the Rhone over Mont Genevre to Turin. The Alps, traversed by three splendid roads, ceased to present any obstacle to an invading army;¹ and works, greater than the Roman Emperors achieved in three centuries of their dominion in Italy, were completed by Napoleon in the three first years of his consular government.

The command of Savoy, Piedmont, the Pays de Vaud, and the Valais, gave France a ready entrance through these new roads into Italy; but, not content with this, the First Consul rapidly extended his dominions through the centre of the peninsula. A new constitution was given to the Ligurian Republic, which brought Genoa more immediately under French influence. The secret treaty of March 12, 1801, with Spain, by which Parma and Placentia were ceded to the Italian Republic, was made public, and the French troops took possession of these states, as well as of the island of Elba, on the shores of Tuscany; while the King of Etruria, at Florence, a creature of his creation, preserved entire the ascendancy of the First Consul in the centre of Italy. Thus not only

was the authority of Napoleon obeyed, but almost his dominion extended from the North Sea to the Roman states; while the Pope and the King of Naples, trembling for their remaining possessions, had no alternative but entire submission to the irresistible power in the north of the peninsula. These rapid and unparalleled encroachments would, notwithstanding the bad success of their former efforts, have led to a fresh coalition of the continental powers against France, if they had not been intent at that moment upon the important subject of indemnities to be provided for the German princes, and divided by the fatal apple of discord which French diplomacy had thus contrived to throw between the rival powers of Prussia and Austria.¹

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XXXVI.
1802.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1802, 88, 89.
Dum. ix. 81,
82.

When the conquests of France were extended to the Rhine, and all the territories on the left bank were permanently annexed to the Republic, not only were a host of small German princes dispossessed of their estates, but several of the greater powers lost valuable appendages of their dominions, situated on that side of the river. To soften the effects of this deprivation, it was provided by the treaty of Luneville, that indemnities should be obtained by the sovereigns who had suffered on the occasion, and for this purpose a Congress should be opened in some convenient part of the German empire. But how were the sufferers to be indemnified, when the whole territories on the right bank were already appropriated by lay or ecclesiastical princes; and no one could receive an indemnity without some party being spoliated to give him admission? To solve the difficulty, it was agreed by the greater powers to *secularise*, as it was called, a large proportion of the ecclesiastical sovereignties of the empire. In other words, to confiscate a considerable part of the church property, and out of the spoils thus acquired provide equivalents for the conquests gained by the French Republic. Thus the dangerous precedent was established, of indemnifying the stronger power at the expense of the weaker—a species of iniquity of which France and Austria had set the first example, in their atrocious convention for the partition of the Venetian territories, and which, by showing the German princes that they could place no reliance on the support of the great powers in a

56.
Progress of
the negotia-
tion regard-
ing the German
indemnities.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1802.

57.

Cordial union
of France
and Prussia
in this mat-
ter.

Oct. 8, 1801.

¹ Bign. ii. 89.
Aug. 24,
1801.

² Bign. ii.
301, 320.
See the treaty
in Martens,
vii. 424.

moment of danger, gave an irremediable wound to the constitution of the empire.

As it was early foreseen that the partition of these indemnities would form a most important subject of discussion, and that by dexterous negotiation on that subject more might be gained than by a successful campaign, the great powers soon began to strengthen themselves by secret alliances. Preparatory to the approaching contention, and before entering that great field of diplomacy, France and Russia inserted, with this view, in the secret treaty, 8th October 1801, already mentioned, between the two powers, a stipulation, by which it was provided that the two Cabinets "should pursue a perfect concert, to lead the parties interested to the adoption of their plans in the partition of the indemnities, which have for an invariable object the maintenance of a just equilibrium between the houses of Prussia and Austria."¹ Shortly before, a treaty had been concluded between France and Bavaria, by which the First Consul guaranteed all the possessions of the latter, and engaged to support its claim for indemnities with all the influence in his power. Prussia might already calculate with certainty upon the support of France, not only from general principles of policy and common jealousy of the Emperor, but from the express stipulations in the treaty of Bâle in 1795, and the secret convention of 1796, in virtue of which she had maintained an ambiguous neutrality, of essential service to the Republic in the subsequent desperate struggles with the Imperial forces. The Prussian Cabinet, accordingly, received the warmest assurances of support from the First Consul in the approaching negotiations; the idea of a triple alliance between the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, was even talked of and seriously entertained at all these capitals; insomuch that the French envoy at St. Petersburg, General Hédouville, and the Prussian minister at Paris, the Marquis Lucchesini, received orders from their respective Courts to make every exertion to bring about this object.²

At length, on the 23d May 1802, a treaty was concluded at Paris between France and Prussia, without the privity of the Russian ambassador, which settled the amount of the Prussian indemnity and of that of the Prince of

Orange; and such was the address of the First Consul and his ambassador at St. Petersburg, that the concurrence of the Emperor Alexander to its provisions was obtained without difficulty, notwithstanding the slight thus offered to his influence. By this convention it was stipulated that Prussia should obtain the bishoprics of Paderborn and Hildesheim, L'Eschefeld, the town and territory of Erfurth, the city of Munster, with the greater part of its territory, and other cities and abbacies, to the amount of more than four times what she had lost on the left bank of the Rhine. In return for these large acquisitions at the expense of neutral states, Prussia "guaranteed to the French Republic the arrangements made in Italy, viz.—the existence of the kingdom of Etruria, that of the Italian Republic, and the annexation of the 27th military division (Piedmont) to the French territory." By a treaty, signed on 4th June 1802, between France and Austria, it was stipulated that these two powers should act together in regulating the matter of the indemnities; and the Emperor Alexander, when he ratified the treaty, provided for a compensation to the King of Sardinia for his continental possessions, and to the Duke of Holstein-Oldenburg for his losses under the new arrangement. Thus was Prussia rewarded for her impolitic desertion of the European alliance and seven years of discreditable neutrality, by the acquisition of extensive territorial possessions adjoining her own dominions; and thus did Napoleon, who at first bribed Austria to wink at his Italian conquests by the confiscation of the whole continental possessions of Venice, now reward the defection of Prussia by the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes of the empire. The parties to this general system of spoliation, linked as they were together, seemed to be beyond the reach of punishment; but Providence was preparing for them all, in consequence of their iniquity, the accomplishment of ultimate retribution—for Austria the disasters of Ulm and Austerlitz; for Prussia the catastrophe of Jena and treaty of Tilsit; for Napoleon the retreat from Moscow and rock of St. Helena.¹

The views of Austria in this negotiation were widely different. Intent upon gaining a large indemnity for herself, and desirous even of extending her frontier from

CHAP.
XXXV

1802.

58.

In return for which Prussia guarantees the French acquisitions in Italy. May 23, 1802.

June 4, 1802.

¹ Bign. ii. 304, 325.
Jom. xv. 23,
27. Dum. vii. 10, 23.

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XXXVI.

1802.

59.
Policy of
Austria in
this negotia-
tion, and of
Russia.

the Inn to the Iser at the expense of Bavaria, in exchange for her possessions in Swabia, she was yet opposed to the system of secularisation, and anxious that the compensations should break up as little as possible the old and venerable constitution of the Germanic empire. This policy, which duty equally with interest prescribed to the head of that great confederation, was directly opposite to that which France and Prussia pursued. The latter of these powers was anxious to augment her own strength by the acquisition of as many of the ecclesiastical possessions as possible, and to increase her influence by the enrichment, at the expense of the church, of the princes who were included in the line of neutrality protected by her power; the former looked only to breaking up the German confederation, and creating a circle of little sovereigns round the frontiers of the Republic, dependent on its support for the maintenance of its recent acquisitions. Russia took under its especial protection, after the share of Prussia was secured by the treaty of May 1802, the interests of Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and Baden; and France cordially united in their support; foreseeing already, in the extension of these powers through revolutionary influence, the formation of an outpost which might at all times open an entrance for its armies into the heart of Germany, and counterbalance all the influence of the Emperor in its defence. Thus was Austria, the power best entitled, both from the dignity of the Imperial crown and the magnitude of its possessions in the empire, to a preponderating voice in the negotiation, thrown into the shade in the deliberations; and thus did Russia and Prussia unite with the First Consul in laying the foundation of that CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, from which, as a hostile outwork, he was afterwards enabled to lead his armies to Jena, Friedland, and the Kremlin.¹

¹ Dum. vii.
23, 40. Bign.
ii. 325, 332.
Jom. xv.
26, 29.

60.
Secret views
of the latter
power.

It was not without ulterior views to her own advantage that Russia supported in this extraordinary manner the pretensions of France in the affairs of Germany. The French ambassador at St. Petersburg, M. Hédouville, received instructions from the First Consul to assure the Emperor of his "sincere desire to obtain for Russia the entire and free navigation of the Black Sea;" while, at the same time, Colonel Caulaincourt was commissioned

at Paris to communicate to Napoleon the desire of the Czar to favour the extension of French commerce in the Black Sea. M. Hédouville was also enjoined to open a negotiation for "the triumph of liberal principles in the navigation and commerce of neutral vessels." Thus Napoleon shook for a moment the firm purpose of the Emperor Alexander, by artfully presenting to his youthful imagination the objects of ambition long cherished by his predecessors, Catharine and Paul—afterwards in part attained by his successor, Nicholas.¹

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XXXVI.
1802.

¹ Bign. ii.
320, 321.

Convinced at length, from the intelligence communicated by his ambassadors at St. Petersburg, Paris, and Berlin, of the perfect accord between these powers, the Emperor of Austria deemed it high time to take some step which should vindicate his authority as the head of the empire, and show the coalesced powers that they would not succeed in maintaining all their proposed acquisitions except by force of arms. By an imperial decree he directed that the deputation of the interested powers should meet at Ratisbon on the 3d August. This deputation consisted of four electors, viz, Mayence, Saxony, Bohemia, and Brandenburg, and four members of the College of Princes, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, and Hesse-Cassel. It was universally known that a decided majority of this assembly was in the interest of France; and in effect so little did the coalesced powers attempt to disguise their designs, that the parties whom they supported had seized upon the provinces allotted to them in the secret treaties before the Congress at Ratisbon assembled. The King of Prussia, on July 3d, took possession of the territories assigned to him, in conformity with a proclamation issued on the 6th June, and the Elector of Bavaria, following the example, occupied the territories he was to receive on the 17th July, and was proceeding to do the same with Passau, when the Emperor, who regarded that important city with reason as one of the bulwarks of his hereditary states, anticipated him by marching the Austrian forces into it, as well as into the archbishopric and city of Saltzburg.²

61.
Courageous
act of Austria
in occupying
Passau. July
23, 1802.

July 3.

July 17.

² Dum. vii.
42, 45. Jom
xv. 28, 29.
Bign. ii. 333,
335.

This courageous act, which seemed at first sight to set at defiance the whole power of Russia, Prussia, and France,

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1802.

62.

Angry correspondence in consequence between France and Austria.

was in reality levelled at the First Consul, who had, by secret instructions not communicated to the other powers, enjoined this extravagant prejudication of the deliberations of the Congress. Desirous, however, if possible, to avoid coming to an open rupture with France, the Emperor instructed his ambassador at Paris to soften as much as possible the hostile act, by representing that the town in dispute was only taken possession of in a provisional manner, till its destiny was finally determined by the Congress. An angry interchange of notes ensued between the French and Imperial ambassadors, during which the First Consul deemed the opportunity favourable to draw still closer his relations with the Prussian Cabinet. In consequence, a treaty was concluded on the 5th September between France, Prussia, and Bavaria, by which it was stipulated, that if "within sixty days the Emperor should not evacuate the town of Passau and its dependencies, the French and Prussian Governments should unite their forces to compel him to do so, as well as to maintain the ancient possessions of Bavaria on the right bank of the Inn." To this convention the Cabinet of St. Petersburg acceded, stipulating only as the condition of its concurrence, an adequate compensation to the Grand Duke of Tuscany.¹

¹ Bign. ii. 335, 338.
Dum. viii. 44, 51. Martens, vii. 431.

63.

Conferences at Ratisbon, Aug. 18.

Meanwhile the conferences at Ratisbon were opened, and the fruit of the secret negotiations which had so long been depending became manifest. Immediately after it met, the ministers of France and Russia laid on the table a joint plan for the partition of the indemnities, and insisted that the matters submitted to their deliberations should be finally adjusted within the space of sixty days. This haughty interference on the part of stranger powers was in the highest degree grating to the feelings of the Austrian Cabinet; but, with the usual prudence of their administration, they resolved to dissemble their resentment. Having recourse again to negotiation, they assailed the Cabinet of the Tuileries by the same artifices with which the First Consul had succeeded so well at St. Petersburg and Berlin, and offered, on condition of obtaining some advantages in Germany, to recognise his recent usurpations in Italy. This proposal had the desired effect. Two conventions were concluded at Paris, in the end of

64.

The principle of secularisation is admitted.

December,* between Austria and France, which settled the affairs both of Italy and Germany. By the first, the compensations in which the Imperial family was interested were fixed. The Brisgau and Ortenau were conferred upon the Duke of Modena, in lieu of the states he had lost in Italy; and the Emperor received in exchange the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen, which were severed from the church for that purpose; while Passau was ceded to Bavaria, and in exchange, the bishopric of Aichstedt conferred upon Austria. By the second, the Emperor recognised the king of Etruria, and all the changes which had taken place in Italy since the treaty of Luneville.¹

The shares of the greater powers being settled, the claims of the minor states were easily disposed of, and the indemnities finally adjusted by a recess of 25th February, 1803. By this arrangement, the most important which had taken place since the treaty of Westphalia, the old Germanic constitution was entirely overturned, and a new division made which for ever subverted the fundamental principles of the empire. It was easy to perceive, on comparing the compensations dealt out to the different states, the influence which had preponderated in the deliberations, and the gross injustice with which those states who had inclined, in the preceding contests, to the interests of France, were enriched at the expense of those who had stood by the Imperial fortunes. The Grand Duke of Tuscany received hardly a fourth—the Duke of Modena little more than a third of what they had respectively lost; while Prussia acquired four times, and Bavaria nearly twice, the amount of their ceded provinces on the left bank of the Rhine.²*

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1803.
Dec. 26, 1802.

¹ Bign. ii.
343, 345.
Jom. xv. 31,
32. Martens,
vii. 432.

65.
Compensa-
tions respec-
tively re-
ceived. Feb.
25, 1803.

² Dum. vii.
48, 49. Jom.
xv. 32, 33.
Bign. i. 344,
349.

* By this treaty, the equivalents settled upon the principal powers out of the ecclesiastical spoils of the empire, were thus adjusted.

I. Prussia, by the treaty of Bâle, had ceded to the Republic her provinces on the left of the Rhine, including the duchy of Gueldres, the principality of Mœurs, and part of the duchy of Cleves, containing in all—

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost,	137,000	1,400,000 florins.
Gained,	526,000	3,800,000
So gained,	389,000	2,400,000

Her acquisitions, which made up this great addition, consisted of the free towns of Mulhausen, Nordhausen, and Goslar; the bishoprics of Hildesheim, Paderborn, and part of Munster, and many other abbacies and church lands.

II. Bavaria had lost, beyond the Rhine, the duchy of Deux Ponts, that of Juliers, and the palatinate of the Rhine. She received instead the important

Proportion in
which the
several
powers
gained acqui-
sitions.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1803.

66.

Disastrous
moral effects
of this general
spoliation of
the ecclesiastical Princes.

But it was not merely by the augmentation of some and diminution of other states, and the formation of a body of sovereigns in the empire, dependent on France for the maintenance of their acquisitions, that this partition of the indemnities was fatal to the best interests of Europe. Moral effects far more disastrous resulted from this great act of diplomatic spoliation. In all ages, indeed, the maxim *væ victis* has been the rule of war; and injury or subjugation formed the lot of the conquered. But in all such cases, not even excepting the recent and flagrant partition of Poland, it was on the belligerent states only that these consequences fell; and the adjoining nations were exempt from the effects of the tempest which had overthrown their less fortunate neighbours. It was reserved for an age in which the principles of justice, freedom, and civil right were loudly invoked on both sides, to behold the adoption of a different principle, and see belligerent states indemnify themselves for their losses in war, at the expense not of the vanquished, but of neutral and weaker powers which had taken no part in the contest. This monstrous injustice, of which Napoleon gave the first example in the cession of Venice, precipitated into hostile measures by his intrigues, to Austria, was immediately adopted and

free towns of Ulm, Memmingen, Nordlingen, the bishoprics of Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Augsburg, and Passau, and a vast number of rich abbacies and monasteries. Her losses and gains stood thus—

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost,	580,000	3,800,000 florins.
Gained,	854,500	6,607,000
Gained,	274,500	2,801,000

III. Wirtemberg, for its possessions in Alsace and Franche Comté, obtained nine Imperial cities and eight abbays.

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost,	14,000	240,000 florins.
Gained,	120,000	612,000
Gained,	106,000	372,000

While such were the portions allotted to the states under the protection of France or Russia, who were to be rewarded for preceding neutrality, and form the basis of a counterpoise to the power of Austria, the indemnities allotted to the connexions of that power were of the most meagre description. For example, the Grand Duke of Tuscany had lost in Italy the beautiful duchy of Tuscany, and he received the archbishopric of Salzburg, the bishopric of Aichstedt, part of that of Passau, and the valley of Berchtesgaden.

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
He lost,	1,150,000	3,800,000 florins.
Gained,	286,000	2,150,000
Lost,	864,000	1,650,000

—See BIGNON, ii. 349, 351; and JOMINI, xv. 32, 37.

acted upon by all the great powers ; and at the Congress of Ratisbon their frontiers were rounded, and strength augmented, by the spoils of almost all the ecclesiastical princes, and a great number of the free cities of the empire. This, too, was done, not by conquerors with arms in their hands, not in the heat of victory or triumph of conquest, but by calculating diplomatists, in the midst of peace, without any inquiry into the interest or wishes of the transferred people, and guided only by an arithmetical estimate in cold blood of the comparative acquisitions by each power in revenue, subjects, and territory.

All ideas of public right, of a system of international law, or the support of the weaker against the greater powers, were overturned by this deliberate act of spoliation. Woful experience diffused a universal conviction of the lamentable truth, that the lesser states had never so much cause for alarm as when the greater were coming to an accommodation. Neutrality, it was seen, was the most perilous course which could be adopted, because it interested no one in the preservation of the weaker states ; and all Europe prepared to follow the banners of one or other of the rival chiefs, who, it was foreseen, must soon contend for the empire of the world in the centre of Germany. It is the glory of England that she alone has never acceded to this system of international spoliation ; but on the contrary resisted it, on every occasion, to the utmost of her power : that her acquisitions and losses have been all at the expense of her enemies or herself : that no friendly or neutral power has had cause to rue the day that she signed her treaties : and that so far from gaining at the expense of lesser states, she has repeatedly made sacrifices of enormous magnitude, to soften the consequences of their adverse fortune — a memorable instance of the effects of real freedom and a constitutional government in subduing the desire of gain and elevating the standard of public virtue, and of the difference of its effects from all that the fumes of revolutionary enthusiasm or the ambition of despotic power are capable of producing !

While the continental powers were intent on the acquisition of ill-gotten gains in the centre of Germany, Napoleon had leisure to pursue his projects of ambition

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1802.

67.
It destroyed
all ideas of
public right,
or inter-
national law.

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XXXVI.

1802.

68.
Projects of
Napoleon
against Swit-
zerland. Fe-
deral system
in that coun-
try.

in the mountains of Switzerland. His conduct towards the inhabitants of that country led to important consequences, as it first unfolded, even to his warmest admirers, the insatiable spirit of aggrandisement by which he was actuated, and was one of the immediate causes of the renewal of the war. When republican institutions are established in a country of considerable extent and varied productions, it is by the *federal system*—in other words, a congregation of independent states, having each the power of internal legislation—that the national integrity can alone for any length of time be preserved. The reason is, that separate interests are there brought to bear directly on the conduct of public affairs; and if those interests are adverse, which must frequently be the case, the despotism of the stronger over the weaker power speedily becomes insupportable. A monarch far removed from both, and equally dependent upon either for his support, may dispense equal justice between the contending interests of separate provinces or classes of society; but it is in vain to expect any thing like equity in the judgment formed by one of these provinces or classes upon the rival pretensions of the other. To do so is to expect that men will judge equally and impartially in their own cause; a pitch of perfection to which human nature never has, and never will arrive. The autocrat of Russia, or the emperors of Rome, may deal out impartial justice in determining on the rival and conflicting interests of the different provinces of their vast dominions, because they are equally removed* from any; but it is quite extravagant to look for a just decision by one of these provinces or its representatives with regard to the other. Power, superiority of votes or influence, will ever form the basis of their decision; the majority, as Tocqueville tells us it is now in America, will become despotic; and that power will never be yielded up but to the sword.

69.
Necessity of
the Federal
union in all
extensive de-
mocratic
states.

The unchangeable division in Great Britain between the manufacturing and agricultural classes on the subject of the corn laws, and the threatened dissolution of the American confederacy by the collision of the Southern and Northern Provinces on the subject of the tariff on English goods, are instances of the operation of the simple principle, that no man can judge impartially

in his own cause; a principle which, when applied to nations, forbids the extension of democratic institutions for any great length of time beyond the limits of a single city or particular class of society.* Interest, accordingly, universally leads the holders of considerable property, in all countries where democratic institutions prevail, to support the system of federal union, in preference to that of a central and universally diffused authority; because they find that it is in small states where the interests of the inhabitants are nearly the same, and in such states only, that their influence can be felt, or their wants receive due consideration. On the other hand, the democratic party in such communities are generally at first desirous of the concentration of power in a central government, and the concurrence of all the representatives in its formation; these being the circumstances in which the influence of the leaders of the multitude is most effectually exercised, and the ascendancy of towns, where their partisans are chiefly to be found, most thoroughly established.

Though not extensive in point of superficial surface, Switzerland embraced such an extraordinary variety of climate, soil, and occupation, as rendered the rule of a single central democratic government in an especial manner vexatious. The habits and interest of the vine-growers in the Pays de Vaud are as much at variance with those of the shepherds of Glarus, as those of the intellectual city of Geneva, or the aristocratic society of Berne, are with the manufacturers of Soleure or the chestnut-fed inhabitants of the Italian bailiwicks. Nor were the habits and ideas of the people less at variance than the physical features of the districts in which they dwelt. Their lineage, their language, their religion, their affinities were different. Perched on the summit of the Alps, they partook of the varied character of the races of

70.
Its adaptation to the varieties of the physical condition of Switzerland.

* Sparta, Athens, Carthage, Rome, Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence, are instances of the government of a subject-territory by the citizens of a single town; Holland, of the ascendancy of one commercial class in society: Great Britain, from 1688 to 1832, of a government substantially vested in the representatives of the great properties and *interests* of the state. It is not difficult to foresee what must be the result of the subsequent transference of political power from the proprietors to the multitude in an empire divided by so many interests, and composed of such widely separated and discordant materials.

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1802.

mankind who met at their feet and ran up the valleys to their highest summits. The inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud, speaking the French tongue, shared in the feelings and excitement which the Revolution had produced to the north of the Jura. Those who dwelt on the Tessino and the Misocco betrayed, in their harmonious language, enthusiastic feelings, and indolent habits, the influence of Italian descent; while the brave Switzers to the north of the St. Gothard evinced, in their independent spirit, rough manners, cleanly habits, and persevering character, the distinguishing features which in every age have distinguished the nations of German or Teutonic descent. To establish one uniform democratic government for a country so situated, is as great an absurdity as it would be to propose the same political institutions for the English, trained to habits of order by centuries of freedom; the French, impetuous by nature, and unrestrained by custom; and the Russians, but recently emerged, under the rule of despotism, from savage life.

71.
Discontent
which the
central demo-
cratic govern-
ment pro-
duced.

The natural and unavoidable consequence of the establishment of a central democratical government, in a country composed of such various and discordant materials, was the entire subjugation of the rural districts by the inhabitants of the great towns. The peasants of Unterwalden, the shepherds of Glarus, in vain attempted a contest with the citizens of Berne, Lausanne, or Zurich, speaking a different language, trained to habits of business, and closely congregated round the seat of government. In the unequal struggle they were speedily cast down; and thus the unity of the republic was but another expression to them for the practical loss of all their political franchises. The circumstances, too, under which this constitution had been forced upon them—the cruel devastation of their country by which it had been preceded—the odious foreign yoke which it had brought upon their necks—the unheard-of contributions and spoliation by which it had been followed—had produced indelible feelings of aversion among the mountaineers,—a race of men resolute in their ideas, tenacious of their habits, and more jealous of their independence than any other people in Europe. Hence the singular fact, that the most ardent opponents of the new central government

were to be found among the partisans of the most opposite former constitutions ; and that, beside the oligarchy of Berne and Zurich, where political power was confined to a limited number of families, were to be found the peasants of the Forest Cantons, who exercised indiscriminately, under the canopy of heaven, all the functions of government.¹

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1802.

¹ Jom. xiv.
409, 410.
Dum. viii. 35,
36. Bign. ii.
368.

After the forcible proclamation of the new constitution imposed by the Directory upon Switzerland in 1798, the country remained for four years the theatre of interminable contests and intrigues. The success of the allies in 1799 having brought their forces into the mountains, and the Archduke Charles having, by proclamation, invited the people to re-establish their ancient form of government, an insurrection broke out simultaneously in every part of the country. But the allies being unable to render them any assistance, or advance any distance into their territory, it was speedily suppressed, without difficulty, by the armed force organised in the towns in the French interest. Overwhelmed with astonishment at the immense bodies of men who contended for the empire of Europe amid their mountains, sensible of their own insignificance amidst such prodigious masses, and equally pillaged by friend and foe, the Swiss took hardly any further share in the contest, and resigned themselves, in hopeless despair, to a yoke which, in the circumstances of the world, appeared inevitable. But the passions, restrained from breaking out into open hostilities with foreign powers, burned only the more fiercely in the internal dissensions which tore every part of the Republic. So furious did the spirit of party become, and so vehement the reproaches addressed by the adverse factions to each other, that the historian would be at a loss to recognise the features of the Swiss character, were it not in the lenity of them all, when victorious, to their fallen adversaries,²—a moderation so remarkable, and so analogous to what took place in Holland during all the convulsions subsequent to the Revolution, and in England throughout the Great Rebellion, that it encourages the pleasing hope, that such tempering of savage inclination is either the blessed result of long established freedom and religious

72.

Violent internal
dissensions of the
Swiss Canton.

² Jom. xiv.
410, 411.
Bign. ii. 361.
Dum. viii.
35, 37.

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XXXVI.

1802.

73.

Arguments
adduced by
the partisans
of France.

habits, or is an inherent quality in the nations of Teutonic descent.*

Without pursuing the complicated thread of Helvetic revolution during the four disastrous years that followed the French invasion, it will be more serviceable to give a summary of the arguments urged respectively by the partisans of the new constitution and of the ancient government. On the part of the French supporters it was urged, "that nothing could be so extravagant as to hear the federal party invoke the popular welfare, when they were in reality advancing the interests only of oligarchy and fanaticism. How dare they make use of the sacred name of freedom, when, under the name of a popular government, two or three families have been for above a century in possession of all the offices of administration? It is in vain that they impose so far upon the public credulity as to style the central government a thousand times more burdensome than the ancient régime, when the slightest observation must be sufficient to show, that the burdens which have pressed so severely upon all classes have been owing solely to the evils inseparable from foreign warfare. And are the expenses of a few additional regiments, and of a central administration, composed at most of eighty or a hundred individuals, to be put in comparison with at least twenty separate governments, embracing, with their subordinate agents, several thousand persons? Disguise it as you will, it is not the feelings of patriotism or a regard for the public interest which occasion all the outcry, but selfish consideration and private advantage. Thinking, like Cæsar, that it is better to be the first at Prænesté than the second at Rome, these popular despots would rather reign unmolested in their little valleys than be blended in the general administration of Switzerland, where they would speedily be reduced to their proper level, and where their voices, drowned in the minority, would cease to give them the consideration to which they aspire, under the mask of disinterested patriotism."¹

¹ *Jom.* xiv.
411, 412.

* The usual course with the victorious party was to banish their fallen antagonists to Bâle or Lausanne; and, after a few months, even this severity was relaxed, and the proscribed families returned to their homes and usual avocations. What a contrast to the proscriptions of the Convention, and transportations of the Directory, in the capital styling itself the centre of European civilisation!—See *Bignon*, ii. 361.

It was impossible to deny that there was some truth in these insinuations ; but the opposite party, at the head of which was Aloys Reding, chief of the Canton of Schwytz—a chief of an energetic and noble character—did not fail to retort upon their adversaries arguments of an opposite kind, to which the recent calamities gave additional weight. They urged, “that if the misfortunes of Switzerland, since it had been exposed to revolutionary agitation, did not convince the partisans of a central government of their errors, neither would they be convinced though one rose from the dead. Since the disastrous period when the French troops entered Switzerland, and proclaimed that form of administration amidst the blood of thousands, and by the light of burning villages, what had been witnessed in their once happy and united territory but rancour, hatred, and dissension ? It is idle to ascribe that continued exasperation to the clamour of interested individuals ; it has extended infinitely beyond the persons dispossessed by the recent changes, and embraces, in fact, the whole population, with the exception of that limited class in the towns to whom the central system has given the entire government of the country. Every one knows that Helvetia has paid more in taxes and contributions since the French invaded it than in a century before ; and, in fact, it could hardly have been credited that such vast sums existed in the country as the Republican agents have contrived to extort from its industrious inhabitants. It is in vain to allege that these calamities have been the result of war. The worst of them have arrived, not during war, but in peace ; and have been, not contributions levied by soldiers with arms in their hands, but exactions made by the cupidity of revolutionary agents, armed with the powers of the Central Government. It is utterly impracticable that such a system of administration can answer in a country so peculiarly situated as our Cantons are ; the universal reprobation in which it is held is a sufficient proof of its total failure. In fact, the interested motives, so liberally insinuated on the other side, truly govern those who, for the sake of a constitution in which they have contrived to obtain lucrative situations, oppose themselves to the unanimous wish of their fellow-citizens.”¹

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XXXVI.

1802.

74.

Answer of the
partisans of
the old insti-
tutions.

¹ *Jom.* xiv.
412, 414.
Dum. ix. 16.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1802.

75.
Revolution
effected by
the aid of the
French
troops.

Oct. 28, 1801.

¹ Dum. viii.
37, 39. Bign.
ii. 368, 369.
Jom. xiv. 418,
419.

76.

But it does
not answer
the views of
Napoleon.Nov. 29,
1801.² Dum. ix.
19, 20. Bign.
ii. 370, 371.
Jom. xiv.
420, 421,

Matters were brought to a crisis by a solemn recognition of the central authority, by the Assembly which met at Berne on the 1st August, 1801. The representatives of the lesser Cantons, and of the aristocratic party, protested against that resolution, and also against the power of redeeming tithes, inserted in the new constitution. Deeming opposition fruitless in an assembly ruled by a revolutionary majority, the deputies of nine Cantons separated from the remainder of the body, and finding that their absence only rendered the opposite party more precipitate in their measures, they had recourse to a *coup d'état* to accomplish their subversion. On the night of the 28th of October, a part of the legislative body met, and gave full power to Dolder and Savary, two leading members of the ancient Executive Council, to accomplish the revolution. They immediately had recourse to the French troops, who had secret orders from the First Consul to support the movement; the posts of Government were all forced, the Legislative Assembly was dissolved, and a Provisional Government, with Reding at its head, proclaimed.¹

The object of Napoleon in supporting this counter-revolution at Berne, was to establish a government in the country more in harmony with the monarchical institutions, now in the course of reconstruction at Paris, than the democratic assembly convened during the first fervour of the Helvetic revolution; but he soon experienced some difficulty in steering between the opposite extremes into which the country was divided. Reding, the head of the Provisional Government, repaired to Paris, where the First Consul immediately impressed upon him the necessity of acting upon the principle of fusing together the different parties, on which he himself had proceeded in the formation of the Consular Government; and therefore required, as the condition of his further support, the admission of six of the most moderate of the opposite party into the Government. Reding was coldly received at the Tuileries. His energetic and ardent character little suited the First Consul, who had no intention of reinstating the aristocratic party, who necessarily inclined to Austria, in close proximity to that defenceless part of the French territory.² He returned, therefore, to

Berne, disappointed in his hopes, and applied without success to Austria and Prussia to obtain that support which he despaired of receiving from the Government of the Tuileries.

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1802.

On his return, Reding found the new Government destitute both of power and consideration, and discord breaking out more fiercely than ever between the adverse factions. The Senate appointed by the Revolution of 28th October promulgated a new constitution, professed to be based on the principles laid down by the First Consul; but it neither satisfied either of the parties in Switzerland, nor accorded with the views on which his administration was founded. Deeming the time now arrived, therefore, when his interference was loudly called for, Napoleon instigated Dolder, and the six persons admitted into the Government at his suggestion, to accomplish another revolution. They took advantage of the moment when Reding and the deputies of the Forest Cantons had returned, with patriarchal simplicity, to their valleys, to celebrate the festival of Easter, and effected the object without difficulty. The Government was deposed, the constitution of 17th February abolished, and an Assembly of forty Notables, specified in a list furnished by the French ambassador, appointed to meet at Berne on the 28th April, to put a final stop to the dissensions of the country. The new constitution, framed by Napoleon upon principles infinitely superior to any which had yet been extracted out of the revolutionary crucible, was proclaimed at Berne on the 19th May. It consisted of an Executive, composed of a Landamman and two Lieutenants, appointed for nine years; a Senate of fifty-six members, who proposed all changes in the laws; and a National Diet which sanctioned them. The sense of the citizens was forthwith taken upon this constitution. It appeared that out of three hundred and thirty thousand persons entitled to vote, ninety-two thousand rejected it, seventy-two thousand supported it, and a hundred and seventy thousand abstained from voting. A majority of votes, therefore, were for rejection: but the Government, proceeding on the principle that those who withheld their votes were favourable to the change, proclaimed its adoption by a large majority. The lesser Cantons loudly announced

77.
The government is again deposed, and a new constitution framed by Napoleon. Feb. 17, 1802.

April 17,
1802.

May 19.

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XXXVI.

1802.

¹ Jom. xiv.
424, 425.
Dum. viii. 19,
20. Bign. ii.
371, 372.

78.
The French
troops are
withdrawn,
and the inde-
pendence of
the Valais
proclaimed.
July 20, 1802.

their determination of seceding from the confederacy, if it was forced upon them; but the aristocratic Cantons, influenced by the promise that if accepted the French troops would be withdrawn, at length agreed to its adoption.¹

Deeming the result of the last revolution sufficiently favourable to his views, Napoleon thought it no longer advisable to continue the French troops in Switzerland, where they had remained, in defiance of the treaty of Luneville, for two years, to the evident dissatisfaction both of England and Austria. On the 20th July, accordingly, the retreat of the Republicans was proclaimed by the First Consul, and at the same time the erection of the Valais into a separate Republic announced. This measure, contrary to the wishes of the great majority of the inhabitants, and evidently in connexion with the formation of the great military road over the Simplon, announced but too clearly to the Swiss the state of dependence under which they were to be placed to France by the new government they had obtained, and contributed not a little to the explosion which immediately followed the removal of the French forces. The Government at Berne, aware of the slight hold which they had on the affections of the great majority of the inhabitants, were thunder-struck by the intelligence, that the French troops were to be withdrawn, and loudly remonstrated against the adoption of a measure so fatal to their interests; but the First Consul, tired of the incessant changes of rulers in the Swiss states, and desirous of a pretext for interfering with decisive effect in a country so important to his military operations, persevered in his resolution, and the evacuation in good earnest commenced. The Government, despairing of any support from the national troops, eagerly solicited the aid of the Helvetic brigades, which was granted them by the First Consul: but before they had time to arrive, the insurrection had broken out in the small Cantons, and the constitution approached its dissolution.²

² Jom. xv.
109. Dum. ix.
20, 21.

In a letter addressed to the French ambassador on the 13th July, these Cantons openly announced their resolution to withdraw from the Helvetic confederacy, and renew the ancient league of the Waldstatten, under which they had

in early times maintained their independence.* In this important and touching manifesto, the shepherds of the Alps asserted, by unanswerable arguments, their right to that freedom in the choice of their government for which the French had so long and justly contended, and which had been expressly guaranteed to them by the treaty of Luneville. But the administration of Berne answered them by a proclamation, in which they announced their resolution to maintain by force the unity of the Republic. Upon this the Forest Cantons convoked a diet at Schwytz, which abolished all privileges, and re-established the ancient democratic constitutions; in which they were immediately joined by the neighbouring cantons of Zug, Glarus, Appenzel, and the Rheinthal. "The treaty of Luneville," said they, "allows us the free choice of our institutions: we are at liberty, therefore, to overturn those which have been forced upon us." The opposite parties now openly prepared for war; magazines were formed, arms collected on both sides; and while the mountaineers on the Lake of Lucerne were rousing themselves, under their former magistrates, for the assertion of their ancient democratic rights, the peasants of the Oberland were secretly conspiring with the patricians of Bern for the re-establishment of the former aristocratic privileges of that oligarchy; a union at which the French writers are never weary of expressing their astonishment, not perceiving that it was formed on true conser-

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XXXVI.

1802.

79.

Upon which the Govern-
ment at
Berne is over-
turned, and
the moun-
taineers pre-
pare for war.
Aug. 17,
1802.

* "We have in vain endeavoured," said they, "for four successive years, to extricate ourselves from a constitution which, from its origin, and still more from the violence with which it was established, could not fail to be insupportable. It is in vain that we have constantly hoped that the Helvetic Government, instructed by the calamitous events of the last four years, would at length find that our separation from the Republic was that which was most wise and suitable for both parties; and that the wish which we have so often and so strongly expressed for our ancient liberty, would have induced them to abandon the hope that these three Cantons would ever voluntarily accept any other constitution than that which has always been considered as the only one suited to these states, and for that reason has been so highly prized by ourselves and our ancestors. Our reunion with Helvetia, which has been stained with so much blood, is perhaps the most cruel example of constraint that history can offer.

Heroic pro-
clamation of
the Forest
Cantons.

"In the conviction, therefore, that for a forced and unfortunate marriage divorce is the only reasonable remedy, and that Helvetia and ourselves cannot recover repose and contentment except by the dissolution of this forced tie, we are firmly resolved to labour at that separation with all possible activity; and we think it best to address that authority which for four years past has united us, in spite of ourselves, to the Helvetic Republic. As to any thing further, we only wish to preserve uninterrupted harmony and good understanding with all our neighbours. In listening to our just demands, the Helvetic Republic will find the only means of preserving with us the relation of brotherhood and kindly neighbourhood."—See *Ann. Reg.* 1802, p. 227.

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XXVI.

1802.

80.
Hostilities
commence.
Great early
success of the
mountain-
eers. August
28.

vative principles, which, amidst the experienced suffering produced by urban democracy, invite the nobles and rural population to combine for its overthrow, and for the re-establishment of a government in both situations recommended by experience, and suited to the interests and habits of the people.

Hostilities were commenced in the Forest Cantons, by an attack on the advanced guard of the troops of the Helvetic Republic, near the foot of Mount Pilatus, who were repulsed in an attempt to penetrate from the north into the Canton of Unterwalden. Zurich soon after revolted against the constituted authorities, and the indignation of the inhabitants was strongly excited by an ineffectual bombardment which General Andermatt, at the head of the forces of the Republic, kept up, with the view of terrifying the inhabitants into submission. But the flame now broke out on all sides: the peasants of the Oberland and Argovia assembled under their old leaders, Watteville and D'Erlach, and the approach of their united forces towards Berne compelled the Government to summon Andermatt from the siege of Zurich to its own defence. Dolder, who, by making himself useful to all parties, had contrived to place himself at the helm of the Government, now lost all hope, and seeing no means of making head against the storm, concluded a convention, by which he was allowed to retire with his troops unmolested to the Pays de Vaud. Thither he proceeded accordingly, followed by the French ambassador, who fabricated a story of a bullet having fallen in the court of his hotel, to give his government a pretence for immediate hostilities with the insurgents. The confederates instantly published a proclamation, in which they declared, "After four years of incessant calamity, we have at length attained the object of our desires. Guided by duty, and called by fortune, we have at last re-entered into the city of Berne, our common mother, which your courage and fidelity has placed in our hands. We are penetrated with gratitude and admiration when we behold the generous and sublime burst of patriotism which has led you to brave so many dangers to recover your laws and your government. The supreme authorities have resolved to remain

Aug. 28.

on terms of friendship with those who, during the preceding days of calamity, have deviated from their duty : it tenders them the hand of reconciliation. It expects not less confidently from its own and now victorious supporters, that they will forget their former injuries, and not stain the triumph of their country by acts of individual vengeance."¹

Meanwhile Reding convoked a general Diet to be held at Schwytz ; and announced to the assembled Cantons "the necessity of renouncing for ever all political privileges, and conceding to the people subjected to their government, as to lawful brothers, the same liberties and privileges which are enjoyed by the inhabitants of towns."

A resolution wise and just in itself, and which sufficiently indicated the intention not to re-establish those vexatious distinctions in political power, by which the Swiss Confederacy had been so long deformed. The Diet met on the 27th of September, and immediately adopted the resolution to raise an armed force of twenty thousand men. At the same time, the truce agreed upon with Dolder having expired, hostilities were renewed on the side of the Pays de Vaud ; and Fribourg, after a sharp cannonade, fell into the hands of the confederates. The approaching dissolution of the Central Government was now apparent : the national guards of the Pays de Vaud, who had taken up arms in its defence, were driven back in disorder from Morat to Moudon ; Payerne opened its gates ; and the discomfited authorities could hardly assemble two thousand men at Lausanne for their defence. Already the Swiss troops, in great force, were approaching, and the fugitive government was preparing to retire into the neighbouring territory of France, when a new actor appeared on the stage, and the wishes of Switzerland were crushed for a long course of years, by the armed interference of the First Consul.²

On the 4th October, General Rapp, aide-de-camp to Napoleon, arrived at Lausanne with the following proclamation by the French Government :—"Inhabitants of Helvetia ! Swiss blood has flowed from the hands of the Swiss. For two years you have exhibited the most deplorable spectacle. Contending factions have alternately possessed themselves of power. They have signalised

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1802.

¹ Dum. ix.
24, 30. Jom.
xv. 110, 125.
Hign. ii. 373,
375.

81.
Diet assembled at
Schwytz, and
total subver-
sion of the
central go-
vernment.

Sept. 27

² Jom. xv.
125, 129.
Dum. ix. 30,
38.

82.
Forcible in-
terference of
the First
Consul.

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XXVI.
1802.

their ephemeral authority by a system of partiality which revealed at once their weakness and incapacity. You have disputed for three years without coming to an understanding. If you are abandoned to yourselves, you will massacre each other for three years longer without interruption. Your history proves that you can never settle your intestine divisions except by the interposition of France. It is true I had intended not to intermeddle in your affairs. I had seen all your different administrations seek my advice without following it, and not unfrequently abuse my name to the purposes of their interests and their passions ; but I can no longer remain an unconcerned spectator of the misfortunes which are devouring you. I revoke my resolution. I will become the mediator in your differences ; but my mediation shall be efficacious, and such as suits the dignity of the great nation which I represent. Five days after the publication of the present proclamation the Senate shall assemble at Berne. The Government established at that place since the capitulation is dissolved. All authorities whatever, constituted by it, are at an end. The troops who have been in arms for six months shall alone be retained. All the others are hereby disbanded, and required to lay down their arms.”¹

¹ Dum. x. 38, 39.

83.
The Swiss in vain invoke the aid of Austria. England remonstrates in vain.

This haughty proclamation was a severe blow to the confederate chiefs at the moment of triumph ; for nearly the whole country had now arranged themselves under their banners, and, with the exception of the Pays de Vaud, Switzerland had unanimously overturned the constitution forced upon her by France. The dignity of their conduct was equal to its wisdom under this cruel reverse. Disdaining to submit to the yoke of the conqueror, and yet sensible of their inability to contend with so formidable a state without the aid of more efficient allies, they invoked the support of Austria and the other powers, to assert for them the independence stipulated by the treaty of Luneville ; and, finding the Imperial Cabinet deaf to their entreaties, still refused to separate, protested against the violence by which they were menaced, and declared that “they yielded only to force.” They despatched a confidential agent to Paris, who addressed himself to the ambassadors of all the other

states, imploring their assistance. "Scarcely," said he to the English ambassador, "did Switzerland find herself independent, than she was desirous of returning to her ancient institutions, rendered still dearer to her by her late misfortunes. Almost the whole of the country, with unexampled unanimity and moderation, threw off the yoke. The aristocratic Cantons renounced their exclusive privileges. The new Cantons were left at liberty to form their own constitutions. Who could have imagined that Buonaparte, in defiance of the treaty of Luneville, would have issued such a decree as has just appeared? Is an independent nation to be thus treated? Should he persist in his determination, and the other powers not interfere, it only remains for us either to bury ourselves in the ruins of our houses, though without hope of resistance, prostrated as we are before the Colossus who is about to overwhelm us, or debase ourselves in the eyes of the whole universe. Will the Government of England, ever so generous, do nothing for us under circumstances which are to decide whether we are still to be ranked among free people? We have only men left us. The Revolution, and spoliations without end, have exhausted our means. We are without arms, ammunition, stores, or money to purchase them." But though all the continental powers warmly participated in these feelings, none ventured to give expression to them. England alone interfered, and by an energetic note protested against this subjugation of a neutral power, in direct violation of the treaty of Luneville, and despatched a confidential agent to the borders of Helvetia to ascertain the real state of the country; but, finding it impossible to rouse the continental powers to any interference on its behalf, she justly deemed it inexpedient to proceed further at that moment in support of so remote and inland a state.¹ All was soon accomplished. Ney entered Switzerland with twenty thousand men, and occupied, without resistance, Soleure, Zurich, and Berne; and the scene of violence commenced by the imposition of a contribution of six hundred thousand francs on the cities which had fallen under the power of the invaders. The subjugation of Switzerland being resolved on, the tyrannical process was, however, carried into effect with as much clemency

CHA
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1802.

Oct. 10,
1802.

¹ Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1282.
Jom. xv. 130.
135. Dum. ix. 34, 40. Bign. ii. 377, 378.

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XVI.

1802.

84.

The Swiss in
despair sub-
mit, and Ney
overruns the
country.

and moderation as the circumstances would admit. Ney executed his duty with humanity and discretion. He sent a peremptory order to the Diet to dissolve its forces; and supported the mandate by the advance of masses, evidently overwhelming, to St. Gall, Glarus, and Schwytz. Yielding to necessity, they ordered their troops to disband, and closed their sittings by a touching appeal to posterity, in which they protested against the violence by which they had been oppressed; and bequeathed to happier times the duty of restoring the liberties of their country.* At the same time they notified to Ney, "that the Diet of Schwytz, yielding to force, had come to the resolution of separating, inserting, however, in the name of all Switzerland, the same reservation for the future which it had already made known in its public proclamation." Aloys Reding, after the disbanding of the troops, disdained either to fly or to make submission, but remained at Schwytz, ready to undertake, in his own person, all the responsibility consequent on his patriotic devotion. He was soon after arrested, along with his brother the Landamman of Baden, and some other leaders of the confederates, and sent under a strong guard to Zurich, from whence, in a short time, he was transferred to the castle of Chillon, on the lake of Geneva, a fortress rendered more interesting in the eyes of freedom by his captivity, than by the sufferings of the feudal prisoner over whose fate modern genius has thrown an imperishable lustre.¹

¹ Dum. ix.
56, 58, 59.
Jom. xv. 137.
Ney's Mem.
ii. 247, 260.

85.

Speech of the
First Consul
to the Swiss
Deputies at
Paris.

Resistance being thus rendered hopeless in Switzerland, a Diet of fifty-six Deputies of the Cantons was appointed to meet at Paris, in the December following, to deliberate on the formation of a constitution, and receive the law from the First Consul. His conduct and language on

Dignified ad-
dress of the
Deputies of
the Forest
Cantons on
resigning the
government.

* This memorable address, worthy of the country of Tell, was couched in the following terms:—"The Deputies of the Cantons have come to the resolution of surrendering the powers with which they were invested into the hands of their constituents, inasmuch as the force of foreign armies opposes an irresistible bar to the accomplishment of their duties. But while they recognise the necessity of submission, the Deputies conjure their constituents not for one moment to believe that it can impair their right to choose their own form of government; a right which they inherit from the virtues and courage of their ancestors, and which is expressly guaranteed by the treaty of Luneville. With this view, while they yield to force, they are resolved to do nothing which may impair that precious bequest to future generations, or sanction in any degree that which other inhabitants of Switzerland, by accepting such an alienation, may have the appearance of approving."—See JOMINI, xv. 133; and DUMAS, ix. 57.

this occasion were distinguished by his usual penetration and ability, and a most unusual degree of lenity and forbearance. Indeed if any thing could have reconciled the Swiss to the loss of their independence, it must have been the wisdom and equity which characterised his mediation. "The situation of your country," said he to the assembled Deputies, "is critical; moderation, prudence, and the sacrifice of passion, are necessary to save it. I have undertaken, in the face of Europe, the engagement to render my mediation efficacious. I will faithfully discharge all the duties which that sacred function imposes on me; but that which might be difficult without your concurrence, becomes easy by your influence and assistance. Switzerland does not resemble any other country; its geographical and topographical situation, the difference of religion, and extreme variety of manners which prevail in its various parts, render it an exception to all other states. Nature has made your country federative; to attempt to conquer it is not the part of wisdom. Circumstances, the spirit of past ages, have established among you sovereign and subject people. New circumstances, and the spirit of a different age, have introduced equality of right between all the parts of your territory. Many of your states have been governed for centuries by the most absolute democracy; others have fallen under the dominion of particular families, and subjects have grown into sovereigns. The influence of public opinion in Italy, Savoy, France, and Alsace, which surround you, have powerfully contributed to the formation of these institutions. The disposition of these countries is now changed, and yours must undergo a corresponding modification. The renunciation of all exclusive privileges is at once the wish and the interest of your people.

"What your interests require is—1. Equality of rights among the whole eighteen Cantons; 2. A sincere and voluntary renunciation of all exclusive privileges on the part of the patrician families; 3. A federative organisation, where every Canton finds itself arranged according to its language, its religion, its manners, its interest and opinions. The Central Government remains to be provided for; but it is of much less consequence than the cantonal organisation. It is impossible to establish

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1802.

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86.

His statement of the proposed constitution.

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uniformity, either in finances, army, or civil administration, amongst you. You have never maintained regular armies, nor had established accredited agents at the courts of the different governments. Situated on the summit of the mountains which separate France, Italy, and Germany, you participate in the disposition of all these different countries. Strict neutrality, a prosperous commerce, and family administration, can alone secure your interests, or be suited to your wishes. Every organisation that could be established amongst you hostile to the wishes or welfare of France, would injure you in the most essential particulars. After having addressed you as becomes one of your own citizens, I must now use the language befitting the Chief Magistrate of two of your most powerful neighbours; and I must at once declare, that neither France nor the Italian Republic will ever suffer a system to be established amongst you calculated to promote the interest of their enemies. The repose and tranquillity of forty millions of men, your immediate neighbours, without whom you can neither exist as a state nor subsist as individuals, are also of no small weight in the scale of public justice. Let nothing, as concerns them, be hostile amongst you; let every thing, on the contrary, be in conformity with their interests; and let it continue, as in times past, your first object, your first policy, your first inclination, your first duty, to permit nothing, to leave nothing on your territory which, directly or indirectly, can prejudice the interests, the honour, or the cause of the French people. It is indispensable, not merely that there should exist no sort of disquietude for that portion of our territory which is open, and which you cover; but that we should further feel the assurance, that if your neutrality were ever to be violated, your interest, not less than your inclination, would lead you to range yourselves under the banner of France, rather than in opposition to it."¹

¹ Thib. 356,
359.

87.
Discontent
which his
principles ex-
cite on both
sides.

Apart from the determination here openly announced of subjecting Switzerland to the influence and even government of France, which, however alarming to all the neighbouring powers, as chief magistrate of that country, the First Consul was naturally led to desire, there can be no doubt that the principles which he here

set forth were those which the most profound wisdom would have suggested, for terminating the dissensions of which it had so long been the prey. They gave, accordingly, almost as great umbrage to the vehement republican as to the ultra-conservative party; the former deploring the re-establishment of a federal union, and the separate constitution of different Cantons; the latter the formation of a Central Government, under the influence, and subject to the control of France. Both parties conducted the debate with much warmth, and the greatest abilities of France and Switzerland were employed in the conference, which took place in the Council of State at Paris, in presence of the First Consul. At length the discussion was terminated by the act of mediation pronounced by Napoleon on the 19th February, 1803, which, for the remainder of his reign, settled the condition of the Helvetic confederacy.¹

¹ Dum. ix.
65, 72. Jom.
xv. 133, 140.

By this act Switzerland was divided into nineteen Cantons; the lesser ones were revived, and their limits re-established as formerly. The Oberland was restored to Berne; but the estates of Vaud, Argovia, Thurgovia, St. Gall, and the Tessino, which formerly had been subjected to the other Cantons, were elevated to the rank of constituent members of the confederacy. Five of the principal Cantons, namely, Fribourg, Berne, Soleure, Zurich, and Lucerne, were styled directing Cantons, and the Diet sat, year about, at their chief towns; and for that year the chief magistrate of that Canton was Landamman of Switzerland. The federal contingent was fixed at 15,203 men, and four hundred and ninety thousand five hundred and seven francs (£20,000.) All exclusive privileges were abolished, so that the citizen of any one Canton was a denizen of any part of the confederacy. All alliances of one Canton with another, or with a foreign state, were interdicted. Each Canton sent a deputy to the Diet; Berne, Zurich, Vaud, Argovia, St. Gall, and the Grisons, sent two. The functions of the Supreme Council were declared to be,—1. To proclaim war or peace, and conclude foreign alliances, which required the consent of three-fourths of the Diet; 2. To fix regulations for foreign commerce, capitulations in foreign services, and the recruiting of soldiers; 3. To levy

88.
His final act
of mediation
for the settle-
ment of Hel-
vetia.

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the contingent, and appoint commanders of the armed force, and the foreign ambassadors; 4. To adopt measures of external utility, and settle disputes between one Canton and another. The act concluded in these terms:—"The present act, the result of long conferences with enlightened persons, appears to us the best that could be devised for the constitution and happiness of the Swiss. As soon as it is carried into execution, the French troops shall withdraw. We recognise Helvetia, as organised by this act, as an independent power, and guarantee the federal constitution, and that of each Canton in particular, against the enemies of the tranquillity of the state."¹

¹ Jom. xv.
139, 141.
Dum. ix. 70.
73. App. 253,
279. Pièces
Just.

89.
Equitable
measures for
the govern-
ment of the
country.

The subsequent dispositions of the First Consul were all dictated by a desire to render the foreign yoke then imposed upon the Swiss as light as possible, and win the affections of a people whose situation rendered their neutrality of more value to France than their alliance. Satisfied with the erection of the Valais into a separate republic, which gave him the entire command of the Simplon road, Napoleon allowed the Swiss to retain their neutrality, rejected all idea of an alliance offensive and defensive, and modified the existing stipulated contingent into a levy of sixteen regiments, who were taken into the pay of the French Republic. These lenient conditions gave universal satisfaction in Switzerland. The Deputies of the Cantons met at Fribourg in the beginning of July, under the auspices of Louis d'Affry, designated by Napoleon as the first Landamman of the confederacy, while the presence of Aloys Reding, as Deputy for Schwytz, gave testimony to the commencement of the system of fusion which it was so much his object to establish in all the countries subjected to his dominion, and proved, that if the Swiss were not reconciled to the foreign yoke, at least they had abandoned all hope of further resisting it.^{2*}

² Jom. xv.
240, 241.
Dum. ix. 73,
75.

* The sagacity with which the First Consul discriminated the most important features in the condition of the Swiss Cantons, may be appreciated by the following extracts from the speech he delivered on the formation of the internal constitution of the confederacy:—"The re-establishment of the ancient order of things in the democratic Cantons, is the best course which can be adopted both for you and me. They are the states whose peculiar form of government render them so interesting in the eyes of all Europe; but for this pure democracy, you would exhibit nothing which is not to be found elsewhere. Beware of extinguishing so remarkable a distinction. I know well that this democratic system of administration has many inconveniences; but it is established, it has

The dignified conduct of the Swiss patriots, in the last extremity of their independence, and the necessity to which they reduced the First Consul of openly employing force to subdue them, was in the highest degree contrary to his wishes, and proved more prejudicial to his interests in Europe than any other event which had occurred under his government. He had hoped that all necessity for a visible conquest would be prevented by one of the factions openly invoking his assistance; and that thus Switzerland would be subjugated as other countries had been, by dividing without appearing to do violence to the people. The unanimous expression of public detestation which attended the proclamation of the French Constitution, and the instant overthrow of the Government which followed the removal of the French troops, entirely frustrated this insidious design, and compelled Napoleon to throw off the mask, and, in direct violation of the treaty of Luneville, openly accomplish the subjugation of the country. This violent proceeding was not less painful to the feelings of the people, than it was alarming to the Governments of all the neighbouring states. To see the great central fortress of Switzerland, commanding all the passes from France into Italy, placed in the hands of so ambitious a ruler, at the very time when he was rapidly extending his dominions over the whole peninsula, excited the strongest jealousy in all the

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90.

Extreme dissatisfaction
excited by
this event
over Europe.

subsisted for centuries, it springs from the circumstances, situation, and primitive habits of the people, from the genius of the place, and cannot with safety be abandoned. When usage and systematic opinion find themselves in opposition, the latter must give way. You must never take away from a democratic society the practical exercise of its privileges. To give such exercise a direction consistent with the tranquillity of the state, is the part of true political wisdom. In ancient Rome the votes were counted by classes, and they threw into the last classes the whole body of indigent citizens, while the first contained only a few hundred of the most opulent individuals; but the populace were content, and, amused with the solicitation of their votes, did not perceive the immense difference in their relative value, and that, all put together, they did not equal the influence of a few of the great patrician families.

“Since the Revolution, you have never ceased to seek your safety independent of France. Your position, your history, in fine, common sense, forbid it. The interests of defence bind Switzerland to France; those of attack render it of value in the eyes of other powers. The first is permanent and constant; the second depends on fortune and political combination, and can only be transient in its operation. Switzerland can never defend its plains except with the aid of France; France is open to attack on the Swiss frontier; Austria is not, for she is covered by the bulwark of the Tyrol. I would have gone to war on account of Switzerland; I would have sacrificed a hundred thousand men, rather than allow it to remain in the hands of the party who were at the head of the last insurrection, so great is the influence of its geographical position upon France.”—
THIBAUDEAU, 363, 367.

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European Cabinets ; while the subjugation of the country of William Tell, and the overthrow of Swiss independence by Republican bayonets, awakened deep feelings of commiseration among all to whom the name of liberty was dear. It did more to dispel the general fascination which had attended the government of the First Consul, than any circumstance which had occurred since his elevation to power. At the same time, the indignation of the Dutch was strongly excited by the continued residence of the French troops in their territory, and the heavy load which the finding clothing, and paying so large a body of men, imposed on their almost ruined finances, in direct opposition to the treaty signed, and promises held out on occasion of the late change in their government : and the conviction became as general as it was painful, that the ambition of France was insatiable, and that the establishment of revolutionary governments in the adjoining states, only led to a prolongation of the onerous yoke of the great parent Republic.¹ *

¹ Sir R. Liston's Despatch, Dec. 29, 1802. *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1285.

91.
Tranquillity and happiness of England during this period.

While the continent of Europe was agitated by these important events, and presaged, in the rapid strides of the First Consul towards universal dominion, the approaching renewal of the war, England was tasting, with unalloyed satisfaction, the blessings and the tranquillity of peace. She had given the most unequivocal proof of the sincerity of her confidence in the honour of France, in permitting the vast armament of Le Clerc to

Honourable opinion of Mr. Fox on the subject.

* As a specimen of the effect which these events produced on the liberal party in Europe, it is sufficient to refer to the speeches of the leaders of the Opposition in the British Parliament.—“The French Government,” said Mr. Fox, “was bound by treaty, as well as by every principle of justice, to withdraw their troops from Switzerland, and to leave that country to itself, even with the miserable government which they had established in it, and to respect its independence. During their dominion in that country, they had formed a government so utterly odious to the people, that the moment their troops were withdrawn, the inhabitants, by an insurrection founded on the truest principles of justice, rose and overturned it. The French Government interfered to restore it, and, bad as the system was, the manner of their interfering to restore it was, if possible, still worse. This violent act of injustice, no man can contemplate with more indignation than myself.

And on the treatment of Holland.

“The conduct of France, with respect to Holland, affords a still more intolerable instance of injustice. Were I a master of the use of colours, and could paint with skill, I would take the darkest to delineate the conduct of France towards that Republic. It certainly has been worse treated by her than any other country whatever. Holland has not only suffered all the unavoidable evils of war ; but when peace came, to turn that country, in defiance of a positive treaty with France, into a depot for French troops, for the mere purpose of putting the Dutch to the expense of maintaining them, was an act no less despicable for its meanness than hateful for its atrocity.”—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1446, 1450.

proceed unmolested to the West Indies ; and had beheld, with pain indeed, but without opposition, the successive new-modelling of the Batavian, Cisalpine, Ligurian, and Valaisan Republics, under the authority of the First Consul, and the annexation of Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia to his dominions, or those of his subject states. On occasion only of the overthrow of Helvetic independence, her ministers presented an energetic note to the French Government, complaining of that assault on the European liberties ; but, finding their remonstrances not supported by the other powers, they prudently desisted from any more efficacious interference in their behalf.* Secure in her insular position and maritime strength, she beheld with uneasiness, but without apprehension for her own independence, the successive additions to the power of France ; and deemed herself not called upon to interfere actively in continental affairs till the powers more immediately interested were prepared to second her efforts by efficacious aid.

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During this brief period of national repose, the industry and finances of the country prospered in a most extraordinary degree ; and Great Britain literally reaped at the same time the excitement of war with the commerce and tranquillity of peace. As her statesmen did not deem it safe to make any considerable reduction in the national establishments while the power of France was so formidable, the lassitude arising from a diminished government expenditure was hardly experienced : an extensive

92.
Rapid improvement of
the finances
and trade of
the country.

* " His Majesty has received with deep regret the address of the First Consul to the Helvetic people, published by authority in the *Moniteur* of October 1. His Majesty most sincerely laments the convulsions to which the Swiss Cantons have for some time past been exposed, but he can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only to be favourable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other powers.

" The Cantons of Switzerland unquestionably possess, in the same degree as any other power, the right of regulating their own internal concerns ; and this right has, in the present instance, been expressly guaranteed to the Swiss nation by the treaty of Luneville, by the French Government, conjointly with the other powers who were parties to that engagement. His Majesty has no other desire than that the people of Switzerland, who now appear to be so generally united, should be left at liberty to settle their own internal government without the interposition of any foreign powers ; and with whatever regret he may have perused the late proclamation of the French Government, he is yet unwilling to believe that they will further attempt to control that independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights."—LORD HAWKESBURY'S *Note to M. Otto*, Oct. 10, 1802 ; *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1251.

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paper currency maintained the prices and activity of war, while the opening of the continental ports brought into her harbours the extended commerce of peace, and rendered her commercial cities the emporium of the civilised world. Her exports and imports rapidly increased; * the cessation of the income-tax conferred comparative affluence on the middle classes; agriculture, sustained by continued high prices, shared in the general prosperity; the sinking fund, relieved in some degree from the counteracting influence of annual loans, attracted universal attention; while the revenue, under the influence of so many favourable circumstances, steadily augmented, and the national exigencies were easily provided for, without any addition to the burdens of the people. So wide spread was the enthusiasm occasioned by this bright gleam of prosperity, that even sagacious practical men were carried away by the delusion; and the only apprehension expressed by the moneyed classes was, that the sinking fund would extinguish the debt too rapidly, and capital, left without any secure investment, be exposed to the risk and uncertainty of foreign adventure.

93.
Financial
details.

Under the influence of such favourable circumstances, the permanent revenue of Great Britain steadily increased, while the public expenditure was rapidly diminished. In the year 1802, indeed, the effect of the great war expenses, which the unsettled state of the negotiation prior to the signing of the definitive treaty made it impossible to reduce, rendered a considerable national expenditure necessary; but in the succeeding year the full benefit of pacific reduction was experienced. In the former year the current annual expenditure was, independent of the interest of the debt, £29,693,000, and the

Statistics of
shipping, &c.

* It was stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his place in Parliament, that the real value of British produce and manufactures exported in the year 1802 was little short of £50,000,000, being an increase of £8,000,000 above the year preceding; and the shipping entering the port of London in the years 1801 and 1802 were as follows:—

	British.			Foreign.		
	Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
1801,	1762	418,631	23,096	3385	452,667	20,388
1802,	2459	574,700	33,743	1549	217,117	10,555

Thus indicating that the return of peace had reduced to a half the Foreign shipping in the port of London, and added a half to the British.—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1127.

receipt £36,368,000. In the latter, the receipt had risen to £38,609,000, and the expenditure, without the interest of the debt, fallen to £28,298,000.¹ The financial operations of both years were on a scale of unparalleled magnitude, from the extent of the floating debt which was funded, and loans contracted to meet the winding-up of the war, which produced a receipt and expenditure in each of nearly eighty millions from the public treasury; but, excepting these extraneous sums, the aspect of the national resources was in the highest degree satisfactory. The sinking fund was rapidly and steadily absorbing the debt, and afforded the prospect of extinguishing the whole national encumbrances, great as they were, at no distant period.*

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¹ Porter's
Parl. Tables,
i. p. 1.

* The ways and means and expenditure for these two years stood as follows:—

	<i>Expenditure.</i>	1802.	
Ordinary,	.	.	£29,693,000
Interest of debt, funded and unfunded,	.	.	19,855,588
Exchequer Bills,	.	.	23,892,815
Sinking Fund,	.	.	6,114,033
			<hr/> £79,555,436

Comparison
of the income
and expendi-
ture in 1802
and 1803.

The interest of the debt, funded and unfunded, was £19,855,588, and the produce of the sinking fund £6,114,033.²

	<i>Ways and Means.</i>	
Ordinary Income,	.	£36,368,149
Loan,	.	27,550,449
Exchequer Bills,	.	17,094,653
		<hr/> £81,013,251

² Porter's
Parl. Tables,
i. Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 446,
and Ann.
Reg. 1802,
588, App. to
Chron.

The unfunded debt funded this year amounted to £23,892,815, which explains the difference between the supply and expenditure.

	<i>Expenditure.</i>	1803.	
Ordinary,	.	.	£28,298,366
Interest of funded and unfunded debt,	.	.	20,699,864
Sinking Fund,	.	.	6,494,694
Paid Exchequer Bills,	.	.	17,194,198
			<hr/> £72,687,122

	<i>Ways and Means.</i>	
Revenue,	.	£38,609,392
Loan,	.	11,960,523
Exchequer Bills,	.	20,481,130
		<hr/> £71,051,045

The rapid growth and steady application of the sinking fund was the subject of deserved congratulations to the country, both by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Pitt. They calculated that it would extinguish the whole existing debt in forty-five years; and the celerity of its increase, compared with that of the interest of the debt, might be judged of by the fact, that when it was first instituted in 1784 its produce annually was one-tenth of the interest; whereas in 1803 it had risen to a third of that of the then existing debt. It will hereafter appear that when it was broken upon in 1813, it was producing more

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94.

Causes of irritation which gradually arose with France.

But these flattering prospects were of short duration. Independent of the increasing jealousy with which the British Government beheld the continental encroachments of Napoleon, and which rapidly communicated itself to all classes of the English people, several causes of irritation grew up between the rival governments, which first weakened and at last destroyed their good understanding. The detail of these causes is fraught with the highest historical interest. The fate of the world has depended on the results to which they led. The first of these subjects of irritation was the asperity with which the government and acts of the First Consul were canvassed in the English newspapers. Not only did several French journals published in London, in particular that of Peltier and the *Courrier Français de Londres*, comment with great severity on his proceedings, but almost all the English journals, following the bent of the public mind, descanted in the most unmeasured terms on his continual encroachments in Continental Europe. To Napoleon, who was accustomed only to the voice of adulation, and heard nothing from the enslaved journals of his own country but gracefully turned flattery, these diatribes were in the highest degree painful, and not the less so, probably, because the charges which they contained in regard to his foreign aggressions were more easily silenced by authority than answered by argument.

He therefore caused his minister at the court of London to remonstrate warmly against these articles,* and con-

than half the interest of the debt; and that, if it had been let alone, it would have extinguished the whole debt existing at the conclusion of the war before the year 1840.—See PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 1: *Parl. Deb.* xxxvi. 1127-1130.

* "The greatest of all injuries," said M. Otto, "is that which tends to debase a foreign Government, or to excite within its territory civil and religious commotions; and the most pernicious of all protections is that which places under the safeguard of the laws men who seek not only to disturb the political tranquillity of Europe, but even to dissolve the first bands of society. This is not a question concerning some paragraphs which, through the inadvertence of an editor, might have been accidentally inserted in a public print, but a question of a deep and continued system of defamation, directed not only against the chief of the French Republic, but all its constituted authorities—against the whole nation—represented by these libellers in the most odious and degrading terms. These observations are still more applicable to a class of foreign calumniators, who appear to avail themselves of the asylum offered in England only for the purpose of the better gratifying their hatred against France, and undermining the foundations of peace. It is not merely by insulting and seditious writings, evidently published with a view to circulation in France, but by other incendiary papers distributed through the maritime departments, in order to induce the evil-disposed or weak inhabitants to resist the conclusion of the concordats, that these implacable enemies of France continue to exercise hostilities and provoke the just indignation of the French Govern-

M. Otto's
note on this
subject.

cluded by demanding, "1. That the English Government should adopt the most effectual measures to put a stop to the unbecoming and seditious publications with which the newspapers and writings printed in England are filled. 2. That the individuals specified in the undersigned list should be sent out of Jersey. 3. That Georges and his adherents should be transported to Canada. 4. That, in order to deprive the evil-disposed of every pretext for disturbing the good understanding between the two Governments, it should be recommended to the princes of the house of Bourbon at present in Great Britain, to repair to Warsaw. 5. That such of the French emigrants as still think proper to wear the orders and decorations belonging to the ancient Government of France, be required to quit the territory of the British empire." Of these extravagant demands, which proved that Napoleon understood as little the action of a free government as he did the relative situation of France and England, and their right to treat on a footing of perfect equality, it is sufficient to observe, that they have excited the indignation even of the French historians who are most friendly to his cause. "It was nearly the same thing," says his eloquent apologist, Norvins, "to propose to Great Britain the sacrifice of its constitution, as to insist upon its abandoning the two pillars of its freedom, the liberty of the press and the privilege of habeas corpus. Such a demand was in the highest degree imprudent on the part of the First Consul, as it necessarily rendered him odious to the English people. Such language might have been used to the Cisalpine or Ligurian Republics, the creations of his hands; but it was wholly unsuitable to an independent power like England: and, although that language was but the expression of disunion which already existed between the two Governments, yet it was extremely imprudent to make it known in a diplomatic communication to the whole of Europe."¹

The British Government replied to this extraordinary requisition in dignified but courteous language.* They

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95.
Complaints
and demands
of the First
Consul.

1 M. Otto's
note, Aug.
17, 1802.
Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 1270.
Norv. ii. 234,
238.

ment and people. Not a doubt can exist of these writings having been composed and circulated by Georges and the former bishops of France." — *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1270.

* "It cannot be denied," they observed, "that some improper and indecent paragraphs against the Government of France have appeared, both in the

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96.

Answer of
the British
Government.

answered specifically each of the charges advanced by the French Government, and concluded with observing, "His Majesty is sincerely disposed to adopt every measure for the preservation of peace which is consistent with the honour and independence of the country, and the security of its laws and constitution. But the French Government must have formed a most erroneous judgment of the disposition of the British nation, and the character of its Government, if they have been taught to expect that any representation of a foreign power would ever induce them to consent to a violation of those rights on which the liberties of the people of this country are founded."¹

No further diplomatic correspondence took place on this subject; but soon after, to remove all grounds for complaint on the part of the First Consul, a prosecution

English newspapers and the French journals published in London: but they have not been published under the authority of the British Government, nor are they any ways responsible for their contents. His Majesty neither can nor will, in consequence of any representation or menace from a foreign power, make any concession which may be in the smallest degree dangerous to the liberty of the press, as secured by the constitution of this country. This liberty is justly dear to every British subject; the constitution admits of no previous restraints upon publications of any description; but there exist judicatures wholly independent of the executive, capable of taking cognisance of such publications as the law deems criminal; and they may investigate and punish not only libels against the Government and magistracy of this kingdom, but those reflecting on the individuals in whose hands the administration of foreign Governments is placed. The British Government is perfectly willing to afford to the French Government all the means of punishing the authors of any writings which they may deem defamatory, which they themselves possess; but they never can consent to new-model their laws, or to change their constitution, to gratify the wishes of any foreign power. If the French Government are dissatisfied with our laws on the subject of libels, they may punish the vendors or distributors of such writings as they deem defamatory in their own country, or increase by additional penal regulations the risk of their circulation within their own bounds.

"With respect to the removal of the persons considered obnoxious, to the French Government from the British dominions, his Majesty has no desire that the princes of the House of Bourbon should continue to reside in this country, if they are disposed or can be induced to quit it: but he feels it to be inconsistent with his honour and with his sense of justice to withdraw from them the right of hospitality, as long as they conduct themselves peaceably and quietly, and unless some charge can be substantiated of their attempting to disturb the peace which subsists between the two Governments. The emigrants in Jersey, most of whom are there chiefly in consequence of the cheapness of provisions, had removed, or were removing, previous to M. Otto's note. If any of them can be shown, by reasonable evidence, to have distributed papers on the coast of France with the view of disturbing the Government, and of inducing the people to resist the new Church Establishment, his Majesty will deem himself justified in taking measures to compel them to leave the country. Measures are in contemplation, and will be taken, for removing Georges and his adherents from his Majesty's European dominions. There are few, if any, of the French emigrants who continue to wear the decorations of the ancient Government; it might be more prudent if they all abstained from doing so; but the French Government cannot expect that his Majesty will commit so harsh an act as to send them out of the country on that account."—*LORD HAWKESBURY'S Note, 17th August 1802; Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1274, 1276.*

¹ Lord Hawkesbury's Note, Aug. 17, 1802. Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1277.

was instituted by the Attorney-General against Peltier, for one of the most vehement of his articles against the French Government. This prosecution, which, in the excited state of the public mind on the subject of France, awakened the most intense interest, gave occasion to a splendid display of eloquence in defence of the accused from Sir James Mackintosh, who then first gave public proof of those great abilities which his *Vindiciæ Gallicæ* and lectures on constitutional law had long made known to a more limited circle. Peltier was found guilty; but the subsequent breaking out of war between the two countries prevented his being brought up to receive judgment. The war of journals continued with redoubled vehemence on both sides of the Channel, as events succeeded calculated to call forth mutual complaints; and several articles in the *Moniteur*, of the most hostile character, bore evident marks of the First Consul's composition. The French incessantly urged the execution of "the treaty of Amiens, the whole treaty of Amiens, and nothing but the treaty of Amiens;" loudly complained that the British Government had not evacuated Alexandria, Malta, and the Cape of Good Hope, as stipulated in that instrument; and declared that France would ever remain in the attitude of Minerva, with a helmet on her head and a spear in her hand. The English answered, that the strides made by France over Continental Europe since the general pacification, and her menacing conduct towards the British possessions, were inconsistent with any intention of preserving peace, and rendered it indispensable that the securities held by them for their own independence should not be abandoned. This recriminatory warfare was continued with equal zeal and ability on the opposite sides of the Channel; loud and fierce defiance were uttered by both parties; and it soon became manifest, from the temper of the people, not less than the relations of their Governments, that the contest could be determined only by the sword.¹

In truth, it was not merely from the continental acquisitions of France, great as they had been since the peace, that the British Government conceived apprehensions of the impossibility of long maintaining friendly

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97.

Trial of Peltier for a libel on the First Consul.

¹ Dum. ix. 98, 106. Norv. i. 238, 241. Ann. Reg. 1803, 240, 246.

98.

Expedition of Sebastiani to Egypt.

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terms with that power. Other circumstances nearer home revealed a determination on the part of the First Consul to resume the contest at no distant period, and render the places evacuated by the treaty of Amiens the outposts, from which hostilities were to be directed against their vital interests. The continued stay of a large French force in Holland, in defiance of express treaty; the gradual accumulation of troops on the shores of the Channel and on the frontiers of Hanover, indicated any thing rather than a pacific disposition, and menaced England in the quarters where she was most easily assailable. At the same time, the mission of Colonel Sebastiani to Egypt and Syria, in October 1802, for purposes evidently of a warlike character, and the minute and elaborate military report which he laid before the First Consul on his return, proved that, so far from having abandoned the idea of conquest on the banks of the Nile, he was prepared to resume it on the first convenient opportunity.* Influenced by these circumstances, and the evident demonstration of an insatiable ambition which the conduct of France to Italy and Switzerland afforded, the English Government sent orders to delay the evacuation of Malta, Alexandria, and the Cape of Good Hope, which they had not only resolved on, but in part commenced,†¹ and openly declared their

¹ British declaration. Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1257, 1297, 1332, 1333.

* It appears from Colonel Sebastiani's Report, that he embarked on the 16th September at Toulon, and, after visiting Tripoli, arrived at Alexandria on the 16th October. "I communicated," says he, "to the English commander there the order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to demand a speedy evacuation, and the execution of the treaty of Amiens. General Stuart told me that the evacuation of the place would shortly be effected, and when I insisted for a more specific answer, he declared that he had no orders from his court to quit Alexandria, and that he believed he should winter there." He minutely examined the fortifications of Alexandria, and all the neighbouring forts; afterwards visited Cairo under an escort of five hundred men; traversed Upper Egypt as far as the cataracts, and returned by St. Jean d'Acre and the Ionian Islands to France, with specific information as to the military and political state of the countries he had visited, and their respective dispositions towards France and England. The First Consul thought it so little necessary to disguise his designs, that he published the Report, which is very long and elaborate, in the *Moniteur*; and it was particularly observable that Sebastiani assured all the Christians from whom he received deputations in Egypt and Syria "of the friendship and protection of the First Consul." The Report concluded with a detailed statement of all the British troops in Egypt, and the respective forces of the Turks and native chiefs.—See the whole Report in *Parl. Hist.* xxxvii. 1350, 1359.

† As decisive evidence that in autumn 1802, and anterior to the manifestation of the First Consul's ambitious designs in Europe, the British Government was sincere in its intention to execute the treaty of Amiens, it is sufficient to refer to the testimony of the French historians. "England," says General Matthieu Dumas, "notwithstanding its regret at seeing the key of the Levant

resolution to retain these important stations till some satisfactory explanation was obtained of the French movements.

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99.

Violent explosion of
Napoleon in
conversation
with Lord
Whitworth.

This resolution of the Cabinet of St. James's immediately gave rise to an angry diplomatic correspondence between the two Governments; but, instead of quoting these official documents, it is more important to give the substance of the famous interview which the First Consul had with Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador at Paris, on the 21st February, 1803, which is so descriptive of the character of that extraordinary man as to be one of the most valuable documents of history. "He placed," says that nobleman in his account of the interview transmitted the day following to his own Government, "in the very first rank our not evacuating Egypt and Malta, as we were bound by the treaty to have done. In this," said he, "no consideration on earth shall make me acquiesce. Of the two, I would rather see you in possession of the faubourg St. Antoine than Malta. The abuse thrown out against me in the English public prints is vexatious, but not of so much consequence, nor so mischievous, as what appears in the French papers published in London. My irritation against England is daily increasing, because every wind which blows from England brings nothing but enmity and hatred against me. If I had felt the smallest inclination to take Egypt by force, I might have done it a month ago, by sending twenty-five thousand men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country, in defiance of the four thousand British in Alexandria. Instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it only

and the East Indies slip from its grasp, was making preparations for receiving in the fortresses of Malta the Neapolitan troops, who, by the treaty of Amiens, were to form its garrison for a year. Such, indeed, was their sincerity, that the foreign troops were actually disembarked and well received. From the 15th to the 20th September, at the periods fixed by the treaty, orders were in like manner transmitted for the evacuation of Alexandria by the British troops, and the surrender of the Cape of Good Hope to the Dutch forces." General Dundas and Sir Roger Curtis had received positive orders for the surrender of the Cape, with all its dependencies, to the Dutch forces. The best understanding prevailed between the troops of the two nations. The 1st January 1803, was fixed for the final evacuation; and the English troops had actually commenced their embarkation, and were half on board, when, on the evening of the 31st of December, a vessel arrived, which had left Plymouth on the 31st October, with orders to stop the cession of the colony. The British had only fifty-nine men at that time in the town; the Dutch garrison was fifteen hundred strong; and the British troops were eight miles distant when this unexpected intelligence arrived. — DUMAS, ix. 91, 120, 121.

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furnishes me with a pretence for invading it. I shall not do so, however I may wish to possess it as a colony, because I do not think it worth the chance of a war, in which I might possibly be considered as the aggressor, and by which I should lose more than I should gain; since sooner or later Egypt must belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte.

100.
Danger to
him from war,
and his asser-
tion of desire
to conciliate.

"What have I to gain by going to war? A descent upon your coasts is the only means of offence I possess; and that I am determined to attempt, and put myself at its head. But can you suppose that, after having gained the height on which I stand, I would risk my life and reputation in so hazardous an undertaking, unless compelled to it by absolute necessity? I know that the probability is, that I myself and the greatest part of the expedition will go to the bottom. There are a hundred chances to one against me, but I am determined to make the attempt; and such is the disposition of the troops, that army after army will be found ready to engage in the enterprise. France, with an army of four hundred and eighty thousand men, to which amount it is to be immediately completed and ready for the most desperate enterprise, and England with a fleet which has rendered her the mistress of the seas, and which I shall not be able to rival for ten years, might, by a good understanding, govern the world, and by their strife would overturn it. If I had not felt the enmity of the British Government on every occasion since the peace of Amiens, there is nothing I would not have done to prove my desire to conciliate.

101.
And of the
inveterate
hostility of
England.

"Participation in indemnities, as well as influence on the Continent; treaties of commerce; in short, any thing that would have testified confidence. Nothing, however, has been able to overcome the hostility of the British Government; and thence we are now come to the point—Shall we have peace or war? To preserve peace, the treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled; the abuse in the public prints suppressed or kept within due bounds, and the protection openly given to my bitterest enemies withdrawn. If you desire war, it is only necessary to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the treaty. I have not chastised the

Algerines, from my unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers; but I hope that the time will come when England, Russia, and France, will feel that it is for their interest to destroy such a nest of robbers, and force them to live by cultivating their lands instead of by plunder. Peace or war depends on Malta. It is in vain to talk of Piedmont and Switzerland. They are mere trifles, and must have been foreseen when the treaty was going forward. You have no right to speak of them at this time of day. I do not pretend to say this mission of Colonel Sebastiani was merely commercial. It was rendered necessary, in a military point of view, by your infraction of the treaty of Amiens."

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¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 1297,
1299.

This energetic and highly characteristic conversation was not of a nature calculated to diminish the alarm of the British Government, or allay the hourly increasing irritation in the two countries. The result was, that the English Cabinet openly gave orders for the assembling of forces; and on the 8th March, a message from the King to both Houses of Parliament announced, that "as very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, his Majesty has judged it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his dominions. Though the preparations to which his Majesty refers are avowedly directed to colonial service, yet, as discussions of great importance are now subsisting between his Majesty and the French Government, this communication has been deemed necessary." This message was received with the most animated feelings of patriotism by both Houses of Parliament. Mr. Fox, whose eloquence had so often been exerted in palliating the conduct of France, concurred in the address in answer, which passed both Houses without a single dissenting voice; and every thing announced a degree of unanimity in the further prosecution of the war unknown in its earlier stages. A few days afterwards the militia was called out. Ten thousand additional men were voted for the navy; and preparations were made in the principal harbours of the kingdom for the most vigorous hostilities. These measures were immediately met by corresponding menaces on the part of France; and every thing breathed hostility and defiance

102.
Hostile pre-
parations on
both sides.
Unanimity in
England in
support of the
Government.
March 8,
1803.

March 10.

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XXXVI.

1803.

¹ *Parl. Hist.*
xxxvi. 1170,
1180. *Dum.*
ix. 138, 144.
Ann. Reg.
1803.

103.
Second
violent ebul-
lition of Na-
poleon to
Lord Whit-
worth.
March 14.

in the two countries.* Lord Nelson was entrusted with the command of the Mediterranean fleet. Lord Keith set out for Plymouth. Sir Sidney Smith received orders to put to sea with a squadron of observation. A hot press took place in the Thames. Sixteen ships of the line were instantly put in commission. The public ardour rose to the highest pitch; and England resumed her arms with a degree of enthusiasm exceeding even that with which she had laid them aside.¹

These hostile preparations speedily led to a second and still more violent ebullition on the part of the First Consul. In a public court at the Tuileries, held a few days after the King's message had been communicated to him, he publicly addressed Lord Whitworth in the following terms:—"So you are determined to go to war. We have already fought for fifteen years. I suppose you want to fight for fifteen years more. The English wish for war; but if they are the first to draw the sword, I shall be the last to put it into the scabbard. They have no respect for treaties. Henceforth they must be shrouded in black crape. Wherefore these armaments? Against whom these measures of precaution? I have not a single ship of the line in the harbours of France; but if you arm, I shall arm also. If you insist upon fighting, I shall fight also. You may destroy France, but never intimidate it. If you would live on terms of good understanding with us, you must respect treaties. Wo to those who violate them! They will answer for the

* M. Talleyrand, in answer to the message of the English King, drew up the following note, which was delivered to the British ambassador:—

1. If his Britannic Majesty, in his message, means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetsluys, all the world knows that it is destined for America, and was on the point of sailing; but in consequence of that message its orders are countermanded.

2. If we do not receive satisfactory explanations respecting these armaments in England; and if they actually take place, it is natural that the First Consul should march twenty thousand men into Holland, since that country is named in the King's message.

3. These troops being once in the country, it is natural that they should form an encampment on the borders of Hanover; and that additional bodies of troops should join them.

4. It is natural that the First Consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts.

5. It is likewise in the nature of things that the First Consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country.

6. It is also the natural consequence of all this that the First Consul should send a fresh force into Italy, to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum.—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1309.

consequences to all Europe." This violent harangue, rendered still more emphatic by the impassioned gestures with which it was accompanied, induced the English ambassador to suppose that the First Consul would so far forget his dignity as to strike him ; and he was deliberating with himself as to what he should do in the event of such an insult being offered to the nation which he represented, when Napoleon retired, and delivered the assembled ambassadors of Europe from the pain they experienced at witnessing so extraordinary a scene.¹

This vehement exposure of hostile disposition produced an extraordinary sensation both in England and Europe. In the former, by the indignation it excited, and the ardent desire to revenge the slight thus publicly put upon the national honour, in the person of its ambassador: in the latter, by the clear evidence which it afforded of the impossibility of amicable terms being any longer preserved between the rival powers. Couriers, despatched the same night to every court in Europe, immediately made generally known the conflict that was approaching ; and diplomacy was soon as active in endeavouring to contract alliances as military energy in forwarding war-like preparations. General Duroc was forthwith sent by the First Consul to Berlin, and Colonel Colbert to St. Petersburg, to endeavour to rouse the Northern Powers to reassert the principles of the armed neutrality, and join in the league against Great Britain ; but these potentates had already concerted measures, on occasion of the meeting they had at Memel in the preceding year to settle the matter of German indemnities, and refused to interfere in the contest. At the same time he put the army on the war footing ; ordered the immediate levy of a hundred and twenty thousand men ; reinforced the troops both in Holland and Italy ; declared Flushing and Antwerp in a state of siege ; commenced the formation of the great arsenals which were afterwards constructed in the Scheldt ; hastened his naval preparations with the most incredible activity ; and already began to direct those numerous corps to the shores of the Channel, which, under the name of the Army of England, were so seriously to menace the independence of Great Britain.² The flame spread to every heart ; patriotic feeling was roused to the

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¹ Lord Whitworth's Despatch. March 14, 1803. Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1310. Norv. ii. 249. Dum. ix. 163, 164.

104.
Diplomatic and military preparations of France.

² Dum. ix. 146. Norv. ii. 250.

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108.
Note in reply
to Napoleon's
complaints
from Lord
Hawkesbury,
March 15,
1803.

highest pitch in France as well as in England ; and never was war commenced with more cordial approbation on the part of the people of both countries.

To these intemperate sallies on the part of the First Consul the British Government contented itself with replying, through the medium of the minister for foreign affairs : " His Majesty has the most sincere desire that the treaty of Amiens should be executed in as complete a manner as possible ; but it is impossible for him to consider that treaty as founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other treaty or convention — namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and to the treaties or public engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion ; and that if that state of possession or engagement was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situations ; and that if ever there was a case in which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late treaty of peace ; for the negotiation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his Majesty, but specially agreed to in a note by the French Government—namely, that his Majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests, for the acquisition of territory made by France upon the Continent. The subsequent acquisitions made by France in various quarters, particularly in Italy, have extended the power and increased the territory of France ; and therefore England would have been justified, consistently with the spirit of the treaty, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His Majesty, however, would have been willing to have overlooked these acquisitions, for the sake of not disturbing the general peace of Europe, and was prepared to have acted up to the very letter of the article regarding the evacuation of Malta,¹ when his attention was arrested by the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani on Egypt,

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 1311,
1312.

which discloses views utterly inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the treaty of Amiens."

Notwithstanding the hostile nature of these declarations, the negotiation was kept open for two months longer, and had very nearly terminated by the English being permitted to retain Malta, on an indemnity being provided for France on the Continent. The British Government proposed that Malta should be retained by England, and the Knights indemnified: that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated by the French troops: Elba confirmed to France: the Italian and Ligurian Republics recognised by England, with the kingdom of Etruria, upon a satisfactory indemnity being provided to the King of Sardinia. To this the French Cabinet would not agree; and it was next proposed by the English ministers, that "Great Britain should possess Malta for ten years: that the island of ~~Campe~~ Lampedosa should be ceded in perpetuity to that power: that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated by the French troops, and the new Italian states recognised by England, on provisions in favour of Sardinia and Switzerland being contained in the treaty."¹ If these terms were not acceded to in seven days, the British ambassador was enjoined to demand his passports. Napoleon would only consent, on the other hand, that Malta should be placed in the power of Russia, Prussia, or Austria, upon their agreeing to it and becoming parties to the treaty of Amiens; but this the British Cabinet declined, alleging that Russia, the only power deemed independent of France, had positively refused to be a party to any such arrangement.* As a last resource, and finding the British ambassador resolute, Talleyrand suggested an arrangement by which Malta should be ceded in perpetuity to Great Britain, in return for a proper equivalent to France; but Lord Whitworth had no authority to enter into such an arrangement, which was one of

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106.
Ultimatum
of both
parties.
War is at
length de-
clared.

¹ April 23,
1803. Lord
Hawkes-
bury's De-
spatch.

* When this was first proposed to the Emperor Alexander, he answered, that it would be ineffectual, as so inconsiderable an island could not be the real object of contest between the parties; but he afterwards signified his readiness to accept the treaty, though it was then too late, as war was declared. The communication from the Russian ambassador, signifying the Emperor's readiness to act as mediator, was dated 24th May, and was not communicated to the English Government till all diplomatic relations with France had ceased, by the declaration of war on the 16th May preceding.—See Bignon, iii. 73, 107, 108.

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¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 1339,
1349. Lord
Whitworth's
Despatch,
May 12, 1803.
Bign. iii. 65,
75. Norv. ii.
250, 253.
Dum. ix. 160.
177.

107.
Arrest of all
the British
travellers in
France.

Decree, May
22, 1803.

exchange, instead of indemnity and security ; and Talleyrand positively refused to explain himself further on the subject, or specify what equivalent France required. Lord Whitworth, in consequence, demanded and received his passports on May 12th ; letters of marque were issued by the British Government on the 16th ; General Andreossi, the French ambassador, embarked* at Dover on the 18th May ; and the flames of a war were again lighted up, destined ere long to involve the whole world in conflagration.¹

This declaration of war was immediately followed by an act as unnecessary as it was barbarous, and which contributed, more perhaps than any other circumstance, to produce that strong feeling of animosity against Napoleon which pervaded all classes of the English during the remainder of the contest. Two French vessels had been captured, under the English letters of marque, in the bay of Audierne ; and the First Consul made this a pretence for ordering the arrest of all the English then travelling in France between the ages of eighteen and sixty years. Under this savage decree, unprecedented in the annals of modern warfare, above ten thousand innocent individuals, who had repaired to France in pursuit of business, science, or amusement, on the faith of the law of nations, which never extended hostilities to persons in such circumstances, were at once thrown into prison, from whence great numbers of them were never liberated till the invasion of the allies in 1814. This severity was the more unpardonable, as the Minister of foreign affairs had, a few days before, given the English at Paris assurances that they should be permitted to leave the kingdom without molestation ; and numbers had, in consequence, declined to avail themselves of the means of departure when in their power. No other authority than that of Napoleon itself is required to characterise this transaction. "Upon reading," says he, "the ironical and insolent answer made by the English Government to my complaints, I despatched, in the middle of the night, an order to arrest over all France, and in all the territories occupied by our armies, the whole English, of whatever description, and retain them as hostages for our vessels, so unjustly seized. The greater part of these English

were wealthy or noble persons, who were travelling for their amusement. The more novel the act was, *the more flagrant its injustice*, the more it answered my purpose. The clamour it raised was universal, and all the English addressed themselves to me; I referred them to their own Government, telling them their fate depended on it alone."¹ In committing this unpardonable act, Napoleon hoped to bring under his power such a number of Englishmen of distinction as should compel the British Government to yield to his terms; but he mistook the character of the people with whom he had to deal, and contributed only to the rousing of that inveterate spirit of hostility which mainly occasioned his overthrow.²*

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1808.

¹ Nap. in
Las Cas. vii.
32, 33.² Ann. Reg.
1803, p. 289,
Dum ix. 178,
Bign. iii. 127,
128.

* Of the feelings with which this unjustifiable proceeding on the part of the First Consul was received even by those of his generals who were most attached to his person and government, no better proof can be required than is furnished in the Duchess d'Abrantes' Memoirs, to whose husband's lot, as governor of Paris, it fell to carry the painful decree into execution in that city. He was sent for by the First Consul in the middle of the night, who put letters into his hands explaining the cruel measure which was in contemplation. His eyes flashed fire, his whole figure was trembling with agitation. "Junot," said he, "you must, before an hour elapses, take measures, so that *all* the English, without one single exception, shall be arrested. The Temple, the Force, the Abbaye will hold them—they must be seized;" and with these words struck the table violently with his fist. "This measure," said Napoleon, "must be executed at seven in the evening.—I am resolved that, in the obscurest theatre, or lowest restaurateur's in Paris, not an Englishman shall this night be seen."—"My General," replied Junot, who, though at first stunned, soon recovered from his stupor, "you know not only my attachment to your person, but my absolute devotion to every thing which concerns you. It is that devotion which induces me to hesitate at obeying your orders and imploring you to take a few hours to reflect on the measure which you have now commanded." Napoleon frowned: "Again," said he, "are we to have the scene of the other day over again? Even Duroc, with his quiet air, will soon come here to preach to me. By God, gentlemen, I will show you that I can make myself obeyed. Lannes has already experienced that; he will not find much to amuse himself with while eating oranges at Lisbon. Do not trust too far, Junot, to my friendship; from the moment that I conceive doubts as to yours, mine is gone." "My General," replied Junot, still undaunted, "it is not at the moment that I am giving you the strongest proof of my devotion, that you should thus address me. Demand my blood—demand my life—I will surrender them without hesitation; but to ask a thing which must cover us with—" "Go on," cried Napoleon; "what is likely to happen to me, because I fling back on a faithless Government the insults which it offered to me?"—"It is not my part," said Junot, "to decide on the conduct which you should pursue. I am sure that when you come to yourself, and are no longer fascinated by those around you who compel you to violent measures, you will be of my opinion."—"Of whom do you speak?" Junot made no answer: he knew what he would say, but his noble heart disdained to descend to the accusation of others.³

General indignation
which it excites
even in France.

The pretence put forth by the French writers, that this unparalleled measure was justified by the capture of two French vessels in the bay of Audierne before war was formally declared, is totally groundless. These vessels were seized on the 20th May, eight days after the English ambassador had left Paris, and two after the French had sailed from Dover,—that is, after hostilities had been openly announced between the two countries; and four after the issuing of letters of marque by the British Government. To set up this, the first capture of the war, as an excuse for the severe and cruel measure adopted towards the private travellers—a class of men who invariably have been allowed, in modern Europe,

³ D'Abr. vi.
398, 403.

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108.
Debates on
the war in
Parliament.
Arguments
in favour of it
by the Minis-
ters.

The renewal of the war was soon after the subject of important and animated debates in both Houses of Parliament; but in the tone which pervaded the speeches of the Opposition, it was manifest how materially the light in which the war was viewed by the Whig party had changed in the course of the contest, and how much the constant aggressions of Napoleon had alienated the minds of those who had hitherto shown themselves the staunchest enemies of the conduct of Government in resisting the progress of the Revolution. It was argued by Mr. Pitt, Mr. Canning, and Lord Hawkesbury, "that the first great point on which the negotiation turned was, whether there was such clear evidence of an intention on the part of France to resume its designs against Egypt, as justified us in retaining Malta for our security? Now, on this point, the proof furnished by the conduct of the First Consul was decisive. The mission of Sebastiani to the Levant, which he himself admitted to Lord Whitworth was of a military character; the emphatic declaration which he made to that nobleman, that sooner or later Egypt must belong to France; and the information of the same intention, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, evidently proved that he had only suspended his designs against that country, and was resolved to renew them on the first favourable opportunity. This was a direct violation both of the letter and spirit of the treaty of Amiens, which expressly provided for the integrity of the Turkish empire; and the time when he set out (Sept. 16) was important, as it entirely destroyed the pretence that he was sent to refute the statements in Sir Robert Wilson's work, which it is notorious was not published at that time.

109.
Defence of
the retention
of Malta.

"It is in vain to oppose to the inference clearly deduced from these circumstances the improbability that, if such had really been the designs of the French Government, they would have so openly avowed them; for it has been uniformly the system of all the rulers of that state since the Revolution, and seems to be now a fixed principle of their policy, instead of carefully concealing any

to retire unmolested upon hostilities breaking out—was a pretext as flimsy as the measure itself was unjustifiable and impolitic; and it was, in an especial manner, unseemly in a power which made such loud complaints of the enforcing of the ordinary rules of war in maritime affairs by the English cruisers.

project likely to shock the feelings of mankind till the moment of its execution, to announce it publicly for a long period before, in order that the minds of men may be familiarised to its contemplation, and have come to regard it with indifference. If, then, the design against Egypt is apparent, can there be the smallest doubt that we are entitled, from the moment it is discovered, to take such measures of prevention and security as are sufficient to guard against the danger to which we are thus exposed? And, if this be admitted, the justice of our retaining Malta, the outwork both of Egypt and India, is apparent. All military authorities are agreed upon the vast importance of that island; and among them we must place, in the very first rank, the First Consul himself, who has not only declared that he would rather see us in possession of the faubourg St. Antoine, but has evinced the sincerity of that declaration by preferring all the hazards of a war which he was obviously anxious to avoid, to its relinquishment. England's interest in Malta is apparent, because it is a step on the road to India; whence the extraordinary anxiety of France for its acquisition, if not as a stage on the same journey for herself? Consider, then, what would be our feelings if, after all the warnings given us, we were now to surrender Malta out of our hands, and the attack upon Egypt were to follow in six or twelve months afterwards.

"The conduct of France on the continent of Europe has been equally inconsistent with the maintenance of pacific relations. What shall we say to her arrogant interference in the matter of the German indemnities, and arrangement of the sharing of the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes, without the concurrence either of the Emperor or the States interested in the maintenance of the equilibrium of the empire? What of the unprovoked and tyrannical attack on Switzerland? What of the continued stay of French troops in Holland, in direct violation both of the treaty of Amiens and the subsequent conventions with the Batavian Republic? The annexation of Piedmont, the severing of the Valais from Switzerland, the acquisition of Parma and Placentia, the new governments imposed on the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics,

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110.
The aggressions of France on the Continent as a ground for war.

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1803.

the erection of the kingdom of Etruria, are so many steps towards supreme dominion over Italy, which may be already said to be in the hands of the French Government. And are we, with such instances of disregard of treaties and insatiable ambition before our eyes, to permit the First Consul to make the same unresisted strides towards maritime, which he has already made towards continental supremacy?

111.
And Napoleon's measures specially directed against England.

"Add to this a still more glaring attack on our national independence, the clandestine sending of agents in the train of the French ambassador, with instructions to take soundings in our ports, and obtain information as to the military situation of all the provinces of the kingdom; and when the Government of England applied to the French ambassador to have them removed, the First Consul manifested an avowed determination to introduce, in defiance of our formal refusal, authorised emissaries, under the name of commercial agents, to prepare, in the midst of peace, the most effectual means for our annoyance and destruction in time of war. He has at the same time summoned us, in the most arrogant manner, to restrain the liberty of the press with reference to his government; in other words, to make an exception in favour of France as regards that general right to free discussion which is the birthright of Englishmen, and daily exercised against their own government and all the world besides. What do these acts amount to but the requiring us to surrender at once our liberties and the means of national defence? And, not content with this, he requires us to banish the Bourbon princes, and transport the French emigrants to Canada—addressing thus the King of England as if he were the president of one of his newly-created republics, and requiring him to submit to the last indignity of the conquered, the necessity of betraying the unfortunate.

112.
Results of non-interference during the peace.

"We have tried the system of connexion with Europe for a century, and that of leaving the Continent to shift for itself for eighteen months, and we see what has been the result. Compare the rank and station to which we raised ourselves by our former policy, with that to which we have been fast descending by the prevalence of the latter. Weigh the insults which we have borne,

the aggressions to which we have been exposed, during this short period, against all the causes and provocations of war scattered over the face of the preceding century, and see if the former do not preponderate. We have found, then—and this, if nothing else, the experiment of the peace of Amiens has clearly proved—that a country, circumstanced as this is, cannot safely abjure a dignified policy, and abdicate its rank among nations; that with such a country to be lowly is not to be sheltered, to be unpresuming is not necessarily to be safe. We may now see, by dear-bought experience, that our safety is necessarily linked with that of Continental Europe, and that a recurrence to our ancient and established policy is not only the most honourable, but the most prudent course which can be pursued. In these circumstances, nothing remains but to be prepared, collectively and individually, to meet with courage and resignation whatever difficulties it may be the will of Providence we should encounter; to make such vigorous naval and military preparations as may not only be adequate to repel any attempt at invasion, but diffuse the most complete sense of security throughout the whole nation; and enter at once upon such a resolute and prospective system of finance, as may enable the people to contemplate, without apprehension,¹ the maintenance of the war for as long a period as it has already lasted, and prevent its expenses in the end from being unnecessarily, perhaps intolerably, augmented.”

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1803.

On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Fox and Mr. Wilberforce, “that, however manifest it might be that the First Consul cast a longing eye to Egypt, and coveted Malta as a stepping-stone to that country, still the question of peace or war did not depend on that circumstance. Was it not evident that from the very first he had fixed his affections on that fortress? and nothing has recently occurred to strengthen the conviction of every thinking man on that subject. But still, seeing that, knowing that, we made peace, and stipulated for the surrender of Malta to a neutral power; and this was all that the security of our eastern possessions required. This is what, by the treaty of Amiens, we had a right to claim; this is what we should have remained contented with. Malta, indeed,

113.
Arguments
on the other
side by the
Opposition.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 1387,
1398, 1430.

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1809.

is a valuable possession; but the most valuable of all possessions is good faith. By claiming the sovereignty of Malta, instead of its independence, you take a ground which is barely tenable, and give your inveterate enemy an opportunity of mis-stating your real views, both to France and Europe, and charging this country with those projects of rapacity and monopoly by which it has been his incessant object to represent its councils as actuated. The language of Buonaparte in the later stages of the negotiation, affords reason to believe that he would have acquiesced in the independence of Malta, if not in our retention of it for ten years; and this affords a reply to the argument that the surrender of Malta, or a declaration of war, was the only alternative left us. No; there was another alternative, the independence of Malta—that independence which, under the treaty of Amiens, we had a right to claim, and which would have secured Egypt and our Eastern possessions. Why were we so dilatory in availing ourselves of the proffered mediation of the Emperor of Russia? Whence the extraordinary haste, at the very close, to break off the negotiation, when it had taken a turn favourable beyond our most sanguine hopes—when the First Consul apparently was willing, rather than risk a war, to have ceded it to us in perpetuity, upon obtaining an equivalent, and the appearance of coercion being avoided?

114.
Their defence
of the Ger-
man spolia-
tions, &c.

“Undoubtedly you may interfere to prevent the aggrandisement of any continental state upon the general principles of policy, which include prudence, and upon the first principle which governs nations as well as individuals, the principle of self-defence. Nay, you are authorised by the rank you hold, and I trust will ever hold in the scale of nations, to interfere and prevent injustice and oppression by a greater to a smaller power. But has the conduct of France since the peace been such as to call for the application of this principle? The system of German indemnities, indeed, was robbery, spoliation of the weaker by the stronger power; but France has had no greater share in the general iniquity than other powers against whom we have made no complaint. To say that the Emperor was injured by the arrangements made, is nothing to the purpose. Undoubtedly he was; but what

else could be expected after the disasters of the war? Piedmont, at the time of the treaty of Amiens, was substantially a province of France; it was the twenty-seventh military division, and belonged to that power as effectually as Gibraltar does to us. Whether it is expedient that it should belong to France, instead of being restored to the King of Sardinia, is a different question, which should have been settled, if it was meant to have been seriously agitated, at the treaty of Amiens. The violent interference with Switzerland no one can contemplate with more indignation than myself; but it was an act not particularly directed against this country, and which, how culpable soever, we were not called on to resist, if the powers more immediately interested looked on with indifference. The disgraceful treatment of Holland, in defiance alike of treaty and former services, is indeed one of the most atrocious acts on record; but we have allowed the proper season for complaining to go past, and by acquiescing in its injustice at the time, have precluded ourselves from making it the subject of recrimination afterwards. The mutual abuse of the press is not to be classed with these serious subjects of complaint. Great and permanent as was the evil thereby occasioned, from the irritation which it perpetuated in the minds of the people of both countries, still it is not a fit subject for war; and both nations might properly be addressed in the advice which Homer put into the mouth of the Goddess of Wisdom — ‘Put up your swords, and then abuse each other as long as you please.’

“The demand to send away the French refugees, however, can never be too strongly reprobated. To deny to any man, whatever be his condition or rank, the rights of hospitality on the ground of political principles, would be cowardly, cruel, and unworthy of the British character. The demand that we should send out of the country persons obnoxious to the Government of France, is made upon the most false and dangerous principles. The acquiescence of two such nations as England and France in such a system of international law would exterminate every asylum, not only to crime but to misfortune, on the face of the globe. To yield to such demands would be the height of baseness. No man has, politically speaking,

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1802.

115.
Reprobate
the demands
of Napoleon
relative to the
emigrants.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1808.

less respect for the House of Bourbon, nor a greater desire for peace, than I have; but yet for that family, or the very worst prince it contains, if among them there should be a bad one, I should be willing to draw my sword and go to war, rather than comply with a demand to withdraw a hospitality to which he had trusted. I say this with respect to persons against whom no crime is alleged; with respect to those who are accused, whether justly or unjustly, of a crime, I think some inquiry should be made into the grounds of the accusation, and the result, whatever it is, be publicly made known. This is a duty we owe not only to France but ourselves; for the hostility of a great and generous nation gives no countenance to crimes even against its worst enemies.

116.
And the sending of French commissioners to England.

“As to the commercial commissioners, as it is apparent that they were in truth military men, and in effect no better than spies, it was a shameful attempt to impose upon us for a most mischievous purpose; and therefore there was but one course to have pursued, namely, to have sent them immediately out of the country, and instantly applied to France for explanation and satisfaction for having sent them here under such colours and for such objects. But without doing either the one or the other, the question is, was this a ground for going to war? Is Malta essential to Egypt? Is Egypt essential to India? Both propositions are more than doubtful. Great stress is laid upon the possession of the banks of the Nile as indispensable to the security of our Eastern possessions; but is there any rational foundation for this opinion? Is it not rather the result of an overweening interest in that country, from the glorious triumphs to our arms of which it has recently been the theatre?—feelings natural and praiseworthy if kept within due bounds, but not fit to be made the ground for determination in so momentous a question as that of peace and war. And let us beware, lest, while crying out against the aggrandisement of France in Europe, we do not give them too good cause to recriminate upon us for our conduct in Asia; and consider well, whether, since the treaty of Amiens, we have not added more to our territories in the Mysore, than France has done in the whole Continent put together.”¹

¹ Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1405, 1438, 1466.

The House divided, when three hundred and ninety-eight supported the Address approving of the war, and sixty-seven voted against it. In the House of Lords the majority was still greater; one hundred and forty-two voting for the Address, and ten against it.¹

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1803.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 1491,
1514.

The altered tone of the Opposition upon the war was very remarkable, and eminently characteristic of the change which, in the estimation even of its warmest opponents, the contest had undergone. There were no longer the fierce recriminations, the vehement condemnation of Government, the loud accusations of leaguings with sovereigns in a crusade against the liberties of mankind, with which the chapel of St Stephen had so long resounded when the subject was brought forward. France now had little of popular sympathy in any country. She had lost the support of the democratic party throughout Europe, and stood forth merely as a threatening and conquering military power. This change, though at the time little attended to, like all alterations which are gradual in their progress, was of the utmost moment, and deprived the contest, in its future stages, of the principal dangers with which it had at first been fraught. It was no longer a war of opinion on either side of the Channel. Democratic ambition did not now hail, in the triumphs of the French, the means of individual elevation. Aristocratic passion ceased to hope for their overthrow, as paving the way to a restoration of the ancient order of things. The contest had changed its character: from being social it had become national. Not the maintenance of the constitution, the coercion of the disaffected, the overthrow of the Jacobins, was the object for which we fought: the preservation of the national independence, the vindication of the national honour, was now felt to be at stake. The painful schism which had so long divided the country was at an end. National success was looked upon with triumph and exultation by an immense majority of the people, with the exception of a few party leaders who to the last regarded it with aversion. The war called forth the sympathies of almost all classes of citizens. The young, who had entered into life under its excitement, were unanimous in its support; and a contest which had commenced amid more divided

117.
Reflections
on the altered
tone of the
Opposition.

CHAP.
XXXVI

1803.

118.
England was
obviously re-
solved on
war.

feelings than any recorded in the history of England, terminated with a degree of unanimity in its behalf unprecedented in her long and glorious career.

Upon coolly reviewing the circumstances under which the contest was renewed, it is impossible to deny that the British government manifested a feverish anxiety to come to a rupture, and that, so far as the transactions between the two countries are concerned, they were the aggressors. The great stress laid on Sebastiani's mission to Egypt; the evasion of Russian mediation; the peremptory refusal to abandon Malta, even to a neutral power; the repeated demands by the English ambassador for his passports; the resolution at last not to treat, even on the footing of Malta being abandoned to England, are so many indications of a determined spirit of hostility, and a resolution, on one pretence or another, to put an end to amicable relations between the two countries.

119.
But it was
unavoidable
on his ac-
knowledge
intention.

On the other hand, the same impartiality requires it to be stated, that the conduct of France to other states, and the language which the First Consul had begun to hold towards Great Britain herself, indicated a settled resolution of disregarding the stipulations of treaties, and the commencement of a system of intimidation inconsistent with the existence of any independent power. The stretches made by France over Europe during a period of profound peace, in defiance alike of express agreement and of the regard due by the common law of nations to the independence of weaker powers, were such as to render any long-continued pacification out of the question. Pointing as the acts of the First Consul evidently did towards universal dominion, actuated as he plainly was by the principle that every thing was allowable which was conducive to the interests or the grandeur of France, it was in vain to expect that he would long continue at peace with this country—the only obstacle that stood in his way in the prosecution of these intoxicating objects. If he had not hitherto engaged in open acts of hostility against us, it was only because he was not prepared for them, because peace was requisite to restore his marine and put his naval resources on a more respectable footing. But his language already showed his secret designs, and

in his anxiety for supreme authority he spoke as if he had already acquired it. In these circumstances it is of little consequence what was the ostensible cause of the rupture; the real ground of it was a well-founded distrust of the pacific intentions of the First Consul, or his ability to remain at peace even if he had been so inclined—a conviction, which subsequent events have abundantly justified, that he was preparing, at some future period, a desperate attack upon our independence, and that all which he now acquired would ere-long be turned with consummate talent against it.

He himself has told us what he meant to have done, and unfolded the matured designs he had formed for our subjugation. It was no part of his plan to have gone to war in 1803, or exposed his infant navy to the risk of being swept from the ocean, or blockaded in its harbours, before his sailors had acquired the experience requisite for success in naval warfare. He intended to have remained at peace with England for six or eight years; to have built annually twenty or twenty-five ships of the line; immensely enlarged his ports and fortifications in Holland, the Scheldt, and the Channel; extended, in the interim, his dominion over all the lesser states in the Continent, and not unfurled the flag of defiance till he had from eighty to a hundred ships of the line at Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest, manned by experienced seamen, to cover the embarkation of the invading army at Boulogne.* The immense docks which he excavated out of the granite of Cherbourg and the slime of the Scheldt, the vast arsenal of Antwerp, the capacious basin

CHAP.

XXXVI.

1803.

120.

Napoleon's own account of his designs against England at this period.

* "I was resolved," said Napoleon, "to renew at Cherbourg the wonders of Egypt. I had already raised in the sea my pyramid. I would have also have had my lake Mareotis. My great object was to concentrate at Cherbourg all our maritime forces, and in time they would have been immense, in order to be able to deal out a grand stroke at the enemy. I was establishing my ground so as to bring the two nations, as it were, body to body. The ultimate issue could not be doubtful, for we had forty millions of French against fifteen millions of English. I would have terminated by a battle of Actium."

His designs for the naval subjugation of this country.

"The Emperor had resolved upon a strictly defensive plan till the affairs of the Continent were finally settled, and his naval resources had accumulated to such a degree as to enable him to strike a decisive stroke. He ordered canals in Brittany, by the aid of which, in spite of the enemy, he could maintain an internal communication between Bordeaux, Rochefort, Nantes, Holland, Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest. He proposed to have at Flushing, or its neighbourhood, docks which were to be capable of receiving the whole fleet of Antwerp, fully armed, from whence it could put to sea in twenty-four hours. He projected near Boulogne a dike similar to that at Cherbourg; and between Cherbourg and Brest, a roadstead like that of l'Isle de Bois. Sailors were to be formed by

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1803.

¹ Nap. in
Las Cas. v. 8,
14.

121.
Greatest
stretches of
power by
France dur-
ing his reign
were always
made in time
of peace.

of Boulogne, were all preparations for the great design which he had in contemplation, and which no moderation or pacific disposition on the part of Great Britain, short of absolute submission, could possibly have averted. "When by these means," said he, "England came to wrestle hand to hand with France, and the advantage which she derived from her insular situation was at an end, she must necessarily have fallen. The nation which depends on a population of seventeen millions, must in the end sink before one which commands the resources of forty."¹

In forming a judgment on the propriety of the course adopted by England on this occasion, there are two considerations not generally attended to, which require to be steadily kept in view, arising as they do out of the whole conduct of the French government throughout the revolutionary war.

The first is, that all the great stretches of power during the whole contest were made by France in periods of peace; and that, great as were her military conquests, they were yet inferior to the strides which she made, in defiance of treaty, during the forced pacifications which followed her triumphs. During the peace of Campo Formio, she conquered Switzerland, revolutionised Rome, and subjugated Naples. By the treaty of Luneville, she was bound to allow the Helvetian, Ligurian, and Cisalpine Republics to choose their own constitutions; but hardly was the ink of her signature dry, when she established governments in these independent states, all entirely composed of her creatures, and incorporated

exercising young conscripts in the roads, and performing gun practice and other operations in the harbours. He intended to construct twenty or twenty-five ships of the line every year. At the end of six years he would have had two hundred ships of the line, at the end of ten as many as three hundred. The affairs of the Continent being finished, he would have entered heart and soul into that project; he would have assembled the greater part of his forces on the coast from Corunna to the mouth of the Elbe, having the bulk on the shores of the Channel. All the resources of the two nations would thus have been called forth, and then he would either, he conceived, have subjected England by his moral ascendancy, or crushed it by his physical force. The English, alarmed, would have assembled for the defence of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the Thames. Our three corps off Brest, Cherbourg, and Antwerp, would have fallen on their central masses, while our wings burned them in Scotland and Ireland. Every thing then would have depended on a decisive affair, and this was what Napoleon called his battle of Actium. 'We must have conquered,' said he repeatedly, 'when the two nations were opposed to each other, body to body, for we were forty millions, and they only fifteen.'—See LAS CASES, v. 8, 15.

Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia with her dominions. The treaties of Presburg and Tilsit were immediately followed by the overthrow of her own allies, Holland, Spain, and Portugal, and the seating of brothers of Napoleon on the thrones of the two first of these kingdoms. The peace of Vienna, in 1809, was but a prelude to the incorporation of the Roman States, Holland, and Hamburg, with the French dominions; and the treaty of Vienna, in 1805, was the immediate forerunner of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the conquest of Naples for his brother Joseph; in other words, the organisation of half of Germany and the whole of Italy under the direction of the Emperor.

Nor did the military strength of France, under the able direction of Napoleon, grow in a less formidable manner during every cessation of hostilities. Like blood in a plethoric patient, it accumulated fearfully during each interval of bleeding; and resistance to the malady became the more difficult the longer it was delayed. Down to 1800 Austria had maintained a protracted and doubtful contest with the Republic; but during the peace which followed, the military resources of France were so immensely increased, that in the next war which ensued, in 1805, she was struck to the earth in a single campaign. The long repose of Germany which succeeded the treaty of Tilsit in 1807, was marked by such an extraordinary growth of the military strength of France, as enabled it at the same time, in 1812, to maintain three hundred thousand men in Spain, and precipitate five hundred thousand on the Russian dominions. Continued hostility, however, in the end weakened this colossal power—the military resources of France rapidly declined during the fierce campaigns of 1812 and 1813; and at length the Conqueror of Europe saw himself reduced, in the plains of Champagne, to the command of fifty thousand men. This effect of peace to France, so different from what is generally observed in conquering states, was the result of the complete overthrow of all pacific habits and pursuits during the Revolution; the rise of a generation, educated in no other principles but the burning desire for individual and national elevation, and the organisation of these immense warlike resources

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1803.

122.
And vast
growth dur-
ing peace of
her military
power.

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1803.

by a man of unexampled civil and military talent. Napoleon felt this strongly. He had no alternative but continued advance or abandonment of the throne. "My conquests," said he, "were in no respect the result of ambition or the mania for dominion; they originated in a great design, or rather in necessity."¹ More truly to him than even to the Numidian prince were the words of the historian applicable:—"In Jugurthâ tantus dolus, tantaque peritia locorum et militiæ erat, uti, absens an præsens, pacem an bellum gerens, perniciosior esset in incerto haberetur."*

¹ *Las Cas. II.*
273.

123.
His constant severity to his most friendly and submissive allies, as exemplified in the cases of Holland, Sardinia, and Spain.

The second is, that Napoleon uniformly treated with the greatest severity the powers which had been most friendly and submissive to his will; and that acquiescence in his demands, and support of his interests, so far from being a ground to expect lenient, was the surest passport to vindictive measures; while he reserved all his favours for the rivals from whom he had experienced only the most determined hostility. Reversing the Roman maxim, his principle was—

"*Parcere superbis et debellare subjectos.*"

The object of this policy was, that he might strengthen himself by the forces of the weaker before he hazarded an encounter with the greater powers. Its steady prosecution was an important element in his unexampled success; its ultimate consequences the principal cause of his rapid decline. Holland was the first power which submitted to the Republican arms. The inhabitants of its great towns hailed the soldiers of Pichegru as deliverers. Its government was rapidly revolutionised, and throughout the whole war stood faithfully by the fortunes of France; and it received in return a treatment so oppressive as to call forth the passionate censure of Mr Fox in the British Parliament,† and induce a brother of Napoleon to abdicate the throne of that country, that he might not be implicated in such oppressive proceedings. Piedmont next submitted to the rising fortunes of Napoleon. After a campaign of fifteen days it opened its

* "In Jugurtha there was so much craft, and such knowledge of places and war, that it was hard to say whether he was more formidable present or absent, in peace or in war."—SALLUST, *Bell. Jugurthinum*.

† *Ante*, Chap. xxxvi. §. 90, note.

gates to the conqueror, and placed in his hands the keys of Italy; and in a few years after, the King of Sardinia was stript of all his continental dominions, and the territories he had so early surrendered to France were annexed to the engrossing Republic. Spain was among the first of the allied powers which made a separate treaty with France; and for thirteen years afterwards its treasures, its fleets, and its armies were at the disposal of Napoleon; and he rewarded it by the dethronement of its king, and a six years' war fraught with unexampled horrors.

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1803.

Portugal at the first summons drew off from the alliance with England, and admitted the French eagles within the walls of Lisbon; and it received in return an announcement in the *Moniteur* that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign. The Pope submitted without a struggle to all the rapacious demands of the French government: the treasures, the monuments of art, one-third of the dominions of the Church, were successively yielded up; the Head of the Faithful condescended to travel to Fontainebleau to crown the modern Charlemagne; and he was rewarded by a total confiscation of his dominions, and imprisonment for the remainder of his life. Venice maintained a neutrality of the utmost moment to France during the desperate struggle with Austria in 1796, when ten thousand even of Italian troops would have cast the balance against the rising fortunes of Napoleon; and he, in return for such inestimable services, instigated a revolt in its continental dominions, which afforded him a pretence for destroying its independence, and handing over its burning democrats to the hated dominion of Austria. A majority of the Swiss fraternised with the Republicans, and called in the French forces in 1798; and in 1802 Switzerland was deprived of its liberties, its government, and its independence. Prussia, by a selfish and unhappy policy, early withdrew from the alliance against France; and for ten years afterwards maintained a neutrality which enabled that enterprising power to break down the bulwark of central Europe, the Austrian monarchy; and on the very first rupture he treated it with a degree of severity almost unparalleled in the annals of European conquest.

124.
And in those
of Portugal,
the Pope,
Venice, &c.

CHAP.
XXXVI.

1803.

125.

His lenity to
the great
powers which
resisted him.

While such was the conduct of Napoleon to the states which had earliest submitted and most faithfully adhered to his fortunes, his lenity towards the powers which had boldly resisted and steadily defied his ambition was not less remarkable. Austria, after a desperate warfare of five years, received as the price of its pacification the Venetian territories, more than an equivalent for all it had lost in the Low Countries ; and on occasion of every subsequent rupture, obtained terms so favourable as to excite the astonishment even of its own inhabitants ; until at length a princess of the House of Hapsburg was elevated to the Revolutionary throne, and a continued hostility of twenty years rewarded by a large share of the conqueror's favour. Russia had twice engaged in fierce hostility against France ; but the resentment of Napoleon did not make him forget his policy. He made the most flattering advances to Paul in 1800 ; and after the next struggle, the treaty of Tilsit actually gave an accession of territory to that formidable rival. With England, his most inveterate and persevering enemy, he was ever ready to treat on terms of comparative equality. He surrendered valuable colonies of his allies at the peace of Amiens ; and was inclined, in the last extremity, to have abandoned Malta rather than provoke a war with so dreaded a naval power, when his own maritime preparations were only in their infancy.

126.

All which
was a prelude
to his grand
final attack
on England.

The inference to be drawn from these circumstances is, not that Napoleon towards the greater powers was actuated by a spirit of moderation, the reverse of what he evinced towards the lesser, for such a conclusion is at variance with the whole tenor of his life ; but that his ambition in every instance was subordinate to his judgment, and that he studiously offered favourable terms to the states with whom he anticipated a doubtful encounter, till his preparations had rendered him master of their destinies. His long-continued favour to Prussia was but a prelude to the conquest of Jena and partition of Tilsit : his indulgence to Russia only a veil for his designs till the assembled forces of half of Europe were ready in 1812 to inundate its frontiers : his proffered amity to Great Britain, the lure which was to deceive the vigilance of its Government till the Channel was studded

with hostile fleets, and a coalition of all the maritime states had prepared a Leipsic of the deep for the naval power of England. Such being the evident design of the First Consul, as it has now been developed by time, and admitted by himself, there can be but one opinion among all impartial persons as to the absolute necessity of resuming hostilities, if not in 1803, at least at no distant period, and preventing the formidable increase of his resources during that interval of peace, which with him was ever but the time of preparation for a more formidable future attack, and might have been made instrumental in depriving Great Britain of all the security which she enjoyed from her insular situation and long-established maritime superiority.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES TO THE OPENING OF
THE SPANISH WAR.—MAY, 1803—DECEMBER, 1804.

CHAP.
XXXVII.

1803.

1.
Great pre-
parations on
both sides for
the renewal of
the war.

THE recommencement of the war was followed by hostile preparations of unparalleled magnitude on both sides of the Channel. Never did the ancient rivalry of France and England break forth with more vehemence, and never was the animosity of their respective governments more warmly supported by the patriotism and passions of the people. The French, accustomed to a long career of conquest, and considering themselves, on land at least, as invincible, burned with anxiety to join in mortal combat with their ancient and inveterate enemies; and anticipated, in the conquest of England, the removal of the last obstacle which stood between them and universal dominion. The English hurled back with indignation the defiance they had received, warmly resented the assertion of the First Consul that Great Britain could not contend single-handed with France, and invited the descendants of the conquerors of Hastings to measure their strength with those in whose veins the blood of the victors of Cressy and Azincour yet ran. Ancient glories, hereditary rivalry, were mingled with the recollection of recent wrongs and newly-won triumphs. The Republicans derided the military preparations of those who had fled before their arms in Holland and Flanders—anticipated in the conflagration of Portsmouth a glorious revenge for the fires of Toulon—and pointed to the career of William the Conqueror as that which was to be speedily followed by the First Consul. The English reverted to the glories of the Plantagenet reigns; recounted with pride the career of Marlbo-

rough ; and referred with exultation to the sands of Egypt, as affording an earnest of the victories they were yet to obtain over the veteran armies of France. Both parties entered, heart and soul, into the contest—both anticipated a desperate and decisive struggle ; but little did either foresee the disasters which were to be encountered, or the triumphs that were to be won before it closed.

The first military operation of the French ruler was attended with rapid and easy success. Ten days after the hostile message of the King of England to the House of Commons, the French army in Holland, now advanced to the frontiers of Hanover, received orders to put itself in motion, and accomplish the reduction of that electorate. The force intrusted to Mortier on this occasion was twenty thousand men ; and the Hanoverian troops, whose valour was well known, amounted to nearly sixteen thousand ; but the preponderating multitudes with which it was well known the First Consul could follow up, if necessary, this advanced guard, rendered all attempts at resistance hopeless. Some measures of defence were, however, adopted ; and the Duke of Cambridge, in an energetic proclamation, enjoined the immediate assembly of the *levée en masse* ; but the rapid advance of the French troops rendered all these efforts abortive. Count Walmoden made a gallant resistance at Borstell, on the shores of the Weser ; but as there was no time for succours to arrive from England, and it was desirable not to involve that inconsiderable state in the horrors of a protracted and hopeless struggle, a convention was wisely entered into two days afterwards at Suhlingen, by which it was stipulated that the Hanoverian army should retire with the honours of war, taking with them their field-artillery, behind the Elbe, and not bear arms against France during the remainder of the contest till exchanged. The public stores in the arsenals, amounting to nearly four hundred pieces of cannon and thirty thousand muskets, fell into the hands of the French ; but what they valued more, were nineteen colours and sixteen standards, the trophies of the army of Prince Ferdinand during the Seven Years' War.¹

The British government, upon being informed of these transactions, refused to ratify the capitulation, and loudly

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1803.

2.
Conquest of
Hanover by
the French.
May 26.

June 2.

¹ Bign. III.
129, 133.
Ann. Reg.
1803, p. 326
Dum. I. 20.
205.

CHAP.
XXXVII.

1803.

3.

A convention
is agreed to
by the Hano-
verian gene-
rals.

complained of the invasion of the German confederation by this irruption, in defiance alike of the privileges of the Elector of Hanover as a prince of the Empire, and the neutrality of his German states, which had been observed throughout all the late war, and was expressly provided for in the treaty of Luneville. The consequence was, that Walmoden was summoned by Mortier to resume hostilities or lay down his arms. The brave Germans declared they would rather perish than submit to such a degradation, and, on the 27th, hostilities recommenced along the whole line. But the contest was too obviously unequal to permit either party to come to extremities. The French abated somewhat from the rigour of their first terms. The Hanoverian army was dissolved; the soldiers disbanded and sent home for a year; the officers retained their side-arms; those of the common men were given up to the civil authorities. The troops thus let loose afterwards proved of essential service to the common cause. They were almost all received into the English service, and, under the name of the King's German Legion, were to be seen side by side with the British in every subsequent field of fame from Vimiera to Waterloo.¹

¹ Dum. ix.
217, 220.
Ann. Reg.
1803, 326.
Beamish, l.
18, 19.

4.

Violation of
neutral rights
by the French
generals.

In the course of this incursion, the French armies set at nought the neutrality, not only of Hanover, but of all the lesser states in its vicinity. Mortier traversed without hesitation all the principalities, not merely which lay in his way on the road to Hanover, but many beyond that limit. Hamburg and Bremen were occupied, and the mouth of the Elbe and Weser closed against British merchandise. This uncalled-for aggression is not only of importance, as demonstrating the determination of the First Consul to admit of no neutrality in the contest which was commenced, but as unfolding the first germ of the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, to which he mainly trusted afterwards in his hostilities against Great Britain. Unaccustomed, however, as the European powers hitherto were to such instances of lordly usurpation, this violation of neutral rights excited a very great sensation. In the north especially the advance of the French standards to the Elbe, and the permanent occupation of the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen by the troops of that

nation, awakened a most extraordinary jealousy. Russia openly expressed her discontent, and Austria and Prussia made representations on the subject to the cabinet of the Tuileries: while Denmark, more courageous, actually assembled an army of thirty thousand men in Holstein, to prevent the violation of the Danish territory. But the Emperor was too much depressed by his long-continued disasters—Prussia too deeply implicated in her infatuated alliance with France—to resent openly this violation of the German confederation; and Russia too far removed to take any active steps, when the powers more immediately interested did not feel themselves called on to come forward. Thus the jealousies of the North evaporated in a mere interchange of angry notes and diplomatic remonstrances; the troops of Denmark alone appeared in the field to assert the cause of European independence; too weak to contend with the Republican legions, they were compelled to retire into their cantonments, after being treated with insulting irony in the French journals;* and the north of Germany permanently fell under the dominion of France, from which it was only delivered, ten years after, by the disasters of the Russian campaign.¹

Simultaneous with the conquest of Hanover by the French, was the march of an army into the south of Italy, and the occupation of the port of Tarentum by the Republican forces. St Cyr received the command of the troops destined to this service, which were fourteen thousand strong; and on the 14th May he addressed a proclamation to the soldiers, which was soon after followed by the invasion of the kingdom of Naples. He advanced forthwith to Tarentum, which, with its extensive fortifications and noble roadstead, again formed the outwork of France against the Eastern possessions of Great Britain. At the same time Tuscany was invaded, Leghorn was declared in a state of siege, and all the English merchandise found in that great seaport confiscated; the First Consul thus evincing that he was resolved to admit of no neutrality in a lesser state in the great contest which was approaching, and that, by

5.
They extend
themselves
through
Southern
Italy.

* "The military mania," said the *Moniteur*, "is a strange passion to seize little princes."—BIGNON, iii 139.

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upon the noble design of forming a Vendéan legion, "all composed," to use his own words, "officers and soldiers, of those who have carried on war against us;" and its ranks were speedily filled by the remains of that unconquerable band.

8.
Object of
these pre-
parations.

The object to be gained by all these preparations was to assemble, at a single point, a flotilla capable of transporting an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, with its field and siege equipage, ammunition, stores, and horses; and at the same time to provide so formidable a covering naval force as might ensure its safe disembarkation, notwithstanding any resistance that could be opposed by the enemy. Such a project, the most gigantic to be attempted by sea of which history makes mention, required the assembling of very great means and no small share of fortune for its success. But it was within the range of possibility, and the combinations made for its accomplishment were among the most striking monuments of the extensive views and penetrating genius of the First Consul.

9.
Works and
flotilla at
Boulogne.

The harbour of Boulogne was taken as the central point for the assembling of the vessels destined for the conveyance of the troops. Its capacious basin, enlarged and deepened by the labour of the soldiers, was protected by an enormous tower, constructed on a coral reef amidst incredible difficulties arising from the action of the waves, and armed with heavy cannon capable of carrying to the distance of two miles; while similar excavations extended the neighbouring ports of Etaples, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse. Every harbour, from Brest to the Texel, was rapidly filled with gun-boats of different dimensions; in the dockyards the shipwrights were universally put into activity; and as fast as the vessels were finished, they were sent round, under protection of the numerous batteries with which the coast abounded, to Cherbourg, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. The number and intrepidity of the British cruisers in the Channel rendered this a service both of difficulty and danger; but the First Consul was indefatigable, and by communicating his own incredible activity to all the persons in subordinate situations, at length made great progress in the assembling of naval forces within sight of the shores of Britain. No

sooner were the English cruisers blown off their stations by contrary winds, than the telegraph announced the favourable opportunity to the different harbours; numerous vessels were speedily seen rounding the headlands and cautiously cruising along the shore, while the artillerymen, with lighted matches in their hands, stood at the numerous batteries with which it bristled, to open upon any ships of the enemy which might come within range in attempting to impede their passage. The small draught of water which the gun-boats required enabled the greater part of them to escape untouched, and concentrate in the roads of Boulogne: but a considerable number were intercepted and destroyed by the British cruisers, and innumerable deeds of daring courage were performed, in too many of which valuable blood was shed in the attainment of a comparatively trifling object.¹*

The small craft assembled was of four different kinds, according to the weight and species of the troops which they were intended to convey. The praams, or largest sort, carried each six four-and-twenty pounders, and were intended rather to protect the smaller vessels which conveyed the troops than to be employed in the transport themselves. The next class bore four twenty-four pounders and one howitzer; they were calculated to receive each from a hundred and fifty to two hundred men, and made flat-bottomed, in order to land them as near as possible to the shore. The third were armed each with two twenty-four pounders, and were capable of conveying eighty men each; while the smallest had a four-pounder at the poop and a bomb at the stern, and bore from forty to fifty men each. The artillery were intended to be embarked in the larger vessels, the cavalry in those of a medium size, the infantry in the smallest; and such was the discipline and organisation of the troops destined for the expedition, that each man knew the vessel on board of which he was to embark; and experience proved that a hundred thousand men could find their places in less than half an hour.²

Upwards of thirteen hundred vessels of this description

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¹ Dum. x. 38,
48. Bign. iii.
144, 145.
Norv. ii. 261,
262.

10.
Description
of the small
craft assem-
bled.

² Dum. x. 40,
45. Bign. iii.
145, 147.

* In this partisan warfare, Captain Owen in the *Immortalité*, and Sir Sidney Smith in the *Antelope*, particularly distinguished themselves.—See JAMES'S *Naval Hist.*, iii. 294, 346.

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11.
Napoleon
visits Ant-
werp, and
orders im-
mense works
there.

July 21.

were, in the course of the year 1803, collected at Boulogne and the adjoining harbours; but, immense as these preparations were, it was not on them alone that the First Consul relied for the execution of his project. Innumerable transports were at the same time assembled, which, without being armed, were destined for the reception of the stores and ammunition of the army; and Napoleon himself proceeded to the coast to hasten by his presence the preparations which were going forward, and judge with his own eyes of the measures which should be adopted. He visited all the material points in the maritime districts; inspected at Flushing the new docks and fortifications which had been commenced; and rapidly discerned in Antwerp the central point where the chief arsenal for the naval subjugation of England should be established. An *arrêt* of the 21st July directed that a dock should be there constructed, capable of containing twenty-five ships of the line and a proportionate number of frigates and smaller vessels; and those immense works were immediately commenced, which in a few years rendered this the greatest naval station on the Continent.* Not content with the realities of that marvellous period, the minds of men, as usual in times of highly-wrought excitement, were inflamed by fictitious prodigies; and the announcement that, in excavating the harbour of Boulogne, a hatchet of the Roman legions and a medal of the Norman princes had been discovered, conveyed to the vivid imaginations of the French soldiers the happy omen that they were about to tread in the footsteps of Julius Cæsar and William the Conqueror.¹

But these naval forces, great as they were, constituted but a part of those which were destined to be employed

* The opinion of Napoleon was repeatedly and strongly expressed as to the great importance of Antwerp as a naval station to France. "He often declared," says Las Cases, "that all he had done for Antwerp, great as it was, was nothing compared to what he intended to have done. By sea, he meant to have made it the point from whence a mortal stroke was to be launched against the enemy; by land, to have rendered it a certain place of refuge in case of disaster, a pivot of the national safety; he intended to have rendered it capable of receiving an army in case of defeat, and sustaining a whole year of open trenches. Already all the world admired the splendid works erected at Antwerp in so short a time, its numerous dockyards, magazines, and basins; 'but all that,' said the Emperor, 'was nothing: it was only the commercial town; the military town was to be on the opposite bank of the Scheldt, where the ground was already purchased for its construction. There three-deckers were to have reposed, with all their guns on board, during the winter months; vast sheds were to have been constructed to shelter their huge bulk from the weather in

¹ Bign. iii.
147, 149.
Norv. ii. 263,
264. Dum. x.
77, 78.

in the invasion of Great Britain. The whole fleets of France and Holland, and soon after that of Spain, were engaged in the mighty enterprise. The design of Napoleon, which he himself has pronounced to have been the most profoundly conceived and nicely calculated which he ever formed, was to have assembled the fleet destined to compose the covering naval force at Martinique, by a junction of all the squadrons in the harbours of Spain and the Mediterranean in the West Indies; to have brought this combined armament rapidly back to the Channel while the British blockading squadron was traversing the Atlantic in search of the enemy, raised the blockade of Rochefort and Brest, and entered the Channel with the whole armament, amounting to seventy sail of the line. It was under cover of this irresistible force that Napoleon calculated upon crossing¹ over to England, at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand men, with whom he thought he would reach London in five days, and where he intended instantly to proclaim parliamentary reform, the downfall of the oligarchy, and all the objects which the English republicans had at heart. Numerous as were the chances against the successful issue of so vast a design, it will appear in the sequel how near it was succeeding, how little the English were aware of the danger which really threatened them, and with what signal ingratitude they treated the gallant officer whose important combat defeated the most profound combination that the genius of Napoleon ever formed for their destruction.¹

But towards the success of this attempt a very great military as well as naval force was necessary; and the attention of the First Consul was early turned to the

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12.

His design
for the inva-
sion.

¹ Nap. in
Month. ii.
227. Jom.
Vie de Nap.
ii. 20, 21.
Las Cas. ii.
277, 280.

peace; every thing was determined on on the most gigantic scale. Antwerp was to me a province in itself. It is one of the great causes of my exile to St Helena; for the cession of that fortress was one of the principal reasons which induced me not to agree to peace at Chatillon. If they would have left it to me, peace would have been concluded. France, without the frontier of the Rhine, and Antwerp, is nothing.' All the difficulties attendant on the situation were nothing in the eyes of Napoleon: in his impatience to make the English feel the dangers of the Scheldt, which they had themselves often signalised as so formidable, he was indefatigable; and in less than eight years Antwerp had become a maritime arsenal of first-rate importance, and contained a considerable fleet."² When Napoleon made these energetic remarks at St Helena, he was far from anticipating that, in twelve years, a British squadron was to aid a French army in wresting this magnificent fortress from the ally of England, and restoring it to the son-in-law of France, and the sway of the tricolor flag!

² Las. Cas. vii.
43, 44, 50, 57.

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13.

And mea-
sures to en-
force disci-
pline in the
army on the
coast.

means of restoring the strength of that arm, which the expedition to St Domingo and detachments into Italy and Hanover had very much diminished. The soldiers, long habituated to the excitement and plunder of war, had become weary of the monotony of a garrison or pacific life ; discipline was sensibly relaxed, and desertion, especially among the old soldiers, had increased to an alarming extent. The most energetic measures were immediately taken to arrest this evil ; new regulations introduced to ensure a rigid enforcement of the conscription, and the height requisite for the service lowered to five feet two inches—a decisive proof that the vast expenditure of human life in the preceding wars had already begun to exhaust the robust and vigorous part of the population. Such was the rigour with which the conscription laws were now enforced, that escape became hopeless ; and the price of a substitute, which soon rose to the enormous sum of £500, rendered it totally impossible for the middle classes to avoid personal service. Napoleon was indefatigable on the subject. “Keep your eyes,” said he to the minister of war, “incessantly fixed on the recruiting ; let not a day pass without your attending to it ; it is the greatest affair in the state.” From necessity, then, not less than inclination, the military life became the sole object of ambition ; and the proportion of the number drawn to that of the youth who were liable to serve each year was so great, that, for the remainder of his reign, it practically amounted to a total absorption of half, sometimes almost the whole of the young men, as they rose to manhood, into the ranks of war.¹ *

¹ Dum. x. 60,
72.

Nor was Napoleon less solicitous, by means of foreign negotiations, to increase the disposable force which he could bring to bear against the common enemy. Ney, who had commanded in Switzerland, concluded a capitulation, by which sixteen thousand troops of that government were put at the disposal of France, and soon after

* It was calculated that 208,233 young men in the French empire annually attained the age of 20, the period when liability to serve commenced. Thus the first conscription of 1798, which required 200,000 men who had that year attained that age, absorbed nearly the whole persons liable, and the drawing of lots became a vain formality. The conscription in 1803 was 120,000, and it was seldom less, generally much greater, during the remainder of the war.—DUMAS, x. 65.

placed in reserve of the Army of England at Compeigne, while a treaty offensive and defensive was concluded between the two states, which stipulated that the Helvetic Confederacy should in addition, if necessary, furnish eight thousand auxiliary troops to France; General Pino led an Italian division across the Alps, to form part of the same armament; while Augereau assembled a corps in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, to enforce the mandates of the Consular government, if the courts of Madrid and Lisbon refused to conclude treaties on the footing of the orders sent out from the Tuileries. But there was no need for the precaution; terror and French influence were already paramount at both those capitals, and the seal was put to the disgrace of the Peninsula by the treaties concluded with Spain on the 19th October, and with Portugal on the 25th December. By the first of these conventions, a monthly payment of six millions of francs (£240,000 a-month, £2,880,000 a-year) was stipulated in favour of France, to be either remitted to Paris or employed in repairing the French ships of war in the Spanish harbours; several officers holding important situations in the Spanish army, were to be dismissed for alleged offences against the French government; many stipulations in favour of the export of French manufactures, and their transit into Portugal, were agreed to; and the Spanish government engaged to procure the payment of at least a million of francs (£40,000) a-month by the Portuguese to the French government, as long as the maritime war lasted. By the second, Portugal purchased exemption from actual hostilities by an annual payment of 16,000,000 francs (£640,000) to Napoleon. The conclusion of these treaties was a virtual declaration of war by both Spain and Portugal against Great Britain, since it placed the pecuniary resources of both countries at the disposal of France during the continuance of the contest. Bitterly did the people of the Peninsula subsequently lament their degradations, and nobly did they then wipe off the stain on their honour.¹

No sooner, also, did the maritime war appear inevitable, than Napoleon concluded an arrangement with the

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14.

Humiliating
treaties
agreed to by
Switzerland,
Spain, and
Portugal.
Sept. 27.

Oct. 19.

Dec. 25.

¹ Norv. ii.
265, 266.
Ibign. iii. 200,
201, and 238.
Martens, viii.
136.

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15.

Louisiana
sold to Ame-
rica, April
30, and
Piedmont
annexed to
France.

Vast force
collected on
the coast by
the money
thus gained.

United States of America, by which, in consideration of eighty millions of francs, (£3,200,000,) he ceded to them his whole rights, acquired by the convention with Spain, to Louisiana ; anticipating thus, for a valuable consideration, the probable fate of a naval contest, and extricating from the hands of the British a valuable colonial possession, which would assuredly soon have become their prey ; while, by a *Senatus Consultum* issued on the 11th September, he at once, and of his own authority, annexed the whole of Piedmont to the French Republic. By these different means, Napoleon was enabled to put on foot a very large army for the invasion of Great Britain. An order addressed to the minister at war, on the 14th June 1803, fixed the organisation of the army, which was divided into six corps, each of which was to occupy a separate camp, and be under a different commander. Ney, Soult, Davoust, and Victor, were to be found among the names of the generals. It extended along the whole coast, from the Texel to the Pyrenees. The first camp was in Holland, the second at Ghent, the third at St Omer, the fourth at Compeigne, the fifth at St Malo, the sixth at Bayonne. The whole troops assembled at these different points were intended to exceed a hundred and fifty thousand men, and their command was intrusted to the most distinguished generals of the army. Though all included under the name of the Army of England, their wide dissemination renders it probable that the First Consul had other objects in view besides the subjugation of Great Britain in their disposition ; but the continental powers shut their eyes to the danger which awaited them from the concentration of such powerful forces, and secretly rejoiced that the vast army from which they had all suffered so much was quietly cantoned at a distance from them on the shores of the ocean, intent on a remote and hazardous enterprise.¹

Great as these preparations were, they were not beyond the resources at the disposal of the First Consul. The army of France alone, without counting the subsidiary forces of Holland, Switzerland, and the Italian states subject to its command, amounted to the enormous aggregate of 427,000 men, independent of the national

¹ Jom. ii. 22.
Dum. x. 89.
91. Bign. iii.
169, 170.
Martens, vii.
160.

16.
Military
force and
finances of
France.

and coast guards, which were above 200,000.* The finances of the country, largely recruited by the contributions levied in other states, were in an equally flourishing condition. The revenue exceeded that of 1802, and amounted to 570,968,000 francs, or £23,000,000 sterling;† while the immense subsidies paid by Spain and Portugal as the price of their pretended neutrality—by the Italian Republic, in return for the alliance of France—and the maintenance by Hanover, Holland, Naples, and Tuscany, of all the troops cantoned in their respective territories, largely contributed to the increase of the resources of the Republic.¹

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1 Bign. iii.
245, 246.

But nothing were the government or people of England daunted by the formidable preparations which were directed against them. Relying on the patriotism and spirit of the people, the administration made the most vigorous efforts for the national defence, in which they were nobly seconded both by parliament and the people. Independent of the militia, eighty thousand strong, which were called out on the 25th March, and the regular army of a hundred and thirty thousand already voted, the House of Commons, on June 28th, agreed to the very unusual step of raising fifty thousand men additional by conscription, in the proportion of thirty-four thousand for England, ten thousand for Ireland, and six thousand for Scotland; which it was calculated would raise the regular troops in Great Britain to a hundred and twelve thousand men, exclusive of the troops in the

17.
Preparations
of England
to repel the
danger.

* The army consisted of—

Infantry,	341,000
Artillery,	26,000
Cavalry,	46,350
Invalides,	14,560

427,910

—See *Report of the Minister at War*, June 1803; DUMAS, ix. 117.

† The budget for 1803 stood thus:—

	Francs.	
Direct contributions,	305,105,000	or £12,200,000
Registers, stamps, &c.	200,106,000	„ 8,000,000
Customs,	36,924,000	„ 1,480,000
Post-Office,	11,200,000	„ 450,000
Salt-tax,	2,300,000	„ 92,000
Lottery,	15,326,000	„ 610,000
	570,961,000	or £22,832,000

—See DUC DE GAETA, i. 304.

The annual subsidy paid by the Italian Republic was 25,000,000 francs, or £1,000,000 sterling.—DUMAS, xi. 134.

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colonies, besides a large surplus force for offensive operations. In addition to this, a bill was brought in shortly afterwards, to enable the King to call on the levy *en masse* to repel the invasion of the enemy, and empowering the lords-lieutenant of the several counties to enrol all the men in the kingdom, between seventeen and fifty-five years of age, in different classes, who were to be divided into regiments according to their several ages and professions. But all persons were to be exempt from this conscription who were members of any volunteer corps approved of by his Majesty; and such was the general zeal and enthusiasm, that in a few weeks three hundred thousand men were enrolled, armed, and disciplined in the different parts of the kingdom, and the compulsory conscription fell to the ground. This immense force, which embraced all classes and professions of men, not only was of incalculable importance, by providing a powerful reserve of trained men to strengthen the ranks and supply the vacancies of the regular army, but contributed in a remarkable manner to produce a patriotic ardour and feeling of unanimity among the people, and lay the foundation of that military spirit which enabled Great Britain at length to appear as principal in the contest, and beat down the power of France, even on that element where hitherto she had obtained such unexampled success.¹

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 1604,
1627, 1630.

18.
Numbers and
warlike spirit
of the volun-
teers.

The spectacle now presented by the British islands was unparalleled in their previous history, and marked decisively the arrival of a new era in the war—that in which popular sympathy was enlisted against the Revolution, and the military usurpations of France had roused a unanimous resolution to resist its aggression. In the multitudes who now thronged to the standards of their country were to be seen men of all ranks and descriptions, from the Prince of the Blood to the labourer of the soil. The merchant left his counting-house, the lawyer his briefs; the farmer paused in the labours of husbandry, the artisan in the toils of his handicraft; the nobleman hurried from the scene of dissipation or amusement, the country gentleman was to be seen at the head of his tenantry. Every where were to be seen uniforms, squadrons, battalions; the clang of artillery was heard in the streets,

the trampling of cavalry resounded in the fields. Instead of the peasant reposing at sunset in front of his cottage, he was to be seen hurrying, with his musket on his shoulder, to his rallying point. Instead of the nobleman wasting his youth in the ignoble pleasures of the metropolis, he was to be found inhaling a nobler spirit amidst the ranks of his rural dependents. In the general excitement, even the voice of faction was stilled; the heart-burnings and divisions on the origin of the war were forgotten; the Whigs stood beside the Tories in the ranks of the volunteers; from being a war of opinion, the contest had become one of nations, and, excepting in a few inveterate leaders of party in the legislature, one feeling seemed to pervade the whole British empire.* Mr Sheridan, with that independent and patriotic spirit which ever distinguished him, at the close of the session made an eloquent speech on moving the thanks of parliament to the volunteers and yeomanry for the zeal and alacrity with which they had come forward in defence of their country; and thunders of applause shook the House when he declared it to be the unalterable resolution, not less of the legislature than the government, that "no proposal for peace should be entertained while a single French soldier had footing on British ground."¹

Nor was it at land only that preparations to resist the enemy on the most gigantic scale were made: the navy, also, the peculiar arm of British strength, received the early and vigilant attention of government. Fifty thousand seamen, including twelve thousand marines, had been in the first instance voted for the service of the year; but ten thousand additional were granted when it became probable that war would ensue, and forty thousand more when it actually broke out. Great activity was exerted in fitting out adequate fleets for all the important naval stations the moment that hostilities were resumed, although the dilapidated state of the navy, in consequence of previous ill-judged economy, rendered it a matter of extreme difficulty.² Seventy-five ships of the line, and two hundred and seventy frigates and smaller vessels,

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Aug. 10.
1 Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 1694,
1697. Dum.
x. 136.

19.
Naval pre-
parations.
Dec. 2, 1802.

March 14,
1803.

June 11.

² James, vol.
iii. Table,
No. 12. Ann.
Reg. 1803,
621 App.
to Chronicle.

* The King reviewed in Hyde Park, in October, sixty battalions of volunteers, amounting to 27,000 men, besides 1500 cavalry, all equipped at their own expense, and in a remarkable state of efficiency. The total volunteers of the metropolis were 46,000.

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were put in commission. The harbours of France and Holland were closely blockaded; Lord Nelson rode triumphant in the Mediterranean; and, excepting when their small craft were stealing round the headlands to the general rendezvous at Boulogne, the flag of France, at least in large fleets, disappeared from the ocean.

20.
Finances and
new taxes of
the year.
June 14.

No small efforts in finance were required to meet these extensive armaments by sea and land; but the resources of the country enabled government to defray them without difficulty. A property-tax of 5 per cent, which it was calculated would produce £4,500,000 yearly; additional customs to the amount of £2,000,000 a-year; additional excise duties, chiefly on malt spirits and wine, which were estimated at £6,000,000; and a loan of £12,000,000, were sufficient to enable government to meet the heavy expenses attendant on the renewal of the war, even on the extended scale on which it was now undertaken. These burdens, especially the income and malt taxes, were severe, but they were universally felt to be necessary; and such was the general enthusiasm, that the imposition of war taxes in a single year to the amount of twelve millions and a half, did not excite a single dissentient voice in parliament, or produce any dissatisfaction in the country.* What was still more extraordinary, this great increase of taxes proved entirely productive, and industry flourished with unabated vigour under the prodigious additional load thus imposed upon it.¹

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 1595.

21.
Mr Pitt's
speech on
fortifying
London.

A long and interesting debate took place in parliament, upon the question whether London should be fortified. Colonel Crawford urged strongly the great danger of the capital and the principal depot for our military and naval stores being wholly undefended; and maintained that, as matters then stood, the loss of a single battle might draw after it the surrender of the metropolis and chief arsenals of the kingdom, the effect of which, both in a political and military point of view, would be incalculable. Mr Pitt added the great weight of his authority on the same side, and strongly enforced the propriety, not only of strengthening the metropolis, or at least the arsenals in its vicinity, but of fortifying the principal headlands of the coast, in order to render landing by the enemy more

* See Appendix A, Chap. xxxvii.

difficult. "It is in vain to say," said he, "you should not fortify London, because our ancestors did not fortify it, unless you can show that they were in the same situation that we are. We might as well be told that, because our ancestors fought with arrows and lances, we ought to use them now, and consider shields and corslets as affording a secure defence against musketry and artillery. If the fortification of the capital can add to the security of the country, I think it ought to be done. If, by the erection of works such as I am recommending, you can delay the progress of the enemy for three days, it may make the difference between the safety and destruction of the capital. It will not, I admit, make a difference between the conquest and independence of the country; for that will not depend upon one or upon ten battles: but it makes the difference between the loss of thousands of lives, with misery, havoc, and desolation spread over the country on the one hand, or the confounding the efforts and chastising the insolence of the enemy on the other."¹

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¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 1659,
1662.

These arguments were little attended to at the time, and the proposed measure was not adopted: but there can be no doubt that they were well founded, and that England might have had bitter cause to regret their neglect, if Napoleon, with a hundred thousand men, had landed on the coast of Sussex. For this opinion we have now abundant grounds, in the result of the invasions of Austria, Russia, and France, at a subsequent period, when possessed of much greater military resources than were then at the command of the British government, and the best of all authority in the recorded opinion of Napoleon himself. Central fortifications near or round the metropolis are of incalculable importance, in order to gain time for the distant strength of the kingdom to assemble when it is suddenly assailed; if they had existed on Montmartre and Belleville, the invasion of the Allies in 1814, instead of terminating in the submission of France, would probably have issued in a disastrous retreat beyond the Rhine; and he is a bold man who on such a subject ventures to dissent from the concurring opinion of Mr Pitt and Napoleon.*

22.
Reflections
on this mea-
sure.

* "Napoleon says he frequently turned in his mind the propriety of fortifying Paris and Lyons; and this in an especial manner occurred to him, on occasion of his return from the campaign of Austerlitz. Fear of exciting alarm among the inhabitants, and the events which succeeded each other with such

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23.
Fresh Re-
bellion in
Ireland.

This year was again distinguished by one of those unhappy attempts at rebellion, which have so frequently of late years disgraced the history and blasted the prospects of Ireland. Though the country was disturbed by the usual amount of predial violence and outrage, no insurrection of a political nature was apprehended, when suddenly, on the 14th July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastile, unequivocal symptoms of a fermentation of a more general character were observed in the population of Dublin. It was soon discovered that a conspiracy was on foot, the object of which was to force the castle and sack the harbour and stores of the capital, dissolve the connexion with England, and establish a republic in close alliance with France. But the means at the disposal of the conspirators were as deficient as the objects they had in view were visionary and extravagant. Eighty or a hundred persons, under the guidance of Emmett, a brother of the chief who had been engaged in the former insurrection, a young man of an ardent and enthusiastic temperament, proposed, on the 23d July, to assemble in open rebellion the peasantry from the adjoining counties, who were for that purpose to flock into the metropolis, under pretence of seeking for work in hay-making, on the eve of the festival of St James; and with that motley array they were to march against a garrison consisting of above four thousand

Napoleon's
opinion on the
subject.

astonishing rapidity, prevented him from carrying his designs into execution. He thought that a great capital is the country of the flower of the nation, that it is the centre of opinion, the general depot; and that it is the greatest of all contradictions to leave a point of such importance without the means of immediate defence. At the season of great national disasters, empires frequently stand in need of soldiers, but men are never wanting for internal defence, if a place be provided where their energies can be brought into action. Fifty thousand national guards, with three thousand gunners, will defend a fortified capital against an army of three hundred thousand men. The same fifty thousand men in the open field, if they are not experienced soldiers, commanded by skilled officers, will be thrown into confusion by the charge of a few thousand horse. Paris, ten times in its former history, owed its safety to its walls: if, in 1814, it had possessed a citadel capable of holding out only for eight days, the destinies of the world would have been changed. If, in 1805, Vienna had been fortified, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the war: if, in 1806, Berlin had been fortified, the army beaten at Jena might have rallied there till the Russian army advanced to its relief: if, in 1808, Madrid had been fortified, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, and Somosierra, could never have ventured to march upon that capital, leaving the English army, in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, in its rear." Let not the English imagine, that their present naval superiority renders these observations inapplicable to their capital: it was *after* the victory of Austerlitz that the necessity of fortifying Paris occurred to the victor in that memorable fight. Who will guarantee the navy of England in all future times against a maritime crusade, and a rout of Leipsic at the mouth of the Thames?—See NAPOLEON in MONTHOLON, il. 278, 280.

men. In effect, on the day appointed the country labourers did assemble in vast numbers in St James's Street as soon as it was dark, and Emmett put himself at their head ; but he soon discovered that the insurgents were rather disposed to gratify their appetite for assassination and murder, than engage in any systematic operations for the subversion of the government. In vain he and a few other leaders, animated with sincere though deluded patriotic feeling, endeavoured to infuse some order into their ranks, and lead them against the Castle and other important points of the city. Instead of doing so, they murdered Lord Kilwarden, the venerable Lord Chief-Justice of Ireland, and Colonel Browne, a most worthy and meritorious officer, whom they met in the streets ; and, equally incapable of resolute as humane conduct, were shortly after dispersed by two volleys from a subaltern and fifty men, who unexpectedly came on the rear of their savage and disorderly columns.¹

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1803.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1803, 300,
312.

The fate of the Lord Chief-Justice was peculiarly deplorable. He arrived at the entrance of Thomas Street in his carriage, accompanied by his daughter and nephew, when the chariot was stopped, the venerable Judge and his nephew dragged out and murdered by repeated stabs from the ruffians, who struggled with each other for the gratification of striking them with their pikes. Meanwhile the young lady, whom they had the humanity to spare, fled in a state bordering on distraction through the streets, and arrived at the Castle in such agitation as to be hardly capable of recounting the tragic event which she had witnessed. A bystander, shocked at the savage ferocity of the murderers, exclaimed that the assassins should be executed next day ; but the words recalled his recollection to the upright dying magistrate, and he raised his head for the last time to exclaim, " Murder must be punished ; but let no man suffer for my death but on a fair trial, and by the laws of his country," and immediately expired. Memorable words to be uttered at such a moment by such a man, and eminently descriptive of that love of impartial justice which constitutes at once the first duty of a judge, and the noblest epitaph on his sepulchre !²

24.
Murder of the
Lord Chief-
Justice in
Dublin.

² Ann. Reg.
1803, 311,
312.

Emmett and Russel, the two leaders of the insurrection,

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XXXVII.

1803.

25.
Execution
of the ring-
leaders.

July 28.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 1671,
1675.26.
Naval events
of the year.

July 17.

Sept. 12 and
23.² Ann. Reg.
1804, p. 2.
Bign. iii. 158.

were soon after seized, brought to trial, and executed. The former made no sort of defence, but when called upon to receive sentence, stood up and avowed the treason with which he was charged, glorying in his patriotic intentions, and declaring himself a martyr to the independence and liberties of his country. At his execution he evinced uncommon intrepidity and composure, received the communion of the Church of England, and died the victim of sincere but deluded patriotism. The remaining conspirators were pardoned, upon making a full disclosure of their projects and preparations, by the judicious lenity of government; and a bill was shortly after brought in for the better suppression of insurrection, and the temporary suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland, which passed both Houses without any opposition. A frantic and unsuccessful attempt at the assassination of the King was made, in the same year, by Colonel Despard, a revolutionist of the most dangerous character, who was tried, condemned, and executed.¹

Notwithstanding the magnitude of the preparations on both sides, the naval operations of the first year of the war were inconsiderable. The French fleets were not yet in such a state of forwardness as to be able to leave their harbours in large masses; and the closeness of the British blockade prevented any considerable number of detached vessels from escaping. As usual, the effects of the English maritime superiority speedily appeared in the successive capture of the enemy's colonies. St Lucia and Tobago fell into their hands in July, and Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo in September. The planters in these sugar islands willingly yielded to the British forces, anticipating from them protection from their own slaves, whom the events in St Domingo and Guadaloupe had given them so much reason to dread, and a share in that lucrative commerce which, under the British flag, they could carry on with every part of the world, and which the almost total cessation of production in the French islands had thrown almost exclusively into their hands. Some angry disputes broke out in this year between the British government and the local legislature in Jamaica,² in consequence of the refusal of the latter to contribute the requisite supplies to the support of the large military

garrison of the island ; but they gradually gave way in the following years, in consequence of the advantageous market for their produce which the war afforded them, and the approach of real danger from the combined fleets of France and Spain.

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The first gleam of success came from the Eastern ocean, and, what was remarkable, from the merchant ships of England. Immediately after war was declared, Admiral Linois, with one sail of the line and three frigates, escaped from the roads of Pondicherry, in consequence of the British admiral on that station being ignorant of the commencement of hostilities ; and since that time he had cruised about the Indian Archipelago, capturing detached ships, and doing considerable damage to British commerce. Emboldened by this success, he lay in wait for the homeward-bound China fleet, which he expected would prove an easy prey. On the 14th February, he descried the fleet leisurely approaching, in no expectation of encountering an enemy, and anticipated little opposition ; but Commodore Dance, who commanded the British vessels, by a bold and gallant manœuvre defeated his efforts, and to his infinite honour saved the valuable property under his command from destruction. Dismissing the heavily

27.
Defeat of
Linois by the
China fleet.

Feb. 15, 1804.

laden and weaker vessels to the rear, he made the signal for the stronger and better equipped to bear down in succession upon the enemy ; and so intimidated was the French admiral by their gallant bearing and vigorous fire, that after a few broadsides he took to flight, and was pursued for above two hours by his commercial victors ! This gallant action, which confounded the enemy, and saved British property to the amount of a million and a half sterling, excited the greatest satisfaction throughout the nation.¹ Rewards were distributed with an unsparing hand by the East India Company to the various commanders and their brave crews ; and the Commodore received the honour of knighthood from his Majesty's hands. Various attacks were made in the course of the summer on the Boulogne flotilla and the squadrons of small craft proceeding to that destination ; but although the utmost gallantry was uniformly displayed by the officers and men engaged, the success obtained was in general very trifling, and bore no proportion to the loss

¹ Ann. Reg.
1804, 141,
and Chron.
409. Dum.
xi. 64, 66, 69.

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1804.

May 3.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1804, 138,
139.

sustained by the assailants. The only conquest worthy of record made by the British, either at sea or land, during the year 1804, was that of Surinam in the West Indies, which, in the beginning of May, yielded, to the great joy of the inhabitants, to a military and naval force under the command of Sir Charles Green, and Commodore afterwards Sir Samuel Hood; on which occasion also a frigate and brig fell into the hands of the victors.¹

28.
Supplies and
finances for
1804.

The supplies voted by parliament for the service of the year 1804, were much greater than for the preceding year, and the military and naval force kept on foot far more considerable.* The expenditure swelled, independent of the charges of the debt, to no less than £53,000,000, of which £42,000,000 was for the current expenditure, and £11,000,000 for retiring of Exchequer bills. The land troops of the year amounted, including twenty-two thousand in India, to above three hundred thousand men, exclusive of three hundred and forty thousand volunteers—an enormous force, capable, if properly directed, not only of repelling any attempt at invasion, but of interposing with decisive effect in any strife which might take place between France and the great military powers of the Continent. The naval forces also were very considerably augmented, there being no less than one hundred thousand men, including twenty-two thousand marines, voted for the service of the year, and eighty-three ships of the line and three hundred and ninety frigates and smaller vessels in commission.² †

² James, iii.
App. Table,
13. Ann.
Reg. 1804,
577. App. to
Chron. Parl.
Deb. ii. 351,
355.

* See Appendix B, Chap. xxxvii.

† This force was distributed as follows:—

In the British Isles,	129,039
Colonies,	38,630
India,	22,897
Recruiting,	533
Militia in Great Britain,	109,947
Regular and Militia,	301,046
Volunteers in Great Britain,	347,000
Total in Great Britain,	648,046
Irish Volunteers,	70,000
Military,	718,046
Navy,	100,000
Grand Total in arms,	818,046

—See *Parl. Deb.* i. 1678, and *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 19.

But the magnitude of their forces, compared with the inconsiderable amount of the services rendered by them to the country, ere long revealed the secret weakness of the administration. It was in vain to disguise, and fruitless to deny, that the public expenditure could not long continue at the enormous height which it had now reached, and that unless some advantages commensurate to the sacrifices made were gained, the nation must in the end sink under the weight of its exertions. To the animation, excitement, and hope which generally prevailed at the commencement of the war, had succeeded the listlessness, exhaustion, and discontent which invariably, after a certain interval, follow highly wrought and disappointed feeling. The trifling nature of the success which had been gained, notwithstanding such costly efforts, during the first year of the contest, produced a very general conviction that ministers, whatever their individual respectability or talents might be, were unequal as a body to the task of steering the vessel of the state through the shoals and quicksands with which it was surrounded; and, in particular, did not possess that weight and eminence in the estimation of foreign states, which was necessary to enable Great Britain to take her appropriate station as the leader of the general confederacy, which it was now evident was alone capable of reducing the continental power of France. This feeling was strongly increased by the complaints which generally broke out as to the reduced and inefficient state of the navy under the management of Earl St Vincent; and it soon became painfully evident, from a comparison of the vessels in commission at the close of the former and commencement of the present war, that this important arm of the public defence had declined to a very great degree during the interval of peace; and that, under the delusion of a wretched, and in the end most costly economy, the stores on which the public salvation depended had been sold and dissipated, to an extent in the highest degree alarming. The consequence was, that when war broke out the navy was in an unprecedented state of dilapidation;¹ and from the absence of convoys for our merchant fleets, and the neglect to apprise Admiral Rainier and the fleets in the East of the breaking out of hostili-

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1804.

29.

General de-
pendency
which ensued
in Britain.¹ Ann. Reg.
1804, 129,
131.

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ties by an overland dispatch, many severe losses, which might have been avoided, were sustained by the commercial interests.*

30.
Increased by
the alarming
illness of the
King.

The public despondency, already strongly excited by these untoward events, was soon after increased to the highest degree by the alarming intelligence which spread abroad as to the health of the King. On the 14th February, it was publicly announced by a bulletin at St James's Palace that his Majesty was indisposed; and a succession of similar notices soon left no doubt in the public mind that the disease was that mental malady which had plunged the nation fifteen years before in such general consternation. On this occasion the panic was still greater, from the alarming posture of public affairs, and the general distrust which prevailed as to the stability and capacity of the administration. But after an interval of a few weeks it was announced that the most distressing symptoms had abated. On the 29th February, the Chancellor of the Exchequer declared in parliament, "that there was no necessary suspension of the Royal functions." On the 14th March the Lord Chancellor stated in the House of Lords, that "he had since conversed with his Majesty, and that his mental state warranted the Lords Commissioners in expressing the royal assent to several bills which had passed through parliament;" and on the 9th and 18th May, the King drove, to the infinite joy of the inhabitants, through the principal streets of the metropolis: though it was several months afterwards before he was restored to his domestic circle, or able to undertake the whole functions of royalty.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1804, 27, 29.

* Mr Addington boasted during the peace, that if war broke out, fifty ships of the line could be equipped in a month; but when this declaration came to be put to the test, it was discovered that the royal arsenals were almost emptied, and every thing sold requisite for the naval defence of the country. Even the men-of-war on the stocks, at the close of the contest, had been left imperfect, and the hands employed upon them dismissed. In the general penury which prevailed, neither vessels could be procured for the King's squadrons, nor convoys provided for the merchant service. When the royal message was delivered to parliament, on 8th March 1803, there was hardly a ship of war either ready or in a state of forwardness; and the greatest aversion to the public service pervaded every department of the navy. The consequence was, that notwithstanding the utmost efforts to repair the ruinous economy and dilapidations of the two preceding years, the ships in commission on the 5th January 1804, were only 356, of which 75 were of the line: whereas in the commencement of 1801 the number had been 472, of which 100 were of the line.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 130, 131; and *JAMES'S Naval Hist.* iii. Tables No. 9 and 13.

But during this interval of doubt and alarm, the minds of the great majority of men throughout the nation became convinced of the necessity of placing the helm of the state under firmer guidance, and all eyes were naturally turned to that illustrious statesman, who had retired only to make way for a pacific administration, and could now, in strict accordance with his uniform principles, resume the direction of the second war with revolutionary France. As usual in such cases, the gradual approximation of parties in the House of Commons indicated the conversion of the public mind; and it soon became evident that the administration was approaching its dissolution. On the 15th March matters came to a crisis. Mr Pitt made a long and elaborate speech, in the course of which he commented with great severity on the maladministration of the royal navy under the present government, and concluded by moving for returns of all the ships in commission in 1793, 1801, and 1803. He was cordially supported by Mr Fox and Mr Sheridan; and it became evident that a coalition had taken place between the Whig and Tory branches of the Opposition. The motion was lost by a majority of seventy; there being one hundred and thirty for it, and two hundred against it. But from the character and weight of the men who voted, it was easy to see that the ministry were rapidly sinking, and that they only retained office till their successors could be appointed, which the unhappy condition of the King rendered a doubtful period.¹ In effect, their majority went on continually declining; and on the 25th April, in a question on the army of reserve, it was only thirty-seven. It was now openly stated by ministers that they only held office during the continuance of a delicate state of public affairs; the Opposition, seeing their object gained, suspended all further attacks till the King's health was restored; and on the 12th May, the day after he had appeared in public, it was formally announced in the House of Lords that ministers had resigned, and their successors had been appointed.²

It was at first expected that a coalition was to be formed as the basis of the new administration; but it was soon discovered, both that there was an irreconcilable

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XXXVII.

1804.

31.

All eyes are
turned to Mr
Pitt, and co-
alition against
the ministry.

March 15.

¹ Parl. Deb.
i. 866, 927.

May 12.
² Ann. Reg.
1804, 80, 84.
Parl. Deb. i.
319, 409.

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XXXVII.

1804.

32.

Mr Pitt be-
comes Prime
Minister.

difference between the opinions of the leaders of the different parties on the chief subjects of policy, and also that there were scruples in the royal breast against the admission of Mr Fox, which rendered his accession to the cabinet nearly impracticable. The new ministry, therefore, was formed exclusively of Tories; and a majority of it was composed of members of the late cabinet. The material changes were, that Mr Pitt was made First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, in room of Mr Addington; Lord Melville First Lord of the Admiralty, in room of Earl St Vincent; and Lord Harrowby Foreign Secretary, in lieu of Lord Hawkesbury.* Lord Grenville, the able and faithful supporter of Mr Pitt during the former war, declined to take office, assigning as a reason that it was formed on too narrow a basis, at a time when the public dangers called for a coalition of all the leading men in the state to give vigour and unanimity to the national councils; an opinion in which he was joined by a great proportion of the men of moderate principles throughout the country. Yet Mr Pitt probably judged rightly in constructing his cabinet entirely of men of his own principles, as experience has proved that no individual talent, how great soever, can withstand the loss of character consequent on an abandonment of principle. Thence it is that coalition administrations have seldom any long existence.¹

The vigour and decision of Mr Pitt's councils speedily appeared in the confederacy which he formed of the continental states, on the greatest scale, to stem the progress of French ambition. Nor was the ability and energy of Lord Melville less conspicuous in the rapid restoration of the navy, from a state of unexampled decrepitude and decay, to a degree of exaltation and lustre unprecedented even in its long and glorious annals. Every thing was to

¹ Lord Grenville's Letter to Mr Pitt, Ann. Reg. 1804, 123, 125.

33.
Vigorous measures of Lord Melville for the restoration of the navy.

* The new Cabinet stood thus:—

Mr Pitt, Premier.
Duke of Portland, President of the Council.
Lord Eldon, Lord Chancellor.
Earl of Westmoreland, Privy Seal.
Earl of Chatham, Master-General of the Ordnance.
Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board of Control.
Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.
Lord Harrowby, Foreign Affairs.
Earl of Camden, War and the Colonies.
Lord Mulgrave, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

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1804.

be done ; for such was the mutilated and shattered state of the fleet, and to such an extent had the disastrous spirit of parsimonious reform been carried, that when stores and timber were offered at comparatively moderate terms, they were refused by the late Admiralty, and suffered to be sold to the agents of the country, rather than deviate from their pernicious economy, even in the purchase of those articles which were in daily consumption. The consequence was, that Lord Melville was compelled to accept the offers of timber, stores, and masts, at whatever price the contractors chose to demand ; and the savings of one naval administration entailed a quadruple expenditure upon that which succeeded it. But by strenuous exertions, and at an enormous cost, the defects were at last made up ; the deficiencies were supplied by the purchase of East India vessels, and by contracting for the repairs of others ; and the old practice of building prospectively for the service of future years, which had been abandoned in the fervour of ill-judged economy, was again resumed with the very best effects to the public service. The results of the admirable vigour and efficiency which the new First Lord of the Admiralty introduced into every part of the civil department of the navy, were soon conspicuous. Instead of three hundred and fifty-six vessels, including seventy-five of the line, which alone were in commission in the beginning of 1804, there were four hundred and seventy-three, including eighty-three of the line, ready for sea in the beginning of 1805 ; eighty vessels of war, including twenty-six of the line, were in a few months far advanced on the stocks ; and the navy was already afloat which was destined to carry the thunder of the British arms to the shoals of Trafalgar.¹

¹ James, iii.
App. Nos. 12,
13. Ann.
Reg. 137.

Nor was the conduct of Lord Melville less beneficial in the civil regulations introduced for the increase of the comfort and health of the sailors. Many admirable practical improvements were established ; many experienced evils removed ; the wives of absent seamen allowed to draw a certain proportion of their wages during their absence, at the nearest harbour to their places of residence ; several serious abuses as regarded the food, clothing, and pay of the men corrected ; and the foundation laid for that excellent system of management which is

^{34.}
And admirable civil
regulations
for that service.

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ultimately, it is to be hoped, destined to wipe the stain of impressment, with all its concomitant evils, from the British constitution. The merits of the new Admiralty on these subjects, however, were neither generally known to, nor appreciated by, the country. In hostile projects they were, for the first year of their administration, by no means fortunate. From unacquaintance with nautical subjects, they lent too credulous ears to the designs of visionary projectors: repeated unsuccessful attacks on the French flotilla tarnished the reputation of the navy; and the total failure of an attempt to blow it up by means of infernal machines, called Catamarans, exposed it to the ridicule of all Europe.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1804, 141,
143. Dum.
xi. 26, 51.

35.
Alexander's
difference
with France.

While these vast preparations on either side were making in England and France, for the prosecution of the war, events were occurring destined ere long to rekindle the flames of war on the Continent. Notwithstanding the high admiration which Alexander felt for Napoleon, and the open support which he had given to his policy in the matter of the German indemnities, events soon occurred which produced first a coldness, and at length a rupture between them. The first of these arose out of the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, which stipulated that Malta should be placed under the guarantee of the great powers, and especially Russia, Austria, and Prussia. No sooner was the war renewed, than England made the most strenuous exertions to induce the Czar to accept the office of mediator between the contending powers in regard to this matter; and Napoleon could not refuse to accede to the proposal. After a long negotiation, however, it came to nothing. While Talleyrand was prodigal of protestations in regard to the sincere desire of the First Consul to submit to the decision of so magnanimous and just a potentate, he took care to make no concessions whatever calculated to restore the peace of Europe. The Russian monarch, by his rescript of May 24, insisted that, as a basis of the arrangement, the neutrality of the north of Germany and the Neapolitan territory should, in the event of war, be maintained inviolate, in terms of the secret articles of the treaty of 11th October, 1801;² but hardly was this basis laid down when Hanover was

May 24,
1803.

¹ Bign. iii.
108, 111.
Dum. x. 5
and 6.

invaded by the army of Mortier, and Naples, as far as Tarentum, overrun by that of St Cyr.

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1804.

The consequence of this double breach of engagement eventually was the revival of the coalition. Russia and France, indeed, easily came to an understanding on the subject of Switzerland, the Czar agreeing to leave the First Consul undisturbed in his usurpation over the Helvetic confederacy, provided the latter would not interfere in his arrangements concerning the Ionian Isles; but, on other and more vital points, it was soon discovered that their pretensions were irreconcilable. Napoleon proposed that Malta should be garrisoned by Russian troops for as many years as should be deemed necessary; Lampedosa be ceded to Britain; Switzerland and Holland evacuated by the French troops; and the acquisitions of France in Italy recognised by England. The British government, on the other hand, offered to submit all their differences with France to the decision of Alexander, and insisted that the evacuation of Hanover and the north of Germany should be a part of the arrangement; but to this Napoleon positively refused to accede. This matter was soon warmly taken up by the Russian cabinet, especially after the occupation of Cuxhaven by the French troops, and the closing of the Elbe and the Weser to British vessels—measures utterly subversive of the neutrality of Germany, and in which the Duke of Oldenburg, brother-in-law to the Emperor, whose territories were next threatened by Gallic invasion, was in an especial manner interested. The continued occupation of Tarentum by the French troops also irritated the Russian cabinet, as well as the failure to provide an indemnity to the King of Sardinia for his continental dominions, as stipulated in the same treaties; and to such a height did the mutual exasperation arrive, that, before the end of 1803, M. Markoff, the Russian ambassador, was received with so much indignity, in a public audience, by the First Consul, that he was recalled, and M. D'Oubril, the chargé-d'affaires, alone left at the French capital.¹

36
Which leads
to the recall
of the Russian
ambassador
from Paris.

June 18,
1803.

¹ Rign. iii.
205, 225.
Dum. x. 6.

Prussia at first warmly seconded Russia in its remonstrances against the occupation of the north of Germany, and especially the levying of heavy requisitions on Hamburg and the Elector of Hesse-Cassel by the French

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XXXVII.

1804.

37.
Napoleon
gains over
Prussia by
hinting at its
getting Han-
over.July 30,
1803.

Nov. 1803.

troops. But Napoleon threw out a lure to the cabinet of Berlin, which speedily caused its efforts in that direction to slacken. He directed his diplomatic agents at that capital to drop hints, that possibly the electorate of Hanover might, in the event of Prussia withdrawing her opposition to France, be incorporated with her monarchy; and though the Prussian ministers did not venture to close at once with so scandalous an aggression, yet, actuated partly by the desire of securing so glittering a prize, partly by a wish to be freed from the disagreeable vicinity of the French soldiers, they proposed to Napoleon that his troops should evacuate Hanover, which should be occupied till a general peace by those of the Prussian monarchy. Napoleon declined to accede to such an arrangement, but offered, on condition of an alliance, offensive and defensive, being entered into with France, to cede in perpetuity Hanover to that power. Prussia had the virtue or the prudence to resist this insidious offer, and reverted to the proposal that the French troops should retire from the north of Germany, and the First Consul should respect the neutrality of the empire. It was suggested that, in consideration of this, Prussia should engage that, during the continuance of the war, France should neither be attacked by Germany, nor across Germany. This proposition, however, by no means suited the great designs which Napoleon had already formed of forcing all the neutral powers into a general confederacy against England, and, in consequence, the negotiation fell to the ground, leaving only the Prussian cabinet, unhappily for itself, a secret desire for the possession of the Hanoverian states, which long prevented them from joining in the general league against French usurpation.¹*

1 Bign. iii.
230, 233.

Matters were in this state when the arrest and execu-

* The working of this feeling may be discerned in the secret instructions sent to the Marquis Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, on 17th December 1803. He was directed, if possible, to conclude a convention, containing a secret article, in these terms:—"Without entering into any formal stipulation as to the fate of the electorate of Hanover, which the events of the maritime war and the negotiations for a general peace will determine, the First Consul, considering that the geographical position of Prussia renders these arrangements of more importance to her than to any other power, engages to keep chiefly in view the interest of his Prussian Majesty in all the discussions which the destination of that country may give rise to." Napoleon, however, declined to accede to any such half measures.—See BIGNON, *iii.* 232, 233.

tion of the Duc d'Enghien excited a unanimous feeling of horror through Europe, and universally overwhelmed the French partisans by the indignation which it aroused in every virtuous mind. The impulse given by this deed, not less impolitic than criminal, to the fermenting elements of a coalition against France, was immense. The court of St Petersburg went into deep mourning on the occasion, and sent orders to all its diplomatic ministers at foreign courts to do the same; that of Stockholm followed the example; and M. D'Oubril, on the part of his Imperial Majesty, presented an energetic remonstrance on the occasion, both to the diet at Ratisbon and to the cabinet of the Tuileries. This produced a vigorous reply from the First Consul, written in his usual powerful manner, but with so little circumspection, that it was evidently calculated to widen instead of closing the breach already existing between the two powers. "The complaint of Russia on this matter," said he, "leads one to ask whether, when England meditated the assassination of Paul, and it was known that the proposed assassins were within a league of the frontier, the Russian government could have had any hesitation in seizing them? A war, conducive, as any struggle between France and Russia ever must be, to no other interests but those of England, will never be voluntarily undertaken by the First Consul; but, commence it who will, he would prefer it to a state of things derogatory in the slightest degree to the equality subsisting between the great powers. He claims no superiority over them, but he will submit to no degradation. He interferes with none of the measures of the Russian cabinet, and he requires a corresponding forbearance on their part." Similar explosions took place between the diplomatic agents of the two powers at the diet of Ratisbon; and, resolved to have the lead in provoking a rupture, if it should arise, Napoleon sent instructions to his ambassador, General Hédouville, to quit St Petersburg in forty-eight hours, and leave only a chargé-d'affaires there. "Know," said he, "as your final instructions, that the First Consul has no desire for war; but he fears no human being."¹

As a sort of counterpoise to the powerful feeling excited against them by the tragic fate of the Duc

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38.

Immense sensation excited by the death of the Duc d'Enghien.
March 21.

¹ State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1804, 644. Bign. iii. 439, 441.

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39.
French gov-
ernment
endeavours a
set-off by fal-
sifying Mr
Drake's pro-
ceedings at
Stuttgart.

March 21,
and April 11,
1804.

d'Enghien, the French government, shortly after that catastrophe, published, by means of Regnier the head of the police, the particulars of some steps taken towards effecting a counter-revolution in France by the British government, in which Mr Drake, their accredited envoy at the court of Bavaria, and Mr Spencer Smith, the chargé-d'affaires at the Electoral court of Wirtemberg, were the chief agents. They made a very great handle of this transaction, and endeavoured, by a forced and unnatural construction of the expressions employed by these gentlemen, in their instructions to the leaders of the malcontent party in France, to make it appear that their object was not merely a counter-revolution, but the assassination of the First Consul. A simple quotation, however, of the expressions used, as given in their own report, is sufficient to demonstrate that this was not the case, and that nothing was aimed at but the subversion of the existing government; a project in which it was never supposed diplomatic characters were forbidden to enter towards powers in hostility with their country, and in which almost all the ambassadors of France, throughout the revolutionary war, were actively engaged.* It clearly appeared, however, that, though well qualified to meet the French forces in the field, England was no match for their police agents in a transaction of this description; for the publication of Regnier revealed the infortifying

* Mr Drake's instructions to his agents are thus given in the official report by the French police:—"Art. 2. The principal object in view being the overthrow of the present government, one of the chief means of accomplishing this is by obtaining knowledge of the plans of the enemy. For this purpose it is of the utmost consequence to begin by establishing a correspondence with the different bureaux for obtaining information as to the plans going forward, both for the exterior and the interior. 7. To gain over those employed in the powder-mills, so as to be able to blow them up as occasion may require. 8. It is necessary to gain over a certain number of printers and engravers that may be relied on, to print and execute every thing that the confederacy may stand in need of. 9. It is much to be wished that a perfect knowledge may be gained of the situation of the different parties in France, and particularly at Paris. 13. It is well understood, that every means must be taken to disorganise the armies both in and out of the Republic." The report adds, that in his intercepted correspondence, Mr Drake says, "If you see any means of extricating any of Georges' associates, do not fail to make use of them;" and again, "I earnestly request you to print and distribute a short address to the army. The main object is to gain partisans among the military; for I am thoroughly persuaded that it is through the army alone that we can reasonably hope to gain the object so much desired." In a subsequent report, mention is made of a project for getting possession of the fortresses of Huningen and Strasburg; but nowhere is there the slightest allusion to the commission of assassination, or any illegal or disgraceful acts.—See *Report* by REGNIER, 24th March, and 11th April, 1804; *State Papers, Ann. Reg.* 1804, 620, 625.

fact, that the whole correspondence both of Drake and Spencer Smith had been regularly transmitted, as fast as it took place, to the police of Paris; and that their principal correspondent in that city, M. Mehu de la Touche, was himself an agent of the police, employed to tempt the British envoys into this perilous enterprise.¹ But that neither the British government nor their diplomatic agents ever entertained any projects of assassination against the First Consul, or any other means of annoyance but those of open hostility, is admitted by the person in the world who had the best opportunity of information on this subject, the private secretary of Napoleon himself;* and it is difficult to see how the First Consul could object to diplomatic characters in other countries engaging in attempts to overturn revolutionary governments in hostility with their own, when his own brother Joseph, during his embassy at Rome, was, with his knowledge and authority, actively engaged in a conspiracy which overturned the Papal government in 1797; and the French ambassador at Venice, in 1796, took so active a part in the democratic conspiracy which led to the destruction, by his means, of that ancient republic.^{2†}

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¹ Report by Regnier, April 14, 1804. State Papers, 624, 625, Ann. Reg. 1804.

² Hard. Memoirs, v.

* "I can affirm," says Bourrienne, "with perfect confidence, that the British government have constantly rejected with indignation, not indeed the projects submitted to them for overturning the Consular or Imperial government, but all designs of assassination or personal violence against the First Consul and the Emperor. Positive proof of this will be found in the subsequent part of these memoirs."—BOURRIENNE, v. 12. Again, the same author adds, "All the correspondence, which scandalised every honest man, on this subject, was the work of the perfidious suggestions of the secret agents of police, of whom Mehu de la Touche was the chief, who acted in the perilous but lucrative line of double espionage. I can affirm as a positive fact, that during the six years that I spent at Hamburg, I was in a situation to *know every thing*; and I can with confidence affirm, that neither in my public character nor private relations have I ever discovered the smallest evidence to warrant the assertion that the English government was ever engaged in any plots of a dishonourable character."—BOUR. vi. 207.

† "Should the Pope die," said Napoleon to his brother Joseph, when ambassador at Rome in 1797, "you must exert yourself to the utmost to prevent another being appointed, and to bring about a Revolution."—*Confidential dispatch of NAPOLEON to JOSEPH*, dated Passeriano, 20th September 1797. "What you have to do," said Talleyrand, in his confidential dispatch of 10th October following, "is to take care that the *reign of the Popes shall cease*; and to encourage the disposition of the people for liberty, you must proclaim at Rome a representative government, and deliver Europe from the Papal supremacy; taking care, at the same time, to secure for us Ancona, with a suitable extent of maritime territory."—See HARDENBERG'S *Memoirs*, v. 186, 192. These were the instructions of Napoleon and the French government to an ambassador at the court of a friendly power, for the purpose of revolutionising that very power; whereas the acts complained of on the part of the English diplomatic agents were all directed against France, with whom their sovereign was in a state of declared hostility.

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40.
Opinions of
the diplo-
matic body at
Paris on the
subject.1 State
Papers, 630,
638, Ann.
Reg. 1804.Note of Lord
Hawkesbury
on the subject.
April 30.And answer
of Talleyrand.
Sept. 6.

The publication of the details of this abortive attempt at a counter-revolution in France, which were officially communicated to the whole foreign ambassadors at Paris, led to answers from all the members of that body, which are curious, as evincing the different degrees of subjection in which the European potentates were then kept by the French ruler. The answer of the Russian ambassador was evasive, amounting to nothing but a declaration in favour of the rights of nations; that of the Austrian equally ambiguous; but those of Prussia and all the lesser powers were more or less an echo of the sentiments of the French government on the occasion, and clearly indicated the paramount ascendancy exercised over their minds by the ruler of its military force. Lord Hawkesbury, as the official organ of the British government, also published a manifesto on the subject, which was followed by an answer from Talleyrand on the part of the French cabinet; but the interest of these manifestos was soon lost in the whirl of more important events, arising out of the ceaseless advance of French ambition.¹*

This attempt on the part of the French government to turn aside a portion of the odium which attached to them

* Lord Hawkesbury observed, in the British note, "That his Majesty's government should disregard the feelings of such of the inhabitants of France as are justly discontented with the existing government of that country; that he should refuse to listen to their designs for delivering that country from the degrading yoke of bondage under which it groans, or to give them aid and assistance, so far as those designs are fair and justifiable—would be to refuse fulfilling those duties which every wise and just government owes to itself and to the world in general, under circumstances similar to the present. Belligerent powers have an acknowledged right to avail themselves of all discontents that may exist in countries with which they may be at war. The exercise of that right, even if in any degree doubtful, would be fully sanctioned in the present case, not only by the present state of the French nation, but by the conduct of the government of that country, which, since the commencement of the present war, has constantly kept up communications with the disaffected in the territories of his Majesty, and has assembled at the present moment on the coast of France a corps of Irish rebels, destined to second them in their designs against that part of the United Kingdom. In the application of these principles, his Majesty has commanded me to declare, besides, that his government have never authorised a single act which could not stand the test of the strictest principles of justice, and of usages recognised and practised in all ages. If any minister, accredited at a foreign court, has kept up correspondence with persons resident in France, with a view to obtain information as to the designs of the French government, or for any other legitimate purpose, he has done nothing more than what ministers, under similar circumstances, have always been considered as having a right to do, and much less than the ministers and commercial agents of France have done towards the disaffected in his Majesty's territories."

To this it was replied by M. Talleyrand, "In every country, and in every age, the ministry of diplomatic agents has been held in veneration among men; ministers of peace, organs of conciliation, their presence is an augury of wisdom, justice, and happiness. England, on the contrary, wishes that its diplomatic agents should be the promoters of plots, the agents of troubles, the correspon-

throughout Europe in consequence of the violation of the territory of Baden and murder of the Duc d'Enghien, was attended with very little success. The Russian cabinet, now fully wakened to a sense of the imminent danger arising from the evident resolution of the First Consul to extend his power over the whole Continent, and feeling the personal slights put upon the Emperor Alexander in the correspondence of Napoleon, were resolute in demanding satisfaction; and on the 21st July a most important note was presented by M. D'Oubril, which at once announced the basis of a new coalition against France. In this able document it was stated, that no government could behold with indifference the dreadful blow given to the independence and security of nations by the recent arrest and execution of the Duc d'Enghien: that Russia, by the peace of Teschen, engaged to guarantee and act as mediator in the settlement of the German Empire, and in that character was not only entitled, but bound to interfere in that matter: that, desirous to extinguish the flames of war, she had since proposed to act as mediator between France and England, but was not accepted: that since the renewal of the war the French government had evinced a determination to disregard all

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41.

Warlike note
presented by
D'Oubril on
the part of
Russia to Na-
poleon.
July 21.

dents of vile spies, and profligate emissaries: it charges them to foment seditions, to provoke and reward assassination, and pretends to cover these infamous proceedings with the respect and inviolability that belongs to the ministers of kings and the pacificators of nations. 'Diplomatic agents,' says Lord Hawkesbury, 'are not permitted to conspire in the country where they reside, against the laws of that country, but they are subject to no such restriction in regard to the states for which they are not accredited.' Admirable restriction! Europe will be covered with conspiracies, but the defenders of public right will have no cause of complaint: some distance will always intervene between the chief conspirator and his accomplices; Lord Hawkesbury's ministers will pay the crimes which they instigate; but they will have sufficient deference to appearances to avoid being at once their instigators and witnesses. Such maxims are the height of hypocrisy and audacity: never did government make so barefaced a sport of the opinion of cabinets and the conscience of nations. The Emperor is resolved to put a stop to proceedings so fatal to humanity; and you are therefore invited to communicate to your government, that the French government will not recognise the English diplomacy in Europe, until the English cabinet shall cease to charge its ministers with warlike commissions, and restrain them to their proper functions." It is curious to recollect that this tirade, which proceeds entirely upon the false assumption that the British envoys were implicated in plots for assassination, emanated from Napoleon and Talleyrand, who directed Joseph Buonaparte, in 1797, to revolutionise Rome, the very state at which he was the ambassador of the French Republic. — See *State Papers, Ann. Reg.* 1804, 602; and *DUMAS*, x. 279-280. A similar attempt was made by the Prince of Peace to charge Mr Frere, the English ambassador at Madrid, with having let fall in conversation some expressions favourable to the assassination of Napoleon; but this immediately drew forth a positive and indignant denial from that gentleman, and, from the degraded character of the Spanish favourite, obtained no credit in Europe.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1805, 124-125.

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the rights of neutral powers, by marching its troops to the coasts of the Adriatic, and levying contributions on, and taking military possession of, the Hanse Towns, though these states had no connexion whatever with the depending contest: that Portugal and Spain had been compelled to purchase their neutrality by enormous pecuniary sacrifices: that Switzerland, Holland, and great part of Italy were mere French provinces; that one part of the German empire was occupied by the French troops, and in another arrests were committed by French detachments, in open violation of the law of nations: that Russia had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of France, but neither could she remain a passive spectator of the successive trampling under foot of all the weaker states of Europe by its armies; nor could she overlook the insult offered to his Imperial Majesty in alluding to the death of his father, and advancing a totally groundless charge, in relation to that matter, against Great Britain, which France never ceases to calumniate, merely because she is at war with it. The note concluded by declaring that M. D'Oubril had been ordered to state that he could not prolong his stay in Paris unless the following points were adjusted:—"1. That, conformably to the fourth and fifth articles of the secret convention of 11th October, 1801, the French troops should be ordered to evacuate the kingdom of Naples; and having done so, its government should engage to respect the neutrality of that power during the remainder of the war. 2. That, in pursuance of the second article of the same treaty, the French government should agree in future to act in close concert with his Imperial Majesty for the settlement of the affairs of the Italian peninsula. 3. That he should engage, in conformity with the sixth article of the same convention, and of the promises so often repeated to Russia, to provide without delay an indemnity to the King of Sardinia for the losses he has sustained. 4. That, in virtue of the obligation implied in a common mediation and guarantee, the French government should engage to evacuate the north of Germany, and undertake to respect strictly in future the neutrality of the Germanic confederacy."

¹ State
Papers, 648,
Ann. Reg.
1804.

However just and conformable to the letter as well as the spirit of preceding treaties these demands may have

been, it was hardly to be expected that the First Consul would accede to them, or permit France openly to recede before Russia; and it is therefore probable that in making this demand in such peremptory terms, the Russian cabinet had it in view to establish a basis on which, at some future period, they might found the resumption of hostilities. M. Talleyrand answered the note on the 29th of the same month, and declared,—“Whenever the court of Russia shall fulfil the articles of its treaty with France, the latter will be ready to execute them with the same fidelity. If the cabinet of St Petersburg is of opinion that it has claims on that of Paris, in consequence of the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of the secret convention of 1801, France also claims the execution of the third article of the same treaty, which provides that the two contracting parties shall not suffer their respective subjects to maintain any correspondence, direct or indirect, with the enemies of the two states; a wise provision, which has been totally neglected by the Imperial ambassador, M. Markoff, the true author of the disunion and coldness between the two powers, and who, during his residence at Paris, has even gone so far as to lend the asylum to which he was entitled to the hired agents of England. Was the mourning assumed by the Russian court for a man whom the French tribunals had condemned for having conspired against the safety of the First Consul, conformable to the letter or spirit of this article? The French government demands the execution of the ninth article of the secret convention, in which the two contracting parties mutually guarantee the independence of the Republic of the Seven Isles, and that no foreign troops shall remain in it; stipulation evidently violated by Russia, since she has continued to retain her troops there; reinforced them in an ostentatious manner; and changed the government of the country without any concert with France. Finally, France claims the execution of the eleventh article of the same treaty, which evidently requires that, instead of evincing a spirit so unduly partial to England, and rendering itself perhaps the first auxiliary of its ambition, Russia should unite with France to consolidate a general peace, and re-establish a just equilibrium in the different parts of the world, to secure the liberty of the seas.”¹

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42.

Talleyrand's
answer.

¹ State
Papers, 649.
650, Ann.
Reg. 1804.

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43.
Further me-
morial of
Russia.

The same views were more fully unfolded in a subsequent memorial presented by M. D'Oubril to the French cabinet on August 28th. The Russian minister there loudly complained that the King of Sardinia, stripped of all his continental dominions by the union of Piedmont to France, still remains without the indemnity so often promised by France ; that the King of Sardinia and the north of Germany are still oppressed by the burdensome presence of the French troops ; that the organisations of the whole of Italy has been changed by the innovation of the French government, without any concert with his Imperial Majesty ; and replied to the charge of the cabinet of the Tuileries, with regard to the ninth article of the secret convention, "That if the Russian troops have a second time occupied the Ionian Islands, it is with the consent of the Ottoman Porte, at the request of the inhabitants, and in virtue of a previous concert with France. The Emperor only awaits the intelligence of his chargé-d'affaires' departure from Paris to give notice to the French mission to quit his capital. He beholds with regret the necessity under which he is laid of suspending his relations with a government which refuses to perform its engagements ; but he will remain in that suspensive position, which it lies on the French government to convert, if it pleases, into one of open hostility." This note remained without any answer ; and on the day following, M. D'Oubril received his passports, with the intimation, however, that it was expected he would not cross the frontier till he received intelligence that the French chargé-d'affaires had left the Russian territories, and he remained accordingly at Mayence. War was not yet openly proclaimed between the two empires, but it could hardly be said that peace existed ; and its open declaration was evidently postponed only for a convenient opportunity. And when the accession of Napoleon to the imperial throne was notified to the court of St Petersburg, the Emperor refused to recognise his new title, even after it had been acceded to by the sovereign whose dignity it appeared more immediately to affect—the Emperor of Austria. The warlike intentions of Russia during this year were not confined to diplomatic manifestoes. Independent of several lesser

squadrons which were cruising in the Baltic, a fleet of nine ships of the line and several frigates passed the Sound, and sailed round by the Straits of Gibraltar towards the Adriatic Sea; while several expeditions from Sebastopol proceeded through the Dardanelles in the same direction, and disembarked seven thousand men in the Ionian Islands. The army was every where put on the most efficient footing, vacancies filled up, new levies ordered, and every thing done which could enable Russia to interpose with a weight proportioned to its strength in the great conflict which was approaching in Western Europe.¹

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¹ State
Papers, Ann.
Reg. 1804,
951, 953.
Bign. iii. 452,
454. Dum.
xi. 53, 55.

While the political horizon was thus overshadowed by clouds in the northern hemisphere, Austria continued faithful to her system of maintaining a strict neutrality, and repairing in silence the breaches in her army and finances which had been produced by the disasters of preceding years. An event occurred, however, in the course of the year, which proved that the spirit of the Imperial cabinet was far from being extinguished, and that Austria might still be calculated upon to bear a prominent part in any coalition which might be formed for the maintenance of the independence of Europe. The Elector of Bavaria had become entangled in some very unpleasant disputes with the nobles of the equestrian order, as they were called; (that is, the nobles who held directly of the empire, and were subject to no other jurisdiction, wherever their territories might be locally situated, who had fallen under his dominion on the partition of the indemnities.) The Elector, considering them as to all intents and purposes his subjects, had summoned them to meet him at Bamberg, to settle the point in dispute between them; but they had refused, and applied to the Emperor, who supported their pretensions to independence of the Elector's government. Upon this the Elector appealed to the First Consul; but, however well inclined he might have been, in general, to support any sovereign who resisted the jurisdiction and weakened the authority of the Emperor, he had no desire to see Austria added to the number of his enemies in the present threatening aspect of affairs in the north of Europe.²

44.
Pacific sys-
tem of Aus-
tria.

² Ann. Reg.
1804, 190
Bign. iv. 1, 9.

The Elector, therefore, received, to his no small astonish-

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1804.

45.

Its conduct
on the death
of the Duc
d'Enghien,
and the affair
of Drake and
Spencer
Smith.
Jan. 24.
Jan. 28.

ment, a notification that he must not oppose the rights of the Emperor in this particular, and also give satisfaction to Austria for the seizure of the Oberhausen, a district situated on the frontiers, near the Inn, the year before, and long the subject of contention between the two powers. By a solemn decree of the Aulic Council, the nobles of the equestrian order throughout the empire were confirmed in all the privileges which belonged to them before the division of the indemnities ; and the execution of this decree by force of arms was committed to the Archduke of Austria, and the Electors of Saxony and Baden ; a result which contributed in no small degree to restore the influence of the Emperor throughout Germany, and revive the ancient respect for the majesty of his undefined authority which preceding events had so much impaired. Careful, however, not to hazard the advantage thus gained by any premature or unsupported measure of hostility towards France, the cabinet of Vienna abstained from expressing any open indignation at the violation of the territory of the empire at Ettenheim, and gave an answer rather favourable than otherwise to the circular transmitted to the diplomatic body at Paris, relative to the affair of Drake and Spencer Smith. Nay, they at once ordered the French emigrants to quit their territories, when the First Consul represented that their residence there gave umbrage to the government of France. Notwithstanding these pacific steps, however, the armaments in the interior went on without intermission ; magazines were formed in Styria, Carinthia, at Venice, and in the Tyrol ; the army was gradually increasing in strength, and reviving in spirit ; and an attentive observer could discern, amidst a constant interchange of pacific assurances, appearances not a little indicative of an approaching rupture.¹

¹ Bign. iv.
12, 13, 19.
Ann. Reg.
1804, 190,
194.

46.
Recognises
Napoleon's
imperial title.

Matters were in this state between the cabinets of Vienna and the Tuileries, when the elevation of Napoleon to the Imperial dignity opened up, apparently, a fresh subject of discord between the two powers. But, instead of testifying any repugnance at this step, the Austrian cabinet had the address to make it a ground for adopting a measure which had been long in their contemplation, but for which a favourable opportunity had not yet

arrived ; viz. the assumption of the title of Emperors of Austria by the House of Lorraine, and rendering it hereditary in their family. After a long correspondence between the two cabinets, this matter was adjusted to their mutual satisfaction, and on the 11th August, immediately after the Emperor, in a full council, had recognised the title of Emperor Napoleon, he assumed for himself and his successors in the Austrian dominions the title of "Emperor of Austria." The motive for this step was declared to be "the preservation of that degree of equality which should subsist between the great powers and the just rank of the House and State of Austria among the nations of Europe." The step was justified on "the precedent formerly afforded by the assumption of the Imperial crown by the Czars of Russia, and more recently by the ruling sovereign of France ;" and though it at first excited considerable jealousy among the lesser princes of Germany, yet they soon all recognised the new and hereditary title of the Emperor ; and it was ere long acquiesced in by all the potentates of Europe, those under the influence of Napoleon, not less than those who were opposed to him ; by the first, because it afforded some countenance to the recent assumption of the imperial dignity by the French ruler : by the latter, because it promised to consolidate in the Austrian dominions some counterpoise to his power.¹

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Aware that the cabinet of Vienna would endeavour, on the first favourable opportunity, to regain some of its lost possessions, and that its friendly dispositions could not with certainty be calculated upon for any length of time, Napoleon was urgent in his endeavours, during the whole of this year, to draw closer the cords which united France to Prussia. The murder of the Duc d'Enghien had awakened at Berlin, as elsewhere, the most profound feelings of indignation ; and in the consternation with which it overwhelmed the friends of France, might be seen, says the panegyrist of Napoleon, the clearest evidence that "more than even a crime, that act was a fault."² But though the Anti-Gallican party was greatly strengthened, it was not placed in possession of power by that event. The policy of the cabinet still continued to be guided by French influence ; and accordingly the

¹ State Papers, 695. Ann. Reg. 1804. Bign. iv. 22, 20.

47. Temporising policy of Prussia.

² Bign. iv. 32.

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King of Prussia was among the first of the greater powers which formally recognised the title of the French Emperor. When the menaces of Russia gave reason to apprehend an immediate rupture in the north, it became of the utmost moment for Napoleon to secure, if not the alliance, at least the neutrality of Prussia, in order that a barrier might be opposed to the march of the Muscovite troops across the north of Germany: and, on condition that the French troops in the electorate of Hanover should not be augmented, and that the burden of the war should not be laid upon the neutral states of that part of the empire, Prussia agreed to maintain a strict neutrality, and not to permit the march of Russian or any other foreign troops across her territories. In return for these concessions, which, though not so extensive as he desired, were yet of great moment to the French Emperor, Napoleon openly proclaimed, both in his diplomatic relations, and in the official columns of the *Moniteur*, his inclination to augment the strength of Prussia, and his intention not to let any pretensions of France upon Hanover stand in the way of the territorial aggrandisement of that power.¹

¹ Bign. iv.
30, 41.
Ann. Reg.
1804, 194,
195. *Moni-
teur*,
28 July.

48.
Accession of
Hardenberg
to power pro-
duces no
external
change.

A change which occurred at this period in the Prussian ministry, was looked to by the diplomatists of Europe as likely to lead to a material alteration in its foreign policy; but it was not attended at first with the effects which were anticipated. Count Haugwitz, who for ten years had been the chief director of its diplomatic relations, and whose leaning towards the French alliance had been conspicuous throughout the whole of his administration, retired to his estates in Silesia: and the chief direction of affairs fell upon BARON HARDENBERG,* a

* Charles Auguste, Prince of Hardenberg, was born at Hanover on the 31st May 1750, of the eldest branch of a very old family which boasted its descent from the days of Henry the Fowler and Otho the Great. He received the rudiments of his education in his paternal home, and concluded it at the universities of Göttingen and Leipsic. Destined from early youth to the diplomatic line, he entered on his initiation into it in the administration of the electorate of Hanover, in which he received a subordinate situation; but, desirous of extending his information, he subsequently travelled through England, France, and Holland, terminating with Weimar, where he formed an intimacy which continued for life, with the celebrated Goethe, who early appreciated his great abilities. As his talents soon became known, he was entrusted soon after with several diplomatic missions to Great Britain, in the course of which, the clearness of his understanding and elegance of his manners were so conspicuous, that he soon acquired a distinguished place in the highest society of London. But this led to a great and unlooked for misfortune, which led to his quitting the Hanoverian and entering the Prussian service. The Prince of Wales, then in

statesman of great ability, who was known to be decidedly hostile to the revolutionary principle, the devastating effects of which he had had ample opportunities of appreciating in the course of his diplomatic career, and whose inclination towards the English and Russian alliance, already warmly espoused by the Queen, was expected to produce important effects on the fate of northern Europe. The new minister, however, proceeded at first in the footsteps of his predecessor; the negotiation for the occupation of Hanover, if not by Prussian, at least by Saxon or Hessian troops, instead of French, was resumed, though without success, as Napoleon showed an invincible repugnance to quitting his hold of that important part of the German territory; but the jealousy of Prussia

the bloom of youth and fashion, distinguished Baroness Hardenberg, who was of the noble Danish house of Reventlow, and one of the most beautiful women of the age, by his particular notice; and the result was her separation from her husband, who, chagrined by this lamentable occurrence, abandoned for ever England and Hanover, and betook himself to the court of Brunswick, where he was received with open arms by the reigning duke, a soldier of the great Frederick, who afterwards acquired such a deplorable celebrity in the campaign of 1792. He was immediately appointed privy councillor, and soon acquired a large share of the duke's confidence. Frederick the Great having died in 1786, he was sent by the Duke of Brunswick with the will which that monarch had deposited in his hands. It may be conceived how favourable was the reception which such a man, coming on such an errand, received at the court of Berlin. He was immediately offered a place in the Prussian civil service, which he accepted, and from that period his fortunes were indissolubly connected with those of that monarchy.

His first mission was to direct the administration of the provinces of Anspach and Bareuth, which it was in contemplation at that time to cede to Prussia; and he did this till the cession took place in 1791 with such probity and success, that his name is revered by the inhabitants, and the fame of his administration gained him a distinguished place in the estimation of the Prussian cabinet. He was in consequence transferred to the diplomatic line; was engaged in the secret negotiation of Pillnitz in 1791; and accompanied the King of Prussia in the famous invasion of France in 1792; a circumstance which renders his revelations of the political arrangements which rendered abortive all the efforts of the Allies in that campaign, of peculiar value. In 1794, he was intrusted with a secret mission to the German provinces near the Rhine; the object of which was to procure from them an agreement to provide for the support of the Prussian armies, at the very time when that power was obtaining large subsidies from England for that purpose. The bad faith of the cabinet of Berlin was now quite apparent. Accordingly he received a very ungracious reception from the princes of the empire. The Count de Goltz, chief of the Prussian diplomacy, having died on the 6th February 1795, Hardenberg was appointed to succeed him, and, as his successor, he signed the treaty of Bâle with France on the 15th May 1795. He was received in the most flattering manner at Berlin, on his return, and the extreme polish of his manners procured for him equal respect from the rude Republicans, who at that period directed the affairs of France. He was too clear-sighted, however, not to see the ruinous consequences to Prussia which would ensue from her submission to France and withdrawal from the cause of Europe; and accordingly, in the end of 1795, he withdrew from diplomatic affairs and resumed his administrative duties at Anspach, where he remained strenuously exerting himself in promoting the happiness of the inhabitants till the end of 1804, when he was called to the direction of foreign affairs. Thenceforward his history is indissolubly united with that of European diplomacy.—See *Biographie Universelle, Supplement*, lxxv. 405, 417. (HARDENBERG.)

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¹ Bign. iv.
41, 43.

was allayed by a renewed promise, that the French troops in that electorate should not exceed thirty thousand men ; on condition of which the King engaged that they should not be disquieted from the side of his dominions.¹

49.
They remon-
strate against
the seizure of
Sir George
Rumboldt.
Oct. 25.

An event, however, soon occurred, which put the independence of Prussia to the test, and afforded the measure of the extent to which its cabinet was disposed to sacrifice its pretensions to the rank of an independent power to the ascendancy of the French alliance. Sir George Rumboldt, the English minister at Hamburg, was seized at his country villa within the territory of that free city, on the night of the 25th October, in virtue of an order for arrest, signed by the French minister of police at Paris, and forwarded without delay to that capital, where he was lodged in the Temple, and all his papers submitted to the inspection of the French government. This violent proceeding was not only a flagrant violation of the law of nations, in the person of the accredited minister of England in the circle of Lower Saxony, but a grave fault of policy ; as it directly brought the Emperor of France into collision with the King of Prussia, the protector of that circle of the empire, and endangered all the amicable relations which with so much care had been nursed up for ten years between the two powers. It produced a very great sensation at Berlin. The party hostile to the French alliance represented it as a grievous slight upon the honour of Prussia, and such as if unredressed would for ever blast its influence in the north of Germany. Soon the opinion became universal, that the ambition of Napoleon knew no bounds, and that he was resolved to treat the independent states of Europe in the same manner as the provinces of his own empire. The conduct, both of the King and the cabinet at this crisis, was worthy of the successors of the Great Frederick. The Prussian ambassador at Paris received instructions to make the most energetic remonstrances on the subject to the cabinet of the Tuileries, and the King wrote in person a confidential letter to the Emperor, expressing how deeply he had been hurt by the event. These representations had the desired effect : nothing was discovered in Sir George's

papers tending to implicate either him or the British government in any thing which could answer the purposes of Napoleon, and after a few days' confinement he was sent to Cherbourg, and delivered over with a flag of truce to the English cruisers, leaving to France only the disgrace of having violated the law of nations, and the independence of Germany, without any object, and receded before the remonstrances of a comparatively inferior power.¹

The first decided symptom of hostility towards France came from Sweden; a country removed by its situation from the immediate dangers of French invasion, and under the government of a prince of an ardent and chivalrous character, whose animosity to the revolutionary system had been long and powerfully marked. As Duke of Pomerania, that sovereign had a voice in the diet of the empire at Ratisbon; and his notes presented to that assembly on the subject of the Duc d'Enghien, had breathed an uncommon degree of spirit and independence.² This conduct, which was not more than might have been expected from an intrepid sovereign who was married to a princess of the House of Baden, the potentate immediately insulted on that occasion, drew forth the pointed animadversions of the French Emperor; and in a series of articles inserted in the official part of the *Moniteur*, the King of Sweden was assailed in a manner which could hardly be tolerated by any independent power.³ In one, in particular, a distinction was drawn between the Swedish nation, with whom the writer professed a desire to remain on a friendly footing, and its sovereign, a rash and headstrong young man misled by extravagant ideas. "Your merchant vessels," it added, "shall ever be well received in the ports of France: your squadrons, whenever they stand in need of them, shall be victualled in her harbours. She will see on their mast-heads only the colours of the Gustavuses who have reigned before you." When language such as this prevails between sovereigns, the transition is easy to a state of actual hostility. On the 7th September, a note presented by the Swedish ambassador,⁴ addressed *Monsieur* Napoleon Buonaparte, announced the termination of all confidential communication between the two govern-

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1804.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1804, 183,
184. Bign. iv.
43, 46.

50.
Hostile dis-
positions of
Sweden.

² State Pa-
pers, Ann.
Reg. 1804,
697.

³ *Moniteur*,
Aug. 14.

Sept. 7.
⁴ Bign. iv.
57. Ann.
Reg. 1804,
195.

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51.
Which is
taken advan-
tage of by
Great
Britain.
Dec. 3.

ments, and at the same time the importation of French journals and pamphlets into Sweden was prohibited.

Mr Pitt was too vigilant an observer not to perceive, in this state of mutual irritation, the means of establishing a convention favourable to the interests of Great Britain, and on the 3d December a treaty was concluded at London between England and Sweden, by which it was stipulated that a depot should be established at Stralsund in Pomerania, or in the adjoining island of Rugen, for the formation of a legion which it was intended to form of Hanoverian troops, in the pay of Great Britain; and that an entrepot should be permitted in that town, for the disposal of British colonial produce and manufactures. In return for these concessions, and in order to enable the Swedish government to put Stralsund in a respectable state of defence, a subsidy of eighty thousand pounds was promised by England. If these provisions did not amount to any act of open hostility against France, they at least

¹ Bign. iv.
57, 59. Ann.
Reg. 1804,
195. Mar-
tens, viii. 328.

demonstrated that Sweden was not disposed to enter into the projects of the Emperor Napoleon for the exclusion of British commerce from the continent of Europe;¹ a disposition which amounted in his estimation to a declaration of war against the French empire. At the time that Sweden was thus giving the first example of a decided resistance to France, the Ottoman empire also adopted a peremptory tone on the same subject. Retaining still a lively recollection of the evils they had sustained in consequence of the unprovoked attack of Napoleon on Egypt, they refused to recognise him as Emperor; and Marshal Brune, the French ambassador at Constantinople, after six months of vain attempts at negotiation, was compelled to quit that capital, which fell entirely into the views of the Russian party.²

* Dum. xi.
56, 57.

52.
Extension of
French
power in
Italy.
Oct. 20.

While the northern and eastern powers were thus giving signs of approaching hostility to France, Napoleon was unceasingly extending his grasp over the Italian peninsula. By a treaty with the Ligurian Republic, of October 20, the whole resources of Genoa were placed at the disposal of France, and that magnificent harbour became a great French naval station in the Mediterranean. The Emperor engaged to procure admission on favourable terms for the Ligurian manufactures into the states of

Piedmont and Parma, and to cause its flag to be respected by the Barbary powers; in return for which he obtained six thousand sailors, and the free use of the arsenals, fleets, and harbours of the Republic. Napoleon immediately took measures for the construction of ten ships of the line at Genoa. "This," says the French historian, "was in effect an appropriation of Genoa to France; the Act of Incorporation which soon after followed of this republic with the French empire, was but a public proclamation of what then took place."¹

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1804.

Bign. iv.
117, 119.

While negotiations of such moment were being conducted by the diplomatic body throughout Europe, and every thing conspired to indicate an approaching rupture of the most terrible kind, Napoleon was actively engaged in measures calculated to rouse the spirit and heighten the enthusiasm of his own subjects. On the 14th July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille, the inauguration of the Legion of Honour took place with all imaginable pomp in the splendid church of the Invalides at Paris, built by Louis XIV.; and on the same day the crosses of honour of that body were distributed by the generals in all the camps and garrisons of the empire. The profound policy of Napoleon was here singularly conspicuous, in selecting the anniversary of the first victory of the Revolution for the establishment of an institution calculated to revive the distinctions which it was its chief object to abolish, and blending in the public mind the recollection of republican triumph with the edifice and the associations which were most likely to recall the splendour of the monarchy. At the same time that this apparent homage to republican principles was paid at Paris, a measure of all others the most destructive to real freedom was carried into effect in the restoration of the ministry of police, with the crafty Fouché again at its head.²

53.

Internal mea-
sures of Na-
poleon.

July 14.

July 15.

² Dum. xi.
40, 41. Norv.
ii. 336.

Shortly after the conclusion of this important ceremony in the capital, the Emperor repaired to the head-quarters of the grand army at Boulogne, and there, on the 16th August, the anniversary of the fête of his tutelar saint, a spectacle of the grandest and most imposing kind took place. Marshal Soult received orders to assemble the whole troops in the camps at Boulogne and Montreuil, nearly eighty thousand strong, on the slopes of a vast

54.

Splendid fête
at Boulogne.
Aug. 16.

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XX XVII.

1804.

natural amphitheatre, situated on the western face of the hill on which the Tower of Cæsar is placed, lying immediately to the eastward of the harbour of the former of these towns. In the centre of this amphitheatre a throne was placed, elevated on a platform of turf, at the summit of a flight of steps. The immense masses of soldiers were arranged in the form of the rays of a circle, emanating from the throne: the cavalry and artillery, stationed on the outer extremity, formed the exterior band of that magnificent array; beyond them, a countless multitude of spectators covered the slope to the very summit of the hill. The bands of all the regiments of the army, placed on the right and left of the throne, were ready to rend the air with the sounds of military music. At noon precisely, the Emperor ascended the throne amidst a general salute from all the batteries, and a flourish of trumpets unheard since the days of the Romans: immediately before him was the buckler of Francis I., while the crosses and ribands which were to be distributed were contained in the helmet of the Chevalier Bayard. His brothers, ministers, and chief functionaries, the marshals of the empire, the counsellors of state and senators, the staff of the army, its whole generals and field-officers, composed the splendid suite by which he was surrounded. Amidst their dazzling uniforms the standards of the regiments were to be seen: some new and waving with yet unsullied colours in the sun; many more torn by shot, stained with blood, and black with smoke—the objects of almost superstitious reverence to the warlike multitude by which they were surrounded. The Emperor took the oath first himself, and no sooner had the members of the Legion of Honour rejoined “We swear it,” than, raising his voice aloud, he said, “And you, soldiers! swear to defend, at the hazard of your life, the honour of the French name, your country, and your Emperor.” Innumerable voices responded to the appeal, and immediately the distribution of the decorations commenced, and the ceremony was concluded by a general review of the vast army, who all defiled in the finest order before the throne where they had just witnessed so imposing a spectacle.¹

¹ Dum. xi.
40, 42.
D'Abr. vii.
176, 178.
Norv. ii.
336, 338.

The chief of such a host might be excused for deeming himself the sovereign of the earth; but an event was

approaching, destined to teach the French Emperor, like his great predecessor Canute the Dane, that there were bounds to his power, and that his might was limited to the element on which his army stood. It was part of the pageant that a naval display should take place at the same time, and the eyes of Napoleon and his minister of marine, M. Decrès, were anxiously turned, towards the close of the ceremony, to the headlands round which it was expected the vanguard of the flotilla would appear. In effect, it did make its appearance at four o'clock ; but at the same moment a violent tempest arose, the wind blew with terrific force, and several of the vessels, in the hands of their inexperienced mariners, were stranded on the beach. This untoward accident, though, practically speaking, of little importance, was yet in the highest degree mortifying to Napoleon, arriving as it did on such an occasion, in presence not only of his own troops, but of the English cruisers, and characteristic as it was of the impassable limits which the laws of nature had placed to his power. He retired chagrined and out of humour for the rest of the day ; all the magnificence of his military display could not console him for the rude manner in which he had been reminded, at the highest point of its splendour, of his weakness on the other element, which required to be subdued before his dreams of universal dominion could be realised.¹

The fête of Napoleon was celebrated in the other harbours of France by the completion of works of more durable utility, but every where with the same enthusiastic feeling. At Cherbourg it was signalised by discharges of artillery from the battery placed on the great sea-dike intended to break the fury of the waves which roll into that harbour—a work begun by the unfortunate Louis XVI. and now completed by his illustrious successor. At Antwerp the rejoicings were equally sincere : several smaller vessels were launched on the occasion ; and already its basins in a great state of forwardness, three ships of the line and a frigate almost completed, and immense preparations in the arsenals and dockyards, attested the impulse which the genius of the Emperor, in a single year, had given to the naval resources of France. Two days after the fête, the English cruisers stood into

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1804.

55.

His vexation
at the disper-
sion of his
flotilla in the
midst of it.

¹ D'Abr. vii.
185, 187.
Norv. ii. 338.

56.

General re-
joicings over
France.

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XXXVII.

1804.

Aug. 18.

¹ Dum. vi.
44, 47. Bign.
iv. 124, 125.

57.
Anecdotes of
Napoleon at
this period.

the harbour of Boulogne, and a heavy cannonade took place between them and the front line of the French flotilla. Napoleon, on board a gun-boat with Admiral Bruix, was a spectator of the combat; and after an exchange of long shots for two hours, the English ships stood off, not having succeeded in inflicting any serious damage on the enemy—a circumstance which afforded the French, little accustomed even to indecisive combats at sea, an opportunity for boundless exultation, and the happiest augury of success in the great maritime contest which was approaching.¹

No man knew better than Napoleon how to win the affections and excite the gratitude of his soldiers; and it was to his wonderful powers in this respect, almost as much as to his political and military capacity, that his long-continued success was owing. To increase this effect, and add to the naturally retentive powers of his memory in this respect, he inquired privately from the officers who were the veterans of Egypt or Italy in their regiments; and when he passed them in review, stopped the men who had been previously designated to him, and said, “Ah! you are a veteran:—How is your old father?—I have seen you at Aboukir or the Pyramids.—You have not a cross; here is one for you!”—and threw the *cordon* round the astonished soldier’s neck. It may easily be conceived what must have been the effect of such a demeanour, impressing as it did the soldiers with the belief that they were all known to the Emperor if they had distinguished themselves, and that any one might look, under such auspices, to becoming a marshal of the empire. It was not only in his own soldiers, however, that this great man appreciated heroic or generous conduct. No one set a higher value upon it in his enemies. When at Boulogne, two English sailors were brought before him, who had escaped from the depot at Verdun, and attempted to cross the Channel in a frail bark a few feet long, just capable of floating them, which they had constructed of wood which they found on the sea-beach. The daring nature of the attempt attracted the admiration of the Emperor, who said to them, “Is it really true that you have endeavoured to cross the sea in that bark?”—“Ah! Sire,” they replied, “if you doubt it, give us leave, and you will see us set out

instantly." "I indeed wish it," replied he: "you are bold enterprising men; but I will not let you expose your life. You are free. Further, I will cause you to be conducted on board an English ship: you shall return to London, and tell the English what esteem I have for the brave, even among my enemies." He dismissed them with several pieces of gold each. This incident took such a hold of his imagination that he recounted it to his companions in exile at St Helena.¹

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¹ Bour. vi.
201, 202.

From Boulogne the Emperor traversed the coast of the Channel as far as Ostend, every where reviewing the troops, inspecting the harbours, stimulating the preparations, and communicating to all classes the energy of his own ardent and indefatigable mind. From thence he proceeded to Aix-la-Chapelle, endeavouring by all means to revive the recollection of the empire of Charlemagne, an era of which, with Eastern servility, he was incessantly reminded in the adulatory addresses which flowed in from the mayors and constituted authorities in all the districts through which he passed. "God," said the prefect of Arras, "created Buonaparte, and rested from his labours,"—an excess of flattery which shortly drew forth from the faubourg St Germain the witty addition, that he had better have reposed a little sooner.² This incident also is valuable as an historical fact, demonstrating how rapidly revolutionary violence leads to Eastern despotism; for in no part of France was democratic cruelty more vehement ten years before than in that very town of Arras, the scene of the unparalleled atrocities of Le Bon, and the place where the guillotine had become so familiar an object, that it was employed by the little children to decapitate cats, birds, and mice, which had fallen into their hands.³

58.
Disgraceful
adulation
with which
he was sur-
rounded.

² Norv. ii.
347. Bour.
vi. 194, 195,
205.

³ See c. 15.
§ 51, and
D'Abr. vii.
213, 214.
Bour. vi. 221,
222.

More important changes were destined to result from the next station at which the Emperor rested, Mayence, where he received at the same time the congratulatory addresses of all the eastern provinces of France and of all the lesser German potentates on the right bank of the Rhine, whom he was already preparing to mould into the frontier bulwark of his power. It was here that he first brought to maturity the design which he had already formed of a CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, under the

59.
Vast designs
of the Em-
peror at
Mayence for
the Confede-
ration of the
Rhine.

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1804.

¹ Marquis
Lucchesini's
Confed.
Rhenana, i.
74. Bign. iv.
127, 128.
Norv. ii. 344.

² Letter of
Sept. 29.
1804. Dum.
xi. 205.
Pièces Just.

Sept. 11.

Sept. 21.

Aug. 25.
July 16.
³ Bign. iv.
130, 139.
Norv. ii. 340,
341.

protection of France, which would practically amount to an extension of its power into the heart of Germany.¹ Napoleon remained during the autumnal months at this great frontier fortress; and while to the public eye he seemed engaged only in matters of parade and magnificence, receiving the congratulations of the adjoining states on his accession to the Imperial throne, he was in reality incessantly occupied with those vast designs which in the succeeding year led to such memorable results both at land and sea. It was there that he first conceived the plan of that great combination to elude the British fleets, and concentrate an overwhelming force in the Channel, which so nearly proved successful in the following year, and placed the English monarchy in greater jeopardy than it had stood since the battle of Hastings;² and it was there too that he matured the details of that astonishing march of his land forces from the shores of the Channel to the heart of Germany, which was so soon destined to lead to the triumphs of Ulm and Austerlitz. Nor were objects of internal utility and pacific improvement neglected amid these warlike designs. Numerous decrees for the encouragement of industry, as well as the advancement of science and the protection of the frontier, are dated from the places visited during this journey. One from the camp at Boulogne established nine prizes of ten thousand francs, (£400,) and thirteen of five thousand each, for useful inventions in agriculture and manufactures, proceeding on the noble desire expressed in the preamble, that "not only should France maintain the superiority she had acquired in science and the arts, but that the age which was commencing should advance beyond that which was drawing to a close:" one from Mayence, on 21st September, organised the institution of twelve colleges in the principal towns of the empire for the study of law: one from Dunkirk gave a new and more effective organisation to the body of engineers for roads and bridges throughout the state: while another put upon a new and much improved footing the important establishment of the Polytechnic School.³

The close of the year was marked by a melancholy event, on which the British historian must dwell with

pain, and which led to lighting up the flames of war between England and Spain. The treaty of St Ildefonso in 1796 has been already mentioned, by which Spain became bound to furnish France with an auxiliary force;* and also the subsequent convention of 19th October, 1803, by which this auxiliary force was commuted into a subsidy to the amount of £2,880,000 yearly, by the Spanish to the French government.¹ The hostile character of this treaty, and great amount of this subsidy, had long been a matter of jealousy to the British government, furnishing, as it evidently did, the sinews of war to France: and being, as it was, as directly applied to the fitting out of the armaments destined for the invasion of England, as if the gun-boats, instead of being constructed with this treasure at Boulogne, had been fitted out at Cadiz or Corunna. As it was known, however, that the Spanish cabinet, in yielding to this tribute, was in truth constrained by necessity, the English government, from whom its amount was studiously concealed, was not at first disposed to make it the subject of complaint; and it was intimated, soon after the convention was agreed to, that England would not consider a small and temporary advance of money as any ground for the commencement of hostilities. In the close of the year, however, when rumours as to the magnitude of the payment had got abroad, the English ambassador stated in a formal note to the Spanish government, that if it amounted to any thing like such a sum as three millions, Great Britain would consider it as a war subsidy, and as in itself equivalent to a hostile aggression against herself.† In reply,

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1804.

60.

Origin of the
differences
between Eng-
land and
Spain.

¹ Ante, chap
xxxvii. § 14

Dec. 13, 1803.

* This force was mutually stipulated at fifteen ships of the line and twenty-four thousand men; and this ~~and~~ was to be furnished on the simple demand of the requiring party, without any inquiry into the policy or justice of the hostilities in which they were to be engaged; and by Art. ii. of the same treaty, the contracting parties were to assist each other with their whole forces, in case the stipulated succours should not be sufficient.

† Mr Frere, the English ambassador at Madrid, stated in this note: "With respect to the subsidy, his Majesty is perfectly sensible of the difficulties of the situation in which Spain is placed, as well by reason of her ancient ties with France, as on account of the character and habitual conduct of that power and of its chief. These considerations have induced him to act with forbearance to a certain degree, and have inclined him to overlook such pecuniary sacrifices as should not be of sufficient magnitude to force attention from their political effects. But it is expressly enjoined to me to declare to your Excellency, that pecuniary advances, such as are stipulated in the recent convention with France, cannot be considered by the British government but as a war subsidy; a succour the most efficacious, the best adapted to the wants and situation of the enemy, the most prejudicial to the interests of the British subjects, and the most dangerous

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Feb. 18.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1805, 124,
125. Parl.
Deb. iii. 62,
92.

61.
Secret mea-
sures of hos-
tility by the
latter power.
Sept. 29.

the Spanish cabinet insisted that the amount of the subsidy was perfectly consistent with the neutrality which their court professed towards England, and not greater than would have been required to fit out the war contingent provided for in the former treaty. Thus the matter rested for six weeks, when the English ambassador presented a fresh and energetic remonstrance, upon the ground of the evident partiality and preference shown to French vessels over British, especially in the sale of prizes, and complaining of hostile preparations and armaments in the Spanish harbours.* The Spanish government, in reply, strongly expressed their desire to give perfect satisfaction to the English cabinet on every subject excepting the subsidy, as to which they would not draw back from existing engagements; upon which the British ambassador stated, that his government wished for an indefinite suspension of hostilities on the ground of the subsidy, provided no other causes of complaint were given; but that if such took place, they would forthwith commence war without any further declaration of an intention to do so.¹

Matters were in this state of jealous watching and suspended hostility, when, in the end of September, intelligence was received by the British government that several small detachments of French troops, amounting in all to fifteen hundred men, had proceeded from Bayonne to Ferrol, where a French naval force of four ships of the line was already lying, and that the Spanish government had transmitted orders for the arming, without loss of time, three ships of the line, two frigates, and several

to the British dominions; in fine, more than equivalent for every other species of aggression. Imperious necessity compels him now to declare these sentiments, and to add, that the passage of French troops through the territories of Spain would be considered as a violation of her neutrality, and that his Majesty would feel himself compelled to take the most decisive measures in consequence of that event." The Spanish minister replied: "Although the Spanish cabinet is penetrated with the truth, that the idea of aiding France is compatible with that of neutrality towards Great Britain, yet they have thought that they could better combine these two objects by a method which, without being disagreeable to France, strips her neutrality towards Great Britain of that hostile exterior which military succours necessarily present."—*Parl. Deb.* iii. 74, 91.

* On the 18th February 1804, Mr Frere stated, in his note to the Spanish minister at Madrid: "I am ordered to declare to you, that the system of forbearance on the part of England depends entirely on the cessation of every naval armament within the ports of this kingdom; and that I am expressly forbidden to prolong my residence here, if unfortunately this condition should be rejected. It is also indispensable that the sale of prizes brought into the ports of this kingdom should cease, otherwise I am to consider all negotiations as at an end, and I am to think only of returning to my superiors."—*Parl. Deb.* iii. 89, 91.

smaller vessels at that port; that similar instructions had been sent to Carthagena and Cadiz; that three first-rate line-of-battle ships had been directed to proceed from Cadiz to Ferrol, and that orders had been given to the packets to arm as in time of war. This information was accompanied by the alarming addition, that within a month eleven ships of the line would in this way be ready for sea at the latter harbour; that numbers of soldiers were daily arriving there from France; that the ships, though said to be bound for America, were victualled for three months only; that they merely waited the arrival of the treasure on board the frigates from America to throw off the mask; and that there did not appear a doubt of the hostile intentions of Spain.¹ In consequence of this intelligence, which was transmitted at the same time to Mr Frere at Madrid, warm remonstrances were presented to the Spanish government; and it was intimated by the British ambassador, "that the total cessation of all naval preparations in the ports of Spain having been the principal condition required by England, and agreed to by Spain, as the price of the forbearance of Great Britain, the present violation of this condition can be considered in no other light but as a hostile aggression on the part of Spain, and a defiance given to England. These preparations become still more menacing from a squadron of the enemy being in the port where they are carrying on. In no case can England be indifferent to the armament which is preparing, and I entreat you to consider the disastrous consequences which will ensue, if the misery which presses so heavily on this country be completed by plunging it unnecessarily into a ruinous war." To this note the Prince of Peace replied, on the part of the Spanish government, "The King of Spain has never thought of violating the agreement entered into with the British government. The cessation of all naval armaments against Great Britain shall be observed as heretofore; and whatever information to the contrary may have been received, is wholly unfounded, and derogatory to the honour of the Spanish nation."²

Every thing indicated that hostilities could not be averted many weeks, when they were unhappily precipitated by the measures of the British cabinet. No sooner

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¹ Admiral Cochrane's Dispatches, Sept. 3, 5, and 11, 1804. Parl. Deb. iii. 95, 242, 243. and Sir R. Calder's Dispatch, Ibid. 213.

Sept. 27.
Mr Frere's note.

Oct. 3.
D. P. Cavallo's answer.

² Parl. Deb. iii. 95, 98.

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62.

Catastrophe
which pre-
cipitated hos-
tilities.

was Admiral Cochrane's dispatch, announcing the serious naval preparations at Cadiz, Carthagea, and Ferrol, received by the English government, than they transmitted orders to that officer to prevent the sailing of either the French or Spanish fleets from the harbour of Ferrol, and to intimate this intention to the French and Spanish admirals; and at the same time they sent instructions to Lord Nelson on the Mediterranean, Admiral Cochrane on the Ferrol, and Lord Cornwallis on the Brest station, to despatch two frigates each to cruise off Cadiz, in order to intercept the homeward-bound treasure frigates of Spain; and they directed these admirals to stop any Spanish vessels laden with naval or military stores, and keep them till the pleasure of the British government was known, but without committing any further act of hostility either on such vessels or the treasure frigates.¹ These orders were unhappily most punctually executed. On the 5th October, a squadron of four British frigates off Cadiz, under the command of Captain Moore in the *Indefatigable*, fell in with the four Spanish frigates having the treasure on board, and the British officer immediately informed the Spanish commander that he had orders to detain his vessels, and earnestly entreated that this might be done without effusion of blood. The Spaniard, of course, declined to submit in this way to an equal force, and the consequence was, that an engagement took place, and in less than ten minutes one of the Spanish ships blew up with a terrific explosion. The three others were captured, with the valuable treasure, amounting to above £2,000,000 sterling, on board; but England had to lament a loss on the part of Spain of a hundred killed and wounded, besides two hundred and forty lost in the frigate which exploded, before any formal announcement of hostilities.²

¹ Orders, Sept. 18, 19, and 25. Parl. Deb. iii. 118, 121.

² Captain Moore's Dispatch, Ann. Reg. 1804. 557, and 144.

63.
Which at once brings on a war.

It is needless to proceed further with the details of this painful negotiation. The capture of the frigates produced the result which might have been anticipated, in an immediate declaration of war by Spain against Great Britain on the 12th December. Various attempts at explanation and apology were made by the English government, but Spain was too completely in the arms of France to forego such an opportunity of joining in the war; nor, indeed,

after such an act of violence, could it be expected that any independent state would abstain from hostilities.¹ *

This unhappy catastrophe produced a great and painful division of opinion among the people of Great Britain. While the ministerial party lamented the necessity under which government lay of adopting the steps which had led to so deplorable an effusion of human blood, they yet vindicated the measure as justifiable in itself, and unavoidable in the circumstances in which they were placed; but a large and conscientious body of their usual supporters beheld with pain what they deemed an unwarrantable invasion of the rights of nations, and loudly condemned an act derogatory to the honour of the British name. The debates in parliament on this subject condensed as usual every thing that was or could be urged on the opposite sides, clothed in all the force of language of which the great orators who then led the different parties were masters. On the one hand, it was urged by Mr Fox and Lord Grenville, "that there appeared nothing but inattention, negligence,

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¹ Parl. Deb.
iii. 99. 115.

64.
Arguments
against the
conduct of
government
in parliam-
ent.

* The Spanish manifesto on this occasion stated: "It was very difficult for Spain and Holland, who had treated jointly with France at Amiens, and whose interests and political relations are reciprocally connected, to avoid finally taking part in the grievances and offences offered to them ally. In these circumstances, his Majesty, proceeding on the principle of a wise policy, preferred pecuniary subsidies to the contingent of troops and ships with which he was bound to assist France by the treaty of alliance in 1796; and expressed, by his minister at the court of London, his decided and firm resolution to remain neutral during the war. But the English government, animated by a spirit of hostility against Spain, not only listened to the reclamations of individuals addressed to it, but exacted as the precise condition on which they would consider Spain as neutral the cessation of every armament in her ports, and a prohibition of the sale of prizes brought into them. Though these conditions were urged in the most haughty manner, they were complied with, and religiously observed by the Spanish nation; when the English government manifested its secret and perverse aims by the abominable capture of four Spanish frigates, navigating in a state of profound peace, at the very moment when the English vessels were enjoying the full rights of hospitality in the harbours of Spain. Barbarous orders at the same time were given to detain and carry into its harbours as many Spanish ships as its fleets could meet with, to burn or destroy every Spanish ship below a hundred tons, and carry every one of larger dimensions into Malta."—*State Papers*, 700, 701; *Ann. Reg.* 1804.

Spanish mani-
festo.

To this it was replied in the British declaration of war: "The stipulations of military and naval succours to a great extent by the treaty of 1796, followed by an obligation to put at the disposal of France, if required, the whole resources of the Spanish monarchy, gave Great Britain an incontestible right to declare, that unless she decidedly renounced that treaty, or gave assurances that she would not perform its conditions, she could not be considered as a neutral power: that the monthly sum which Spain was bound to pay by the present convention far exceeded the bounds of forbearance, as it might prove a greater injury than any other hostility: that in consequence it had been intimated to the Spanish government, that England's abstaining from hostilities must depend upon its being only a temporary measure, and that if either any French troops entered Spain, or authentic accounts were received of any naval armaments preparing in the harbours of Spain for the assistance of France, the

Reply by Eng-
land.

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and mystery on the part of the British government on this occasion. The Spanish government had been most eager to cultivate a good understanding with this country, and had made repeated applications for this purpose to the British cabinet ; but the criminal negligence or supineness of ministers had at length forced them into the arms of France, and compelled them to permit the march of fifteen hundred French troops to Ferrol. Spain no doubt had, in 1796, entered into a treaty of alliance with France, which might well have been made the ground of hostility, but it was not made such ; and when afterwards she commuted the military succours there stipulated into a fixed annual payment, to this, too, there was no serious objection stated.* They told the Spanish government, indeed, that the continuance of a suspension of hostilities would mainly depend on the cessation of all naval preparations in the harbours of Spain ; but was this condition violated ? Ships, indeed, were fitting out at Ferrol ; but when remonstrated with on the subject, the Spanish government at once declared that their sole object was to transport troops to the coast

British ambassador had instructions forthwith to leave Madrid : that the constant report of naval armaments in the ports of Spain, had induced the British cabinet to give the Spanish government explicit warning on the 18th February, 1804, that all further forbearance on the part of England must depend on the cessation of all naval preparations in the ports of Spain : that notwithstanding the strongest assurances of the Spanish government that this should be the case, information was received from the British admirals that considerable bodies of French troops had arrived at Ferrol from France ; and that orders had been given for fitting out four ships of the line and two frigates in that very harbour, in which four French line-of-battle ships were already assembled, so as to threaten to outmatch the British blockading force : that these circumstances compelled the British government explicitly to declare, by its ambassador at Madrid, that the continuance of peace required a complete and unreserved disclosure of the Spanish relations and engagements with France, which had hitherto been withheld ; and that at the same time it became necessary to issue orders to prevent the sailing of the French or Spanish squadron from Ferrol, and to intercept and detain the treasure ships till its destination was divulged, and to send back any Spanish ship of war to the harbour from which she sailed, but on no account to detain any homeward-bound ships of war not having treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatever."—See *Parl. Deb.* iii. 126, 130.

The statement in the Spanish manifesto as to the orders given to Lord Nelson to destroy all vessels under one hundred tons, and send the others to Malta, is an exaggerated and mistaken allusion to these last instructions. No such orders were given by the British government. On the contrary, the instructions were, "not to detain, in the first instance, any ship belonging to his Catholic Majesty sailing from a port of Spain ; but you are to require the commander of such ship to return directly to the port from whence he came, and only in the event of his refusing to comply with such requisition, to detain him and send him to Gibraltar or England. You are not to detain any homeward-bound ship of war, unless she shall have treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatever." They are also directed "to detain any Spanish ships or vessels laden with naval or military stores."—See *Orders*, 25th September and 25th November, 1804, *Parl. Deb.* iii. 119, 121.

of Biscay, where a rebellion had broken out; and at the same time the governor of Ferrol stated, that, to remove all uneasiness, the men should be put ashore, and sent round by land, however inconvenient. Not satisfied with these explanations, not waiting to see if they were well founded, we proceeded at once to the violence of assaulting their ships on the high seas. It is in vain to assimilate this to an embargo on an enemy's ships. Was there no difference between delaying merchant ships, which might be delivered back, and assaulting them on the high seas? Take a merchant's property, it might be restored to him; imprison seamen, they might be discharged; but burn, sink, and blow up ship and crew, and who can restore the innocent blood which has been spilt? The French branded us with the name of a mercantile people, and said that we were ever thirsting after gold. They would therefore impute this violence to our eagerness for dollars. Better that all the dollars and ten times their quantity were paid, so as this could wash away the stain which had been brought on our arms.

"In considering this question, we must carefully distinguish between the causes of a rupture which might have been set forth, and those which actually were made the ground of hostilities. The treaty of St Ildefonso was clearly an offensive treaty, and its existence was as clearly a ground on which war might have been declared. It was even more offensive than the family compact. But the grand objection to the conduct of ministers was, that they did not instantly take a decided line on the resumption of hostilities with France. They should then have required Spain to renounce the offensive articles of that treaty, or used every effort to cultivate a good understanding with that power, while yet her disposition was amicable. They did neither. The subsequent commutation of the warlike succours into a money payment, may possibly have been considered as an additional hostile act by ministers, but unquestionably they did nothing to evince this feeling to the court of Spain. Mr Frere remained, and was directed to remain, at Madrid, long after the commutation was known. Spain, in truth, was acting under the dread of French conquest; and therefore it was cruel to inquire rigidly into her con-

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1804.

65.
On its conduct with regard to the treasure-ships.

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¹ Parl. Deb.
iii. 354, 362,
448, 453.

66.
Defence of
the govern-
ment by Mr
Pitt.

duct. The armament at Ferrol was quite inconsiderable, and had been admitted by Mr Frere himself to be destined for the conveyance of troops to Biscay. The orders for sailing had been countermanded, and the vessels directed, on the 16th September, to be laid up in ordinary ; so that all ground of complaint had been removed before the English orders to stop the treasure frigates had been given. Even the refusal to communicate the terms of the commutation treaty was no justification of the violence which had been committed, because that refusal was subsequent to the order which produced the capture.”¹

On the other hand, it was answered by Mr Pitt and Lord Hawkesbury : “The terms of the treaty of St Ildefonso, by which France and Spain mutually guarantee each other’s territories, and engage to furnish reciprocally a force of fifteen ships of the line, and twenty-four thousand men, to be given upon the mere demand of the requiring party, and the additional obligation upon each, in case of need, to assist the other with their whole forces, lie at the foundation of this question, because they constituted the ground of the whole proceedings which the British government found themselves compelled to adopt. In whatever light this treaty be viewed, it could not be considered, on the part of Spain, but as a reluctant tribute to the overbearing dictates of its ambitious and tyrannic ally ; and although conditions so plainly hostile would have justified the demand of an explicit and immediate renunciation from Spain, on pain of a declaration of war in case of refusal, yet a feeling of pity towards a gallant and high-spirited though unfortunate nation long dictated a delicate and temporising policy. But at the same time, the interests of this country imperatively required that a pledge should be given that this treaty should not be acted upon : and in reply to the representations of the English ambassador to that effect, the Prince of Peace evinced, in August last, a disposition to elude if possible the demands of France. The requisitions of the First Consul, however, were urgent, and nothing short of a subsidy of £250,000 a-month, or £3,000,000 a-year, would be accepted : although the Spaniards were so sensible of the enormity of complying with such a demand, that they strongly urged that even

a subsidy of £700,000 yearly would expose them on just grounds to a declaration of war from Great Britain. The particulars of this treaty, Spain, down to the very last moment, refused to communicate: and when urged on this subject, her government answered, 'You have no reason of complaint, because you do not know what we pay.' From what we have learned, however, of the commutation which was finally agreed to, it is evident that, so far from being an alleviation, it was the greatest aggravation of the original treaty. At the very highest, the rated equivalent for fifteen ships of the line would be £1,000,000 yearly; so that, as the Spanish government has agreed to pay £3,000,000 annually, there remains £2,000,000 for the commutation of the land forces, being at the rate of £85 a-man; whereas the equivalent for service of this kind usually given, and that agreed to in the treaty between this country and Holland in 1788, was £9 for each man: a fact which clearly demonstrates that the commutation is nearly ten times as injurious to Great Britain as the original treaty would have been.

"The forbearance of ministers, under such aggravated circumstances of provocation, was not founded upon blindness to the danger which the hostility of Spain, under French direction, might hereafter produce, but upon motives of policy adopting due preparations against that event. Their forbearance was expressly said to be conditional, and to depend as a *sine quâ non* on a total abstinence from naval preparations in all the harbours of Spain, and the prohibition of the sale of prizes in Spanish ports. When it is recollected that the total revenue of Spain does not exceed £8,000,000, and that she had consented to give £3,000,000, or not much less than the half of this sum, annually to France, these conditions cannot be deemed exorbitant. It is in vain to say that this enormous subsidy was subsequently acquiesced in. In all his notes to the Spanish government on this subject, Mr Frere accurately distinguishes between temporary connivance and permanent acquiescence; and reserved the right of making the subsidy the ground of hostility at some future period, even by itself: and much more, if any additional ground for complaint were given. Such

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67.
On the successive provocations given by the Spanish government.

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was the state of affairs, when information was received from Admiral Cochrane that the condition on which alone the neutrality of Spain, under existing circumstances, had been connived at, had been violated by the Spanish government. That government were called upon to act upon that information, cannot be denied. The existence of formidable preparations in the ports of Ferrol, at the very time when a French squadron was lying blockaded there, and French troops were pouring in through the Spanish territory, and the arming of the packets as in time of war, were such indications of approaching hostility as would have rendered the British government to the last degree culpable if they had not instantly adopted measures of precaution.

68.
Defence of
the capture of
the frigates.

“What would have been said, if, through their negligence in doing so, the Ferrol, in conjunction with the Cadiz and Carthagea squadrons, had struck a blow at our interests, or co-operated with the French in any part of the great naval designs which they have in contemplation? The excuse that they were wanted to convey troops to quell an insurrection in Biscay, is a pretence so flimsy as to be seen through the moment it is stated. If such was really the object, why not transport the troops in small craft, or in ships of war armed *en flute*? and why, for such a domestic transaction, range her line-of-battle ships alongside of the French and Dutch in the harbour of Ferrol? Why arm the packets, if land operations in Biscay alone were in contemplation? The only question, in truth, is, not whether we have done too much, but whether we have done enough? It was clearly stated by us, long before hostilities commenced, that if the conditions of neutrality were violated by Spain, we would consider it as a declaration of war: they were so violated, and we acted upon them as such. We would, in such circumstances, have been clearly justified in preventing the junction of the French, Dutch, and Spanish squadrons, and intercepting the treasures destined for the coffers, not of Spain, but of France; but we adopted the milder expedient of stopping and detaining them only; and if they have subsequently been rendered good prize, it is entirely owing to the conduct of Spain herself,¹ in refus-

¹ Parl. Deb.
iii. 366, 386.

ing to communicate any particulars in regard to the commutation convention, and following that up by a declaration of war against this country."

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Upon a division, the conduct of ministers in this affair was approved of by a majority of two hundred and seven in the Lower House; there being three hundred and thirteen in their favour, and one hundred and six on the other side. In the House of Lords a similar decision was given by a majority of seventy-eight; the numbers being one hundred and fourteen to thirty-six.¹

69.
The government is supported by parliament.
Feb. 12, 1805.
¹ Parl. Deb. lii. 354, 468.

Thirty years have now elapsed since this question, so vitally important to the national honour and public character of England, was thus fiercely debated in parliament and the nation: almost all the actors on the stage are dead, or have retired into the privacy of domestic life, and the rapid succession of other events has drawn public interest into a different direction, and enabled us now to look back upon it with the calm feelings of retrospective justice. Impartiality compels the admission, that the conduct of England in this transaction cannot be reviewed without feelings of regret. Substantially, the proceedings of the English cabinet were justifiable, and warranted by the circumstances in which they were placed: but formally, they were reprehensible, and forms enter into the essence of justice in the transactions of nations. It is true the treaty of St Ildefonso was a just ground for declaring war: the commutation treaty was a still juster; and even the armaments at Ferrol, if not explained, might have warranted the withdrawing of the ambassador at Madrid, and commencement of hostilities. Spain was in the most delicate of all situations in relation to Great Britain, after agreeing to the enormous war subsidy stipulated by that treaty; and this the French historians cannot dispute, since they represent the accepting of a subsidy of £80,000 a-year from England, by the convention of the 3d December of that very year, as an overt act of hostility on the part of Sweden against France.² She was bound, therefore, in return for the forbearance which overlooked such excessive provocation, to have been studiously careful not to give offence in any other particular; and could not have complained if the crossing of the Bidassoa by one French company,

70.
Reflections on the subject.

² Bign. iv. 68.

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1804.

71.
And particu-
lars in which
England ap-
pears to have
been wrong.

or the arming of one frigate at Ferrol, had been followed by an immediate declaration of war on the part of Great Britain.

But, admitting all this, conceding that ample ground for declaring war existed, the question remains, could the existence of these grounds warrant the commencement of hostilities without such a declaration, while the British ambassador was still at Madrid, and negotiations for the explaining or removal of the grounds of complaint were still in dependence? That is the material question; and it is a question on which no defence can be maintained for the conduct of England. True, the declaration of war would, in such circumstances, have been a piece of form merely: true, it would not have averted one shot from the treasure frigates, and, on the contrary, led to their immediate capture instead of conditional detention. But it was a step which the usages of war imperatively required, and the want of which distinguishes legitimate hostility from unauthorised piracy. A line apparently as unsubstantial frequently separates the duellist from the assassin, or the legitimate acquirer of property from the highway robber; and they have much to answer for who, in the transactions of nations which acknowledge no superior, depart from one formality which usage has sanctioned, or one security against spoliation which a sense of justice has introduced. It is with painful feelings, therefore, that the British historian must recount the circumstances of this melancholy transaction; but it is a subject of congratulation, that this injustice was committed to a nation which was afterwards overwhelmed by such a load of obligation. Like the Protestant martyr at the stake, England held her right hand in the flames till her offence was expiated by suffering; and if Spain was the scene of the darkest blot on her character which the annals of the revolutionary war can exhibit, it was the theatre also of the most generous devotion and the brightest glories which her history has to record.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

NAPOLÉON'S ASSUMPTION OF THE IMPERIAL THRONE,
AND CORONATION.—JANUARY—DECEMBER—1804.

It were well for the memory of Napoleon if the historian could stop here; and after having recounted the matchless glories of his military exploits, conclude with the admirable wisdom of his civil administration, and the felicity with which, amidst so many difficulties, he reconstructed the disjointed elements of society after the Revolution. But history is not made up wholly of panegyric; and after discharging the pleasing duty of recording the great and blameless achievements which signalised the Consulate, there remains the painful task of narrating the foul transactions, the dark and bloody deeds, which ushered in the Empire. Every thing seemed to smile upon Napoleon. In the civil administration all were reconciled to the consulate for life, or submitted in silence to an authority which they could not resist. The army, dazzled by his brilliant exploits, had rallied round his standard, and sought only to give expression to its admiration for the illustrious chief who had raised to such an unprecedented height the glory of the republican ensigns. The people, worn out with the sufferings and anxieties of the Revolution, had joyfully submitted to a government which had given them that first of blessings, security and protection, and, forgetting the dreams of enthusiasm and the fumes of democracy, returned to their separate pursuits, and sought in the enjoyments of

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1.

Favourable
prospects of
Napoleon's
government
in the begin-
ning of 1804.

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1804.

¹ Thib. 321.

private life a compensation for the experienced vanity of their political anticipations. But amidst these seemingly auspicious circumstances many seeds of latent evil existed, and discontent and dissatisfaction prevailed to a great extent among the classes where they were least to be expected.¹

²
Discontent of
the Republi-
can officers of
the army.

This appeared, in an especial manner, in the generals and higher officers of the army. Bernadotte, though brother-in-law to Joseph Buonaparte, was constantly in opposition to the First Consul. Early attached to republican principles, he viewed with undisguised jealousy the evident approaches which the chief magistrate was making to arbitrary power; and in consequence of his influence, a number of officers in his staff and in the garrison of Rennes voted against the consulate for life. Moreau, however, was the head of the malcontent party. On every occasion he made it a point to oppose, to the increasing splendour of military dress and routine of court etiquette, the simplicity and uniformity of republican costume. The conqueror of Austria traversed, amidst crowds of brilliant uniforms, the Place Carrousel, or the saloons of the Tuileries, in the plain dress of a citizen, without any sort of decoration. He declined on various pretences repeated invitations to the Tuileries, and at length was no longer asked to appear. He often manifested to the First Consul, when they met in public, a degree of coldness which must have estranged persons even less jealous of each other's reputation than the heroes of Marengo and Hohenlinden. Nothing could induce him to attend the ceremony performed in Notre Dame on occasion of the concordat; and at a dinner of military men at his house on the same day, he openly expressed the greatest contempt for the whole proceeding. Female jealousy added to the many causes of discord which already existed between these rival chiefs; Madame Hulot, his mother-in-law, and Madame Moreau, his wife, were animated by the most violent jealousy at the elevation of Josephine, and unceasingly urged Moreau to step forward, and openly claim that place in society and the state to which his dignity and services so well entitled him.² So far did this spirit of rivalry proceed, that Madame Moreau could not be hindered from breaking

² Thib. 321.
323. Bour. v.
232. Las
Cous. vii. 247.

out into unseemly expressions, when, on one occasion of a visit, she was detained a few minutes waiting in the antechambers of Josephine; and on another she was only prevented by force from taking the precedence, at a public assembly, of the wife of the First Consul.

While Moreau was thus insensibly and unavoidably becoming the leader of the discontented Republicans in Paris, circumstances were preparing for another distinguished general of the Revolution the chief direction of the Royalist party. Escaped from the deserts of Sinnimari, Pichegru had found an asylum in London, where he entered into close correspondence with the French emigrants who endeavoured in that capital to uphold the sinking cause of the monarchy. His great abilities and acknowledged reputation procured for him the confidence of the British government, and he was occasionally consulted by them, especially in 1799, as to the probability of a Royalist movement declaring itself in the south of France.¹ On the renewal of the war, various attempts had been made by the Royalist emigrants in London to effect an insurrection in favour of the exiled family in different parts of France. The object of these attempts was the restoration of the Bourbons, and the effecting the expulsion of the First Consul from the throne; but it formed no part of the plan of any design, at least in which Louis XVIII. or any of the royal family were participants, to imbrue their hands in his blood, or do aught to him that he had not repeatedly done to every state with which he was in hostility.* The celebrated Chouan chief, Georges, was the soul of the conspiracy. He had resisted all the offers of the First Consul, who was anxious to engage him in his service; and in a secret interview the elevation and disinterestedness of his character excited the admiration of that keen observer of human character.²† Since that time he had resided

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3.
Pichegru in
London, and
Royalist
movements
in France.

¹ Bign. iii.
318. Norv.
ii. 272.

² Bour. v.
274. Bign.
iii. 318.
Norv. ii. 272.

* "I must do Louis XVIII.," said Napoleon, "the justice to say, that I never discovered his participation in any plot against my life, although such were constantly in agitation elsewhere; his operations were confined to systematic plans and ideal changes."—*LAS CASES*, ii. 368.

† "You cannot be permitted," said Napoleon to him in 1800, "to remain in the Morbihan; but I offer you the rank of lieutenant-general in my armies."—"You do me injustice," replied Georges; "I have taken an oath of fidelity to the house of Bourbon, which I will never violate." The First Consul then offered him a pension of a hundred thousand francs if he would abandon the cause of the king

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4.
Project of
Fouché for
getting up a
conspiracy of
Republicans
and Royal-
ists.

chiefly in London, and was deeply implicated, along with Pichegru, in a conspiracy, which had for its object to rouse the Royalist party in France, and overturn the government of the First Consul.

On the existence of these opposite elements of conspiracy, emanating from the extremes of the Republican and Royalist parties, Fouché founded the project of uniting them in a conspiracy which might at once prove ruinous to both, and restore him to that consideration in the eyes of the First Consul, which it had been his unceasing object to regain since his dismissal from office. The words of the *Senatus Consultum* removing him from the police were constantly present to his mind, that "if difficult circumstances should again arise, there was no one to whom the ministry of police might so fitly be intrusted;" and if he could only engage the two greatest generals in the Republic, next to the First Consul, in a conspiracy against his government, there seemed to be no doubt that he would attain the object of his ambition. With this view, in the end of 1803, he began to instigate some of their mutual friends to effect a reconciliation between these illustrious characters. The Abbé David was the first person employed in this service; but having been arrested and sent to the Temple, his place was supplied by General Lajolais, a relation of Generals Klingen and Wurmser, who came to London, arranged with Pichegru the period of his departure for Paris, and returned soon after to the French capital to prepare matters for his reception there.¹

¹ Bour. v.
272, 273.
Norv. ii. 273.

5.
The Royal-
ist leaders are
landed on the
French coast.
Jan. 16.

Meanwhile Georges, Polignac, Lajolais, and the other conspirators, had been landed on the coast of Normandy, and had cautiously and secretly advanced to Paris, not with the view of engaging in any plot at that time, but to obtain accurate information as to the real state of the Royalist party in the capital. All their measures were

² Beauch. iv.
512.

³ Bour. vi.
158, 160.

and remain quiet; but he was proof also against this temptation. He learned soon after that an order for his arrest had been given, and set off the same day for Boulogne, from whence, with M. Hyde Neuville, he reached England in safety.² Napoleon, alluding to this interview, observed—"Georges evinced that elevation of character which belongs to a great mind; but he was so enthusiastic in favour of his own party, that we could come to no understanding. His mind was cast in the true mould; in my hands he would have done great things. I knew how to appreciate his firmness of character; I would have given it a good direction."³

known to the police by means of secret information communicated by Lajolais and other traitors in the party; the points of their descent, the places where they were to sleep every night, were regularly detailed to Fouché. Every thing was made easy by the agents of the police. They were allowed to come to the capital, and remain there for a considerable time unmolested. Several meetings took place between Georges, Pichegru, Lajolais, and the other leaders of the party, and Moreau had a conference with Pichegru on the Boulevard de la Madeleine, and another in his own house.* The principles of Moreau, however, were those of the Revolution, and therefore it was impossible that he could agree with the Royalists upon ulterior measures, and the only purpose of the conferences was to put the Chouan chiefs in possession of the views of this illustrious leader of the Republican party. The agents of Fouché had given the Royalists to understand that Moreau would readily enter into their views; but in this they soon found that they had been completely deceived; and accordingly, it was

* The accurate intelligence which the secret police of Fouché had of all the proceedings of the Royalist leaders, and the art with which they led them into the snare prepared for them, is completely proved by the proclamation published by the government on the day of their arrest. "In the year 1803," said Regnier, the head of the police, "a criminal reconciliation took place between Pichegru and Moreau, two men between whom honour should have placed an eternal barrier. The police seized at Calais one of their agents at the moment when he was preparing to return for the second time to England. In his possession were found all the documents which proved the reality of an accommodation inexplicable on any other principle but the bond which crime occasions. Meanwhile the plot advanced. Lajolais, the friend and confidant of Pichegru, passed over secretly from Paris to London, and from London to Paris, communicating to Moreau the sentiments of Pichegru, and to Pichegru those of Moreau. The brigands of Georges were all this time preparing, underhand, at Paris, the execution of their joint projects. A place was fixed on between Dieppe and Treport, at a distance from observation, where the brigands of England, brought thither in English ships of war, disembarked without being perceived, and there they met with persons corrupted to receive them; men paid to guide them during the night, from one station to another, as far as Paris. There they found rooms ready hired for them by trusty guardians; they lodged in different quarters at Chaillot, in the Rue de Bac, in the faubourg St Marceau, in the Marais. Georges and eight brigands first disembarked; then Coster St Victor and ten others; and in the first days of this month a third party arrived, consisting of Pichegru, Lajolais, and others; the conspirators met at the farm of La Poterie; Georges and Pichegru arrived at Paris. They lodged in the same house, surrounded by thirty brigands, whom Georges commanded. They met with General Moreau; the day, the hour, the place, where the first conference was held, were known; a second was fixed on, but not accomplished: a third and a fourth took place in the house of Moreau himself. The traces of Georges and Pichegru have been followed from house to house; those who aided in their debarkation, those who, under cloud of night, conducted them from post to post; those who gave them an asylum at Paris, their confidants, their accomplices, Lajolais, the chief go-between, and General Moreau, have been arrested."—*Bour.* y. 293—295.

Artful measures of Fouché to draw them on. Feb. 17.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1804.

1 Bour. v.
283, 287.
Norv. ii. 274,
275.

6.
Fouché re-
veals the plot
to Napoleon,
and is restor-
ed to power.
Arrest of the
conspirators.

Feb. 15.

proved at the trial that Moreau declared to Pichegru that he knew of no conspiracy whatever; and that Polignac was heard to say to one of the party, "All is going wrong; we do not understand each other; Moreau does not keep his word; we have been deceived." Discouraged by these appearances, the conspirators were about to leave Paris, and Georges was on the point of setting out for La Vendée.¹*

But matters had now arrived at that point when Fouché deemed it expedient to divulge the information he had acquired, and reap the fruit of his intrigues. He had previously written to Napoleon that "the air was full of poniards," and prepared him, by various mysterious communications, to expect some important intelligence. Regnier, who was intrusted with the duties though not the situation of minister of police, was totally ignorant of what was going forward, and confidently maintained that Pichegru had dined a few days before in the neighbourhood of London, when Fouché arrived with evidence that he had been for some time in Paris. Napoleon upon this devolved the further conduct of the affair upon the ex-minister, whose superior information was now clearly manifested, and the immediate charge of the matter was intrusted to Real, one of his creatures, with orders to take his instructions from Fouché alone. At length, matters being ripe for the *denouement*, the whole suspected persons, to the number of forty-five, with the exception of Moreau, Georges, and Pichegru, who had not yet been discovered, were arrested at once in Paris, and thrown into prison. Among them were two young men of noble family and generous dispositions, destined to a melancholy celebrity in future times,—Counts Armand and Jules Polignac. Moreau was the first of the three who was seized. Charles d'Hozier, one of the prisoners, had attempted to commit suicide in prison, and his dying declarations, wherein he had impli-

* This is established by the testimony of Napoleon himself:—"Real (the head of the police) told me," said Napoleon, "that when Moreau and Pichegru were together, they could not come to an understanding, as Georges would undertake nothing but for the interest of the Bourbons. He had therefore a plan, but Moreau had none; he wished to overturn my power, but had no person in view to put in my place. It was no wonder, therefore, they could not come to terms of agreement."—Bour. vi. 160.

cated that general, were made use of as a ground to order his arrest, although the subsequent report by Regnier admitted that the police had been throughout privy to all his meetings with the conspirators. Returning from his country estate to Paris, he was seized and conveyed to the Temple; and on the morning of the 17th, all Paris was astonished by the following order of the day, addressed to the garrison of the capital. "Fifty brigands have penetrated into the capital; Georges and General Pichegru were at their head. Their coming was occasioned by a man who is yet numbered among our defenders, by General Moreau, who was yesterday consigned to the hands of the national justice. Their design was, after having assassinated the First Consul, to have delivered over France to the horrors of a civil war, and all the terrible convulsions of a counter-revolution."¹

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XXXVIII.
1804.

¹ Norv. ii.
276. Bour.
v. 274, 287.

No words can convey an adequate idea of the consternation which prevailed in Paris on this intelligence being promulgated. Moreau was looked up to by a numerous and powerful party, especially in the army, as one of the greatest men of the Revolution; his name was rendered illustrious by the most glorious exploits; the simplicity and modesty of his private life had long endeared him to all classes, and especially the numerous body who were enamoured of republican manners. To find so illustrious a name coupled with those whom they regarded as brigands, to hear the known supporter of republican principles accused of a design to bring about a counter-revolution, was so violent a revulsion, so inconceivable a change, as to excite in the highest degree the suspicions and passions of the people. The Revolutionists regarded Moreau as the leader of their party, and the only consistent supporter of their principles; the soldiers looked back with pride to his military achievements, and burned with indignation at the incredible imputations cast upon his honour; the ancient and ill-extinguished jealousy of the armies of Italy and the Rhine, broke forth again with redoubled fury; the latter openly murmured at his arrest, and declared that the First Consul was about to sacrifice the greatest general of the Republic to his ambitious designs.² He had then good cause to congratulate himself that Richepanse and twenty-five thousand of the

7.
Consternation which the announcement of the plot excites in Paris.

² Norv. ii.
277. Nap.
vii. 243.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1804.

8.
Arrest of
Pichegru.

Feb. 28.

conquerors of Hohenlinden had met with an untimely end on the shores of St Domingo.*

Napoleon, however, was not intimidated. The arrest of Moreau was soon followed up by that of Pichegru, who was seized in his bed a fortnight after. It was not without difficulty that this renowned leader was made prisoner; his ready presence of mind, undaunted spirit, and prodigious personal strength, made it no easy matter to secure him even under circumstances the most favourable to the assailants. He was at length betrayed by an old friend in whose house he had sought refuge. This infamous wretch, who was named Leblanc, had the baseness to reveal his place of retreat for a hundred thousand crowns. "His treachery," says Napoleon, "was literally a disgrace to humanity." Guided by this traitor, and fully informed as to the means of resistance which Pichegru always had at his command, a party of police, strongly armed, entered his bedroom at night, by means of false keys, furnished by their perfidious assistant. They found the general asleep, with a lamp burning on a table near the bed, and loaded pistols by his side. Advancing on tiptoe, they overturned the table so as to extinguish the light, and sprung upon their victim before he was aware of their approach. Suddenly awaking, he exerted his strength with undaunted resolution, and struggled long and violently with the assailants. He was at length, however, overpowered by numbers, bound hand and foot, and conducted, naked as he was, to the Temple.† The arrest of Pichegru was immediately followed by a decree of the Senate, which suspended for two years trial by jury in all the departments of the Republic, "for the crimes of treason, attempts on the person of the First Consul, or the exterior or interior security of the Re-

Feb. 26.
1 Bign. iii.
327, 328.
Bour. vi. 10,
11. Las
Cases, iii.
363.

* "The crisis," says Napoleon, "was of the most violent kind: public opinion was in a state of fermentation: the sincerity of government, the reality of the conspiracy, were incessantly called in question. All the violent passions were awakened; the rumours of change were incessant; the storm was tremendous."—LAS CASES, vii. 243, and iii. 361.

† "Pichegru's seizure was owing to his generosity in declining to receive another asylum, where he would have been perfectly safe. An old aide-de-camp of his, M. Lagrenie, who had retired from the service some years before, and a man of undoubted honour, besought him to take refuge in his house; but he positively refused to endanger, by accepting the offer, a man who had given so striking a proof of attachment to his person."—Bour. vi. 11, 12.

public." For this purpose the tribunals were organised in a different manner, agreeably to the direction of the law of 23d Florial, 1802. All the persons accused in Paris were sent for trial to the tribunal of the department of the Seine.

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XXXVIII.
1804.

Georges, however, was still at liberty, although a rigid blockade prevented his leaving Paris; but he did not long escape the vigilance of the police. On the 9th March, he was arrested as he was crossing the Place of the Odéon, at seven in the evening, in a cabriolet. He never went abroad without being armed; his capture in that public manner cost the life of one man, whom he shot dead as he stopped his horse, and he desperately wounded another who advanced to seize him in the carriage. He was instantly conducted to the Temple, and treated with such rigour, that when Louis Buonaparte went to see him the next day in prison, he found him lying on his mattress, with his hands strongly manacled, and bound across his breast; a spectacle which excited the indignation of that humane prince, as well as that of General Lauriston, who was present on the occasion. When examined before the judge of police, Georges openly avowed his intention to overturn the First Consul. "What was your motive for coming to Paris?—To attack the First Consul.—What were your means of attack?—By force.—Where did you expect to find the means of applying force?—In all France.—There is, then, a conspiracy extending over all France, under the direction of you and your accomplices?—No; but there was a *réunion* of force at Paris.—What were the projects of yourself and your associates?—To place a Bourbon in the room of the First Consul.—What Bourbon did you mean to place on the throne?—Louis Xavier Stanislaus formerly, whom we now designate Louis XVIII.—What weapons were you to use?—Weapons similar to those of his escort and guard." Moreau, however, was treated in a very different manner; he met with the most respectful attention, and was surrounded by military men who would not have permitted any insult to be offered to so illustrious a character.¹

9.
And of
Georges Ca-
doudal.
March 9.

¹ Bour. vi.
37, 45. Cap.
Hist. de la
Rest. ii. 159
Norv. ii. 279.

On the day after the arrest of Georges, a meeting of the Council of State was held, in which Napoleon took a step from which his memory will never recover. He decided

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1804.

10.
History and
character of
the Duc
d'Enghien.

Sept. 2, 1793.

1 Refutat. de
M. le Duc de
Rovigo, 134.Generous con-
duct of his
grandfather
on a proposal
to assassinate
Napoleon.
Jan. 24, 1802.

the fate of the DUC D'ENGHIEN. This young prince, son to the Duc de Bourbon, and a lineal descendant of the great Condé, was born, apparently to the highest destinies, at Chantilly, on August 2, 1772. While yet a boy, he accompanied his father in his flight from Paris on July 16, 1789, and had ever since remained in exile, attached to the noble but unfortunate corps which, under the Prince of Condé, continued, through adverse equally as prosperous fortune, faithful to the cause of the monarchy. A noble countenance, a commanding air, and dignified expression, bespoke, even to a passing observer, his illustrious descent, while the affability of his manners and generosity of his character justly endeared him to his numerous companions in adversity. On all occasions in which they were called into action, these shining qualities displayed themselves. Ever the foremost in advance, he was the last to retreat, and by his skill and bravery eminently contributed to the brilliant success gained by the emigrant corps at Bertsheim in an early period of the war. On that occasion a number of Republican prisoners fell into the hands of the Royalists; the soldiers loudly demanded that some reprisals should be made for the sanguinary laws of the Convention, which had doomed so many of their comrades to the scaffold; but the young prince replied, "The blood of our companions, shed in the most just of causes, demands a nobler vengeance. Let them live; they are Frenchmen, they are unfortunate; I put them under the safeguard of your honour and humanity."¹*

* The Prince of Condé, grandfather of the Duc d'Enghien, had acted in an equally generous manner, when a proposal was made to him by a person who offered to assassinate the First Consul. In a letter to the Comte d'Artois, he gives the following account of the transaction:—"Yesterday, a man arrived here (in London) on foot, as he said, from Paris to Calais. His manner was gentle, and tone of voice sweet, notwithstanding the errand on which he came. Understanding that you were not here, he came to me at eleven o'clock in the morning, and proposed, with the greatest simplicity, to get quit of the usurper in the most expeditious manner. I did not give him time to conclude the details of his project, but instantly rejected them with the horror they were fitted to inspire, assuring him, at the same time, that if you were here you would do the same; that we should ever be the enemies of the man who had usurped the power and throne of our king, as long as he excluded him from it; that we had combated him with open arms, and would do so again, if an occasion should present itself; but that we would never carry on hostility by such means, which were suited only to the Jacobins; and that if they betook themselves to crimes, certainly we should not follow their example. I then sent for the Baron de Roll, who confirmed all that I had said of your determination in that respect."*—Réfutation de M. LE DUC DE ROVIGO, 49.—Pièces Just. No. 1.*

It was on the fate of a prince thus richly endowed with every noble virtue, that the Council of State, under the presidency of Napoleon, sat at Paris on the 10th of March, 1804. It appeared from the depositions of two of the prisoners who had been apprehended, that a mysterious person had been present at some of the meetings of the Royalist chiefs, who was treated by Georges with the utmost respect, and in whose presence none of the persons assembled sat down.* Suspicion turned on some prince of the blood as the only person to whom these marks of respect were likely to be shown; and no one was thought to answer the description so completely as the Duc d'Enghien, who at that period was at Ettenheim, a chateau situated on the right bank of the Rhine, in the territories of the Duke of Baden, and four leagues from Strasbourg. A confidential officer was despatched to Strasbourg to make inquiry; he ascertained that the duke was frequently at the theatre of Strasbourg, lived a very retired life, was sometimes absent for ten or twelve days together, and appeared passionately fond of hunting, in which the greater part of his time was employed. On this slender basis did this iniquitous Council of State, under the immediate direction of Napoleon, hold it established that the Duc d'Enghien was the mysterious stranger alluded to in the depositions of Georges' associates. Upon this Napoleon himself dictated and signed an order for his arrest in a neutral territory, with such minute directions for the seizure of the prince and his conveyance to Strasbourg, that it was evident his destruction was already resolved on. Cambacérès, the second consul, who had voted in the Convention for the death of Louis, made the strongest remonstrances against this proposed measure, especially its accomplishment by means of a violation of the neutral territory of Baden; but Napoleon cut him short by the observation,¹—"You

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1804.

11.

His arrest is unjustly resolved on by Napoleon and the Council of State.

¹ Bour. v. 305, 306. Rovigo, ii. 34, 37.

* The description they gave was as follows:—"Every ten or twelve days, their master received a visit from a person with whose name they were unacquainted, but who was evidently a man of high importance. He appeared to be about thirty-six years of age, his hair was light, his height and size of ordinary dimensions, his dress elegant; he was always received with great respect, and when he entered the apartment all present rose, and remained standing, without the exception even of MM. Polignac and Rivière. He was frequently closeted with Georges, and on these occasions they were always alone."—Rovigo's *Memoir*, 11.

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XXXVIII.

1804.

12.
Occupation
of the Prince
at that time.

have become singularly chary of the blood of the Bourbons."*

The truth was, that the unfortunate prince was at Ettenheim, on account of a passion with which he was inspired for the Princess de Rohan, an emigrant lady of distinction in that neighbourhood, and it was to visit her that he was absent for the periods which, as it seemed to the suspicious mind of the First Consul, could have been for no other purpose but to concert measures with Georges in the French metropolis. His mode of life is thus described by Savary, who afterwards was so deeply implicated in his execution. "Several emigrants had arrived in the environs, and were entertained by the prince. He was passionately fond of the chase, had a *liaison de cœur* with a French lady who shared his exile, and was frequently absent for several days together. This may easily be conceived, when it is recollected what a passion for the chase is, and what the attractions of the mountains of the Black Forest."¹ In truth, he had never been at Paris at all, nor engaged in any conspiracy whatever against either the government or life of the First Consul; and the mysterious stranger who was supposed to be him in the conferences with Georges afterwards turned out to be Pichegru.²

¹ Rev. ii. 35.

² Bour. v.
307. Rev. ii.
59.

13.
He is seized
and conducted
to Stras-
bourg. Vain
intercession
of Josephine.

The designs of the First Consul were too faithfully carried into effect. The execution of the order was intrusted to General Ordaner, who, following punctually the directions he had received, set out from New Brisach with three hundred gens-d'armes, and arrested the prince in his bed at night on the 15th March, in Ettenheim, on the German side of the Rhine. He was immediately conducted to Strasbourg, with all his papers and all the persons in the house, and intelligence despatched to Paris by the telegraph of his arrest. When it was known at the Tuileries that he had been seized, Josephine, who never failed to exert her influence on behalf of misfortune, implored the First Consul to show mercy. She threw herself on her knees, and earnestly begged his life: but he said, with a stern air, "Mind your own matters; these are not the affairs of women; let me alone." His

* Napoleon enjoined the officer intrusted with the mission to take two hundred dragoons, and send three hundred more, with four pieces of light cannon, to Kehl, and a hundred men, with two pieces of cannon, from New Brisach.—See *Revue*, ii. 266.—*Pièces Just.* No. 1.

violence on this occasion exceeded any thing that had been witnessed since his return from Egypt. He was so prepossessed with the idea that the Bourbon princes were one and all leagued in a plot against his life, that he was incapable of exercising the natural powers of his mind in considering the evidence on the subject. "I am resolved," said he, "to put an end to these conspiracies; if the emigrants will conspire, I will cause them to be shot. I am told there are some of them concealed in the hotel of M. de Cobentzell" (the Austrian ambassador;) "I do not believe it; if it were so, I would shoot Cobentzell along with them. The Bourbons must be taught that they are not to sport with life with impunity; such matters are not child's play."¹

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XXXVIII.

1804.

¹ BOURB. V.
316, 341.

M. Talleyrand, aware of the imminent danger which the duke ran if he continued in his residence at Ettenheim, had secretly sent him warning to remove, through the lady to whom he was attached at that place, and similar intelligence was at the same time transmitted by the King of Sweden, by means of his minister at Carlsruhe. It augments our regret at the issue of this melancholy tale, that he was only prevented from availing himself of the intelligence, and escaping the danger, by the tardiness of the Austrian authorities in procuring him passports. Upon receiving the warning he resolved to join his grandfather, but in doing so it was necessary that he should pass through part of the Austrian territories. Sir Charles Stuart, the English ambassador at Vienna, wrote for this purpose to the Austrian government to demand a passport for the duke, and it was their tardiness in answering that occasioned the delay, which permitted his arrest by Napoleon, and cost him his life. Orders arrived at Strasbourg from Paris, on the 18th March, to have the Duc d'Enghien forthwith forwarded to the capital. The carriage which conveyed him arrived at the barriers of Paris on the 20th, at eleven o'clock forenoon. He was there stopped, and detained for above five hours, until orders were received from the First Consul. No council was summoned; Napoleon took upon himself alone the disposal of his fate. At four in the evening orders arrived to have him conducted by the exterior barriers to VINCENNES, an ancient castellated

^{14.}
He had been
vainly
warned of his
danger, and
is removed to
Vincennes.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1804.

¹ Bour. v.
304, 305, 328,
330. Rev. ii.
300.

15.
Where he is
delivered over
to a military
commission
by Napo-
leon's orders.

fortress of great strength, a mile and a half beyond the faubourg St Antoine, which had been long used as a state prison, and it was dark before he arrived there. A century and a half before, his ancestor the great Condé had been imprisoned in the same fortress by orders of Cardinal Mazarine. Every thing was already prepared for his reception; not only his chamber was ready, but his grave was dug.¹

No sooner was Napoleon informed of the arrival of the Duc d'Enghien at the barriers, than he wrote out and signed an order for his immediate delivery to a military commission, to be tried for bearing arms against the Republic, for having been in the pay of England, and engaged in the plots set on foot by that power against the external and internal security of the Republic.* The order was directed to Murat, the governor of Paris, who forthwith sent for General Hullin and six of the senior colonels of regiments in Paris, to form a military commission. They immediately proceeded to Vincennes, where they found Savary, with a strong body of *gendarmerie d'élite*, in possession of the castle and all the avenues leading to its approach. The subsequent proceedings cannot be better given than in the words of M. Harel, the governor of the castle. "In the evening of the 20th March, when the prince arrived at the barrier, they sent to inquire of me whether I could lodge a prisoner in the castle. I answered that I could not, as no rooms were in repair but my own chamber and the council hall.

* The order was as follows :

" *Paris, 29 Ventose, Ann. xii., (20 March, 1804.)*

" The government of the Republic decrees as follows :

" Art. I.—The late Duke d'Enghien, accused of having borne arms against the Republic, of having been and still being in the pay of England : of being engaged in the plots set on foot by that power against the external and internal security of the Republic, shall be delivered over to a military commission, composed of seven members named by the governor of Paris, who shall assemble at Vincennes.

" The grand judge, minister of war, and general governor of Paris, are charged with the execution of the present decree.

" The First Consul (signed) BUONAPARTE.

" By the First Consul (signed) HUGHES MARET.

" A true copy.

" The General-in-Chief, Governor of Paris,

" (Signed) MURAT."

See *Mémoire de M. DUPIN sur les actes de la Commission Militaire pour juger le Duc d'Enghien*, 38.—*Pièces Just. No. 2.*

In Murat's order, following on this decree, the commission was directed to "assemble immediately at the chateau of Vincennes, to take cognisance, without separating, of the accused, on the charges set forth in the decree of the government."—*Ibid.* 93.

They desired me to prepare a room for a prisoner, who would arrive in the evening, and to *dig a grave in the court*. I said that would not be easy as the court was paved. They replied, I must then find another place; and we fixed on the ditch, where in effect it was prepared. The prince arrived at seven in the evening; he was dying of cold and hunger, but his air was by no means melancholy. As his room was not yet ready, I received him into my own, and sent out to get food in the village. The prince sat down to table, and invited me to partake his refreshments. He put many questions about Vincennes, and told me he had been brought up in the environs of the castle, and conversed with much kindness and affability. He repeatedly asked, What do they want with me? what are they going to do with me?—but these questions made no alteration in his tranquillity, and indicated no disquietude. My wife, who was unwell, was in bed in an alcove in the same room, concealed by a tapestry; her emotion was extreme, for she was foster-sister to the prince, had enjoyed a pension from his family before the Revolution, and she at once recognised him by his voice.”¹

¹ Bour. v. 328, 330, 331. Biog. des Contemporains, Art. D'Enghien. Rev. ii. 239.

The duke went to bed shortly after; but before he had time to fall asleep, the officers arrived, and conducted him into the council-chamber. General Hullin and six other officers were there assembled; Savary appeared soon after the interrogatories began, and took his station in front of the fire, immediately behind the president's chair. The accused was charged with “having borne arms against the Republic; with having offered his services to the English government, the enemies of the French people; with having received and accredited the agents of the English government, and furnished them with the means of obtaining intelligence, and conspired with them against the exterior and interior security of the state; with having put himself at the head of an assemblage of emigrants and others in the pay of England, formed on the frontiers of France in the territory of Baden; carried on communications in Strasbourg calculated to disturb the peace of the adjoining departments, and favour the views of England; and being engaged in the conspiracy set on foot at Paris against the life of the First Consul, and being about, in case of its success, to enter France.”² The law

^{16.} Gross iniquity committed towards him.

² Jugement sur le Duc d'Enghien, Mem. par Dupin, 49.

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1804.

1 Dupin, 12,
13.17.
He is convicted upon his declaration only, without any evidence.

in such a case required that a counsel should be allowed to the accused; but none was permitted to the prince, and he was obliged, at midnight, to enter unaided upon his defence.¹

No evidence whatever was brought forward against the accused; no witnesses were examined; the documentary evidence consisted only of one single writing, namely, the act of accusation.* The whole case against him rested upon the answers he gave to the interrogatories put by the commission, and they were clear, consistent, and unequivocal, openly avowing the truth, but containing not one single admission which could be tortured into evidence of his culpability.† "There were," says Savary,

* "On n'avait," says Savary, "*qu'un seul document pour toute pièce de charge et décharge; c'était l'arrête des consuls du 20 March. La minute du jugement rédigé à Vincennes le porte textuellement, 'Lecture faite des pièces tant à charge qu'à décharge au nombre d'une.'*"—Rovigo, ii. 251.

† The material parts of the declaration were as follows:—

Being asked if he had taken up arms against France, he answered, "That he had served through the whole war; that he had never been in England, but had received a pension from that power, and had no other means of subsistence; that he had resided for two years and a half at Ettenheim in the Brisgau, by permission from the sovereigns of that country; that he had applied for permission to reside at Fribourg, also in the Brisgau, and remained only at Ettenheim for the pleasures of the chase; that he had corresponded with his grandfather in London, and also with his father, whom he had never seen since 1795; that he had been commander of the advanced guard since 1796, and acted with the advanced guard before that time; that he had never seen General Pichegru, and had no connexion whatever with him; that he knew he desired to see him, but he congratulated himself upon his not having seen him, if it were true that he had

2 See the declarations in Savary, ii. 275. *Pièces Just.* No. iv.

Republic on their own affairs and his, but no correspondence had taken place of the kind alluded to in the interrogatory.²

The iniquities committed on the trial of the Duc d'Enghien were so numerous, as to render it one of the most atrocious proceedings recorded in history. 1. The neutral territory of the Grand Duke of Baden was violated by an armed force, without a shadow of reason, to arrest an individual engaged in no overt acts of hostility, upon the mere suspicion of his being engaged in correspondence with the conspirators in France. 2. The arrest was illegal, on the footing of having borne arms against the Republic; for the decrees of the Convention and Directory on that subject, inhuman as they were, applied only to emigrants taken in France, or in any enemy's or conquered country, and Baden was neither the one nor the other, but a friendly state. 3. The laws against the emigrants did not apply to the Bourbons, who were a class apart, and were for ever banished from the French territory, and, even such as these laws were, they had been universally mitigated in practice since the accession of the First Consul. 4. The military commission was incompetent to try plots undertaken against the Republic, their cognizance being confined to the ordinary tribunals. 5. The whole proceedings at Vincennes were illegal, as having been carried on, contrary to law, in the night; as no defender or counsel was assigned to the accused; as no witnesses or documents were adduced against him; as his declarations admitted nothing criminal, and if they had, they would not *per se* have warranted a conviction; as the conviction did not specify of what he was found guilty, and left a blank for the laws under which the sentence was pronounced, all directly in the face of statutory enactments.—See an able memoir by DUPIN, i. 20, *Discussion des actes de la Commission Militaire pour juger le Duc d'Enghien*.

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the warmest apologist of Napoleon, "neither documents, nor proofs, nor witnesses, against the prince; and in his declaration he emphatically denied the accusation brought against him. His connexions with England, in the rank in which he was born, his correspondence with his grandfather, the Prince of Condé, could not be considered as evidence of any conspiracy. And even if it had been otherwise, what judge is so ignorant as not to know that the admissions of an accused person are never sufficient to condemn him, if unsupported by other testimony?" "I must confess," says General Hullin, "the prince presented himself before us with a noble assurance; he indignantly repelled the aspersion of having been directly or indirectly engaged in any conspiracy against the life of the First Consul, but admitted having borne arms against France, saying, with a courage and resolution which forbade us even for his own sake to make him vary on that point, 'that he had maintained the rights of his family, and that a Condé could never re-enter France but with his arms in his hands. My birth, my opinions, render me for ever the enemy of your government.'" ¹

¹ Rev. ii.
252. Hullin,
7, 8.

At the conclusion of his declaration, the prince added : —"Before signing the present *procès verbal*, I earnestly request to be permitted to have a private audience of the First Consul. My name, my rank, my habits of thought, and the horror of my situation, induce me to hope that he will accede to that demand." A member of the commission proposed that the request should be forwarded to Napoleon; but Savary, who was behind the president, represented that such a demand was inopportune. ² The request, however, made such an impression, that when the sentence was about to be made out, the president took up the pen, and was beginning to write a letter, expressing the wish of the prince to have an interview with Napoleon; but Savary whispered to him, "What are you about?"—"I am writing," said he, "to the First Consul, to express the wish of the commission and of the accused."—"Your affair is finished," replied Savary, taking the pen out of his hand, "that is my business." ³—"In truth," says Savary, "General Hullin had received the most severe instructions." ⁴ Even the case of the accused demanding an interview with the First Consul, had been provided for, and he had been

18.
His noble de-
meanour
before the
judges.

² Hullin, 13.

³ Hullin, 13,
14.

⁴ Rev. ii. 250.

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19.
His sentence
and execu-
tion.

prohibited from forwarding such a communication to the government."

Without a vestige of evidence against the prince, did this iniquitous military tribunal, acting under the orders of a still more iniquitous government, find him guilty of all the charges, and order him to be immediately executed. After the interrogatory had ceased, and while the commission were deliberating with closed doors, he returned to his chamber and fell asleep. "He was so well aware of his approaching fate," says Harel, "that when they conducted him by torch-light down the broken and winding staircase which led to the fosse where the execution was to take place, he asked where they were taking him, and pressing my arm; said, 'Are they going to leave me to perish in a dungeon, or throw me into an *oubliette*?' " When he arrived at the foot of the stair, and entering into the fatal ditch, saw, through the gray mist of the morning, a file of men drawn up, he uttered an expression of joy at being permitted to die the death of a soldier, and only requested that a confessor might be sent for: but this last request was denied him. He then cut off a lock of his hair, which he delivered with his watch and ring to the officer who attended him, to be forwarded to the Princess de Rohan and his parents; and turning to the soldiers, exclaimed, "I die for my king and for France!" calmly gave the word of command, and fell pierced by seven balls. His remains were immediately thrown, dressed as they were, into the grave which had been prepared the evening before at the foot of the rampart.¹*

¹ Mém. sur.
le Duc d'En-
ghien, ii. 171,
172. Rev.
Vindication,
40. Bour. v.
332, 333.

No other authority than that of Napoleon himself is required to stamp the character of this transaction. Immediately after the execution was over, Savary hastened to the First Consul to inform him of what had been done. He received the account with much emotion. "There is

* The spot where this murder was committed is marked by a little cross in the bottom of the fosse of Vincennes, on the side of the forest, about twenty yards from the drawbridge leading into the inner building. The author visited it in August 1833, when the cannon on the ramparts were loaded with grape-shot, and the whole walls of the fortress were covered with workmen armed to the teeth, converting the Gothic edifice into a stronghold destined to bridle the licentious population of Paris, and establish the military despotism of Louis Philippe. The monument of feudal power, the scene of despotic cruelty, the instrument of revolutionary punishment, arose at once to the view. "Les hommes agissent," says Bossuet, "mais Dieu les mene."

something here," said he, "which surpasses my comprehension. Here is a crime, and one which leads to nothing." The prince's innocence was soon completely demonstrated. Hardly were his unconfined remains cold in their grave, when the witnesses who had spoken of the mysterious personage who met with Georges, and was supposed to be the Duc d'Enghien, upon being confronted with Pichegru, at once recognised him as the person to whom they had alluded. "The First Consul," says Savary, "upon receiving this information, mused long; and gave vent, by an exclamation of grief, to his regret at having consented to the seizure of that unhappy man. Notwithstanding his obvious interest to have the affair cleared up, he enjoined absolute silence regarding it, either because he considered such conduct most conducive to his interest, or because he was unwilling to confess the error into which he had fallen.¹

The murder of the Duc d'Enghien was so atrocious a proceeding, that almost every one concerned in it has made an effort to throw the blame off his own shoulders, and implicate more deeply the other actors in the bloody tragedy. Savary, General Hullin, and Napoleon himself, have all endeavoured to vindicate themselves at the expense of their associates in the crime; but the only inference which can justly be drawn from a comparison of their observations is, that they were all guilty, and the First Consul most of all. In commenting on this subject, which frequently recurred to his thoughts during the solitude of St Helena, he at times ascribed the catastrophe to a deplorable excess of zeal in the persons by whom he was surrounded;² at others to an unfortunate prepossession, taken up at an unguarded moment, when he was worked up to madness by the reports he received of conspiracies and plots in every direction around him;³ but in his testament he reverted to the more manly course of admitting the deed, taking upon himself its whole responsibility, and endeavouring to justify it on reasons of state necessity. "I arrested the Duc d'Enghien," said he in that solemn instrument, "because that measure was necessary to the security, the interest, and the honour of the French people, when the Comte d'Artois maintained, on his own admission, sixty assassins.⁴ In similar cir-

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20.

His innocence is completely established after his death.

¹ Rev. ii. 57.

21.

Napoleon's vindication of himself at St Helena.

² Las Cas. vii. 257.

³ Las Cas. vii. 253, 257.

⁴ Test. de Nap. sec. 6. in Anton-archi, ii. App.

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22.
Remarkable
retribution
which over-
took all the
actors in the
murder.1 Hullin's
Memoirs, 13.2 Savary, iv.
282.

cumstances I would do the same." As if any reasons of honour, interest, or security, can ever call for or justify the death of an innocent man without either inquiry, evidence, or trial.*

A memorable retribution awaited all the actors in this bloody tragedy. Murat, seized eleven years afterwards on the Neapolitan territory, when attempting to excite the people to a revolt, was delivered over to a military commission, tried under a law which he himself had made, and shot. General Hullin, after having spent, as he himself said, "twenty years in unavailing regrets; bowed down by misfortune; blind, and unhappy," wished for the grave to relieve him from his sufferings;¹ Savary lived to witness calamities to himself and his country, sufficient, in his own words, to draw from his eyes tears of blood;² and Napoleon, vanquished in war, precipitated from his throne, stripped of his possessions, was left an exile amidst the melancholy main, to reflect on the eternal laws of justice which he had violated, and the boundless gifts of fortune which he had misapplied.† Whether Providence interferes in the affairs of mankind by any other method than general laws, and the indignation which deeds of violence excite in the human heart, must remain for ever a mystery; but in many cases the connexion between national, not less than individual, crime, and its appropriate punishment, is so evident as to be obvious even on the surface of history. The murder of the Duc d'Enghien lighted again the flames of continental war, and induced that terrible strife which ultimately brought the Tartars of the Desert to the walls of Paris.

* It is but justice to Napoleon, however, to add, that he said at St Helena:—"Most certainly, if I had been informed in time of certain features in the opinions and character of the prince, and especially if I had seen a letter which he wrote to me, but which was never delivered, God knows for what reason, till after he was no more, most certainly I would have pardoned him."³ Savary asserts that Napoleon said to Real, after hearing the circumstances of the prince's death:—"Unhappy T——, what have you made me do?"⁴ And Napoleon said to O'Meara at St Helena, that "Talleyrand had kept the duke's letter, written to him from Strasbourg, and only delivered it two days after his death;"⁵ but Bourrienne asserts that the whole story of such a letter having been written and kept back is an entire fabrication.—See BOURRIENNE, v. 312.

3 *Las. Cas.* vii.
268.4 Savary Vin-
dicat on, 60.5 O'Meara, i.
321, 340.

† "Ὀδὲ τις κακουργὸς ὦν
Μη μοι, το πρώτος βῆμ' εἶν δαμνη καλῶς
Νικᾶν δακτύλῳ τῇ δικῇ, πρὶν ἂν πῶλος
Γραμμὴς ἴκηται, καὶ τέλος καμύνη βίου."
EURIPIDES, *Electra*, 959.

From it may be dated the commencement of that train of events which precipitated Napoleon from the throne of Charlemagne to the rock of St Helena.

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When the melancholy event was known in Paris on the morning of the 21st, a universal stupor and consternation prevailed. Few were to be found who approved of the deed; distrust, terror, anxiety, were depicted in every countenance. It was openly stigmatised by a great proportion of the people as a bloody and needless assassination; among none was the general grief more poignant than among the warmest partisans of Napoleon. The bright morning of the consulate seemed overcast, and the empire to be ushered in by deeds of Oriental cruelty. Crowds issued daily through the Barrier de Trône, to visit, in the fosse of Vincennes, the spot where the victim had suffered; a favourite spaniel, which had followed the prince to the place of execution, faithful to death, was to be seen constantly lying on the grave. The interest excited by its appearance was so strong, that by an order of the police the dog was removed, and all access to the place prohibited.¹

23.
Consternation which the act excites in Paris.

The consternation which prevailed among the members of the diplomatic body was still greater. Couriers were instantly despatched to St Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and London; and the ambassadors of all the powers at Paris met to concert measures on the subject. "All Paris," says M. Darlberg, the plenipotentiary of Baden, "is in consternation; Europe will shudder at the deed. We are approaching a terrible crisis; the ambition of Buonaparte knows no bounds; nothing is sacred in his eyes; he will sacrifice every thing to his passions. M. Cobentzell, Lucchesini, and D'Oubril are concerting measures on the part of Austria, Prussia, and Russia."² M. Talleyrand, the minister of foreign affairs, gave a ball on the night of the day on which the prince was executed; but its aspect was mournful, and several members of the diplomatic body sent their apologies. The cabinet of Prussia presented an energetic note, complaining of the violation of the territory of Baden; while that of Russia ordered a court mourning for his death, which was worn by all the ambassadors of that power at foreign courts, and addressed a vigorous remonstrance to the French government.³ The

¹ *Rev.* ii. 45.
Bour. v. 339.
Bign. v. 343.

24.
And in the foreign ambassadors.

² M. Darlberg's letter, March 22, 1804, Paris. *Rev.* ii. 240.

³ *Bign.* iii. 345. *Ann. Reg.* 1804. *State Papers*, 642. *Bour.* vi. 4, 5. *Rev.* ii. 244. M. Darlberg's letter, March 22, 1804. *Rev.* ii. 250.

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25.
Courageous
conduct of
M. Chateau-
briand.

higher classes at Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, were vehement in their condemnation of the sanguinary proceeding; the indignation of the English people, the impassioned tone of the English press, knew no bounds; and already were to be seen, both in the state of the diplomatic relations of the European powers, and the feelings awakened in their subjects, the seeds of the coalition which brought the continent in arms to the fields of Austerlitz and Eylau.

That indignation which the monarchies of Europe did not as yet venture openly to express, a single courageous individual, but one whose weight was equal to a nation in arms, did not hesitate immediately to manifest. The illustrious author of the "*Génie du Christianisme*," M. CHATEAUBRIAND, had been recently appointed ambassador of France to the republic of the Valais, and he was presented to the First Consul on the morning of the 21st, to take leave preparatory to his departure. He observed at the time a striking alteration on the visage of the First Consul, and a sombre expression in his countenance; his matchless powers of dissimulation could not conceal what was passing in his mind; but Chateaubriand knew of nothing at the time to which it could have been owing. Hardly had he left the Tuileries when intelligence arrived of the death of the Duc d'Enghien; he instantly sent in his resignation of the appointment. This intrepid conduct excited a vehement burst of anger in the breast of the First Consul; and the friends of Chateaubriand were in the greatest alarm every morning for a considerable time, expecting to hear of his arrest during the night; but the Princess Eliza, who entertained the highest admiration for that great author, at length succeeded in averting a tempest which, in its outset, might have proved fatal to one of the brightest ornaments of modern literature. From that period, however, may be dated the commencement of that enmity between him and the First Consul, which continued uninterrupted till the Restoration.¹

¹ Bour. v.
348, 349
Bign. iii. 344.

Napoleon was strongly irritated by any opposition to his wishes, or resistance to his will, and accordingly he never forgave Chateaubriand for the public reproof administered on this memorable occasion; but his feelings had no influence on his judgment, and no man could better

appreciate dignified or heroic conduct in an adversary. Although, therefore, the author of the "Genius of Christianity" never afterwards received encouragement from the First Consul, he occupied a high place in his esteem, and this continued in exile, even after the essential injury done by that author to his cause by the celebrated pamphlet on the "Constitutional monarchy," published at the Restoration. "Chateaubriand," said he, "has received from nature the sacred fire; his works attest it; his style is not that of Racine, it is that of a prophet. There is no one but himself in the world who could have said with impunity in the Chamber of Peers, that 'the great-coat and hat of Napoleon placed on the end of a stick on the coast of Brest, would make Europe run to arms from one end to another.'"¹

This tragic event was soon followed by another still more mysterious. Early on the morning of the 6th April, General Pichegru was found strangled in prison. Since his apprehension he had undergone ten separate examinations, in the course of which he had been repeatedly confronted with Georges, Lajolais, and all the witnesses who were examined against them. On all occasions, however, he had evinced an unconquerable firmness and resolution. No one was injured by his answers; and nothing whatever had been elicited from him calculated to effect the great object of implicating Moreau in the conspiracy. Such was the effect produced by his courageous demeanour, that Real, the police magistrate, said openly before several persons on coming from one of his examinations,—“What a man that Pichegru is!” In all his declarations he was careful to abstain from any thing which might involve any other person, and exhibited a grandeur of character and generous resolution in his fetters, which excited the admiration even of his enemies. He positively refused, however, to sign any of his judicial declarations; alleging as a reason, that he was too well acquainted with the arts of the police, who, having once got his signature, would by a chemical process efface all the writing which stood above it, and insert another statement, containing every thing which they wished him to admit. He loudly announced his intention of speaking out boldly on his trial, and in particular

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26.

Opinion
which Na-
poleon enter-
tained of him.

¹ Nap. i.
Mont. iv. 248.
Bour. v. 349.
359.

27.

Death of
Pichegru.

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declared that he was resolved "to unfold the odious means by which he and his companions had been entrapped into the conspiracy by the police. That they had now become fully sensible of the Machiavelian devices which had been practised upon them, from the facility given to their landing and coming to Paris, and the utter nullity of all the reports they had received of the general disposition in their favour. That having had their eyes at length opened, they were only solicitous to get out of Paris, and were making preparations for that purpose when they were arrested by the police." This intention to speak out at the trial was in an especial manner declared on the day of his last examination before Real, and next morning at eight o'clock he was found strangled in his cell.¹

Germinal 16.
¹ Bour. v.
23, 31. Bign.
iii. 411.

28.
The surgeons' report on his death, and presumptions against Napoleon.

The surgeons who were called to examine the body of the deceased signed a report, in which they stated that "the body was found with a black silk handkerchief hard twisted round the neck by means of a small stick about five inches long, which was kept tight on the left cheek, on which it rested by one end, which prevented it from unwinding, and produced the strangulation which had terminated in death." The gendarmes in attendance declared that they heard no noise, except a considerable coughing on the part of the general, which lasted till one, when it ceased; and that the sound resembled that of a person who had difficulty of respiration. This is all the light which positive evidence throws on this mysterious transaction: but it were well for the memory of Napoleon if moral presumptions of greater strength than any such testimony did not incline to the darker side.* "When you would discover," says Machiavel, "who is the author of a crime, consider who had an interest to commit it." Judging by this standard, moral presumption weighs heavily against the First Consul. He was on the eve of the greatest step in his life.² The imperial sceptre was within his grasp, and the public authorities

² Bour. vi.
31, 32. Rev.
ii. 55. Ann.
Reg. 1804,
638. State
Papers.

* It is not the least interesting circumstance in this melancholy story, that Pichegru had been the school companion of Napoleon at the military academy of Brienne. They had been bred up in the same house, and it was he who taught Napoleon the four first rules of arithmetic. Though considerably older than the First Consul, they had received their commissions as lieutenants of artillery at the same time. Now the one was about to ascend the throne of France, while the other was strangled in a dungeon.—See *BOURBIENNE*, vi. 1, 315.

had already been instructed to petition him to assume the crown of Charlemagne. At the same time the crisis was of the most violent kind. The Royalist party were in the highest state of excitement, in consequence of the execution of the Duc d'Enghien; the Republicans, in sullen indignation, awaited the trial of Moreau.

In these critical circumstances it was impossible to over-estimate the effect which might have been produced on such inflammable materials by the bold declarations of Pichegru at his trial, openly denouncing the intrigues and treachery of the police, and tearing aside the veil which concealed the dark transactions, by which Fouché had precipitated the leaders of the opposite parties into measures so eminently calculated to aid the ascent of Napoleon to the throne. The First Consul, it is true, had no cause either to be apprehensive of Pichegru, or to doubt his conviction at the trial. But his ministers had every reason to fear the effect which might be produced by the revelations made by so energetic and intrepid a character, and the strongest grounds for believing that he would utterly negative all attempts to implicate his great rival Moreau in the conspiracy. In these circumstances, private assassination became the obvious expedient, and within the gloomy walls of the Temple numerous wretches were to be found, trained to crime, and profoundly versed in all the means of perpetrating it in the way most likely to avoid detection. There can be no reasonable doubt, therefore, that Pichegru was murdered, but there is no positive evidence to connect Napoleon with the act; and the probability is, that it was perpetrated by Fouché and the police, to prevent the exposure of the infamous means used by them to implicate both Moreau and the royalists in the trammels of the conspiracy, which they had so much reason to apprehend from the illustrious captive's known character and declared resolution.

This view is strongly confirmed, when it is recollected, on the other hand, that Pichegru himself had no conceivable motive for committing suicide. Death to so old a soldier and determined a character could have few terrors; and the experience of the Revolution has proved that its prospect hardly ever led to self-destruction. He had uniformly and energetically declared his resolution to

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29.
Reflections
on the pro-
bable privy
of the First
Consul to his
death.

30.
Confirmation
of the proba-
bility of his
assassination
by his previ-
ous expres-
sions.

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speak fully out at the trial, and nothing had occurred to shake that determination, for his own condemnation he must from the first have regarded as certain. Voluntary strangulation in the way in which Pichegru perished, if not an impossible, is at least a highly difficult act; the religious impressions which he had preserved from his youth upwards rendered it highly improbable on his part; and the secrecy which government maintained in regard to his declarations, necessarily led to the conclusion that they contained matter which it was deemed advisable to bury in the tomb. So universal was the impression produced by these circumstances, that M. Real, on the morning of his death, said, "Though nothing can be more apparent than that this was a suicide, yet it will always be said that, despairing of conviction, we strangled him in prison;"¹ a *cri de conscience* which, coming from such a character, at so early a period, is not the least remarkable circumstance in this mysterious case. Bourrienne, Napoleon's private secretary, declares it as his firm conviction that he was murdered;² and Savary, while he denies this himself, tells us that the belief of his assassination was so general, that a high functionary, a friend of his own, spoke of it some years afterwards as a matter concerning which no doubt could be entertained, and mentioned the gendarmes as the persons by whom the bloody deed had been carried into execution.³ * The populace of Paris, struck by the mysterious circumstances of his death, ascribed it to the Mamelukes who had accompanied Napoleon from Egypt, and had been trained to such deeds in the recesses of Eastern seraglios.⁴

At length, after long and tedious preparatory examinations, Moreau, Georges, the two Polignacs, La Rivière, and the other accused, were brought to trial. Before leaving

Napoleon's defence of himself on this subject at St Helena.

* In discoursing on this subject at St Helena, Napoleon observed, "that he would be ashamed to defend himself against such a charge; its absurdity was so manifest on its very face. What could I gain by it? A man of my character does not act without sufficient motives. Have I ever been known to shed blood from mere caprice? Whatever efforts may have been made to blacken my memory, those who know me are aware that my nature is foreign to crime; there is not in my whole career, a single act of which I could not speak before any tribunal on earth, I do not say, without embarrassment, but with advantage. In truth, Pichegru saw that his situation was desperate; his daring mind could not endure the infamy of punishment; he despaired of my clemency, or despised it, and put himself to death. Had I been inclined to commit a crime, it was not Pichegru, but Moreau, that I would have struck."⁵ Had Napoleon's veracity been equal to his ability as a chronicler of the events of his time, this

5 Les Cœs. vii. 294.

the Temple, Georges harangued the other prisoners in the court, and earnestly recommended prudence and moderation, and that they should abstain from criminating each other. The solemnity of the occasion, and the recollection that it was from the same walls that Louis XVI. had been taken to the scaffold, had subdued to a sadder and milder mood his naturally daring and vehement character. "If in the trials which await us," said he, "your firmness should ever forsake you, look on me, recollect that I am with you, remember my fate will be the same as your own. Yes! we cannot be separated in death, and it is that which should console us. Continue, then, mild and considerate towards each other; redouble your mutual regards; let your common fate draw tighter the bonds of your affection. Look not back to the past. We are placed in our present position by the will of God; in the hour of death let us pray that our country, rescued from the yoke which oppresses it, may one day be blessed under the rule of the Bourbons. Never forget that it was from the prison which we are about to quit that Louis XVI. went forth to the scaffold. Let his sublime example be your model and your guide."¹

Early on the 28th May, the doors of the Palace of Justice were thrown open, and the trial began. An immense crowd instantly rushed in, and occupied every avenue to the hall; the doors were besieged by thousands, urgent to obtain admittance. The public anxiety rose to the highest pitch. Persons of the chief rank and greatest consideration in Paris were there; the remnants of the old nobility, the leaders of the modern republic, flocked to a scene where the fate of characters so interesting to both was to be determined. The prisoners, to the number of forty-five, were put to the bar together. Public indignation murmured aloud at seeing the conqueror of Hohenlinden seated amidst persons, many of whom

passage would have been deserving of the highest consideration: but the slightest acquaintance with his writings and actions must be sufficient to convince every impartial person that he had no regard whatever to truth in any thing that he either said or wrote; and fired off words as he would do shot in a battle, to produce a present effect, without the slightest idea that they ever would be sifted by subsequent ages, or ultimately recoil upon himself. He forgets that it was to secure the conviction of Moreau, and cut off the decisive evidence that he could give in favour of him, that the private assassination of Pichegru became expedient, and that the more he elevates the character of the Republican general who was brought to trial, the more he magnifies the probability of the destruction of the Royalist chief whose testimony might have led to his acquittal.

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31.

Speech of
Georges to
his fellow-
prisoners,
before being
brought to
trial.

¹ Bour. vi.
47.

32.

Trial of
Moreau,
Georges, and
others.

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¹ Bour. vi.
115, 119.
Rev. ii. 61,
63.

33.
Amount of
the admission
on which
Moreau was
condemned.

were regarded as the hired bravoës of England. In the course of the trial, which lasted twelve days, a letter from Moreau to the First Consul, written from the prison of the Temple, was read, in which he stated his case with so much simplicity and candour, that it produced the most powerful effect on the audience.* The result of the trial was, that Moreau's innocence was completely established, or rather the prosecutor totally failed to prove any criminal connexion on his part with the conspirators. Not one witness could fix either a guilty act or important circumstance upon him.¹

He admitted having seen Pichegru on several occasions, but positively denied that he had ever been in presence of Georges; and, though two witnesses were adduced who swore to that fact, their testimony was inadmissible by law, and, at all events, unworthy of credit, being that of accused persons under trial for the same crime.† Throughout the whole trial his demeanour was dignified, mild, and unassuming. On one occasion only his indignant spirit broke forth, when the president accused him

Letter of
Moreau to Na-
poleon.

* Moreau there said, "In the campaign of 1797 we took the papers of the Austrian staff: amongst them were several which seemed to implicate Pichegru in a correspondence with the French princes; this discovery gave us both great pain, but we resolved to bury it in oblivion, as Pichegru, being no longer at the head of the army, was not in a situation to do injury to the Republic. The events of the 18th Fructidor succeeded; disquietude became universal; and two officers who were acquainted with that correspondence, represented to me the necessity of making it public. I was then a public functionary, and could no longer preserve silence. During the two last campaigns in Germany, and since the peace, he has occasionally made remote and circuitous overture to me as to the possibility of entering into a correspondence with the French princes, but I considered them so ridiculous that I never made any answer.

"As to the present conspiracy, I can equally assure you that I have not had the smallest share in it. I repeat it, General, whatever proposition may have been made to me, I rejected it at once in my own mind, and regarded it as the most absurd of projects. When it was represented to me that the occasion of a descent into England would be favourable to a change of government, I answered that the Senate was the authority to which all Frenchmen would look in case of difficulty, and that I would be the first to range myself under its authority. Such overtures made to me, a private individual, wishing to keep up no connexions, neither in the army, nine-tenths of which have served under my orders, nor in the state, imposed upon me no duty but that of refusal; the infamy of becoming an informer was repugnant to my character; ever judged with severity, such a person becomes odious, and deserving of eternal reprobation when he turns against those from whom he has received obligations, or with whom he has maintained terms of friendship. Such, General, have been my connexions with Pichegru; they will surely convince you that rash and ill-founded conclusions have been drawn from a conduct on my part perhaps imprudent, but far from criminal." These words bear the stamp of truth, and they embrace the whole of what was proved against Moreau. Not one of the one hundred and nineteen witnesses examined at the trial said more against him.—BOURRIENNE, vi. 118, 120.

† Lajolais and Picot were the persons who spoke to it, and Lajolais was the secret agent of Pouché throughout the whole transaction; and both were fellow-prisoners at the bar with Moreau.²

² Rovigo, l. 63.

of a desire to make himself dictator :—" Me dictator ! " exclaimed he, " and with the partisans of the Bourbons ! Who, then, would be my supporters ? I could find none but in the French soldiers, of, whom I have commanded nine-tenths, and saved above fifty thousand. They have arrested all my aides-de-camp, all the officers of my acquaintance, but not a shadow of suspicion could be found against any one, and they have all been set at liberty. Can there be such folly as to suppose that I proposed to make myself dictator by means of the partisans of the old French princes, who have combated for the royalist cause since 1792 ? Do you really believe that these men, in twenty-four hours, should have been so suddenly changed as to make me dictator ? You speak of my fortune, of my income ; I began with nothing, and might now have been worth fifty million francs ; I possess only a house and a small property attached to it ; my allowances amount to forty thousand francs, and let that be compared with my services." ¹

CHAP.
XXXVIII.
1804.

¹ Bour. vi.
115, 123, 124.
Rev. ii. 61,
64.

As the case went on, and the impossibility of convicting Moreau on the capital charge preferred against him became apparent, the disquietude of the First Consul was extreme. He sent in private for the judges, and questioned them minutely as to the probable result of the process ; and as it had become impossible to convict him of any share in the conspiracy, it was agreed that he should be found guilty of the minor charge of remotely aiding them. Some of the judges proposed that he should be entirely acquitted, but the President Hemart informed them that such a result would only have the effect of impelling the government into measures of still greater severity ; and therefore this compromise was unanimously agreed to. Napoleon strongly urged a capital sentence, in the idea probably of overwhelming his rival by a pardon ; but the judges returned the noble answer, " and if we do so, who will pardon us ? " In truth, the temper of the public mind was such, that any capital sentence on so illustrious a person would probably have produced a violent commotion, and it was extremely doubtful whether the soldiers of the army of the Rhine would not have risen at once to his rescue. So intense was the interest excited by

34.
Intense interest excited
at Paris.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1804.

¹ Bour. vi.
124, 126.
Bign. iii. 420.

35.
Heroic indifference of
Georges, and
condemnation of the
prisoners.

² Bour. vi.
138, 140.
Bign. iii. 421.
Rev. ii. 62,
63.

his situation, that when Lecourbe, one of the bravest and most distinguished of his lieutenants, entered the court with the infant child of Moreau in his arms, all the military present spontaneously rose and presented arms; and if Moreau had given the word, the court would that moment have been overturned, and the prisoners liberated. Whenever he rose to address the judges, the gendarmes, by whom he was guarded, rose also, and remained uncovered till he sat down. In fact, the public mind was so agitated, that the influence of Moreau in fetters almost equalled that of the First Consul on the throne.¹

The demeanour of Georges throughout the whole trial was stoical and indifferent; he rejected the humane proposals made to him by Napoleon to save his life, if he would abandon his attempts to reinstate the Bourbons, saying, "that his comrades had followed him into France, and he would follow them to death." Armand and Jules Polignac excited the warmest interest, by the generous contest which ensued between them as to which had been really implicated in the conspiracy, each trying to take the whole blame upon himself, and to exculpate the other.* When the debates were closed, and the judges retired to deliberate, the public anxiety rose to the highest pitch; they remained four-and-twenty hours in consultation; and all the while, the court, and all its avenues, were thronged with anxious multitudes. The most breathless suspense prevailed when the judges returned to the court, and Hemart, seating himself in the president's chair, read out the sentence, which condemned Georges Cadouhal, Bouvet de Lozier, Russilon, M. de Rivière, Armand de Polignac, Lajolais, Picot, Costor San Victor, and others, to the number of sixteen, to death;¹ and Moreau, Jules de Polignac, Leridant, Roland, and a young girl named Issay, to two years' imprisonment.²

* Armand de Polignac first declared publicly, that he alone was accessory to the conspiracy, and that his brother was entirely innocent, and earnestly implored that the stroke of justice might fall on him alone. On the following day, his brother Jules rose and said, "I was too much moved yesterday at what my brother said to be able to attend to what I was to advance in my own defence; but to-day, when I am more cool, I implore you not to give credit to what his generosity has prompted him to suggest in my behalf. If one of us must perish, I am the guilty person. Restore him to his weeping wife; I have none to lament me; I can brave death. Too young to have enjoyed life, how can I regret it?"—"No," exclaimed Armand, "you have life before you; I alone am the guilty person; I alone ought to perish."—Bour. vi. 138, 139.

Though the preservation of Moreau's life, which had been placed in such imminent hazard, was universally considered as a subject of congratulation, yet the condemnation of so great a number of persons, many of whom belonged to the highest society in Paris, to death together, spread a general consternation through the capital. During four years of a steady and lenient administration, the people had not only lost their indifference, but acquired a horror, at the shedding of blood; and a catastrophe of this sort, which recalled the sanguinary scenes under the Convention, diffused universal distress. To this feeling soon succeeded a sense of the gross injustice done to Moreau, found guilty upon the unsupported declarations of two conspirators who were condemned along with himself; and with so strong a sense of the iniquity of the conviction in the breast of the judges, that they were obliged to sentence him to a punishment, ridiculous and inadequate if he were guilty, oppressive if he were innocent.¹

Napoleon, however, was not really cruel; he was, on the contrary, in general averse to measures of severity, and only callous to all the suffering they occasioned, when they seemed necessary either for the projects of his ambition, or the principles of his state policy. His object in all these measures was to attain the throne, and for this purpose the death of the Duke d'Enghien, which struck terror into the Royalists, and the condemnation of Moreau, which paralysed the Republicans, seemed indispensable. Having attained these steps, he yielded not less to his own inclinations than to the dictates of sound policy in pardoning many of the persons convicted. Murat, immediately after the sentence was pronounced, repaired to Napoleon, and earnestly entreated him to signalise his accession to the imperial throne by pardoning all the accused; but he could not obtain from him so splendid an act of mercy. Josephine, never wanting at the call of humanity, exerted her powerful influence in favour of several of the persons under sentence; many other persons at the court followed her example; and some were pardoned, in particular Lajolais, in consideration of the services they had rendered to the police during the conspiracy. In these different

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1804.

36.
Public feeling
on this
subject.

¹ Rev. ii. 63.
64. Rom.
vi. 140, 141.

37.
Clemency of
the First
Consul, after
the convictions
were
obtained.

CHAP.
XXXVI.
1804.

ways, Bouvet de Lozier, Rivière, Armand de Polignac, Lajolais, Armand Gaillard, and three others, experienced the mercy of the First Consul. The remainder were executed on the 25th June, on the Place de Grève; they all underwent their fate with heroic fortitude, protesting with their last breath their fidelity to their king and country; and Georges, in particular, insisted upon dying first, in order that his companions, who knew that he had been offered his pardon by the First Consul, might see that he had not deserted them in the extreme hour.¹

¹ Bour. vi.
142, 144.
Rev. ii. 66.

38.
His intended
lenity to
Moreau.

Napoleon asserted to Bourrienne, shortly after the trial was over, that he had been greatly annoyed by the result of the process, chiefly because it prevented him from utterly extinguishing Moreau as the head of a party in the state; that assuredly he never would have suffered him to perish on the scaffold; but that his name, withered by a capital conviction, would no longer have been formidable, and that he had been led to direct a prosecution, from his Council assuring him that there could be no doubt of a conviction.* He added, that if he had foreseen the result, he would have privately urged Moreau to travel, and even have given him a foreign embassy to colour his departure.² After the sentence was pronounced, he acted with indulgence to his fallen rival. On the very day on which he requested permission to retire to America, Napoleon granted it; he purchased his estate of Gros Bois, near Paris, which he conferred upon Berthier, and paid the expenses of his journey to Barcelona, preparatory to embarking for the United States, out of the public treasury. His ardent mind had been singularly captivated by the stern resolution of Georges;³

² Bour. vi.
156, 157.
Rev. ii. 66.

³ Bour. v.
159. Ann.
Reg. 1804,
165. Rev. ii.
65, 66.

* Napoleon's policy in this, as in many other respects, was the same as Voltaire has so finely ascribed to Cæsar:—

“ Je sais quel est le peuple : on le change en un jour ;
Il prodigue aisément sa haine et son amour.
Si ma grandeur l'aigrit, ma clemence l'attire :
Un pardon politique à qui ne peut me nuire,
Dans mes chaînes qu'il porte un air de liberté,
Ont ramené vers moi sa faible volonté.
Il faut couvrir de fleurs l'abîme où je l'entraîne,
Flatter encore ce tigre à l'instant que l'on enchaîne ;
Lui plaire en l'accablant, l'asservir le charmer,
Et punir mes rivaux en me faisant aimer.”

La Mort de Cæsar, Act i. scene 1.

after his sentence was pronounced, he sent Real to the Temple, and offered, if he would attach himself to his service, to give him a regiment, and even make him one of his aides-de-camp. But the heroic Vendéan remained faithful to his principles even in that extremity, and preferred dying with his comrades to all the allurements of the imperial service.*

One other deed of darkness belongs to the same period in the government of Napoleon. Captain Wright, from whose vessel Pichegru had been disembarked, was afterwards shipwrecked on the coast of the Morbihan, and brought with all his crew, to Paris, where they were examined as witnesses on the trial of Georges. This intrepid man, who had formerly been a lieutenant on board Sir Sidney Smith's ship, when he stopped the Eastern career of Napoleon at Acre, positively declined to give any evidence, saying, with the spirit which became a British officer, "Gentlemen, I am an officer in the British service; I care not what treatment you have in reserve for me; I am not bound to account to you for the orders I have received, and I decline your jurisdiction." He added, after his deposition, taken in prison, was read over in court, that "they had not annexed to that declaration the threat held out to him, that he should be shot if he did not reveal the secrets of his country."¹ Some time after this, but the precise date is not known, as it was not revealed by the French government for long afterwards, Captain Wright was found in his cell in the Temple with his throat cut from ear to ear. By whom this was done remains, and probably will ever remain, a mystery. The French authorities gave out that he had committed suicide in prison; but the character of that officer, and the letters he had written shortly before his death, in which he positively declared he had no in-

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XXXVIII.
1804.

39.
Death of
Captain
Wright, in
prison, at
Paris.

1 Bour. v.
135, 136.
Rev. ii. 60.
Scott, v. 126,
128.

* "There is one man," said Napoleon, "among the conspirators whom I regret, that is Georges. His mind is of the right stamp; in my hands he would have done great things. I appreciate all the firmness of his character, and I would have given it a right direction. I made Real inform him, that if he would attach himself to me, I would not only pardon him, but give him a regiment. What do I say? I would have made him one of my aides-de-camp. Such a step would have excited a great clamour; but I should not have cared for it. Georges refused every thing. He is a bar of iron. What can I now do? He must undergo his fate, for such a man is too dangerous in a party; it is a necessity of my situation."² This is a sufficient proof that Napoleon was aware that assassination formed no part of the design of the conspirators against him, for assuredly he would never have taken the chief of such a band into his service.

His opinion of
Georges.

2 Bour. vi. 100.

CHAP.
XX XVIII.

1804.

¹ Scott, v.
127, 129.
Ann. Reg.
1805. Sir
Robert Wil-
son's Egypt,
72. O'Mearn,
i. 275.

tention of laying violent hands on himself, rendered that event extremely improbable. The previous threats which he publicly declared on the trial they had made to him, and the strong desire which the French government had to implicate the English cabinet in a conspiracy against the life of the First Consul, in order to weaken the force of public indignation in Europe at the death of the Duc d'Enghien, render it more than probable; that he was cut off in order to extinguish the evidence which he could give as to the disgraceful methods resorted to by the police to extort declarations from their prisoners; or possibly, as was asserted in England at the time, to destroy the traces of torture on his person.¹

40.
Napoleon
resolves to
assume the
Imperial
Crown.

It was in the midst of these bloody events that Napoleon assumed the IMPERIAL CROWN, and the last shadow of republican freedom was transformed into the reality of Byzantine servitude. Eighteen months before, he had declared in the Council of State, "that the principle of hereditary succession was absurd, irreconcilable with the sovereignty of the people, and impossible in France;" four years before that, he had announced to the Italian states, "that his victories were the commencement of the era of representative governments;" and already he was prepared to adopt a measure which should establish that absurd and impracticable system in that very country, and overturn, within all the states that were subjected to his influence, those very representative institutions. *Vestigia nulla retrorsum* was the principle of his policy. He never looked back to the past, or attempted to reconcile former professions with present actions; success, not duty, was the ruling principle of his conduct; he deemed nothing done while any thing remained to do.

² Thib. 454.

41.
This explains
his murder-
ing the Duc
d'Enghien.

It was neither from a thirst for blood, nor a jealousy of the Bourbons, that he put the Duc d'Enghien to death. Expedience, supposed political expedience, was the motive. "When about to make himself emperor," says Madame de Staël, "he deemed it necessary, on the one hand, to dissipate the apprehensions of the revolutionary party as to the return of the Bourbons; and to prove, on the other, to the Royalists, that when they attached themselves to him, they finally broke with

the ancient dynasty. It was to accomplish that double object that he committed the murder of a prince of the blood, of the Duc d'Enghien. He passed the Rubicon of crime, and from that moment misfortune was written on his destiny."¹ Interposing boldly, like the Committee of Public Salvation on occasion of the fall of Danton; between the Royalists and Republicans, he struck redoubtable blows at both; proving to the former, by the sacrifice of their brightest ornament, that all prospect of reconciliation with them was at an end; to the latter, by the trial of their favourite leader, that all hopes of reviving in the people the dreams of democratic enthusiasm were extinguished. At the same time, to the great body of revolutionary proprietors, the millions who had profited by the preceding convulsions, and were desirous only to preserve what they had gained, he held out the guarantee of a hereditary throne; and a dynasty competent to restrain all the popular excesses of which the recollection was so deeply engraven on the public mind.²

The season chosen for the first broaching of these ideas, which had been long floating in prospect in the thoughts of all reflecting persons, was shortly after the death of the Duc d'Enghien, and when a vague disquietude pervaded the public mind as to the result of the conspiracies and trials which had excited so extraordinary an interest. In a secret conference with several of the leading members of the Senate, held six days after that event, Napoleon represented to them the precarious state of the Republic, dependent as it was on the life of a single individual, daily exposed to the daggers of assassins; passed in review the different projects which might be adopted to give it more stability, a republic, the restoration of the ancient dynasty, or the creation of a new one; and discussed them all as a disinterested spectator, totally unconnected with any plans which might ultimately be adopted. The obsequious senators, divining his secret intentions, warmly combated the transference of power to any other hands, and conjured him to provide as soon as possible for the public weal by making supreme power hereditary in a race of sovereigns, commencing with himself. Feigning a reluctant consent, he at length said: "Well, if you are really convinced that my nomination as emperor is neces-

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1804.

¹ Rév. Franç.
ii. 328.

² Bign. iii.
377.

42.
First broaching of the project to the Senate.

March 27.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1804.

sary to the welfare of France, take at least every possible precaution against my tyranny ; yes, I repeat it, against my tyranny ; for who knows how far, in such a situation, I may be tempted to abuse the authority with which I may be invested ?” The project thus set on foot was the subject of secret negotiation for above a month between the Senate and the government. It was agreed, that the first public announcement of it should come from the Tribunate, as the only branch of the legislature in which the shadow even of popular representation prevailed. So completely had the strength of that once formidable body been prostrated, and its character changed by the alterations made on its constitution when the consulate for life was proclaimed, that it proved the ready instrument of these ambitious projects. Every thing was arranged with facility for acting the great drama in presence of the nation. The moment was chosen ; the dispositions were made ; the speeches, addresses, and congratulations agreed on ; the parts assigned to the principal actors, before the curtain drew up, or the people were admitted to the spectacle. At length, on the 25th April, the representation began in the hall of the Tribunate.¹

¹ Bign. iii.
379, 380.
Bour. vi. 52.
Thib. 455.
De Staël,
Rev. Franç.
ii. 329, 330.

^{43.}
The Tribu-
nate is put
forward to
make the
proposal in
public.
April 25.

M. Curée and Simeon were the most distinguished orators on the side of the government in that branch of the legislature. “Revolutions,” said they, “are the diseases of the body politic ; every thing which has been overturned was not in reality deserving of censure. There are certain bases of public prosperity at the foundation of every social edifice. Seasons of discord may displace them for a time, but ere long their own weight restores them to their natural situation ; and if a skilful hand superintends the reconstruction of the building during that period of returning stability, they may regain a form which shall endure for centuries. It is in vain that we are reminded of the long continuance of the ancient dynasty. Principles and facts alike oppose their restoration. The people, the sole fountain and depository of power, may displace a family, by virtue of the same authority by which they seated them on the throne. Europe has sanctioned the change by recognising our new government. The reigning family in England have no other title to the throne but the will of the people. ‘When Pepin was crowned, it was

only,' says Montesquieu, 'a ceremony the more, and a phantom the less.' He acquired nothing by it but the ornaments of royalty; nothing was changed in the nation. When the successors of Charlemagne lost supreme authority, Hughes Capet already held the keys of the kingdom: the crown was placed on his head because he alone was able to defend it.

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XXXVIII.
1804.

"An eternal barrier separates us from the return of the factions which would tear our entrails, and that royal family which we proscribed in 1792 because it had violated our rights. It is only by placing the crown on the head of the First Consul, that the French people can preserve their dignity, their independence, and their territory. Thus only will the army be assured of a brilliant establishment, faithful chiefs, intrepid officers, and the glorious standards which have so often led it to victory: it will neither have to fear unworthy humiliations, disgraceful disbanding, nor horrid civil wars, where the bones of the defenders of their country are exposed to the winds. Let us hasten, then, to demand hereditary succession in the supreme magistrate; 'for in voting this to a chief,' as Pliny said to Trajan, 'we prevent the return of a master.' But at the same time let us give a worthy name to so great a power; let us adorn the first magistrate in the world by a dignified epithet; let us choose that which shall at once convey the idea of the first civil functions, recall glorious recollections, and in no ways infringe on the sovereignty of the people. I see, for the chief of the national power, no name so worthy as that of EMPEROR. If it means victorious consul, who is so worthy to bear it? 'What people, what armies were ever more deserving of such a title in their chief? I demand, therefore, that we lay before the Senate the wish of the nation, that Napoleon Buonaparte, at present First Consul, be declared Emperor, and in that quality remain charged with the government of the French Republic; that the Imperial dignity be declared hereditary in his family; and that such of our institutions as are only sketched out be definitely arranged.'" No sooner was the harangue delivered than a crowd of orators rushed forward to inscribe their names on the tribune to follow in the same course. The senate of Augustus was never more obsequious.¹

44.
Speech of the
movers on the
occasion.

¹ Bour. vi.
55, 56. Rign.
iii. 381, 382.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1804.

45.
Honourable
resistance of
Carnot.

Notwithstanding the headlong course which public opinion was following towards the establishment of despotic power, and the obvious necessity for it to stay the discord from which such boundless suffering had ensued, there were some determined men who stood forward to resist the change, undeterred by the frowns of power, unseduced by the cheers of the multitude, uninstructed by the lessons of experience. Carnot in the Tribune, and Berlier in the Council of State, were the foremost of this dauntless band. There is something in the spectacle of moral courage, of individual firmness withstanding public transports, of conscious integrity despising regal seductions, which must command respect, even when advocating a course which is impracticable, or inexpedient. "In what a position," said Carnot, "will this proposition place all those who have advocated the principles of the Revolution! When hereditary succession to the throne is established, there will no longer remain a shadow to the Republic of all for which it has sacrificed so many millions of lives. I cannot believe that the people of France are disposed so soon to abandon all that has been so dearly acquired. Was liberty, then, only exhibited to man to increase his regrets for a blessing which he never can enjoy? Is it to be for ever presented to his eyes as the forbidden fruit to which he must not reach out his hand? Has nature, which has inspired us with so pressing a desire for this great acquisition, doomed us in its search to continual disappointment? No! I can never be brought to regard a blessing so generally preferred to all others, without which all others are nothing, as a mere illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is possible, and that the system which it goes to establish is easier of institution, and more stable in duration, than either arbitrary power or an unrestrained oligarchy." Every one respected the courage and motives of these upright men; but the fallacy of their arguments was not the less apparent, the public tendency to despotism not the less irresistible. In the Council of State the hereditary succession was carried by a majority of twenty to seven; and in the Tribune by a still larger majority, Carnot alone voting in the minority.¹

The theatrical representation thus got up in the tribunate, and the exchange of addresses, consultations,

¹ Bour. vi.
61, 62.
Bigh. iii.
362, 363.
Trib. 460.

public and private, which followed, soon produced the desired effect. In Napoleon's words, it was now evident that the pear was ripe. Addresses flowed in from all quarters, from the army, the municipalities, the cities, the chambers of commerce, all imploring the First Consul to ascend the imperial throne, and vying with each other in the strains of servile adulation. Their general strain was, "Greatest of men, complete your work; render it as immortal as your glory; you have extricated us from the chaos of the past; you have overwhelmed us with the blessings of the present; nothing remains but to guarantee for us the future." To the address of the senate, imploring him to assume the purple, Napoleon replied, "We have been constantly guided by the principle that sovereignty resides in the people; and that therefore every thing, without exception, should be rendered conducive to their interest, happiness, and glory. It is to attain this end that the supreme magistracy, the senate, the council, the legislative body, the electoral body, and all the branches of administration, have been instituted. The people of France can add nothing to the happiness and glory which surround me; but I feel that my most sacred as my most pleasing duty is to assure to its children the advantages secured by that revolution which cost so much, and above all, by the death of so many millions of brave men who died in defence of our rights. It is my most earnest desire that we may be able to say, on the 14th July in this year—'Fifteen years ago, by a spontaneous movement, we ran to arms, we gained liberty, equality, and glory.' Now these first of blessings, secured beyond the possibility of chance, are beyond the reach of danger; they are preserved for you and your children. Institutions, conceived and commenced in the midst of the tempests of war, both without and within, are about to be secured, while the state resounds with the designs and conspiracies of our mortal enemies, by the adoption of all that the experience of ages has demonstrated to be necessary to guarantee the rights which the nation has deemed essential to its dignity, its liberty, and its happiness."¹

In this answer is to be found the key to the whole

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1804.

46.

Universal
adulation
with which
Napoleon was
surrounded.
His answer to
the Senate.

May 4.

¹ Bour. vi.
65, 70.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1804.

47.

Key which it
affords to his
whole policy
on the throne.

policy of the First Consul on the throne, and the secret of the astonishing facility with which he established, on the ruins of revolutionary passions, the most despotic throne of Europe. Aware that the great body of mankind are incapable of judging on public affairs, but perfectly adequate to a perception of their private interests, he invariably observed the principles there set forth of carefully protecting all the revolutionary *interests*, and constantly addressing the people in the *language* of revolutionary equality, while at the same time he was depriving them of all political power, and imposing on them the *reality* of Asiatic despotism. By steadily adhering to these rules, he succeeded in at once calming their interested fears, and flattering their impassioned feelings; by constantly holding out that the people were the source of all power, he blinded them to the fact that they had ceased to be the possessors of any; and by religiously respecting all the *interests* created by the Revolution, he rendered the nation indifferent to the abandonment of all the *principles* on which it was founded.*

48.
He is de-
clared Em-
peror of the
French.
General con-
currence of
the nation.
May 18.

All things being at length matured, the senate, by a decree on the 18th May, declared Napoleon EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH; but referred to the people the ratification of their decree, which declared the throne hereditary in his family, and that of his brothers, Joseph and Lucien. The obsequious body hastened to St Cloud with the decree, where the Emperor received them with great magnificence. "Whatever," said he, "can contribute to the good of the country, is essentially connected with my

* Napoleon precisely adopted the course for transforming democracy into despotism, recommended in the powerful lines of the Italian poet:—

———"Intorpidir dei pria
Gli animi loro; il cor snervare affatto;
Ogni dritto pensier svolger con arte;
Spegner virtute (ove pur n'abbia), o farla
Schernò alle genti; i men feroci avverti
Tra' famigliari; e i falsamente alteri
Avvillire, onorandoli. Clemenza,
E patria, e gloria, e leggi, e cittadini,
Alto suonar; più d'ogni cosa, uguale
Fingerti a' tuoi minori—Ecco i gran mezzi,
Onde in ciascun si cangi a poco a poco
Prima il pensar, poi gli usi, indi le leggi;
Il modo poscia di chi regna; e in fine,
Quel che riman solo a cangiarsi, il nome."

ALFIERI, *La Congiura de' Pazzi*, Act ii. scene 1.

happiness. I submit the law concerning the succession to the throne to the sanction of the people. I hope France will never repent of the honours with which she has environed myself and my family. Come what may, my spirit will cease to be with my posterity from the moment that they shall cease to merit the love and the confidence of the great nation." The appeal to the people soon proved that the First Consul, in assuming the imperial dignity, had only acted in accordance with the wishes of the immense majority of the nation. Registers were opened in every commune of France, and the result showed that there were 3,572,329 votes in the affirmative, and only 2569 in the negative. History has recorded no example of so unanimous an approbation of the foundation of a dynasty; no instance of a nation so joyfully taking refuge after the storms of democracy in the stillness of despotism.¹

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¹ Bign. iii.
387, 388.
Moniteur,
May 18.

Various changes, necessarily flowing from this great step, immediately followed. On the day after his accession, the Senate published a *senatus-consultum*, by which the imperial dignity was established in the Buonaparte family, and the rank and precedence of his relations, as well as of the other dignitaries of the empire, were regulated. Various important alterations were made by this decree on the constitution, if constitution it could be called, which had only the shadow of representative institutions with the reality of military despotism; but they will more appropriately come to be considered in the chapter relating to the internal government of the Emperor.* The whole real powers of government were, by the new *senatus-consultum*, vested in the senate and the Council of State; in other words, in the Emperor. The legislative body continued its mute inglorious functions. The Tribunate, divided into several sections, and obliged to discuss in these separate divisions the projects of laws transmitted to it by the legislative body, lost the little consideration which still belonged to it, and paved the way for its total suppression, which soon after ensued. In every thing but the name, the government of France was thenceforward an absolute despotism. Napoleon's next step after ascending the throne was to create the marshals

49.
Rank conferred on his family, and creation of the marshals of the empire, May 19.

* *Infra*, Chap. I. §§ 35-70.

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¹ Bour. vi,
76, 78. Bign.
iii. 363, 401.
Art. 96.
Senat. Cons.
19th May.

of the empire, and it was ordered that they should be addressed as *M. le Maréchal*. Those first named were eighteen in number, well known in the annals of military glory; Berthier, Murat, Monecy, Jourdan, Massena, Augereau, Bernadotte, Soult, Brune, Lannes, Mortier, Ney, Davoust, Bessières, Kellerman, Lefebvre, Pérignon, and Serrurier. He already projected the creation in their favour of those new patents of nobility, which were destined to commemorate the most glorious events of the empire, and form a phalanx of Paladins to defend the imperial throne.¹

50.
Rapid progress
of court
etiquette.

On the same day, Napoleon fixed the titles and precedence of all the members of his family. He directed that his brothers and sisters should receive the title of imperial highness; that the great dignitaries of the empire should adopt that of most serene highness; and that the address of "my lord" should be revived in favour of these elevated personages. Thenceforth the progress of court etiquette and Oriental forms was as rapid at the Tuileries as in the seraglio of the Byzantine empire. "Whoever," says Madame de Staël, "could suggest an additional piece of formality from the olden time, propose an additional reverence, a new mode of knocking at the door of an antechamber, a more ceremonious method of presenting a petition, or folding a letter, was received as if he had been a benefactor of the human race. The code of imperial etiquette is the most remarkable authentic record of human baseness that has been recorded by history."²*

² Rev.
Franc. ii.
334, 335.
Bour. vi. 77,
78.

51.
Dignified
protest of
Louis
XVIII.

No sooner did he receive intelligence of the assumption of the imperial crown by Napoleon than Louis XVIII., on the shores of the Baltic, hastened to protest against an act so subversive of the rights of his family. "In taking

* The French might have addressed to Napoleon on this occasion the words of Sertorius to Pompey in Corneille:—

"Est-ce être tout Romain qu'être chef d'une guerre,
Qui veut tenir aux fers les maîtres de la terre?
Ce nom, sans vous et lui, nous serait encore du;
C'est par lui, par vous, que nous l'avons perdu.
C'est vous qui sous le joug traînez des cœurs si braves:
Ils étaient plus que rois; ils sont moindres qu'esclaves!
Et la gloire que suit vos plus nobles travaux
Ne fait qu'approfondir l'abîme de leurs maux:
Leur misère est le fruit de votre illustre peine,
Et vous pensez avoir l'âme toute Romaine!"

Sertorius, Act I. scene 2.

the title of Emperor," said the exiled prince, "Buonaparte has put the seal to his usurpation. That new act of a revolution, in which every thing has been fundamentally null, cannot doubtless impair my rights; but being accountable for my conduct to other sovereigns, whose rights are not less injured than my own, and whose thrones are shaken by the principles which the senate of Paris has dared to put forth; accountable to France, to my family, to my honour, I should consider myself guilty of betraying the common cause if I preserved silence on this occasion. I declare, then, after renewing my protest against all the illegal acts committed since the commencement of the Revolution, that far from recognising the new title conferred on Buonaparte by a body which has itself no legal existence, I protest against that title, and all the subsequent acts to which it may give rise." This protest was so little regarded by the French government, that it was published on the 1st July in the *Moniteur*.¹

¹ Bign. iii.
389, 391.
Moniteur,
1st July.

Immediately after his return to Paris, from his tour to Flanders and the coast, already mentioned,² in the end of September, Napoleon commenced preparations for the important solemnity of his coronation. Although the spirit of the age was still essentially irreligious, and the forcing through the concordat with the Pope had exposed his government to a ruder shock than the abrogation of all the political privileges acquired by the people during the Revolution,* still Napoleon was well aware that, with a large proportion at least of the rural population, the consecration of his authority by the ceremony of coronation was an essential particular, and that to all, of whatever latitude of opinion, it was of great political importance to prove that his influence was so

52.
His coronation by the Pope resolved on.

² Ante, chap. xxxvii. § 59.

* "At that period (in 1804) there prevailed," says the French historian, "in the Republic a complete indifference on religious subjects; and the apathy of the nation in that respect was such, that it would not leave to any legislator the power of choosing for it any species of Christian worship. This state of things is well worthy of consideration; and it existed in the great majority of the nation to such a degree, that the organisation of the Catholic worship by the concordat appeared to the people a more daring innovation than the overthrow of the national representation on the 19th Brumaire. Religion at that period had no hold of the affections, I had almost said none of the necessities of the people: the spirit of the age, since the days of Louis XV. had been entirely philosophical."—NORVING, ii. 326-7.

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unbounded as to compel the head of the church himself to officiate on the occasion. The Papal benediction appeared to be the link which would unite the Revolutionary to the legitimate régime, and cause the faithful to forget, in the sacred authority with which he was now invested, the violence and bloodshed which had paved his way to the throne.* Napoleon, for these reasons, had long resolved not only that he should be crowned according to the forms of the French monarchy, but that the ceremony should be performed by the Head of Christendom; and for this purpose a negotiation had for some months been in dependence with the Holy See. There was no precedent, indeed, of such an honour being conferred on any crowned head excepting the Emperors of Germany, the successors of the Cæsars, since the days when Stephen III. consecrated the usurpation of Pepin, and poured the holy oil on the head of the founder of a new dynasty, and on that of his son Charlemagne; but this only rendered him the more desirous to secure for himself an honour of which there had been no example for ten centuries; and his achievements certainly would not suffer by a comparison with those of the illustrious founders of the Carlovingian dynasty. Early in June, accordingly, a negotiation had been opened with the Vatican for the coronation of the Emperor by the Pope in person; and although considerable difficulties were at first started by the cardinals, in order to enhance the merit of compliance, and if possible obtain some concessions to the church, from so great an act of condescension on the part of its head, yet, such was the ascendancy of French influence and the terror inspired by Napoleon's arms, that at length the consent of the Consistory was obtained. Accordingly, in reply to a letter of Napoleon, dated from Mayence on the 15th September, the Pope agreed to officiate at the consecration, and announced the speedy commencement of his journey to France.¹ On the day following a concordat was concluded for the

Sept. 15.
1 Bign. iv.
143.
Bot. iv. 136,
142. Dumm.
xi. 75.

* "I will allow the generals of the Republic," said Napoleon, "to exclaim as long as they please against the mass: I know what I am about; I am working for posterity." Though indifferent as to religion himself, he saw clearly that in the end it rules the great body of mankind, and that the irreligious fanaticism of the age was probably destined to be as short-lived as its democratic fervour had been.—See BOURRIENNE, vi. 223.

Italian Republic, on terms precisely similar to those already agreed on with the French government.

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53.

Arrival of the
Pope at Paris.
Nov. 25.

The ceremony was fixed for the 2d December, in the cathedral church of Notre Dame at Paris. The Pope arrived on the 25th of November at Fontainebleau, where the Emperor went to congratulate him on his approach. They met at a cross in the forest on the road to Lyons, about a mile to the southward of the palace, which is still shown to travellers. Napoleon was on horseback; but they both alighted at the same time, and immediately remounted the Pope's carriage—the Emperor entering first, and placing his Holiness on his right hand. They drove together to Fontainebleau, from whence Pius VII. proceeded alone to Paris.* He was everywhere received with extraordinary demonstrations of respect, and lodged at the Tuileries, in magnificent rooms, in the Pavilion of Flora, where, by a delicate attention, he found his sleeping apartment furnished exactly like that which he had recently left on the Monte Cavallo. His arrival at Paris created an extraordinary sensation; among the small remnant of the faithful, of joy at beholding the head of the church within a city so recently defiled by the orgies of infidelity; among the more numerous body of the irreligious or indifferent, of curiosity and astonishment at the extraordinary changes which had so rapidly converted the cathedral where, ten years before, the goddess of Reason was enthroned amidst crowds of revolutionary admirers, into the scene where the august ceremony of coronation was to be performed by the head of the church on the founder of a new race of sovereigns. How sceptical or indifferent soever the great bulk of the people may have been, they were universally impressed with feelings of respect for the venerable pontiff who displayed, in the trying circumstances in which he was placed, so large a portion of Christian charity and forbearance;¹ and on some occasions

¹ Bour. vi.
225, 227.
Bign. iv. 141.
143. D'Abr.
vii. 216.

* It is a remarkable coincidence, that Fontainebleau, where Napoleon, in the pride of apparently boundless power, met the Pope coming to his coronation, was also the witness, ten years after, of his abdication and fall. But the life of the Emperor is full of such extraordinary and apparently mysterious combinations. Immediately after his accession to the consulship, he was intent on a negotiation to obtain for France the island of ELBA, the scene of his first exile; and not a month before his coronation, he dictated orders to Villeneuve for the conquest of St HELENA, the destined theatre of his imprisonment and death.—See BOURRIENNE, vi. 233.

CHAP. on which the brutality of democratic prejudice strove to
 XXXVIII. expose him to insult, his demeanour was so mild and
 1804. benevolent as to excite the unanimous admiration of all
 who witnessed it.*

54.
 Result of the
 appeal to the
 people on the
 subject of the
 hereditary
 succession.

On the day before the coronation, the Senate and
 Tribunate presented, with great pomp, the result of the
 appeal made to the French people on the subject of the
 hereditary succession of his family. Sixty thousand
 registers had been opened. Out of 3,574,898 votes, as al-
 ready noticed, only 2569 were in the negative. Such was
 the result, after fifteen years' experience, of the democratic
 fervour of 1789! In reply to a laboured harangue from
 François de Neufchateau, the orator of the legislature on
 this occasion, Napoleon said—"I ascend the throne where
 I have been placed by the unanimous voice of the people,
 the senate, and the army, with a heart penetrated with
 the splendid destinies of a people whom, in the midst of
 camps, I first saluted with the title of the Great. From
 my youth upwards my thoughts have been entirely occu-
 pied with their glory; and I now feel no pleasure nor
 pain but in the happiness or misfortune of my people.
My descendants will long sit on this throne. In the camps
 they will be the first soldiers of the army, sacrificing their
 lives for the defence of their country. As its first magis-
 trates, they will never forget that contempt for the laws
 and the overthrow of the social edifice are never occa-
 sioned except by the weakness and vacillation of princes.
 You, senators, whose counsels and aid have never been
 wanting in the most difficult circumstances, will transmit
 your spirit to your successors. Remain ever as you now
 are, the firmest bulwarks and the chief counsellors of the
 throne, so necessary to the happiness of this vast empire."¹

1 Bour. vi.
 233.

55.
 Ceremony of
 the corona-
 tion.
 Dec. 2.

The ceremony of coronation took place on the day fol-
 lowing, with the utmost possible magnificence, in the
 cathedral of Notre Dame. The day was intensely cold,
 but clear and bright; the procession long and gorgeous,
 and the whole luxury and magnificence of the empire

* When visiting the Imperial printing-office, one of the workmen was ill-bred enough to keep on his hat in the presence of his Holiness. A murmur of disapprobation arose among the crowd, which the Pope observing, stepped forward and said, with the most benevolent aspect, "Uncover yourself, young man, that I may give you my benediction; no one was ever the worse of the blessing of an old man." The spectators were profoundly affected by this incident.—BOURRIENNE, vi. 227.

displayed within these venerable walls. Carriages glittering with gold and purple trappings; horses proudly caparisoned; liveries, resplendent with colour, dazzled the multitude in the streets through which the cortège passed, as much as a sea of ostrich feathers, rich embroidered court dresses, and a host of stars, ribands, and uniforms, added to the imposing aspect of the scene within the cathedral. The bewildered Republicans who witnessed the ceremony, beheld with pain the pages in attendance on the Empress's carriage, and the swords used as part of full dress, as under the ancient régime. The multitude, though dazzled by the spectacle, was far from testifying the enthusiasm which had been evinced in the fêtes of the Revolution. After taking the oath prescribed by the senatus-consultum of 18th May 1804,* and receiving the Papal benediction, the Emperor, with his own hands, took the crown and placed it on his head; after which he himself, with perfect grace, crowned the Empress, who knelt before him. The general aspect of this interesting scene may be still seen in the admirable picture of David, whose good fortune it has been to be the means of transmitting to posterity so many of the memorable scenes of this heart-stirring epoch.^{1†}

¹ D'Abr. vii.
249, 259.
Bour. vi. 235,
236. Bign.
iv. 145, 146.

On the day following, a military spectacle of a still more animating kind took place in the Champs de Mars.

* The oath was in these words:—"I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Republic; to respect, and cause to be respected, the laws of the concordat and the liberty of worship; to respect, and cause to be respected, equality of rights, political and civil liberty, and the irrevocability of the sale of the national domains; to impose no tax but by legal authority; to maintain the institution of the Legion of Honour; and to govern with no other view but to the interest, the happiness, and the glory of the French people."—BIGNON, *iv.* 144.

† The Duchess of Abrantes, who, as the wife of the governor of Paris, was very near the Emperor on this occasion, mentions, that immediately after crowning the Empress he cast a look of almost intolerable intelligence on her. He thought doubtless of her mother, Madame Permon, and the Rue des Filles de St Thomas, where she had refused his hand ten years before, in the humbler state of his fortunes. What must have been the Duchess's feelings on the fate which might have been her mother's at that moment!—D'ABRANTES, *vii.* 261, 263.

When Napoleon was paying his court to Josephine shortly before their marriage, neither of them having a carriage, they walked together to the notary Raguideau, to whom the latter communicated her design of marrying the young general. "You are a great fool," replied the cautious formalist; "and you will live to repent it. You are about to marry a man who has nothing but his cloak and his sword." Napoleon, who was waiting in the antechamber unknown to Josephine, overheard these words, but never mentioned them to her till the morning of the coronation, when he sent for Raguideau. The astonished old man was brought into the presence of the Emperor, who immediately said to him, with a good-humoured smile, "What say you now, Raguideau; have I nothing but my cloak and my sword?"—BOURRIENNE, *vi.* 237, 238.

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56.
Distribution
of eagles, to
the army.

Napoleon had there laid aside his imperial robes. He appeared in the uniform of a colonel of the guard, to distribute to the colonels of all the regiments present in Paris, and deputations from all those absent, the EAGLES which were thenceforward to form the standards of the army. In the midst of the plain, in front of the Ecole Militaire, a throne was placed on which the Emperor and Empress were seated. The spot selected was nearly the same with that where, fifteen years before, the unfortunate Louis XVI. had sat beside the President of the National Assembly. At a signal given, the troops closed their ranks, and grouped in dense masses round the throne; then the Emperor, rising from his seat, said in a loud voice, "Soldiers! there are your standards. These eagles will serve as your rallying point. They will ever be seen where your Emperor shall deem them necessary for the defence of his throne and of his people."¹

¹ Dum. xi. 77,
78. Bour. vi.
238, 239.57.
Second protest
of Louis
XVIII. on
occasion of
Napoleon's
coronation.

On occasion of the ceremony of the coronation, Louis XVIII. renewed, in yet more emphatic terms, his protest against the usurpation of Napoleon. "On the shores of the Baltic, in the sight and under the protection of heaven, strengthened by the presence of my brother, of the Duc d'Angoulême, and the concurrence of the other princes of the blood; calling to witness the royal victims, and those whom honour, fidelity, patriotism, and duty, have subjected to the Revolutionary axe, or the thirst and jealousy of tyrants; invoking the manes of the young hero whom impious hands have torn from his country and future glory; offering to our people, as a pledge of reconciliation, the virtues of the angel whom Providence has snatched from fetters and death to offer an example of every Christian virtue, we swear, that never will we abandon the heritage of our fathers, or break the sacred bond which unites our destinies to theirs; and we invoke, as witness to our oath, the God of St Louis, the judge of the rulers of men."² Who could have foreseen, at the date of this coronation and this protest, that the bones of Louis XVIII. would repose in the royal vaults of St Denis, while those of Napoleon were to rest under a solitary willow on the rock of St Helena!

Dec. 2.

² Bign. iv.
150.

The coronation of the Emperor was followed by a series of rejoicings, assemblies, and fêtes, which lasted for upwards

of two months. The vast expenditure, both of the court and the numerous civil and military functionaries of government; the great concourse of strangers, and unwonted splendour of the dresses and decorations, caused an unusual degree of activity among the shopkeepers and manufacturers of Paris, and contributed not a little to reconcile that important and democratic body to the Imperial régime, which had now succeeded the terrors of the Revolution. Without possessing the whole elegance or finished manners of the old régime, the Imperial court was remarkable for the lustre and beauty of its assemblies, over which the grace and affability of Josephine threw their principal charm. But not one moment did Napoleon withdraw from state affairs for such amusements. Through the midst of the whole, he laboured eight or ten hours a-day with his ministers, and was already deeply engaged in those great designs which led to such decisive results in the succeeding years.¹

The Pope had been led to expect, in return for his condescension in travelling to Paris to crown the Emperor, some important benefits for the Holy See, and the cabinet of the Vatican looked forward to the restoration of the three legations annexed to the Italian Republic by the treaty of Tolentino. But, however much Napoleon might appreciate the importance of obtaining the Papal benediction to his throne, he was not a man to relinquish any of the substantial advantages of power and territory on that account, and he was little disposed to imitate the magnificent liberality of his predecessor Charlemagne to the Catholic church. He accordingly replied to the petition of the Pope for the three legations—"France has dearly purchased the power which it enjoys. We cannot sever any thing from an empire which has been the fruit of ten years of bloody combats. Still less can we diminish the territory of a neighbouring potentate, which, in confiding to us the powers of government, has imposed upon us the duty of protection, and never conferred upon us the power of alienating any part of its possession."²

Such was the termination of the political changes of the French Revolution: such the consequences of the first great experiment tried in modern Europe of regenerating society by destroying all its institutions. Born of the

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58.

Splendour of
the Imperial
court.

¹ Bign. iv.
153. D'Abr.
vii. 240, 250.

59.

Napoleon
refuses any
accession of
territory to
the Holy See.

² De Pradt,
Quatre Con-
cordats, 173
Bign. iv. 111.
114.

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XXXVIII.

1804.

60.
Reflections
on these
events.

enthusiasm and philanthropy of the higher and educated classes, adopted by the fervour and madness of the people, coerced by the severity of democratic tyranny, fanned by the gales of foreign conquest, disgraced by the cupidity of domestic administration; having exhausted every art of seduction, and worn out every means of delusion, it sank at length into the torpor of absolute power. But it was not the slumber of freedom, to awaken fresh and vigorous in after days: it was the deep sleep of despotism; the repose of a nation worn out by suffering; the lethargy of a people who in the preceding convulsions had destroyed all the elements of durable freedom. In this respect there is a remarkable difference between the state of the public mind and the disposition of the people in England during the usurpation of Cromwell, and in France under the empire of Napoleon. Both were military despotisms, originating in the fervour of preceding times; but the philosophic observer might discern under the one symptoms of an unconquered spirit, destined to restore the public freedom when the tyranny of the moment was overpast; in the other, the well-known features of Asiatic servility—the grave, in every age, of independent institutions.

61.
Difference
between the
English and
French revolutions.

The English nobility kept aloof from the court of the Protector; he strove in vain to assemble a house of peers; the landed proprietors remained in sullen silence on their estates. Such was the refractory spirit of the commons, that every parliament was dissolved within a few weeks after it had assembled; and when one of his creatures suggested that the crown should be offered to the victorious soldier, the proposal was rejected by a great majority of the very parliament which he had moulded in the way most likely to be subservient to his will. But the case was very different in France. There the nation rushed voluntarily and headlong into the arms of despotism; the First Consul experienced scarcely any resistance in his strides to absolute power either from the nobility, the commons, or the people; all classes vied with each other in their servility to the ruling authority; the old families eagerly sought admittance into his antechambers; the new greedily coveted the spoils of the empire; the cities addressed him in strains of Eastern adulation; the peasants almost unanimously seated him on the throne.

Rapid as his advances to despotic authority were, they could hardly keep pace with the desire of the nation to receive the chains of a master ; and with truth might he apply to all his subjects what Tiberius said of the Roman Senate : —“ O homines, ad servitutem parati !”

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We should widely err, however, if we supposed that this extraordinary difference was owing either to any inherent servility in the French character, or any deficiency in the thirst for freedom among the inhabitants of that country when the contest commenced. There never was a nation more thoroughly and unanimously imbued with the passion for liberty and equality, than the French were during the early years of the Revolution ; and in the prosecution of that object they incurred hardships, and underwent sufferings, greater perhaps than any other people ever endured within an equal time. It was the irreligious spirit in which it was nursed, the magnitude of the changes accomplished by the Revolution, the prostration of all the higher classes which it induced, which produced this effect. When France emerged from that convulsion, almost all the old families were destroyed ; commerce and manufactures were ruined, and the only mode of earning a subsistence which remained to the classes above the cultivators of the soil, was by entering into the service, and receiving the pay of government. Necessity, as much as inclination, drove all into subservience to the reigning authority ; if they did not pay court to persons in power, they had no alternative but to starve. Neckar, in his last and ablest work, had already clearly perceived this important truth. “ If by a revolution in the social system, or in public opinion,” says he, “ you have destroyed the class of great proprietors, you must consider yourselves as having *lost the elements requisite for the formation of a tempered monarchy*, and turn, with whatever pain, to a different constitution of society. I do not believe that Buonaparte himself, with all his talent, his genius, and his power, could succeed in establishing in France a constitutional hereditary monarchy. There is a mode of founding a hereditary monarchy, however, widely at variance with all the principles of freedom ; the same which introduced the despotism of Rome ; the force of the army, the Prætorian guards, the soldiers of the East and the West.¹ May God

62.
Which was
all owing to
the violence
and injustice
of the French
convulsions.

¹ Neckar, *Dernières Vues*, 235, 240.

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XXXVIII.

1804.

* 63.
Vast concentration of influence at this period in the hands of government.

preserve France from such a destiny!"¹ What a testimony to the final result of the Revolution, from the man who, by the duplication of the *Tiers Etat*, had so great a share in commencing it!

Madame de Staël has well explained the prodigious and unprecedented accumulation of power and influence which was concentrated in the hands of the First Consul, when reconstructing the disjointed members of society after the preceding convulsions. "Every mode of earning a subsistence had disappeared during ten years of previous suffering. No person could consider himself secure of his livelihood; men of all classes, ruined or enriched, banished or rewarded, equally found themselves at the mercy of the supreme power. Thousands of Frenchmen were on the list of emigrants; millions were the possessors of national domains; thousands were proscribed as priests or nobles; tens of thousands feared to be so for their revolutionary misdeeds. Napoleon, who fully appreciated the immense authority which such a state of dependence gave him, took care to keep it up. To such a one he restored his property, from another he withheld it; by one edict he gave back the unfallen woods to the old proprietors, by another he suspended the gift. There was hardly a Frenchman in the whole kingdom who had not something to solicit from the government, and that something was the means of existence. The favour of government thus led, not to an increase of vain or frivolous pleasures, but to a restoration to your country, a termination of exile, the bread of life. That unheard-of state of dependence proved fatal to the spirit of freedom in the nation. An unprecedented combination of circumstances put at the disposal of a single man the laws passed during the Reign of Terror, and the military force created by revolutionary enthusiasm. All the local authorities, all the provincial establishments, were suppressed or annulled; there remained only in France a single centre of movement, and that was Paris; and all the men in the provinces who were driven to solicit public employment were compelled to come to the capital to find their livelihood. Thence has proceeded that rage for employment or situations under government, which has ever since devoured and degraded France."¹

¹ De Staël, *Rev. Franç.* ii. 259, 261, 372, 373.

Another element which powerfully contributed to the same effect, was the complete concentration of all the influence of the press in the hands of government, in consequence of the changes, and calamities of former times. "The whole journals of France were subjected," says the same author, "to the most rigorous censure; the periodical press repeated, day after day, the same observations without any one being permitted to contradict them. Under such circumstances, the press, instead of being, as it is so often called, the safeguard of liberty, becomes the most terrible arm in the hand of power. In the same way as regular troops are more formidable than militia to the independence of the people, so do hired *writers* deprave and mislead public opinion, much more than could possibly take place when men communicated only by words, and formed their opinions on facts which fell under their observation. When the appetite for news can be satisfied only by continued falsehood; when the reputation of every one depends upon calumnies, universally diffused, without the possibility of their refutation; when the opinions to be advanced on every circumstance, every work, every individual, are submitted to the observations of journalists, as a file of soldiers to the commands of their officers, the art of printing becomes what was formerly said of cannon, 'the last logic of kings.'"¹

These profound observations suggest an important conclusion in political science, which is, that the press can be regarded as the bulwark of liberty only as long as, independent of it, the elements of freedom exist in the different classes of society; and that if these elements are destroyed, and the balance in the state subverted, either by an undue preponderance of popular or regal power, it instantly changes its functions, and instead of the arm of independence, becomes the instrument of oppression. It immensely augments the power of the weapons with which the different classes of society combat each other; but the direction which this great engine receives, and the objects to which it may be directed, are as various as the changing dispositions and fleeting passions of mankind. In a constitutional monarchy, where a due balance is preserved between the different classes of society,

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64.

Total destruction of
the liberty of
the press.¹ De Staël,
Rev. Franç.
ii. 263, 264.

65.

Inference in
political
science to
which this
leads.

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the cause of freedom is strengthened by its influence ; but in another state of things it may be perverted to very different purposes, and become, as in Republican America, the organ of democratic, or in Imperial France, the instrument of sovereign oppression. The only security, therefore, for durable freedom, is to be found in the preservation of the rights and liberties of all classes of the people ; in the due ascendancy of wealth and education, as well as the energy and independence of popular industry ; and the gates to Oriental servitude may be opened as wide by the fervour of popular ambition, or the vehemence of democratic injustice, as by the weight of regal oppression, or the force of military power.

APPENDIX.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Note A, p. 286.

THE New Taxes imposed were :—

1. <i>Customs.</i>	
Twenty per cent additional on sugar, &c. imported,	£1,300,000
Duty of one per cent on exports,	460,000
One penny a pound on cotton wool,	250,000
Tonnage additional,	150,000
2. <i>Excise.</i>	
Fifteen per cent on the lower, and forty-five per cent on higher teas,	£1,300,000
Additional duty of ten pounds a pipe on wine,	500,000
Fifty per cent on spirits,	1,500,000
Two shillings additional on malt,	2,700,000
3. <i>Property.</i>	
Five per cent on income and property,	6,000,000
	4,500,000
In all,	£12,660,000

The Income and Expenditure of the year 1803 stood as follows :—

<i>Expenditure.</i>	
Navy,	£10,211,378
Army,	8,935,753
Militia, &c.	2,889,976
Ordnance,	1,128,913
Miscellaneous,	5,440,441
Grant to National Debt,	200,000
Exchequer Bills,	10,150,456
	£38,956,917
Interest of Debt, funded and unfunded,	20,699,866
	£59,656,783
Sinking Fund,	6,494,000
	£66,150,783
<i>Income.</i>	
Total income from Taxes,	£38,609,392
Loan,	12,000,000
Raised by Exchequer Bills,	20,481,000
	£71,090,392

—See *Ann. Reg.* 1803, 631, *et seq.*; *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1598; and PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

Note B, p. 292.

The Income and Expenditure of the year 1804 stood as follows:—

<i>Expenditure.</i>	
Navy,	£12,350,574
Army,	12,993,000
Militia, &c.	6,159,000
Ordnance,	3,737,000
Miscellaneous,	4,217,000
Extra, do.	2,500,000
Exchequer Bills,	11,000,000
Civil List,	591,000
Additional do.	60,000
	<hr/>
	£53,607,574
Interest of Debt, funded and un-	
funded,	21,726,772
Sinking Fund,	6,436,000
	<hr/>
	£81,772,346

<i>Ways and Means.</i>	
War Taxes,	£15,440,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund,	5,000,000
Malt Duty additional,	750,000
Duty on Pensions, &c.	2,000,000
Lottery,	250,000
Surplus of 1803,	1,370,000
Loan, England,	10,000,000
Do. Ireland,	4,500,000
Exchequer Bills,	14,000,000
Annuities Loan,	1,150,000
Permanent Revenue <i>minus</i> surplus of	
Consolidated Fund,	25,365,000
	<hr/>
	£79,825,000

—See *Parl. Deb.* ii. 351, 355, and *App.* 35; and *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 584, *App. to Chron.*

END OF VOLUME VIII.

Note B, p. 292.

The Income and Expenditure of the year 1804 stood as follows :-

<i>Expenditure.</i>	
Navy,	£12,350,574
Army,	12,993,000
Militia, &c.	6,159,000
Ordnance,	3,737,000
Miscellaneous,	4,217,000
Extra, do.	2,500,000
Exchequer Bills,	11,000,000
Civil List,	591,000
Additional do.	60,000
	<hr/>
	£53,607,574
Interest of Debt, funded and un-	
funded,	21,726,772
Sinking Fund,	6,436,000
	<hr/>
	£81,772,346